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THE    FOUNDING 

OF   THE 

GEEMAN    EMPIBE 

BY    AVILLIAM    I. 

BASED  CHIEFLY  UPON  PRUSSIAN  STATE  DOCUMENTS 

By   HEINRICH   VON   SYBEL 

TRANSLATED  BY 

MARSILILL  LIVINGSTON  PERRIN,   Ph.D.  (Gott.), 

OF  BOSTON   UNIVERSITY. 

ASSISTED  BY 
GAMALIEL   BRADFOKD,    JR, 

Vol.  II. 


"He  possessed  in  a  high  degree  the  power  of  discovering  almost  immediately 
the  wanting  term  by  Ike  intuition  of  his  own  nature." — Thucydides. 


I 


NEW    YORK 
THOMAS   Y.   CROWELL  &   CO. 

4<5  East  Fourteenth  Street 


Copyright,  1891, 
By  Thomas  Y.  Crowell  &  Co. 


Vo^-A^^ 


C.  J.  PETERS  &  SON, 

Typographers  and  Electrotypers, 

146  High  Street,  Boston. 


VD 


liiilVEUfcii  V  OF  CALU'URNIA 
SANTA  BARBARA 


0 


61 


V  ^ 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   II. 


BOOK  V. 
REVIVAL   OF  THE   CONFEDERATE   DIET. 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    COUNT   BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW         ...        3 

Brandenburg's  Instructions.  — Brandenburg  and  Czar 
Nicbolas.  —  Russia  and  the  Holstein  Question. — The 
King  and  tlie  Confederate  Diet.  —  Brandenburg  and  the 
Emperor.  —  Negotiations  with  Schwarzenberg.  —  Dis- 
cussion of  the  Hessian  Question.  —  Temporary  Agree- 
ment. —  Brandenburg's  Wish  for  Peace.  —  Radowitz 
desires  War.  —  Tlie  King  desires  a  Compromise.  —  The 
King  leaves  it  to  tlie  Ministry.  —  Brandenburg's  pro- 
posed Despatch.  —  The  Ministry  decide  for  Peace, 

II.    OLMUTZ 39 

Alarming  News.  —  Prussian  Mobilization.  —  Schwarz- 
enberg's  threatening  Note. — Skirmish  at  Bronzell. — 
Abolition  of  the  Union  Constitution. — New  Difficul- 
ties. —  Prussian  Address  from  the  Throne.  —  Reply  of 
Austria.  — Discussion  in  the  Ministry.  — Austria's  Ulti- 
matum. —  The  King's  Speech.  — The  King's  Letter.  — 
Departure  for  Olmiitz.  —  Detailed  Decisions.  —  Question 
of  Disarmament.  —  Results  of  the  Agreement.  —  Ratifi- 
cation of  the  Agreement.  —  Criticism  of  the  Agree- 
ment. —  Probable  Results  of  a  War. 

ni.     THE   DRESDEN   CONGRESS 83 

Plans  of  Reform.  —  Opening  of  the  Congress.  —  The 
Executive. —  Schwarzenberg  and  Manteuffel. —  Attempts 
at  Reconciliation.  —  The  Decisions  of  the  Committees. 
—  Schwarzenberg's  Wishes.  —  Objection  to  Austria's 
Proposition.  —  Conference  over  the  Presidency.  —  Frus- 
tration of  Austria's  Plans.  —  Prussia's  Standpoint. — 
Prussia  proposes  an  Alliance.  — Shall  the  Committee  be 
heard  ?  —  ('lose  of  the  Congress. 


iv  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

IV.    THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET     .....    117 

Former  Democratic  Demands.  —  The  Reaction  in 
Austria.  —  Tlie  Change  in  Austria.  —  Question  of  a 
Charter  in  Prussia.  —  Tlie  Reaction  in  Prussia.  — Feudal 
and  Clerical  Relations.  —  Motions  of  the  Two  Great 
Powers. — The  Reaction  Commission. —  Beginning  of  the 
Hessian  Chastisement. —  Peucker's  Attempts  to  mediate. 

—  Continuance  of  Oppression.  — Arbitrary  Measures.  — 
Further  Measures.  —  The  Confederate  Commissioners. 

—  Everything  left  to  the  Great  Powers.  —  Draught  of  a 
New  Constitution.  —  Representation  of  the  Estates.  — 
The  Report  of  the  Committee.  —  Difference  of  Opinions. 

—  New  Constitution  of  Hesse-Cassel. 


BOOK  VI. 
GERMANY  AT   THE   TIME  OF  THE  CRIMEAN  WAR. 

I.    DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION    ....    165 

Parties  in  the  Diet.  —  Otto  von  Bismarck.  —  Schon- 
hausen.  —  Frederick  William  IV.  and  Bismarck. — Bis- 
marck's Natural  Talents.  —  Bismarck's  political  Princi- 
ples. —  Bismarck  in  the  Diet.  —  Quarrel  over  the  Ger- 
man Fleet. —  Sale  of  the  German  Fleet. —  Affairs  in  Han- 
over. Hanover  and  the  Tariff  Union.  — Prussian  Views. 
—  Change  of  Government  in  Hanover.  — Austria's  Pro- 
posals. —  Count  Buol.  —  Commercial  Treaty  with  Aus- 
tria. —  Coup  d'Etat  in  Hanover. 

II.    THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE         .        .    200 

Growth  of  Russian  Influence.  —  Russia's  Plans  in  the 
East.  — Opposition  of  the  other  Powers.  —  Russia's  Iso- 
lation. —  Austria  and  the  Western  Powers.  — Difference 
of  Opinions  in  Prussia.  —  Opposing  Sentiments  in  Prus- 
sia.—  The  King's  Standpoint.  —  The  Mission  of  Pour- 
tales.  —  Prussia's  Neutrality.  — Prussia's  Proposition  to 
Austria.  —  Mission  of  General  von  Hess.  —  Austria's 
Proposal. — Negotiations  in  Berlin.  —  Criticism  of  the 
Treaty.  —  Attitude  of  the  Lesser  States.  —  Meeting  at 
Tetschen. 


CONTENTS.  V 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

III.  DISCORD 234 

Negotiations  about  the  Evacuation.  —  Austria  and  the 
Western  Powers.  —  The  Four  Requisitions.  —  Attitude 
of  Prussia  and  Napoleon,  —  Prussia's  Fears. — Buol's 
Offer.  —  Conclusion  of  the  Alliance.  —  The  King's  Di- 
lemma.—  Prussia  and  the  three  Allies. — Buol's  De- 
spatches. —  Prussia's  Keply.  —  Refusal  of  German 
Assistance. 

IV.  RESULTS 260 

Accession  of  Alexander  II.  —  England's  Proposition. 
—  Drouyn  De  Lhuys.  —  Drouyn  and  the  Emperor.  — 
Character  of  Napoleon. — Napoleon's  Policy.  —  Termi- 
nation of  the  Conferences.  —  Austria's  Despatch.  —  The 
Paris  Congress.  — The  Satisfaction  of  the  Lesser  States. 

V.    THE    CLOSE    OF     THE    REIGN    OF     FREDERICK 

WILLIAM   IV 280 

Differences  among  the  Powers.  —  Bavarian  Proposals 
in  the  Diet.  — Beust's  Memorial.  — The  Neuchatel  Com- 
plication. —  Excitement  of  Frederick  William.  —  Prus- 
sia's Demands  rejected.  —  The  King  wins  Napoleon's 
Support.  —  Switzerland  persists  in  her  Refusal.  —  The 
King  convenes  the  Diet.  —  Napoleon's  Action.  —  Prus- 
sia's Decision.  —  Austria  opposes  Prussia.  —  Switzerland 
decides  to  yield.  — Conference  concerning  Neuchatel.  — 
Propositions  of  the  Four  Powers.  —  The  King's  Hesi- 
tation. — •  Conclusion  of  the  Compact.  —  Herr  von 
Beust.  —  Ilerr  von  Meysenbug. — Prussia's  Answer  to 
Beust.  —  Illness  of  Frederick  William. 


BOOK  VII. 
FIRST   YEARS   OF  THE   RULE   OF   KING  WILLIAM   L 

I.     BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY 329 

Prince  William  of  Prussia.  —  Political  Principles  of 
the  Prince.  —  The  Prince's  Devotion  to  his  Duties.  — 
Bismarck's  Opinion  of  the  Prince.  —  Deputy  or  Regent  ? 
Rudolph  von  Auerswald. — A  Regency  Advocated. — 
The  Decision.  —  HohenzoUern-Aucrswald  Ministry.  — 
Bavarian  Episode.  —  The  Elections.  —  The  European 
SitUiUioii.  —  Austria  and  Prussia.  — Schloswig-IIolstoin. 


vi  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

II.     THE  ITALIAN  WAR       . 361 

Franco-Sardinian  Alliance.  — Efforts  to  bring  on  War. 

—  Austria's  Appeal  to  Germany. — Public  Opinion  in 
Germany  divided.  — Attempts  at  Mediation.  —  Prussia's 
Neutrality.  — Prussia's  Negotiations  at  Vienna.  —  Prus- 
sia states  ber  Position. — Progress  of  tlie  War.  —  Prus- 
sian Preparations.  —  Preliminaries  of  Peace.  —  Popular 
Movement  in  Central  Italy.  —  Criticism  of  Prussia's 
Course.  —  Reaction  in  Germany.  —  Tbe  German  National 
Association. 

III.  QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN   GERMANY     .        .        .391 

Dissatisfaction  witli  Prussia.  —  Views  of  tbe  different 
States.  —  Motion  directed  against  Prussia.  —  The  Hessian 
Constitution.  —  Usedom  criticises  tbe  Diet's  Action.  — 
Prussia  accepts  Usedom's  Motion.  —  Objections  in  Soutb 
Germany.  — Second  Report  of  tlie  Committee,  — Decree 
of  March  24,  1860.  —  Increased  Agitation  in  Italy.  — 
Policy  of  Napoleon. — Napoleon's  Advances  to  Prus- 
sia.—  Assembly  of  Princes  in  Baden. — Napoleon  in 
Baden.  —  Disagreement  among  the  Princes.  —  The  King 
of  Bavaria  and  the  Regent.  —  The  Prince  and  Francis 
Joseph.  —  Unity  of  Italy.  —  The  Sovereigns  at  Warsaw. 

IV.  CONTEST    OVER    THE    MILITARY     REFORMS     IN 

PRUSSIA 432 

Military  Reforms.  — Dissatisfaction  in  Prussia.  —  Rea- 
sons for  Military  Reform.  —  Plan  of  the  Prince  Regent.  — 
The  Regent's  Speech.  —  Opposition  in  the  Parliament. 

—  Patow's  Provisional  Arrangement. — The  Reform 
carried  out.  —  The  Upper  House  and  the  Throne.  —  The 
Opposition  becomes  more  bitter. 

V.    CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS 451 

Defence  of  the  Coasts.  —  Hesse-Cassel.  —  King  William 
at  Ostend.  —  William  I.  crowned  at  Konigsberg.  — 
Beust's  Proposition  for  Reform.  —  The  Proposition 
rejected,  —  Roggenbach's  Outline,  —  Austria's  Position, 

—  Indignation  against  Prussia.  —  The  Party  of  Progress 
in  Prussia.  —  The  Opposition  in  the  Lower  House.  — 
The  Difficulties  increase.  —  The  Hohenzollern  Ministry 
resign. 


CONTENTS.  vii 


BOOK   VIII. 
BEGINNING   OF   THE   MINISTRY   OF   BISMARCK. 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    STRUGGLE  OVER  THE   CONSTITUTION       ...    483 
Affairs  in  Hesse-Cassel.  —  General  Willisen  in  Cassel. 

—  Prussia's  threatening  Attitude.  —  Questions  of  Tar- 
iff. —  Austria  interferes.  —  Commercial  Treaty  with 
France.  —  Prussia  recognizes  Italy.  —  Prussia's  Attitude. 

—  Prussia's  Position  in  Europe.  —  Opposition  to  the 
Military  Reforms.  — Debates  in  the  Pailianient.  — The 
Principles  involved.  —  Bismarck  appointed  Prime  Min- 
ister. —  Tlie  Upper  House  rejects  the  Budget.  —  Bis- 
marck's View  of  the  Struggle.  —  Changes  in  the  Cabinet. 

—  Bis7iiarck's  Action  in  CTcrman  Matters.  —  Bismarck 
and  Count  Karolyi.  —  Austria's  Proposal  rejected. 

II.     COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND 526 

Napoleon   III.   and    Poland.  —  Slate    of    Things    in 
Poland. —  Polish  Parties,  —  The  Marquis  Wielopolski. 

—  Wielopolski's  Proposition. — Spread  of  Insubordina- 
tion. —  Methods  of  tlie  National  Connnittee.  — Action  of 
the  Russian  Government.  —  Wielopolski  and  the  Radi- 
cals.—  The  National  Committee.  —  Wielopolski  in  St. 
Petersburg.  —  Attempts  at  Assassination.  — Plan  of  Re- 
cruiting at  Will.  —  Details  of  the  Plan.  —  Revolutionary 
Preparations.  — Outbreak  of  the  Revolt.  — Plans  of  the 
Grand  Duke.  —  View  taken  by  Prussia. 

III.     PRUSSIA  AND  RUSSIA 566 

Policy  of  France. — Prussia  and  the  Polish  Troubles. 

—  .\Ivensleben  at  St.  Petersburg. — State  of  Things  in 
Poland.  —  Attitude  of  France.  —Tlie  French  Proposal. 

—  Misunderstanding  with  Russia.  —  Gortschakoff 
thwarted.  —  The  Lower  House  attacks  Bismarck.  — 
W'eakiioss  of  the  Government.  —  Attitude  of  England. 

—  France  negotiates  with  Austria.  —  Austria's  Hesita- 
tion.—  Austria  joins  the  Western  Powers.  —  Russia's 
Answer.  —  Affairs  in  Poland.  —  The  Tbree  Powers  again 
interfere.  —  Russia  persists  in  her  Attitude.  —  Prussia 
refuses  to  make  War. 


viii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

IV.  THE  ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT  .  604 
Proposal  of  an  Assembly  of  Trinces.  —  The  Aus- 
trian Memorial.  —  King  William  and  Francis  Joseph.  — 
Prussia  states  her  Position. — Bismarck's  Criticism. — 
Preparations  at  Frankfort.  —First  Sitting  of  the  Assem- 
bly. _  Doings  of  the  Assembly.  —Debates  aboiit  the 
Outlines.  —  Result  of  the  Deliberations.  —  Prussian 
View  of  the  Resolutions.— Views  of  the  Foreign  Powers. 
—  France  again  draws  near  to  Prussia.  —  Austria  and 
the  Lesser  States. 


BOOK  V. 


REVIVAL   OF  THE   CONFEDERATE  DIET. 


FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE. 


CHAPTER   I. 

COUNT   BRANDENBURG   IN   WARSAW. 

Even  in  tlie  middle  of  the  critical  nineteenth  century 
the  mission  of  Count  Brandenburg  to  Warsaw,  and 
its  results,  gave  rise  to  remarkable,  almost  dramatic 
stories.  Such  mythical  legends  are  usually  supposed 
to  be  found  only  among  the  traditions  of  most  ancient 
times,  or  at  the  latest  in  the  romantic  Middle  Ages. 
We  forget  that  the  modern  races  are  also  gifted  with 
imagination,  and  that  they  like  as  much  as  ever  to  see 
their  theories  and  fancies  expressed  concretely.  The 
generation  that  watched  the  events  of  1850  was  filled 
with  the  idea  that  Prussia's  honor  demanded  a  war 
with  Austria  and  Russia ;  and  when  this  expectation 
was  frustrated,  the  age  created  for  its  own  satisfaction 
a  hero  who  should  suffer  a  tragic  end  in  the  direful 
catastrophe. 

The  accepted  account,  which  was  pul)lished  imme- 
diately after  Brandenburg's  death,  and  rumoiod  ;il)road 
with  many  modifications,  is  well  known.  According  to 
this  version,  Brandenburg  had  been  received  in  Warsaw 

3 


4  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN   WARSAW. 

with  uncivil  arrogance.  The  first  word  of  the  Czar  had 
been,  "  I  ordered  my  brother-in-law  to  come  ;  "  to  which 
Brandenburg  had  replied,  "  Such  a  remark  is  not 
proper  for  Prussian  ears  to  hear."  In  tliis  fashion  the 
interview  had  continued.  Wounded  to  the  quick  and 
physically  exhausted,  Brandenburg  had  returned  to 
Berhn.  Against  his  own  convictions  he  had  repre- 
sented the  pacific  inclinations  of  the  King,  and  upon 
his  return  had  at  once  sunk  into  a  serious  illness, 
during  which  in  his  delirium  he  had  rej)eatedly  begged 
for  his  helmet  and  sword,  until  after  a  few  days  of 
suffering  he  died  of  a  broken  heart. 

This  mythical  fabrication  has  remained  for  a  whole 
generation  uncontradicted,  although  the  story  in  the 
main  and  in  its  coloring  is  exactly  contrary  to  his- 
torical circumstances.  For  as  a  matter  of  fact.  Count 
Brandenburg  was  the  very  man  who  at  the  critical 
moment  gave  to  Prussian  politics  the  turn  which  they 
took  in  favor  of  yielding  to  the  proposed  terms  of 
peace. 

The  office  of  the  Count  had  been,  in  general,  to  con- 
vince the  Czar  Nicholas  of  the  justification  of  the 
Prussian  policy,  and  so  to  win  Russia's  approval  of  the 
Prussian  proposals  with  regard  to  the  question  of  the 
German  Constitution.  A  ministerial  memorial  which 
he  took  with  him  asserted  above  all  things  the  impos- 
sibility of  Prussia's  recognizing  the  assembly  then  in 
session  at  Frankfort  as  the  German  Confederate  Diet, 
inasmuch  as  the  same  after  its  dissolution  in  1848  could 
be   revived   only   by  the    unanimous   vote   of   all   the 


BRANDENBURG'S  INSTRUCTIONS.  5 

German  Governments.  This  point  was  to  be  main- 
tained at  all  hazards.  Then  Brandenburg  was  further 
to  announce  Prussia's  demand  that  the  German  Consti- 
tution should  be  decided  upon  in  open  conferences,  and 
to  make  known  the  chief  propositions  that  Prussia 
would  there  bring  forward.  These  were  the  following 
six  points,  the  most  important  of  which  quite  agreed 
with  the  latest  programme  of  Schwarzenberg,  which  he 
had  confidentially  offered  and  then  quickly  with- 
drawn :  — 

1.  In  the  presidency  of  the  Confederation,  Prussia 
shall  share  equally  with  Austria. 

2.  There  shall  be  a  Confederate  Council  of  seven- 
teen votes,  having  the  same  functions  as  the  old  Con- 
federate Assembly. 

3.  The  duties  of  the  executive  proper  shall  devolve 
upon  Prussia  and  Austria  in  common. 

4.  A  popular  representation  shall  not  exist  for  the 
present  in  the  Confederation. 

5.  Austria  shall  be  admitted  with  all  her  provinces 
into  the  Confederation. 

G.  Individual  states  shall  have  the  right  to  form  a 
Union  among  themselves,  provided  its  conditions  shall 
not  conflict  with  the  conditions  of  the  German  Con- 
federation. 

In  i-espect  to  tlic  TTcssian  and  Tlolstein  questions, 
Brandcnlnirg's  instructions  were  limited  to  repeating 
the  demand  that  these  should  not  be  determined  by  the 
Confederate  Diet,  but  by  commissioners  from  the  two 
Great  Powers  sanctioned  by  all  the  German  Govern- 


6  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

ments.  As  to  the  manner  of  this  settlement  nothing 
was  said.  We  have,  however,  already  noted  that  the 
Berlin  Cabinet  was  as  anxious  for  the  restoration  of  the 
sovereign  authority  in  both  countries  as  were  the  two 
Imperial  Courts.  The  King  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
long  ago  assured  Emperor  Nicholas  of  this  with  regard 
to  Holstein ;  and  he  had  no  misgivings  about  express- 
ing himself  quite  as  freely  to  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
in  relation  to  the  contest  over  the  Constitution  in 
Hesse. 

Just  as  Count  Brandenburg  was  about  to  leave 
Berlin  with  these  instructions,  the  news  came  that  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  and  Prince  Schwarzenberg, 
upon  their  return  from  the  meeting  in  Bregenz,  intended 
to  repair  to  Warsaw.  The  King,  then,  immediately 
instructed  Brandenburg  by  all  means  to  await  there  the 
arrival  of  the  Austrians.  He  also  announced  this  to  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  in  an  autograph  letter,  which, 
in  sharp  contrast  with  the  warlike  spirit  manifested  at 
Bregenz,  was  filled  with  words  of  warm  friendship, 
calling  upon  the  Emperor,  at  its  close,  to  give  up  the 
idea  of  the  Confederate  Diet,  which  would  occasion 
only  strife,  and  to  turn  to  his  Prussian  friend  and  ally, 
whose  interests  in  Hesse-Cassel  were  the  same  as  his 
own ;  namely,  that  that  bad  example  which  had  been 
given  to  the  world  by  the  Hessian  officers  and  function- 
aries might  be  effectually  obliterated. 

Count  Brandenburg  arrived  in  Warsaw  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  17th  of  October.  Before  the  lapse  of  more 
than  an  hour,  the  Emperor  invited  him  to  an  audience. 


BRANDENBURG  AND   CZAR  NICHOLAS.  7 

at  which  Nicholas  welcomed  him  most  graciously,  re- 
ceived from  him  a  letter  from  the  King,  and  after  the 
first  greetings  allowed  the  count  at  once  to  discourse 
upon  the  current  topics.  Brandenburg  declared 
Prussia's  inability  to  recognize  the  so-called  Confed- 
erate Diet,  her  willingness  to  work  for  a  reform  of  the 
Confederation  in  open  conferences,  and  her  suggestion 
that  the  Danish  and  Hessian  questions  should  be  settled 
by  special  commissions.  "  The  Emperor,"  reported  Bran- 
denburg to  the  King,  "  listened  to  me  attentively  during 
the  whole  of  the  discourse,  which  lasted  several  hours. 
He  said  that  he  understood  our  wishes,  and  had  himself 
recognized  the  need  of  reform  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  Confederation,  having  often  spoken  of  this  matter 
himself.  He  believed,  however,  that  under  the  jDresent 
circumstances  it  would  be  best  to  recognize  the  Consti- 
tution that  had  been  in  force  for  the  last  thirty  years, 
and  then  to  proceed  to  the  reforming  of  it." 

When  Brandenburg  laid  before  the  Emperor  the  six 
propositions,  he  purposely  observed  that  in  settling 
these  points  with  Austria,  the  Czar's  mediation  might 
have  a  great  effect.  But  Nicholas  immediately  took 
up  the  remark,  and  protested  repeatedly  and  decidedly 
that  he  did  not  intend  to  mediate  at  all.  He  had  the 
best  wishes  for  both  parties,  and  desired  above  all 
things  order  and  quiet;  but  he  should  not  meddle  in 
any  way.  Braudeiilnirg  did  not  fail  to  understand 
that  Nicholas  refused  to  interfere  in  the  German  ques- 
tion, only  because  he  wished  to  leave  the  Austrians 
entirely  free  in  their  decision  of  the  matter.     So  that. 


8  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

strictly  speaking,  there  could  be  no  negotiations  held 
in  Warsaw  with  the  Russian  Emperor,  but  only  with 
Prince  Schwarzenberg. 

In  the  further  course  of  the  conversation,  the 
Emperor  praised  the  determination  of  the  Hessian 
elector  to  look  to  the  Confederate  Diet  for  aid,  and 
especially  emphasized  the  necessity  for  an  immediate 
disarming  of  Holstein.  It  was  evident  that  his  whole 
attitude  turned  upon  this  point.  "  If,"  wrote  Branden- 
burg, "  these  two  questions  can  be  settled  by  commis- 
sions, the  Emperor  will  probably  quietly  acquiesce.  It 
is  less  certain,  however,  what  would  happen  in  the 
contrary  case,  and  whether  he  would  be  satisfied  with 
being  convinced  of  Prussia's  barren  good-will. 

The  Russian  chancellor,  Count  Nesselrode,  proved 
to  be  more  tractable  in  his  conferences  with  Branden- 
burg than  the  Emperor.  He  considered  the  six  propo- 
sitions a  very  suitable  basis  for  an  understanding 
between  the  two  German  Powers,  and  succeeded  in 
obtaining  from  the  Emperor  the  permission,  given 
somewhat  reluctantly,  to  recommend  them  as  such  to 
Prince  Schwarzenberg.  The  Russian  ambassador  in 
Vienna,  Baron  Meyendorff,  likewise  urged  them  upon 
the  attention  of  the  Prince,  although  the  latter  had 
repeatedly  asserted  after  the  meeting  at  Bregenz  that  a 
war  was  the  only  possible  means  of  bringing  Prussia  to 
reason. 

To  this  Meyendorff  replied,  that,  inasmuch  as  peace- 
able means  had  not  yet  been  exhausted,  any  offensive 
movement  on  the  part  of  Austria  would  find  Russia  on 


RUSSIA   AND   THE  HOL STEIN  QUESTION.  9 

the  side  of  the  enemy.  Thereupon  Schwarzenberg's 
cry  for  war  was  pitched  in  a  somewhat  lower  key.  He 
expressed  his  willingness  to  come  to  terms,  provided 
that  Prussia  would  disband  the  Union,  and  would  send 
a  deputy  provisionally  to  tlie  Confederate  Diet  with 
the  understanding  that  he  might  be  recalled  in  six 
months,  if  within  that  time  no  result  had  been  reached 
about  a  Confederate  Constitution.  Meyendorff  brought 
these  terms  on  the  23d  of  October  to  Warsaw,  where 
the  Prussian  Prime  Minister  rejected  them  as  being 
utterly  inadmissible. 

Meanwhile,  the  Czar  Nicholas  kept  reverting  to  the 
Holstein  question.  "  Your  proposal,"  said  he  to 
Brandenburg,  "  about  settling  it  by  a  commission  which 
shall  confer  with  a  Danish  plenipotentiary,  would 
consume  altogether  too  much  time.  The  simplest  and 
the  quickest  way  would  be  for  Prussia  herself  to  send 
troops  at  once  against  the  Holsteiners."  Brandenburg 
answered,  "  As  to  the  obligations  which  Prussia  has 
herself  individually  assumed,  she  has  either  discharged 
them  already  or  is  ready  to  discharge  the  remainder 
whenever  the  necessary  conditions  shall  be  fulfilled  by 
the  other  side.  As  to  her  obligations  as  a  member  of 
the  German  Confederation,  she  will  always  be  ready  to 
do  anything  requested  of  licr  by  a  universally  recog- 
nized Confederate  authority.  At  present,  however,  no 
such  authority  exists.  It  is  precisely  in  order  to 
accomplish  the  desire  of  the  Czar  for  a  speedy  pacifica- 
tion that  measures  are  now  being  urged  which  may 
effect  a  reconciliation  with  Austria.     It  is  also  certain 


10  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

that  tlie  Ducal  Government  in  Holstein  is  ready  to 
abide  by  the  decision  of  such  a  commission  as  Prussia 
proposes." 

The  Emperor  remained  fixed  in  his  opinion.  "  It  is 
Prussia's  duty,"  he  said,  "  to  put  an  end  to  the  war, 
which  she  has  kindled  and  carried  on.  Slie  must  do 
this  by  effecting  an  actual  peace,  i.e.  by  the  pacifica- 
tion of  Holstein,  and  she  must  not  oppose  measures  to 
secure  this  end,  that  may  be  decided  upon  in  Frank- 
fort. If  an  order  is  sent  from  Frankfort  to  Kiel 
prohibiting  all  hostilities,  and  commanding  immediate 
disarming  of  the  troops,  what  is  to  hinder  3^ou,"  he 
asked,  "from  issuing  a  similar  order  from  Berlin?" 
Brandenburg  promised  to  consider  the  matter,  but  gave 
very  little  hope  of  securing  the  royal  approval  of  a 
course  of  conduct  that  implied  concurrence  with  the 
action  of  the  Confederate  Diet,  and  that  would  thus 
mean,  in  effect,  the  recognition  of  that  body.  His  cau- 
tion only  increased  the  importunity  of  the  Emperor. 
To  General  Rochow,  with  whom  he  had  been  for  years 
accustomed  to  converse  familiarly,  the  Czar  said, 
"  You  ought  to  despatch  an  army  against  the  Hol- 
steiners,  scatter  them  to  the  winds,  and  then  hang 
General  Willisen." 

Sorrowfully,  but  firmly,  the  Emperor,  on  the  22d  of 
October,  announced  to  Count  Brandenburg  his  final 
decision.  He  said  that  he  should  be  obliged  to  regard 
Prussia's  continued  opposition  to  measures  determined 
upon  by  the  Confederate  Diet  for  the  pacification  of 
Holstein  as  a  personal  insult  to  himself,  and  should  be 


THE  KING  AND   THE   CONFEDERATE  DIET.     11 

obliged  to  resort  to  arms.  He  himself  would  feel  it 
his  duty  to  recognize  the  Confederate  Diet  so  soon  as 
that  body  should  take  the  first  step  toward  the  desired 
object.  He  afterwards  said  again  to  Herr  von  Rochow, 
"  I  shall  be  perfectly  willing  to  see  Prussia  at  the  head 
of  her  Union,  and  Austria  with  her  allies  in  session  at 
Frankfort.  But,  he  continued,  "  neither  of  them  may 
claim  the  right  to  prescribe  laws  for  the  other,  nor 
to  trespass  upon  her  territory.  Whoever  does  that  will 
have  to  count  on  being  my  enemy."  Rochow  sighed, 
as  he  reflected  that  the  Emperor  unfortunately  consid- 
ered Hesse  and  Holstein  as  belonging  to  the  territory 
of  the  Confederate  Diet. 

All  of  these  remarks  of  the  Emperor  were  not  to  be 
looked  upon  as  official.  Nicholas  remained  true  to  his 
first  declaration  that  he  would  in  no  way  interfere,  and 
that  consequently  negotiations  were  not  to  be  carried 
on  with  him,  but  only  with  Austria."  Yet  his  attitude 
produced  a  great  impression  upon  Brandenburg ;  and 
when,  on  the  24th  of  October,  Nesselrode  represented 
to  the  latter  that  a  reconciliation  with  Austria  was  not 
at  all  impossible,  but  that  it  would  certainly  become  so 
in  the  event  of  a  collision  between  the  Prussian  and 
Bavarian  troops  in  Hesse-Cassel,  Brandenburg  wrote 
to  Berlin  that  he  also  shared  this  opinion,  and  offered 
his  advice  that  instructions  should  be  given  to  the 
Prussian  troops  in  Hesse-Cassel  not  to  attack  any 
Bavarians  whom  they  might  encounter  in  the  electorate, 
but  temporarily  to  remain  inactive  in  their  vicinity. 

Brandenburg  could   not,   to   be   sure,    express  these 


12  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

private  sentiments  to  Count  Nesselrode,  but  was 
obliged  still  to  affirm  that  Prussia  would  not  suffer  the 
so-called  Confederate  troops  to  enter  Hesse-Cassel ;  yet 
he  concurred  the  more  heartily  with  the  proposals  of 
the  Russian  minister,  especially  with  his  suggestion  to 
get  entirely  rid  of  the  Holstein  question  before  entering 
upon  the  work  of  reforming  the  German  Confederation. 
Brandenburg  in  his  reports  to  Berlin  pressed  the  ques- 
tion whether  it  would  not  be  better,  at  the  same  time 
that  Prussia's  unwillingness  to  recognize  the  Confed- 
erate Diet  should  be  emphasized,  to  take  steps  —  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  simultaneously  with  those  taken  at 
Frankfort  —  towards  the  pacification  of  Holstein,  i.e., 
the  subjection  of  the  land  to  the  Danish  king. 

But  the  feeling  in  Berlin  just  at  this  time  was  far 
from  favorable  to  the  entertainment  of  such  ideas. 
Indignation  at  the  arbitrary  convocation  of  the  Confed- 
erate Diet  and  its  unauthorized  doings  outweighed 
every  other  consideration.  Radowitz  averred  that  he 
did  not  believe  that  their  opponents  seriously  meditated 
war.  Since  1848  the  Austrians  had  not  seemed  to  him 
to  be  so  very  formidable.  As  to  the  Russians,  it  was 
said  that  it  would  take  them  six  months  to  prepare  for 
an  attack.  Thus  he  became  the  exponent  of  the  con- 
viction that  peace  would  be  the  more  certainly  insured, 
the  less  Prussia  showed  fear  and  hesitancy,  and  the 
more  strongly  fortified  and  ready  she  seemed  to  be  at 
the  critical  points.  If  she  had  only  been  actually  forti- 
fied and  ready !  But  we  have  seen  how  paltry  were 
the  results  of  Stoekhausen's  precautionary  measures. 


THE  KING  AND   THE   CONFEDERATE  DIET.      13 

Nevertheless,  the  King  was  still  unable  to  endure 
the  thought  that  an  unlawful  body,  and  one  that  he 
abhorred  as  he  did  the  Frankfort  assembly,  should,  in 
spite  of  his  remonstrances,  send  its  armies  into  the 
midst  of  Prussian  provinces,  and  even  allow  them  to 
manoeuvre  on  the  north  coast  of  the  kingdom  itself. 
On  the  22d  of  October,  upon  the  unanimous  vote  of 
the  Ministry,  he  sanctioned  the  sending  of  the  following 
instructions  to  General  Count  Groben,  who  had  been 
appointed  to  the  command  in  Hesse :  namely,  that  at 
the  approach  of  Bavarian  troops,  he  should  first  try  all 
possible  peaceable  measures  before  resorting  to  armed 
force ;  but  if  the  former  failed,  he  should  then  act  only 
in  accordance  with  military  regulations,  and  drive  back 
the  Bavarians  wherever  he  found  them. 

Radowitz  communicated  this  to  Count  Brandenburg, 
and  wrote  to  him  on  the  25th  that  the  Minister  of  War 
had  declared  it  impossible  for  Prussia  to  assume  the 
obligation  to  respect  any  occupation  of  Hessian  land  by 
Bavarian  troops,  or  on  that  account  to  abstain  from 
offensive  movements.  Radowitz  said  everything  indi- 
cated that  the  Hessian  affair  was  intended  by  the 
enemies  of  Prussia  to  serve  only  as  a  pretext  for  sub- 
jecting her  to  foreign  domination  and  to  a  shameful 
humiliation.  lie  rejected  decidedly  Brandenburg's 
sucjcrestion  to  take  measures  against  Holstein  similar  to 
those  taken  by  the  Confederate  Diet,  and  simultaneously'' 
with  them,  and  declared  that  even  an  accidental 
co-operation  with  tluit  body  must  be  avoided. 

On  the  2r;th  of  October,   the  same  day  upon  which 


14  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

Eadowitz  sent  this  despatch,  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  and  Prince  Schwarzenberg  arrived  in  Warsaw. 
Shortly  before,  Schwarzenberg  had  declined  the 
Prussian  pro]30sition  to  settle  the  Hessian  affair  by  a 
commission ;  and  at  the  same  time  that  Schwarzenberg 
began  the  negotiations  for  peace  on  the  26th  at  Warsaw, 
the  Confederate  Diet  at  Frankfort  passed  the  vote  to 
instruct  the  Bavarians  to  march  into  Hesse,  whereupon 
corresponding  orders  were  sent  from  Berlin  to  General 
Count  Groben.  So  that  in  Warsaw  the  distinguished 
gentlemen  conversed,  as  it  were,  with  revolvers  in  their 
hands. 

In  Vienna,  as  in  Frankfort,  the  diplomatists  from  the 
Lesser  States  were  in  a  state  of  feverish  excitement. 
They  urged  their  Austrian  colleagues  not  to  make  the 
least  concession  to  that  overbearing  Prussia.  They 
could  not  forget  the  imperial  election  of  1849,  and  were 
eager  for  war  in  the  hope  of  putting  an  end  once  for 
all,  with  Russia's  help,  to  the  disproportionate  power  of 
Prussia.  Prince  Schwarzenberg  sympathized  with  the 
feelings  of  his  South  German  friends,  but  was  more 
cautious  in  his  movements  than  they,  since  he  well 
kn^w  that  it  would  be  chiefly  he  that  would  have  to 
bear  the  burden  of  the  war.  For  this  reason,  too,  he  was 
especially  anxious  to  retain  the  good-will  of  Russia. 

The  Emperor  Nicholas,  however,  was  as  little  desir- 
ous as  ever  of  a  war,  and  wished  that  a  reconciliation 
might  be  effected  between  the  two  German  powers. 
He  agreed  with  Austria  in  the  principal  points,  and 
sent  on  the  26th  of  October  a  sharp  monition  to  Berlin, 


BRANDENBURG  AND   THE  EMPEROR.  15 

not  to  interfere  with  the  Confederate  troops  in  Hesse  ; 
yet  at  the  same  time,  he  continually  importuned  Austria 
to  build  bridges  at  any  expense  for  the  enemy  to  retire 
over,  and,  in  every  matter  of  honor  and  diplomacy,  to 
exhibit  a  compliant  spirit. 

On  the  forenoon  of  October  26th,  Brandenburg  had 
his  first  audience  with  the  Austrian  monarch.  The 
Emperor  treated  the  Count  in  every  way  with  respect 
and  courtesy,  but  entered  into  no  political  discussion. 
He  confined  himself  to  formulating  his  position  into  a 
few  sentences,  bej^ond  which  he  did  not  go  even  in  later 
conversations.  "  I  am  exceedingly  anxious,"  said  he, 
"  that  an  understanding  may  be  reached,  and  earnestly 
wish  that  some  satisfactory  form  for  the  same  might  be 
hit  upon ;  yet  I  believe  that  I  stand  with  my  Govern- 
ment upon  the  legal  basis  of  the  treaties,  and  this  I 
cannot  under  any  circumstance  abandon." 

Immediately  upon  this  audience  there  followed  a 
short  conversation  between  Brandenburg  and  Schwarz- 
enberg,  in  which  tliere  was  just  time  enough  before  its 
interruption  for  Schwarzenberg  to  say  that  it  was  not 
sufficient  for  Prussia  to  declare  the  Union  Constitution 
to  be  impracticable :  she  must  promise  its  abandonment 
in  so  many  words.  In  the  evening,  the  two  Ministers 
held  a  long  conference  together.  Brandenburg  after- 
wards reported  that  the  discussion  was  carried  on  with- 
out the  least  exliibition  of  passion,  in  the  most  cordial 
tone,  and  with  all  the  friendliness  of  a  meeting  between 
old  acquaintances,  that  sincerely  wished  to  come  to  an 
understandiiiir  with  each  other. 


16  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

Brandenburg  remarked  that  he  was  not  empowered 
to  change  at  all  the  wording  of  the  decision  of  the  8th 
of  *October  about  the  infeasibility  of  the  Union  Consti- 
tution. But  what  could  occasion  Austria  any  anxiety 
in  the  matter,  he  asked,  if  Prussia  pledged  herself  to 
avoid  in  the  final  Constitution  everything  that  could 
conflict  with  the  formation  of  the  more  comprehensive 
alliance  ?  In  reply  to  Schwarzenberg's  remonstrances, 
he  explained  further  that  the  object  of  the  Union  was 
to  provide  a  legislative  organ  for  the  Governments  thus 
united ;  that  this  should  be  established  with  the  least 
possible  parliamentary  machinery ;  and  that  conse- 
quently the  possibility  of  executing  the  Constitution  of 
the  26th  of  May  seemed  to  him  in  any  case  most  un- 
likely. "  Accordingly,"  said  Brandenburg  at  the  close, 
"  let  us  not  delay  over  this,  but  proceed  with  our 
deliberations.  When  I  return  to  Berlin,  I  shall  see 
whether  a  more  satisfactory  interpretation  cannot  be 
applied  to  the  protocol  of  the  8th  of  October." 

Schwarzenberg  could  not  help  recognizing  that  this 
plan  for  the  Union  differed  very  little  from  the  goal 
towards  which  the  efforts  of  the  spring  of  1849  had 
been  directed.  He  said  that  he  could  readily  agree  to 
such  a  definition  of  the  Union ;  and  after  the  above- 
mentioned  promise  to  reconsider  the  matter  in  a  more 
favorable  light  in  Berlin,  they  proceeded  in  their 
discussion. 

Brandenburg  then  brought  forward  his  six  propo- 
sitions about  the  future  Confederate  Constitution. 
Schwarzenberg's  response  was  very  short  and  concise. 


NEGOTIATIONS    WITH  SCHWARZENBERG.      17 

With  gratification  he  accepted  those  points  that  con- 
tained concessions  to  Austria :  the  formation  of  a  Con- 
federate Council  of  seventeen  votes,  the  similarity  of 
its  functions  with  those  of  the  old  Confederate  Diet,  no 
popular  representation,  and  the  admission  of  the  whole 
of  Austria  into  the  Confederation.  But  he  rejected  the 
measures  that  involved  concessions  to  Prussia :  the 
equal  authority  of  Prussia  and  Austria  in  the  presi- 
denc}-,  and  the  assignment  of  the  executive  power  to 
Austria  and  Prussia  exclusively.  The  first  of  these  he 
wished  to  refer  to  the  arbitration  of  all  the  members  of 
the  Confederation ;  instead  of  the  latter,  he  proposed 
the  "establishment  of  a  powerful  executive,"  without 
naming  the  incumbents. 

These  were,  however,  very  vital  points  for  Prussia. 
If  both  Great  Powers  were  together  to  control  in  the 
future  the  German  army  and  German  diplomacy,  that 
would  be  of  itself  exceedingly  perilous  for  Prussia ; 
yet  she  might  even  then  be  successful  in  a  negative 
way,  by  hindering  any  dangerous  measure.  But  if,  as 
Schwarzenberg  proposed,  a  third  party  were  to  be 
admitted  into  the  executive,  making  of  it  a  "  Direc- 
tory," in  wliich  matters  could  be  determined  by  a 
majority-vote,  then  it  was  all  over  with  Prussia's  inde- 
pendence. Brandenburg  contented  himself  with  saying 
that  he  would  make  a  further  report  upon  this  subject. 

Against  the  sixth  point,  the  right  of  the  states  to 
form  unions  among  themselves,  tlie  Prince  had  no 
objection  to  make,  since,  as  he  observed,  tliis  was 
already  sanctioned  l)y    Aiticle  XI  of  the  Act  of  Con- 


18  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

federation.  But  in  this  way  his  recognition  of  the 
existing  Union  lost  all  its  significance ;  for  hitherto  he 
had  asserted  that  its  assumptions  were  contrary  to  the 
conditions  of  Article  XI,  and  that  it  was  therefore  un- 
lawful and  must  be  abolished.  Brandenburg  passed 
over  this  uncertainty,  and  counted  the  sixth  point  as 
won. 

The  question  was  now  taken  up  that  most  inter- 
ested the  Prussian  king,  one  might  almost  say  which 
alone  interested  him ;  namely,  by  whom,  and  acting  in 
what  capacity,  shall  the  proposed  reform  of  the  Con- 
federation be  determined  and  instituted? 

On  this  point  especially,  Russian  influence  had  had 
its  effect  upon  Schwarzenberg.  He  had  originally,  as 
Emperor  Nicholas  told  Brandenburg  in  the  interview 
the  week  before,  demanded  as  the  preliminary  condition 
to  any  negotiations  whatever,  Prussia's  recognition  of 
the  existing  Confederate  Diet,  and  the  understanding 
that  this  body  should  then  proceed  to  decide  upon  the 
reform  of  the  Confederation.  Meyendorff  and  Nessel- 
rode  had,  however,  afterwards  convinced  him  how 
harmless  it  would  be  in  this  case  to  gratify  the  feelings 
of  Frederick  William,  and  to  allow  the  proposed  reforms 
to  be  determined  upon,  not  in  Frankfort,  but,  as  Prussia 
desired,  in  independent  congresses,  —  provided  only 
that  the  Prussian  Government  would  then,  as  it  might 
be  hoped  she  would,  agree  to  the  proposals  made  in  the 
congresses  by  the  imperial  courts  with  regard  to  Hesse, 
Holstein,  and  the  German  Constitution. 

This  was  so  unanswerably  true,  that  Schwarzenberg, 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  HESSIAN  QUESTION.      19 

however  much  he  would  have  liked  to  see  Prussia 
humiliated  as  well  in  technical  points,  could  not  very- 
well  maintain  his  objections.  Therefore  he  did  not 
now  demand  Prussia's  express  recognition  of  the  Con- 
federate Diet,  provided  she  would  leave  it  unmolested. 
He  declared  that  he  was  ready  to  advocate  a  reforma- 
tion of  the  Confederation  by  independent  congresses  to 
be  held  in  Vienna,  similar  to  those  which  in  1819  had 
instituted  the  Vienna  Final  Act.  To  these  congresses 
deputies  should  be  sent  by  the  eleven  Governments 
whose  representatives  were  now  in  session  at  Frank- 
fort, but  they  should  not  be  looked  upon  as  composing 
the  "  Confederate  Diet,"  and  by  the  twenty-one  united 
States,  but  not  as  representing  the  "  Union."  Branden- 
burg agreed  to  the  proposal  in  the  main,  but  demurred 
against  Vienna  as  the  place  of  meeting.  He  also  re- 
served his  criticism  of  the  reference  to  the  doings  of  1819, 
Next  in  order  were  the  questions  relating  to  Hesse 
and  Holstein.  On  these,  the  Prussian  minister  found 
his  Austrian  colleagues  inaccessible.  Schwarzenberg 
persevered  in  his  rejection  of  the  Prussian  proposal  to 
let  both  of  these  questions  be  settled  by  commissioners 
appointed  from  both  Powers,  and  unswervingly  insisted 
on  the  right  and  duty  of  the  Confederate  Diet  to  render 
assistance  to  two  sovereigns  that  counted  themselves 
among  its  members.  In  tlie  Holstein  affair  the  well- 
worn  arguments  and  counter-arguments  were  repeated 
with  as  little  result  as  ever.  The  geographical  position 
of  this  country  did  not,  however,  demand  an  immediate 
settlement  of  the  difficulty,  as  was  the  case  with  Hesse. 


20  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN   WARSAW. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  troubles  in  this  latter 
country,  Brandenburg  worked  hard,  but  in  vain,  to 
convert  Schwarzenberg  to  the  Prussian  doctrines. 
"  We  cannot,"  said  the  Prince,  "  recognize  as  valid  the 
Prussian  objections  to  the  entry  into  the  electorate  of 
those  troops  that  may  be  required  by  the  sovereign  of 
the  land.  The  entry  will  take  place."  Count  Bran- 
denburg mourned  that  this  should  occur  just  at  the 
moment  when  they  were  in  other  respects  so  near  a 
settlement.  "We  do  not  protest  against  the  entry  of 
foreign  troops  in  itself,  and  should  not  do  so  at  all,  if  it 
were  necessary,  and  if  it  took  place  as. a  measure  dic- 
tated jointly  by  us  both.  If  it  should  happen  now,  it 
would  evidently  take  place  only  in  order  to  give  your 
Confederate  Diet  something  to  do,  and  in  order  to  force 
us  indirectly  to  recognize  this  body's  existence.  The 
Hessian  troops  are  quite  adequate  to  the  requirements 
of  keeping  the  peace,  which  has  been  nowhere  dis- 
turbed. What,  then,  is  the  need  of  foreign  troops? 
Why  not  settle  the  quarrel  over  the  Constitution  in  a 
constitutional  way,  or  by  arbitration  ?  " 

Brandenburg's  arguments  were  irrefutable,  and  the 
Prince  did  not  attempt  to  gainsay  them.  His  reply 
was  monosyllabic  in  the  extreme  :  he  was  sorry  for  the 
consequences,  but  he  could  not  do  otherwise.  This 
produced  upon  Brandenburg  the  impression  of  a  final, 
irrevocable  decision. 

With  this  the  interview  ended.  Later,  in  the 
audience-chamber  of  the  Empress,  it  was  agreed  that 
for   the   sake    of    future    reference    and    negotiations, 


TEMPORARY  AGREEMENT.  21 

Brandenburg  should  make  a  note  of  the  results  upon 
paper. 

Thus  far  the  Prussian  representative  had  not  won 
much.  He  had  as  good  as  abandoned  the  Union  :  to  be 
sure,  Austria  had  in  return  consented  to  the  holding  of 
independent  congresses  for  the  reform  of  the  Confed- 
eration. But  if  in  Berlin  it  had  been  hitherto  regarded 
as  a  matter  of  course  that  during  these  sessions  the 
Confederate  Diet  would  be  adjourned  or  even  sus- 
pended, there  was  certainly  no  suspicion  entertained 
that  the  Confederate  Diet  was  about  to  take  immediate 
and  summary  measures  with  regard  to  Hesse.  That 
meant,  according  to  all  the  votes  recently  passed  in 
Berlin,  war  —  and,  as  Nesselrode  had  just  given  them 
to  understand,  war  with  Russia  as  well. 

Brandenburg  weighed  the  matter  carefully,  and 
came  again  to  the  conclusion  that  the  object  to  be 
attained  was  not  worth  such  a  sacrifice.  This  was 
strengthened  by  the  emphatic  assertion  of  Nesselrode, 
that  Schwarzenberg  was  ready  to  give  Prussia  any 
desirable  guaranty  that  the  occupation  of  Hesse  by 
Confederate  troops  had  no  other  end  in  view  than  the 
restoration  of  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  land,  and 
that  after  this  result  should  be  attained,  the  troops 
would  immediately  (piit  the  electorate. 

So  IJrandenburg  wrote  to  Berlin  on  the  27th  of 
October:  "  The  burning  question,  especiolly  since  the 
Russian  declarations,  is  and  will  be  tlie  Hessian.  My 
advice  is,  in  case  the  Bavarians  actually  mareli  into  the 
countrv,   to  regard  tin'   nuiltcr  from  a  practical  stand- 


22  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN   WARSAW. 

point,  and  by  avoiding  hostilities  to  occupy  the  land 
together.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  would  practically 
obviate  the  danger  lest  from  the  fact  that  Prussia  per- 
mitted the  punishment  of  Hesse  her  recognition  of  the 
Confederate  Diet  should  be  inferred."  Again  he 
extolled  the  condescension  and  courtesy  of  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria,  although  the  latter  continually  in- 
sisted that  he  stood  upon  the  legal  basis  of  the  treaties. 

The  repeated  interviews  with  Schwarzenberg  resulted 
in  a  so-called  "  temporary  agreement,"  arrived  at  on 
the  28th  of  October,  which,  however,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  was  nothing  more  than  the  recognition  by  Prussia 
of  the  three  Austrian  demands  —  the  Confederate 
Council  of  seventeen  votes,  no  popular  representation 
in  the  Confederation,  and  the  admission  of  the  whole  of 
Austria  with  her  dependencies — and  the  enumeration 
of  the  three  points  urged  by  Prussia  with  Austria's  cor- 
responding counter-propositions,  as  we  have  detailed 
them  above,  and  in  addition,  Austria's  exaction  that 
Prussia  should  dissolve  the  Union,  and  not  molest  the 
Confederate  Diet. 

Furthermore,  it  was  stated  in  this  agreement  that 
under  these  conditions,  and  after  the  six  points  should 
be  settled,  Austria  would  consent  to  lay  the  same,  as 
propositions  made  by  herself  in  common  with  Prussia, 
before  all  the  other  German  Governments,  and  then  to 
invite  them  all  to  take  part  in  congresses  to  be  held  for 
the  revision  of  the  Act  of  Confederation.  As  the  place 
for  holding  these,  Prussia  proposed  Dresden,  and  Aus- 
tria, Vienna.     Austria  assumed  as  a  model  for  these  the 


TEMPORARY  AGREEMENT.  23 

ministerial  congresses  of  1819;  and  consequently  she 
insisted  that  the  result  of  these  congresses  should,  by 
a  definite  vote  of  the  Confederation,  receive  all  the 
sanction  and  validity  of  a  Confederate  act,  and  be 
regarded  as  one  of  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
Confederation. 

To  all  this,  Brandenburg  remarked  that  a  further 
decision  with  regard  to  the  Union  Constitution  would 
be  announced  later,  which  should  be  consistent  with 
the  sixth  proposition ;  that  a  recognition  of  the  exist- 
ing Confederate  Diet  was  neither  to  be  intended  nor 
implied,  if  Prussia  should  leave  the  same  unmolested  ; 
that  against  the  analogy  drawn  between  the  proposed 
congresses  and  those  held  by  the  ministers  in  1819, 
Prussia  had  nothing  to  say,  but  only  reserved  the  ques- 
tions of  the  place  of  meeting  and  of  the  presidency  to 
further  negotiations ;  and  lastly,  that  Prussia  was  will- 
ing to  let  the  result  of  tliese  congresses  be  regarded  as 
a  fundamental  law  of  the  Confederation,  although,  of 
course,  a  definite  vote  upon  it  could  only  be  passed  by 
the  new  central  Confederate  organization,  which  should 
result  from  these  congresses. 

Schwarzenberg  expressed  neither  assent  nor  objec- 
tion to  these  observations  of  the  Prussian  Prime 
Minister.  On  the  following  day,  the  29tli  of  October, 
the  august  assembly  broke  up ;  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  31st,  Brandenburg  returned  with  his  "  temporary 
agreement"  to  Berlin. 

On  his  aniviil,  llie  Prime  Minister  found  IV-rlin  in  a 
state   of   increasinjx  excitement  and  eaefcrness  for  war. 


24  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

Among  the  people  the  sentiments  ah-eady  known  to  us, 
contempt  for  the  Hessian  Elector  and  Hassenpflug, 
resentment  at  the  revival  of  the  Confederate  Diet,  and 
especially  their  furious  rage  at  Austria's  presumption 
and  Bavaria's  audacity,  had  been  fanned  into  a  flame  by 
the  news  of  the  movements  of  the  troops  toward  Hesse ; 
and  as  strong  a  patriotic  feeling  of  indignation  was 
reported  to  exist  in  all  the  provinces. 

Nor  had  the  determination  of  the  King  and  the 
Government  slackened,  not  to  endure  the  effrontery  of 
the  so-called  Confederate  Diet  and  its  penal  measures 
against  Hesse.  On  the  29th  of  October,  two  daj^s  be- 
fore Brandenburg's  return,  the  Ministerial  Council,  in 
a  full  session,  had  carefully  considered  the  question, 
whether  it  would  be  advisable  to  hold  this  ground  even 
at  the  risk  of  a  war  with  Austria.  Radowitz  asserted 
the  affirmative,  and  moved  that  instructions  be  sent  to 
General  Groben  to  proceed,  and  that  upon  the  receipt 
of  the  news  of  the  entry  of  the  Bavarians  the  whole 
Prussian  army  be  mobilized  at  once,  unless  perhaps 
with  the  exception  of  the  corps  in  Konigsberg  and 
Posen,  for  which  it  would  be  possible  to  await  Branden- 
burg's return.  Without  a  single  dissenting  voice,  it 
was  voted  that  Radowitz  should  lay  these  suggestions 
before  the  King  as  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  Ministry. 

But  Count  Brandenburg  did  not,  in  the  face  of  all 
this,  suffer  liis  resolution  to  waver.  He  had  come 
back  from  Warsaw  with  the  firm  conviction  that  these 
misunderstandings  must  not  be  allowed  to  lead  to  a 
war  —  a   war  in   which   Prussia    would    have    united 


BRANDENBURG'S   WISH  FOR  PEACE.  25 

against  her  South  Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia,  no 
ally  at  her  side,  and  France,  whose  attitude  would  be 
entirely  uncertain  and  unreliable,  at  her  back. 

The  grounds  for  his  conviction  are  perfectly  clear,  in 
view  of  the  preceding  events ;  but  it  is  quite  as  evident 
that  a  hard  and  bitter  fight  must  await  the  Count  in  his 
endeavor  to  carry  it  out.  The  hesitating  and  inconsis- 
tent conduct  of  Prussia  after  the  close  of  the  Erfurt 
Parliament  had  made  her  position  every  week  more  un- 
tenable. Although  Austria  had  just  granted  the  chief 
demand  of  Prussia,  namely,  that  the  reform  of  the  Con- 
federation might  be  discussed  in  general  congresses, 
the  two  Powers  stood  with  their  hands  on  their  hilts, 
and  opposed  to  each  other  as  directly  as  possible  in 
the  questions  of  the  Union  and  of  the  overthrow  of 
the  Constitution  in  Plesse-Cassel. 

Yet  the  actual  difference  was  exceedingly  slight  be- 
tween the  fmal  aims  of  the  two  Courts.  The  Kinof 
repudiated  the  Constitution  of  the  26th  of  May  quite 
as  decidedly  as  the  court  of  Vienna,  and  declared  that 
it  could  not  be  carried  out ;  but  Prince  Sclnvarzenljcrg 
demanded  its  formal  abolition,  though  this  would  have 
rendered  him  no  safer  in  the  future  than  the  Prussian 
formula.  In  the  affair  of  Ilesse-Cassel,  too,  the  King  as 
well  as  the  Emperor  desired  to  see  the  land  subjected  to 
the  will  of  the  I'Llector ;  the  (juarrel  was  onl}-  as  to  who 
shoukl  assist  Austria  in  overthrowing  the  Constitution, 
—  the  Confederate  Diet,  or  Prussia. 

For  the  sake  of  sucli  points  of  controversy  to  involve 
Prussia   in  a   tremendous  war  seemed  to   l>niudenl)uro- 


26  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

absurd.  But  unfortunately  the  Prussian  Government 
looked  upon  the  execution  of  its  wishes  as  a  matter  of 
honor,  and  the  failure  to  see  them  carried  out  as  a 
humiliation  to  Prussia ;  how  could  she  now,  when  her 
enemies  threateningly  began  to  brandish  their  weapons, 
withdraw  like  a  coward?  Thus  she  was  forced  to 
decide  between  the  two  mournful  alternatives  of  a  use- 
less war  and  a  shameful  peace.  No  wonder  that  there 
was  a  sharp  difference  of  opinions  ! 

On  the  forenoon  of  November  1st,  Brandenburg  made 
his  official  report  to  the  Ministry  concerning  his  visit 
to  Warsaw.  He  closed  with  the  recommendation,  that, 
upon  the  basis  of  what  had  been  there  accomplished, 
negotiations  should  be  continued  with  Vienna. 
Radowitz  arose  on  the  spot  to  express  his  decided 
disapprobation.  He  called  attention  to  Schwarzen- 
berg's  hostile  attitude  to  the  Union,  and  to  the  six 
propositions ;  and  then  passing  on  to  the  consideration 
of  the  Hessian  affair,  he  declared  that  so  soon  as 
Prussia  allowed  the  Confederate  Diet  to  carry  out  its 
penal  measures  toward  Hesse-Cassel,  the  supremacy  of 
that  hated  body  would  be  established  throughout  entire 
Germany.  Accordingly,  the  entry  of  the  Bavarians 
into  the  electorate  must  be  followed  at  once  by  the 
entry  of  Prussian  troops,  repulsion  of  the  enemy,  mobil- 
ization of  the  entire  army,  proclamation  of  a  manifesto 
to  the  nations,  and  convention  of  the  Chambers.  If  this 
course  should  be  considered  too  dangerous,  then  it  Avas 
high  time  to  change  the  tactics  and  to  unite  with 
Austria   and    Russia,    to    send   word    to    Vienna   that 


RADOWITZ  DESIRES    WAR.  27 

Prussia  would  take  part  in  the  congresses  upon  the 
basis  of  the  negotiations  in  Warsaw,  and  would  agree 
to  the  proposed  execution  of  penal  measures  in  Hesse 
in  the  name  of  the  Confederation.  He  should  himself, 
however,  be  unable  to  join  in  following  out  this  latter 
course. 

The  Ministers,  Von  Ladenberg  and  Von  der  Heydt, 
seconded  him  energetically.  On  the  other  hand.  Baron 
Manteuffel,  who  had  drawn  a  long  breath  at  Branden- 
burg's appearance  upon  the  scene,  arose  in  the  interests 
of  conservative  principles,  and  advocated  the  permis- 
sion of  the  Confederate  measures  in  Hesse.  Herren 
von  Rabe  and  Simons  sided  with  Manteuffel. 

At  the  end  of  the  session,  Brandenburg  stated  quite 
as  bluntly  and  decidedly  as  Radowitz  had  done,  that 
his  continuance  at  the  head  of  the  Ministry  depended 
upon  the  decision  of  this  matter.  Under  the  existing 
circumstances  he  could  not,  he  said,  assume  the  respon- 
sibility of  a  war.  If  a  war  was  to  be  avoided,  the 
Bavarians  in  Hesse-Cassel  must  not  be  attacked  :  other- 
wise, the  mobilization  of  tlie  troops  must  take  place 
speedily  as  possible. 

Just  at  this  moment,  the  news  was  received  by  tele- 
graph that  the  Bavarian  troops  liad  crossed  the  Hessian 
frontier  and  had  Ix'gun  the  execution  of  penal  measures 
in  Hanau.  Tliereupon  General  Count  Grijben,  who 
already  had  instructions  in  that  event  to  occupy  Fulda, 
now  received  further  orders  to  send  a  garrison  to  Cassel. 
Thus  I'russia's  military  as  well  as  political  honor  was 
at  stake.     'J'he  decision  could  not  longer  be  postponed. 


28  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN   WARSAW. 

In  the  afternoon,  accordingly,  the  Ministerial  Council 
again  assembled.  The  King  presided,  and  the  Prince 
of  Prussia  was  also  present. 

Count  Brandenburg,  at  the  opening  of  the  discussion, 
asserted  categorically,  that  when  once  Schwarzenberg 
relinquished  his  demand  that  Prussia  should  recognize 
the  Confederate  Diet  and  send  deputies  to  it,  Prussia's 
chief  reason  for  protesting  against  the  punishment  of 
Hesse  was  removed.  It  was  also  to  be  hoped,  he  said, 
that  when  Prussia  was  willing  to  declare  not  only  the 
impracticability  but  also  the  abolition  of  the  Union 
Constitution,  Austria  would  concede  to  her  a  share  in 
the  presidency  of  the  Confederation.  A  battle  in 
Hesse,  however,  would  be  the  signal  for  a  tremendous 
and  dangerous  war. 

When  the  King  then  arose  to  speak,  it  was  evident 
that  Brandenburg's  reports  and  arguments  had  not  failed 
to  produce  a  certain  effect  upon  him.  He  sought  some 
middle  way,  in  which,  by  making  a  few  concessions  to 
the  enemy,  a  part  of  his  own  fond  projects  might  be 
saved.  "  The  Union  Constitution,"  said  he,  "  can  for 
the  time  be  given  up,  and  then  revived  after  the  more 
comprehensive  alliance  has  been  established.  More- 
over, when  Austria  has  once  admitted  the  jilan  of 
holding  the  much-desired  congresses,  a  concession  on 
our  part  in  the  Hessian  matter  is  justifiable.  We 
should  be  called  upon  to  garrison  both  of  the  Prussian 
military  roads  liaving  halting-stations  in  Hesse-Cassel, 
and  to  occupy  the  intervening  country,  so  that  the 
Bavarians  may  spread  themselves  out  in  the  south,  and 


THE  KING  DESIRES  A    COMPROMISE.  29 

the  occupation  of  the  country  would  be  accomplished 
in  common.  In  that  case,  the  sovereign  authority  of 
the  land  could  not  be  restored  without  Prussia's  aid, 
and  the  Elector  would  be  forced  to  turn  from  the  Con- 
federate Diet  to  Prussia.  Meanwhile,  Prussia  would 
be  gaining  time  to  offset  Austria's  preparations  by  the 
mobilization  of  the  whole  Prussian  army." 

Brandenburg  took  the  liberty  of  observing,  at  this 
point,  that  although  Austria  had  not  agreed  to  such 
a  joint  occupation  of  Hesse-Cassel,  he  felt  sure  that, 
if  the  acquiescent  course  intimated  by  His  Majesty 
should  be  pursued,  there  would  then  be  no  need  of  any 
mobilization. 

Hereupon,  Radowitz  excitedly  interrupted  him  and 
cried,  "  Very  true  !  There  would  be  no  need  of  mobil- 
ization if  we  should  satisfy  all  of  Austria's  demands, 
withdraw  from  Hesse-Cassel,  and  abandon  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  —  but  we  must  immediately  call  all  the  troops 
into  active  service  if  we  wish  to  defend  Prussia's  honor 
and  independence."  He  explained  then  at  length  that 
mobilization  did  not  by  any  means  imply  an  immediate 
war ;  that  simultaneously  with  the  mobilization,  the 
negotiations  begun  at  Warsaw  might  be  continued  in 
Vienna ;  that,  without  attacking  the  Bavarians  in 
Hesse,  the  Prussians  might  get  possession  of  as  large 
tracts  of  land  as  possible ;  that  this  method  of  procedure 
offered  far  greater  advantages  than  the  one  proposed 
by  Brandenburg,  although  it  ran,  to  be  sure,  a  greater 
risk  of  immediate  war,  and  for  that  reason  made  the 
mobilization  indispensable  as  a  precautionary  measure. 


30  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

The  Prince  of  Prussia,  too,  spoke  in  favor  of  the  plan 
of  Radowitz,  because,  aside  from  all  other  considera- 
tions, a  formal  abolition  of  the  Union,  such  as  Schwarz- 
enburg  demanded,  meant  the  subjection  of  Prussia  to 
Austria. 

On  the  other  side,  Manteuffel  emphasized  the  dangers 
to  which  the  beginning  of  a  war  would  give  birth,  by 
arousing  revolutionary  passions  among  the  people.  He 
declared  roundly  that  Prussia  had  no  right  whatever  to 
interfere  with  Hessian  affairs,  but  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  Austria  had  good  reasons  for  demanding  the 
complete  dissolution  of  the  Union. 

The  Minister  of  War,  Stockhausen,  confined  himself 
to  the  short  but  weighty  remark,  that,  as  things  were 
now,  mobilization  of  the  troops  would  occasion  at  once 
a  war  with  Austria  and  Russia,  and  that  Prussia  was 
by  no  means  equal  to  these  antagonists. 

At  this  point  the  King  dismissed  the  council  with 
the  order  to  meet  on  the  following  forenoon  with  a 
view  to  continuing  the  discussion. 

On  this  day,  the  2d  of  November,  1850,  a  day 
fraught  with  mighty  consequences,  the  die  was  cast  by 
the  announcement  of  His  Majesty's  royal  will.  Imme- 
diately after  the  opening  of  the  session,  in  a  lengthy 
and  comprehensive  address,  he  expressed  his  view  of 
the  situation  as  follows  :  — 

To  the  entry  of  the  Bavarians  into  Hesse-Cassel, 
Prussia  has  responded  by  a  similar  order,  so  that  these 
moves  offset  each  other.  From  Austria's  warlike 
preparations,    to   which  Prussia   gave   no  occasion,   it 


THE  KING  LEAVES  IT  TO   THE  MINISTRY.      31 

must  be  supposed  that  Austria  desires  war.  Prussia 
must  therefore,  by  mobilization  of  her  army,  put  herself 
in  a  condition  to  accept  the  challenge,  although  she 
may  at  the  same  time  offer  to  continue  the  negotia- 
tions Ijegun  at  Warsaw.  If  Prussia,  thus  thoroughly 
equipped,  takes  part  in  negotiations,  she  can  then, 
without  danger  to  her  honor,  modify  her  claims,  and 
show  a  disposition  to  conciliate  that  under  other  circum- 
stances would  be  a  weakness.  It  has  never  been  so 
necessary  as  now  for  Prussia  to  win  for  herself  the 
hearts  of  the  whole  people.  This  will  be  accomplished 
by  the  mobilization  of  the  army.  All  parties  in  the 
land,  with  very  few  insignificant  exceptions,  will  joy- 
fully stand  by  the  Government.  An  enthusiasm  will 
spread  throughout  the  kingdom,  which  cannot  fail  to 
have  its  effect  upon  its  enemies  and  its  influence  upon 
the  pending  negotiations. 

According  to  all  this,  it  was  in  the  King's  judgment 
advisable, 

1.  To  mobilize  the  army  at  once. 

2.  At  the  same  time  to  continue  negotiations  with 
Austria,  and  to  declare  that  Prussia  would  not  execute 
the  Constitution  of  May  26th,  but  on  the  contrary 
considered  it  nullified. 

3.  To  refrain  from  hostilities  in  Ilesse-Cassel,  and  in 
case  the  proposed  guaranty  should  be  given  by  Austria, 
to  promise  to  limit  Prussia's  occupation  of  the  land  to 
the  military  roads  with  halting-stations  and  the  country 
lying  between  them. 

4.  In    Ilolstcin,  simultaneously   with  the  inhibition 


32  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN   WARSAW. 

of  the  Confederation,  to  give  notice  to  the  Ducal 
Government  that  Prussia's  protection  would  be  with- 
drawn if  the  Duchy  did  not  cease  from  all  hostilities 
against  the  Danes. 

5.  To  send  word  to  Vienna  that  the  mobilization  of 
the  army  was  to  take  place  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
defending  the  Prussian  frontiers  from  any  hostile 
attack. 

By  these  measures  he  believed  that  the  Government 
would  have  the  people  upon  its  side. 

A  most  surprising  circumstance  then  followed.  The 
King  requested  the  Ministry  to  state  whether  it  was 
ready  to  carry  out  his  plan  with  him.  He  added  that 
if  not,  if  the  Ministry  preferred  to  follow  Branden- 
burg's proposition  to  continue  amicable  negotiations 
with  Vienna  and  not  mobilize  the  troops,  then  he  would 
not  hold  himself  aloof  from  the  course  determined  upon 
by  the  ]\Iinistry.  They  should  then  be  free  to  pursue 
the  course  that  they  considered  the  best;  but  they 
must  then  alone  assume  the  responsibility  for  the 
consequences. 

Inasmuch  as  the  King  had  never  been  accustomed  to 
think  and  act  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
parliamentary  government  and  of  ministerial  responsi- 
bility, we  must  conclude  that  in  his  own  mind  he  had 
already  decided  in  favor  of  Brandenburg,  only  he  was 
unwilling  to  confess  it. 

But  if  Brandenburg  was  unwilling  to  undertake  a 
war  for  ends  which  he  considered  worthless,  the  Prince 
of  Prussia  on  the  other  hand,  with  his  straightforward, 


BRANDENBURG'S  PROPOSED  DESPATCH.        33 

soldierly  spirit,  protested  against  any  cessions  what- 
ever. Whether  the  demands  made  by  Prussia  were 
reasonable  or  not,  he  was  opposed  to  yielding  one  inch 
of  ground  when  Prussian  troops  were  standing  face  to 
face  with  the  enem}^  and  when  the  Imperial  Courts 
were  haughtily  crying  their  ultimatum :  Submission  or 
war. 

Even  before  Brandenburg  had  the  time  to  reply  to 
the  question  of  the  King,  the  Prince  arose,  and  in  a 
passiouiite  outburst  of  patriotism  demanded  immediate 
mobilization,  and  the  continuance  of  negotiations  under 
arms,  which,  he  declared,  was  the  only  course  that 
could  keep  Prussia's  banner  unspotted,  the  only  honor- 
able and  practicable  course,  and  the  only  one  which 
would  gain  the  sympathy  of  the  people  and  the  army  : 
in  short,  the  only  line  of  conduct  that  would  maintain 
Prussia's  honor  untarnished. 

He  evidently  did  not  see,  as  did  his  royal  brother,  in 
the  mobilization  of  the  army  a  means  of  excusing  still 
greater  concessions. 

Count  Brandenburg  was  b}'-  no  means  indifferent  to 
the  attitude  of  the  Prince,  yet  remained  unshaken  in 
his  convictions,  and  proceeded,  as  a  reply  to  the  royal 
proi)ositions,  to  expound  his  own  in  the  form  of  an  out^ 
line  of  a  (h'spatcli  wliicli  sliould  be  sent  to  Vienna. 
The  train  of  tliouglit  in  this  outline  was  as  follows:  — 

Prussia  hopes  that  a  successful  result  will  be  attained 
in  tlie  general  congresses  which  it  liad  been  agreed 
sliall  be  soon  liekl  for  a  revision  of  tlie  Confederate  Con- 
stitution.    A  complete  aljolition  of  the  Ujiion  Consti- 


34  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

tution  does  not  lie  in  the  competence  of  Prussia,  but 
can  take  place  only  Avith  the  consent  of  the  allied 
Governments.  Prussia,  however,  as  president  qf  the 
Union,  declares  that  she  will  not  try  to  execute  the 
Constitution,  and  considers  the  same,  for  her  part, 
entirely  given  up.  After  what  Schwarzenberg  has 
expressed,  Prussia's  sufferance  of  the  entry  of  foreign 
troops  into  Hesse-Cassel  cannot  any  longer  be  con- 
strued as  a  recognition  of  the  assembly  at  Frankfort. 
She  can  accordingly  permit  their  entry  so  soon  as  she 
has  received  all  the  necessary  guaranties  with  regard 
to  the  duration  and  purjjose  of  the  occupation  of  the 
electorate,  and  with  regard  to  the  security  of  the 
Prussian  military  roads,  which  would  otherwise  be 
endangered.  Meanwhile,  the  Prussian  troops  in  Hesse- 
Cassel  shall  receive  instructions  to  refrain  from  making 
any  offensive  move.  The  Holstein  affairs  can  also  be 
adjusted  quite  as  peaceably.  Prussia  proposes  as  a 
place  for  holding  the  congresses  either  Dresden  or 
Nuremberg.  It  would  be  desirable  for  the  two  Powers, 
at  the  very  beginning  of  the  congress,  to  propose  jointly 
the  six  propositions  discussed  at  Warsaw.  If  this 
cannot  be  done,  then  both  the  Powers  may  take  part  in 
the  congresses  bound  by  no  obligations.  Inasmuch 
as,  after  what  has  been  said,  there  is  no  longer  any 
difference  that  threatens  a  rupture  between  the  Powers, 
it  is  expected  that  the  warlike  preparations,'  which 
the  other  side  has  been  making,  will  now  cease. 
Otherwise,  it  would  be  necessary  for  Prussia  also  to 
put  herself  into  a  condition  of  readiness  for  a  conflict; 


THE  MINISTRY  DECIDE  FOR  PEACE.  35 

and  this  would  be  a  measure  that  under  the  present 
circumstances  would  not  only  be  superfluous,  but  would 
create  apprehension  on  all  sides. 

It  is  clear  that  the  sending  of  this  despatch  involved 
both  the  abolition  of  the  Union  Constitution  and 
assent  to  the  punishment  of  Hesse.  Nothing  could 
imply  this  more  plainly  than  the  mention  of  the  condi- 
tions upon  which  these  two  concessions  were  tempora- 
rily made  to  depend.  For,  without  doubt,  Austria 
would  at  once  reply  that  the  allied  Union  princes 
would  of  course  agree  to  anything  proposed  by  Prussia, 
and  that  the  desired  guaranty  with  regard  to  the 
stipulated  use  of  the  military  roads  would  be  granted 
by  the  Confederate  Diet,  and  be  as  binding  as  possible, 

After  having  read  this  document  to  the  Council, 
Brandenburg  remarked  that  he  was  well  aware  this 
course  of  procedure  might  lead  to  the  downfall  of  the 
Union,  and  to  the  dissolution  of  the  Chambers  ;  but 
the  opposite  policy  would  surely  bring  upon  Prussia  a 
war  which  she  could  not  successfully  carry  on.  "  A 
mobilization  of  the  troops,"  he  said,  "  would  at  this 
juncture  certainly  enkindle  the  war;  but  if  Austria 
should  attack  us  in  spite  of  our  concessions,  it  would 
be  an  act  of  depredation,  and  we  should  have  Russia 
upon  our  side." 

At  tlie  request  of  the  King,  the  Ministry  then  w^ilh- 
drew  to  an  ante-chamber  to  decide  the  question  put  to 
them  by  I  lis  Majesty.  They  returned  after  a  very 
few  moments,  and  Brandenburg  announced  tlieir  decis- 
ion, which  was  as  follows:  the  majority  of  the  Ministry 


86  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

had  not  been  able  to  change  their  convictions  and  to 
advocate  the  mobilization  ;  on  the  contrary,  they  con- 
sidered it  imperatively  necessary  that  Prussian  move- 
ments should  be  stopped  in  Hesse-Cassel,  that  the 
proposed  despatch  should  be  sent  to  Vienna  with  the 
request  that  Austria's  preparations  for  war  should 
cease,  and  that,  unless  Austria  should  reply  to  the 
despatch  in  an  unfriendly  manner,  no  mobilization 
should  take  place;  they  were  convinced  that  the  imme- 
diate mobilizing  of  the  troops  would  put  a  stop  to 
negotiations  and  provoke  a  war,  to  which  Prussia's 
strength  was  not  equal. 

Radowitz  thereupon  reported  that  the  minority  held 
quite  as  firmly  to  their  previous  convictions ;  and  he 
then  set  forth  an  outline  of  the  message  which  in  their 
opinion  should  be  sent  to  Vienna,  and  which  in  the 
main  accorded  well  with  the  five  principles  propounded 
by  the  King. 

The  King  then  made  the  final  and  decisive  speech. 
"  I  concur  in  every  point,"  said  Frederick  William, 
"  with  the  opinions  of  the  minority.  But  since  the 
majority  persist  in  their  verdict,  I  hereby  repeat  the 
declaration  that  I  see  myself  forced,  since  I  am  fully 
determined  to  retain  the  Ministry,  to  grant  them  free- 
dom to  act  as  they  choose.  I  hope  that  the  members 
of  the  majority  may  never  see  the  day  when  they  shall 
repent  the  step  —  to  my  mind  so  ruinous  —  which  they 
have  taken  to-day." 

This  closed  the  session. 

General  von  Radowitz  immediately  resigned.     Herren 


THE  MINISTRY  DECIDE  FOR  PEACE.  37 

von  Ladenberg  and  von  der  Heydt  followed  his  exam- 
ple. After  the  protestations  of  November  1st,  this 
was  a  surprise  to  no  one.  But  very  unexpected  was 
the  fate  which  suddenly  broke  in  upon  the  victors  of 
November  2d. 

So  far  as  we  have  been  able  to  gather  information 
upon  the  matter,  Count  Brandenburg  had  at  no  time 
during  the  recent  negotiations  given  any  signs  of  a 
diminution  or  any  interruption  of  his  physical  powers  ; 
nor  did  he  show  any  unusual  symptoms  during  the 
followinof  night,  in  the  course  of  which  he  was  twice 
awakened  that  he  might  give  orders  concerning  certain 
matters  which  the  King,  by  the  mouth  of  the  royal 
counsellor  Niebuhr,  referred  wholly  to  the  IMinister's 
judgment.  At  both  of  these  times  he  seemed  to  be 
quite  well  and  ready  for  work. 

On  the  morning  of  the  3d  he  felt  ill,  and  was  not 
able  to  be  present  at  the  meeting  of  the  Ministry, 
although  he  signed  and  sent  to  Vienna  the  despatch 
which  he  luid  the  day  before  drawn  up  and  submitted 
to  the  Cabinet.  After  that  his  condition  grew  rapidly 
worse.  On  the  4th,  a  violent  elimination  of  bile 
temporarily  relieved  him,  but  soon  afterwards  an 
intense  fever,  accompanied  by  nervous  delirium,  seized 
him  ;  and  while  Berlin  was  being  excited  and  set  in 
commotion  by  the  threatening  news  of  increased  war- 
preparations  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  and  of  the 
consequent  Prussian  mobilization  in  spite  of  tlie  verdict 
of  the  Prime  Minister,  this  remarkable  man  lay  dying, 
and  expired  on  the  Gth  of  November,  1850. 


38  COUNT  BRANDENBURG  IN  WARSAW. 

If  the  before-mentioned  reports  about  his  delirious 
ravings  are  at  all  founded,  it  is  easy  to  explain  them 
from  the  fact  that  in  his  lucid  moments  news  repeat- 
edly came  to  him  of  the  passionate  thirst  for  war  which 
was  filling  the  city  with  excitement,  and  from  which  he 
anticipated  only  disaster. 


ALARMING  NEWS,  39 


CHAPTER   II. 

OLMUTZ. 

Ox  the  3d  of  November,  the  most  exciting  news  and 
events  followed  closely  upon  one  another  in  Berlin. 
General  Tietzen  was  on  the  march  toward  Cassel. 
General  Gruben  announced  the  occupation  of  Fulda, 
where  he  hourly  awaited  the  approach  of  the  Bavarians 
from  the  south.  From  Vienna  Count  Bernstorff  sent 
word  that  the  Emperor  Francis  Josepli  had  returned 
from  Warsaw  on  the  30th  of  October,  and  that  imme- 
diately afterwards  orders  had  been  sent  in  all  directions 
to  put  the  army  upon  a  war-footing.  In  Bohemia,  it 
was  said,  there  were  eighty  (according  to  others  a  hun- 
dred) thousand  men,  who  were  being  pushed  in  all 
directions  to  the  northern  frontiers,  and  who  depended 
with  confidence  upon  aid  from  Saxony.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  number  was  seventy-six  thousand. 

The  negotiations  for  peace  seemed  to  the  Ministers 
at  Berlin  for  these  reasons  to  be  the  more  urgent,  and 
the  more  pity  was  it  that  the  leader  of  the  majority, 
Count  Brandenburg,  liad  suddenly  fallen  seriously  ill. 
Ilerr  von  Ladenberg,  the  Minister  next  in  seniority, 
opened  a  liastily-summoned  meeting  of  the  Ivlinisterial 
Council  with  the  notice  that  since  he  had  tciKU'i'cd  liis 
resignation  to  the  King,   he   was   not  entitled   to  take 


40  OLMUTZ. 

part  in  political  discussions,  nor  to  take  upon  himself 
the  duties  of  the  sick  Premier.  After  Herr  von 
Manteuffel  upon  this  had  assumed  the  office  of  presi- 
dent, Radowitz  made  a  similar  announcement,  with  the 
additional  observation  that  the  King  had  already  prom- 
ised to  accept  his  resignation,  and  that  he  was  conse- 
quently unable  to  attend  to  the  current  business  of  the 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Von  der  Heydt  had 
also  asked  for  his  discharge  at  the  same  time  with 
Ladenberg. 

It  was  therefore  decided  to  propose  to  the  King  that 
Brandenburg  should  take  charge  of  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  ;  and  that  so  long  as  his  illness  lasted, 
Mantcuffel  should  take  his  place.  The  despatch  drawn 
up  by  Brandenburg  the  day  before  was  formally 
approved,  and,  after  it  had  been  sent  to  the  Count  for 
his  signature,  forwarded  to  Vienna.  Groben  received 
orders  to  maintain  the  positions  already  taken,  but  to 
advance  no  farther.  At  the  same  time,  it  was  voted  to 
inform  the  Ducal  Government  at  Kiel,  that,  if  the 
Prussian  demands  should  be  refused,  the  Ducliies  need 
count  upon  no  further  effort  of  Prussia  to  mediate. 
The  Prussian  troops  that  were  still  on  the  Holstein 
frontier  were  on  the  4th  withdrawn  from  there  and 
moved  southward.  Likewise,  the  troops  in  Hohen- 
zollern  and  in  the  southern  part  of  Baden  were  ordered 
to  retire  across  the  Murg. 

Nevertheless,  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  Herr  von 
Prokesch,  communicated  on  the  same  day  a  threatening 
note   from   the   Imperial   Cabinet   demanding  that  the 


ALARMING  NEWS.  41 

electoral  sovereignty  should  be  respected,  and  that 
consequently  the  Prussian  troops  should  be  imme- 
diately withdrawn  from  Hesse-Cassel.  Rochow  sent 
word  that  Emperor  Nicholas  would  also,  on  his  part,  look 
upon  a  refusal  to  comply  as  a  signal  for  war.  With  the 
greatest  impatience,  therefore,  Manteuffel  awaited  the 
Austrian  answer  to  Brandenburg's  pacifying  despatch, 
which  unfortunately  could  not  reach  Vienna  before  the 
5th  of  November.  He  put  off  Prokesch  by  referring  to 
this  pending  measure,  and  sent  telegram  after  telegram 
to  Bernstorff,  pressing  him  to  urge  Schwarzenberg  to 
make  an  immediate  reply. 

On  the  5th  of  November,  favorable  news  came  from 
several  quarters :  from  Hanover,  announcing  that  the 
new  Miinchhausen  Ministry  was  little  desirous  of  war; 
and  from  the  Hague,  that  the  Prime  Minister  Thor- 
becke  declared  himself  ready  to  recall  from  the  Frank- 
fort Confederate  assembly  the  deputy  of  Luxemburg, 
whereby  the  number  of  votes  was  reduced  to  eight,  and 
no  longer  represented  a  majority  of  the  old  Confederate 
Diet. 

But  all  this  was  of  no  moment  in  view  of  the  attitude 
of  Russia,  Austria,  and  the  Lesser  States,  about  whom 
the  most  threatening  tidings  were  received  from  all 
sides.  Gruben  reported  tliat  the  Bavarian  ('omiiiaiidcr, 
the  Prince  of  Thurn  and  Taxis,  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  all 
efforts  to  avoid  an  encounter.  From  Dresden  came 
the  news  of  preparations  for  the  mobilization  of  the 
Saxon  troops.  From  Bavaiia  came  tlio  intelligence 
that  the    Austrian    anii3--cor[)S    in    A'orarlbcrg,  said    to 


42  ■  OLMUTZ. 

number  thirty  thousand  men,  had  crossed  the  Bavarian 
frontier  and  was  hastening  in  forced  marches  towards 
the  north.  The  Grand  Dukes  of  Oldenburg  and  of 
Weimar  sent  urgent  monitions  to  the  Prussian  King, 
warning  the  Berlin  Court  not  to  trust  to  false  pretences 
of  peaceful  agreements,  lest  they  should  be  suddenly 
taken  by  surprise  and  unexpectedly  '  attacked.  A 
despatch  from  Bernstorff,  dated  the  2d,  announced 
that  in  Vienna  not  only  Russian,  but  also  French  aid 
was  counted  upon  as  certain,  that  Schwarzenberg  was 
w^ithout  question  intent  upon  waging  a  war  of  annihi- 
lation against  Prussia,  and  that  the  ambassadors  who 
advocated  an  "entire  Germany  "  (retention  of  Austria  in 
the  Confederation)  were  extremely  anxious  and  fearful 
lest  Prussia  should  by  full  compliance  disarm  Austria, 
then  join  the  Confederate  Diet,  and  thus  escape  being 
ruined  by  a  disastrous  war.  It  was  declared  that  for 
all  this  the  Danish  war  was  to  blame,  which  had 
aroused  so  violently  the  Emperor  Nicholas  against 
Prussia. 

]\Iany  of  these  facts  and  sentiments  had  become 
publicly  known,  and  had  raised  the  popular  indignation 
to  a  high  pitch.  An  oppressive  sultriness  pervaded  all 
Berlin.  The  population  was  excited,  and  passionately 
wondered  when  the  Government  would  at  last  come  to 
any  decision,  and  by  energetic  action  remove  this  load 
from  the  hearts  of  the  people.  The  rumors  of  Bran- 
denburg's delirious  summons  to  war  increased  the 
frenzy  of  the  multitudes.  Manteuffel  was  extremely 
ill  at  ease.     He  consulted  with  Prokesch  as  to  how  the 


PRUSSIAN  MOBILIZATION.  43 

danger  might  be  avoided,  and  begged  the  Russian 
Ambassador  to  assure  his  Emperor  of  Prussia's  desire 
for  peace. 

But  the  King,  always  ungracious  whenever  he  was 
obliged  to  hear  about  the  Frankfort  assembly  and  its 
doings,  would  listen  to  no  proposition  of  further  com- 
pliance, but  held  firmly  to  his  ground,  that,  inasmuch 
as  consent  had  been  granted  to  the  entry  of  the  Bava- 
rians into  Hesse  upon  the  condition  that  the  required 
guaranties  should  be  given,  no  concessions  could  under 
any  circumstances  be  made  until  these  were  forth- 
coming. 

Manteuffel  telegraphed  this  fact  to  Bernstorff  in 
Vienna  and  to  General  Peucker  in  Frankfort,  accenting 
Avith  strong  emphasis  the  responsibility  of  those  who, 
at  a  time  when  the  prospects  for  peace  were  so  auspi- 
cious, would  unchain  the  Furies  of  war  by  their  wanton 
conduct  in  Ilesse.  Prussian  troops  took  possession, 
meanwhile,  of  the  whole  region  of  country  between  the 
Prussian  military  roads.  They  were  everywlicre  re- 
ceived by  the  people  as  their  deliverers  and  liberators. 
The  leaders  of  the  Hessian  Oppositiou  carefully  con- 
cealed their  well-founded  doubts  as  to  whether  the 
Prussians  had  really  come  into  the  country  to  save  the 
Hessian  Constitution. 

Ui)on  his  n'('(>})ti()n  of  ]\Iantcuffers  telegram  in 
Frankfort,  Peucker  connnunicated  its  contents  to  the 
Austrian  Ambassador,  Count  Thun,  who  remarked  that 
the  Confederate  Diet  wished  by  all  means  to  avoid  a 
conflict,  but  was,  on  the  other  hand,  bountl  by  its  duly 


44  OLMUTZ. 

toward  the  Elector  to  carry  out  tlie  decrees  it  had 
passed,  and  that  the  hatter  had  very  justly  protested 
agamst  the  presence  of  the  Prussian  troops  in  Hesse. 

The  Count  at  once  summoned  his  colleagues  together 
in  order  to  discuss  the  matter.  He  spoke,  himself,  in 
favor  of  conciliatory  measures ;  but  Hassenpflug  de- 
manded unconditional  execution  of  the  decrees.  The 
majority  were  especially  influenced  to  side  with  Hassen- 
pflug by  the  fact  that  Groben's  position  near  Fulda  did 
not  lie  between  the  Prussian  military  roads.  Conse- 
quently, no  restrictive  orders  were  sent  to  Taxis ;  in- 
deed, it  was  believed  that  the  encounter  might  already 
have  taken  place. 

Peucker's  prompt  report  of  these  transactions,  and 
the  receipt  of  a  telegram  from  St.  Petersburg  con- 
cerning the  Russian  military  preparations  decided 
Manteuffel  in  his  line  of  conduct:  he  saw  before  his 
very  eyes  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  considered  now, 
himself,  the  mobilization  as  unavoidable.  At  once,  on 
the  evening  of  the  5th  of  November,  he  secured  (it 
may  well  be  believed,  without  much  trouble)  the 
King's  approval  of  the  measure. 

He  telegraphed  immediately  the  news  of  this  decision 
to  Vienna,  Frankfort,  and  St.  Petersburg.  He  said 
that  it  had  been  necessary,  in  view  of  the  universal 
warlike  preparations  on  the  part  of  Prussia's  opponents, 
and  in  consideration  of  the  fact  that  the  uncertainty 
with  regard  to  the  final  turn  of  affairs  had  caused  a 
tension  of  feelings,  especially  in  the  army,  which  must 
be  taken  into  account.     Moreover,   the    Prussian  Am- 


SCHWARZENBERG'S   THREATENING  NOTE.     45 

bassadors  were  to  affirm  in  the  strongest  terms  j)Ossible 
that  this  measure  was  taken  not  as  an  offensive  move, 
but  only  as  a  precaution :  the  peaceable  intentions 
expressed  in  Brandenburg's  despatch  of  the  3d  were 
still  in  every  point  unchanged. 

On  the  following  morning,  jManteuffel  brought  all 
this  before  his  colleagues  in  the  Ministry  for  official 
confirmation.  The  King,  who  appeared  in  the  course 
of  the  discussion,  signed  the  order  for  mobilization; 
and  Ladenberg  and  Von  der  Heydt,  whose  resignation 
the  King  had  not  yet  accepted,  said  that  they  were  now 
ready  to  remain  in  office. 

When  the  news  of  Brandenburg's  death  was  an- 
nounced, the  King  conferred  the  temporary  presidency 
of  the  Ministerial  Council  upon  Ladenberg,  so  that  it 
might  seem  as  if  the  minority  of  the  2d  of  November 
had  already  won  the  upper  hand,  especially  since 
General  Groben,  in  consideration  of  the  thirst  for  war 
shown  at  Frankfort,  had  received  instructions  anew  to 
act  without  restraint. 

The  result  of  the  order  for  mobilization  was  precisely 
what  the  King  on  the  2d  had  prophesied  :  an  unbounded 
shout  of  deliglit  arose  from  the  people,  the  press,  and 
the  army.  Tlie  men  of  the  militia,  whom  the  year 
before  tlie  liussar  patrols  were  often  obliged  to  hunt  up 
and  drag  into  the  lines  for  the  Baden  campaign,  now 
flocked  in  crowds  to  the  standards.  Even  the  count- 
less manifestations  of  inefficiency  in  the  administration 
of  the  Prussian  army  at  that  time  did  not  cool  down 
the    ardor   of    the    troops.     The    Austrian    battalions. 


46  OLMUTZ. 

though  filled  almost  exclusively  with  mutiuous  hdnveds^ 
could  hardly  have  long  withstood  their  sanguine 
enthusiasm. 

Meanwhile  the  Prussian  despatch  of  the  3d  of 
November  had  been  received  by  Schwarzenberg  on  the 
5th.  The  concessions  contained  therein  only  confirmed 
the  Prince  in  his  old  conviction,  that  King  Frederick 
William  would  never  be  able  to  bring  himself  to  wage 
war  against  Austria,  and  that,  accordingly,  there  was 
no  urgent  reason  why  the  Imperial  Cabinet  should 
make  any  important  concessions  in  return. 

In  vain  Baron  Meyendorff  represented  to  Schwarzen- 
berg the  opposition  which  Manteuffel,  as  champion  of 
the  peace  policy,  had  to  contend  against  in  Berlin ; 
and  that  it  was  very  desirable  to  strengthen  him  in 
this  position  by  friendly  advances.  In  vain  did  the 
despatches  of  Prokesch  press  tlie  same  point,  and 
advise  the  support  of  Manteuffel,  that  actual  facts 
might  demonstrate  the  statement  of  Radowitz  to  be 
false  which  declared  that  Austria  would  answer  every 
concession  only  with  fresh  demands.  Schwarzenberg 
still  insisted  that  military  movements  could  not  cease 
until  the  cause  had  been  removed. 

The  Prince  at  once  wrote  an  answer  to  Brandenburg's 
despatch,  in  which,  amid  a  perfect  shower  of  roses  in 
the  shape  of  friendly  words  and  phrases,  he  refused 
roundly  and  decidedly  to  accede  to  Prussia's  wishes. 
Whereas  Brandenburg  had  expressed  the  hope  that, 
after  his  explanations  concerning  affairs  in  Hesse  and 
Holstein,    the   general   congresses  for  a  reform  of  the 


SCHWARZEXBEEG'S   THREATENING  NOTE.     47 

Confederation  might  be  held  without  dehiy,  and  that 
during  their  sessions  these  special  subjects  of  con- 
troversy might  be  laid  aside,  Schwarzenberg's  despatch 
of  the  Gth  affirmed  just  the  02)posite :  tliere  could  be  no 
thought  of  convening  the  congresses  until  after  the 
Prussian  troops  should  have  been  entirely  removed 
from  Hesse,  all  resistance  on  the  j)art  of  Prussia 
against  the  chastisement  of  Holstein  withdrawn,  and 
the  abolition  of  the  Union  Constitution  formally 
accomplished.  He  said  that  it  would  afford  him 
pleasure  to  give  the  desired  guaranty  with  regard  to 
the  Prussian  military  roads  in  Hesse,  but  demanded 
that  that  should  not  unwarrantably  be  made  the  excuse 
for  an  occupation  of  the  land.  He  further  asserted 
that  until  these  matters  were  settled,  Austria  could  not 
possibly  desist  from  her  preparations  for  war. 

When  the  Prince  received,  on  the  same  day,  the 
telegram  about  the  Prussian  mobilization,  lie  remarked 
to  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  he  now  had  not  the 
least  doubt  but  that  peace  woukl  be  preserved,  since 
this  positive  move  would  pi'ovide  Prussia  with  a  bridge 
for  an  honorable  retreat.  He  talked  as  if  lie  had  been 
present  at  the  King's  speech  in  the  session  of  Novem- 
ber 2(1. 

AVitli  the  same  intrepidity  as  that  manifested  b}^  the 
Austrian  statesman,  tlie  Prince  of  Taxis  marched  in 
Hesse  against  the  Prussian  position  near  Fulda.  On 
the  8th  of  November,  the  outposts  of  the  two  armies 
stood  face  to  face.  Messages  under  flags  of  truce  went 
back    and    forth.     Gruben    very    emphatically    warned 


48  OLMUTZ. 

the  enemy  not  to  come  nearer.  But  when  at  one  point 
the  Bavarian  vanguard  pressed  forward  among  the 
Prussian  outposts,  the  latter  fired  a  few  shots,  which 
were  returned  from  the  other  side.  Five  Austrian 
men  and  one  Prussian  horse  were  wounded  ;  further 
harm  was  prevented  on  both  sides  by  the  immediate 
interference  of  the  officers,  who  thirsted  less  for  blood 
than  did  the  Frankfort  diplomatists  sitting  around 
their  green  table. 

At  the  same  hour  the  Prussian  Ministerial  Council 
was  busy  framing  a  reply  to  the  despatch  just  received 
from  Austria.  In  spite  of  Ladenberg's  presidency,  the 
prevailing  sentiment  was  still  a  very  strong  desire  for 
peace.  Manteuffel  urged  that  after  Prussia  had  said 
the  Constitution  of  May  26th  should  not  be  carried  out, 
it  was  a  mere  quibble  of  forms  to  refuse  to  concede  to 
Austria's  wish  and  propose  to  the  allied  Governments 
its  definite  abolition.  Furthermore,  Manteuffel  con- 
sidered that  since  Prussia  had,  in  consequence  of  the 
conduct  of  the  Ducal  Government  at  Kiel,  given  up  its 
attempt  to  mediate,  there  could  be  no  harm  in  informing 
the  Vienna  Cabinet  of  this  fact,  and  in  withdrawing 
then  Prussia's  opposition  to  the  penal  measures  insti- 
tuted by  the  Confederation  against  Holstein. 

The  discussion  was  to  be  brought  to  a  close  in  the 
evening.  Then  came  Groben's  telegram  about  the 
skirmish  at  Bronzell.  Its  effect  was  no  slight  one.  It 
was  argued  that  weighty  negotiations  ought  not  to  be 
disturbed  by  such  a  small  affray  among  the  soldiers, 
and  that  after  all  the  advanced  position  at  Fulda  was 


SKIRMISH  AT  BRONZELL.  49 

not  at  all  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  military 
road.  It  was  unanimously  decided  to  instruct  the 
General  to  withdraw  to  the  latter,  if  it  was  defensible. 

Therefore  the  reply  to  be  sent  to  Vienna  was  decided 
upon  as  (][uickly  as  possible.  It  began  with  the  two 
concessions  relating  to  the  Union  and  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein.  In  regard  to  Hesse,  it  was  requested  that  the 
proposed  guaranty  about  the  duration  and  purpose  of 
the  penal  measures  instituted  by  the  Confederation 
should  be  given  not  only  by  Austria,  but  also  by  all 
her  allies  ;  and  it  was  also  desired,  in  view  of  the  con- 
fused state  of  the  executive  and  police  authority,  and 
the  presence  of  foreign  troops  in  the  countr}^  that 
Prussia's  right  to  garrison  her  military  roads  during  the 
continuance  of  these  conditions  should  be  recognized. 
On  the  9th  of  November,  the  King,  after  making  a  few 
minor  changes,  approved  the  despatch. 

The  excitement  aroused  in  Frankfort  by  the  firing  at 
Bronzell  was  greater  than  in  Berlin.  The  representa- 
tives that  advocated  an  "entire  Germany"  talked  of 
violation  of  the  Confederate  oath  and  of  a  declaration  of 
war. 

Schwarzenberg  preserved  his  cool  and  haughty 
attitude,  warned  the  Frankforters  not  to  be  impatient, 
and  yet  sent  word  to  Berlin  on  tli(!  lOtlu  tliat  Prokesch 
must  demand  his  passports  unless  satisfactory  informa- 
tion were  immediately  received  concerning  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Prussians  from  Hesse-Cassel.  Manteuffel 
at  once  re[)lied  that  he  regretted  exceedingly  the  affair 
at  Bronzell,   which   he   said   mnst    liave    been    without 


50  OLMUTZ. 

doubt  occasioned  by  the  precipitate  pushing  forward  on 
the  part  of  the  Bavarians.  He  showed  Prokesch  at  the 
same  time  the  despatch  which  had  just  been  sent  to 
Vienna.  Tliis  appeased  the  latter  to  a  very  great 
degree.  He  was  delighted  with  the  abandonment  of 
Schleswig-Holstein ;  and  Schwarzenberg  at  once,  on  the 
11th  of  November,  called  upon  the  Confederate  Diet  to 
give  to  Prussia  the  required  guaranty  concerning  the 
duration  and  object  of  the  penal  measures  in  Hesse. 

Schwarzenberg,  however,  called  the  attention  of  the 
Prussian  Ambassador  to  the  fact  that  after  this  guar- 
anty had  been  given,  Prussia  would  have  no  reason 
whatever  for  holding  possession  of  the  military  roads, 
and  thus  making  the  execution  of  the  Confederate 
plans  more  difficult.  A  despatch  sent  to  Berlin  on 
the  13th,  in  which  Schwarzenberg  politely  accepted 
Prussia's  concessions  and  spoke  of  a  speedy  convention 
of  the  congresses,  reiterated  in  the  strongest  terms  his 
demand  for  the  evacuation  of  Hesse-Cassel.  He  was 
strengthened  in  this  position  by  the  advent,  on  the 
same  day,  of  Prince  Gortschakoff  in  Frankfort,  who 
had  come  to  announce  officially  Russia's  recognition  of 
the  Confederate  Diet  as  the  highest  central  authority 
in  all  Germany,  and  in  this  way  to  show  to  the  world 
Russia's  perfect  sympathy  with  Austria's  system  and 
policy. 

Thus  by  Prussia's  compliance,  one  mooted  point 
after  another  was  gradually  cleared  away.  A  few  days 
later,  the  Government  fulfilled  its  promise  of  bringing 
before  the  Collegfe  of  Princes  in  the  Union  the  formal 


ABOLITION  OF  THE   UNION  CONSTITUTION.     51 

proposition  of  abolishing  the  Constitution  of  the  26th 
of  May.  This  was  the  more  a  surprise  to  the  College, 
since  just  before  this  the  summons  had  been  received 
from  Prussia  to  prepare  their  troops  for  war,  and  to 
place  them  under  Prussian  orders. 

It  was  a  crushing  and  unwelcome  blow  to  their 
deliberations.  The  deputies  declared,  one  and  all,  that 
they  were  not  empowered  to  vote  for  such  a  measure. 
In  reply  to  their  reports  to  their  Governments,  they 
received  either  no  response  whatever,  or,  as  Radowitz 
had  predicted,  from  those  members  that  had  long  been 
""  doubtful,"  Baden,  Nassau,  and  Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 
the  declaration  that  the  abolition  of  the  Constitution 
meant  the  downfall  of  the  Union  itself.  The  College 
of  Princes  did  not  get  so  far  as  to  take  a  formal  vote  on 
the  matter.  As  for  a  new  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance,  which  had  formerly  been  often  spoken  about 
as  desirable  in  this  event,  —  such  a  plan  was  not  con- 
sidered worth  mentioning. 

Thus  far,  however,  and  no  farther,  was  King  Freder- 
ick William  ready  to  show  a  spirit  of  compliance  ;  or, 
to  state  the  matter  more  exactly,  he  had  hitherto  com- 
plied witli  what  he  in  his  own  heart  had  wished  for. 
He  fully  agreed  witli  the  Imperial  Courts  that  the 
sovereign  authority  of  the  land  must  be  restored  in 
Hesse-Cassel  and  in  Ilolstein,  and  he  was  truly  thank- 
ful to  Heaven  for  being  at  last  and  entirely  rid  of  the 
liberal  Constitution  of  the  26th  of  May. 

He  looked  u[)on  it  as  a  clear  and  brilliant  triumph  of 
his  policy,  that  he  had  persuaded  Austria  to  accept  of 


52  OLMUTZ. 

the  plan  of  holding  open  congresses  for  the  reformation 
of  the  Confederation.  This  grand  and  important  work 
had  been  torn  from  the  hands  of  that  hated  assembly  at 
Frankfort ;  and  now  he  was  obstinately  determined  not 
to  yield  to  that  unlawful  "  Club  "  the  honor  of  support- 
ing the  sovereign  authority  in  Hesse  and  Holstein. 
So  glorious  a  task  must  be  intrusted  only  to  the 
united  German  Governments,  and  by  them,  according 
to  his  old  proposition,  to  an  Austro-Prussian  com- 
mission. 

We  have  already  heard  him  assert,  on  the  1st  and  2d 
of  November,  his  conviction  that  this  end  could  be  best 
gained  by  his  insisting  upon  the  maintenance  of 
Prussian  garrisons  along  the  military  roads  in  Hesse, 
and  the  consequent  limitation  of  the  Bavarians  to  the 
southern  portion  of  the  country. 

In  that  case,  he  thought,  the  Confederation  could 
not  execute  its  proposed  penal  measures,  and  the 
Elector  would  be  himself  forced  to  ask  Prussia  to 
assist  in  his  reinstatement.  If  this  method  succeeded 
in  Hesse-Cassel,  it  could  be  applied  to  Holstein  as  a 
matter  of  course.  He  should,  to  be  sure,  in  his  treat- 
ment of  the  two  countries,  act  much  more  humanely 
and  graciously  than  the  rude,  uncouth  Bavarians  and 
Hassenpflug's  revengeful  associates  were  now  doing  in 
Hanau  and  Fulda ;  but  in  the  work  of  restoration 
itself,  his  own  conservative  principles  should  be  seen 
to  be  not  a  hair's-breadth  behind  those  of  the  Imperial 
Courts. 

The  Prussian  troops,  then,  were  to  keejD  possession  of 


NEW  DIFFICULTIES.  53 

the  military  roads ;  this  was  the  corner-stone  of  the 
royal  policy.  However  often  and  however  urgently 
Schwarzenberg  demanded  Groben's  retreat,  however 
categorically  Taxis  announced  his  intended  immediate 
advance,  however  fully  the  Confederate  Diet  on  the 
15th  of  November  granted  the  desired  guaranty  con- 
cerning the  military  roads  having  halting-stations  in 
Hesse,  the  King  adhered  firmly  to  his  order  that 
Groben  should  hold  his  position  and  keep  back  the 
Bavarians  from  these  military  roads. 

It  was  in  vain  that  the  Minister  of  War,  Stockhausen, 
affirmed  that  Austria  had  already  collected  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty  thousand  men  in  Bohemia,  and  twenty 
thousand  men  in  Bavaria,  and  that  Bavaria,  Wiirtem- 
berg,  and  Saxony  were  exerting  all  their  energies  in 
getting  ready  for  war ;  in  vain  he  declared  that  the  Prus- 
sian position  in  Hesse  was  untenable.  The  King,  on  the 
18th  of  November,  ordered  the  message  to  be  sent  to 
Vienna  that  he  should  be  obliged  to  regard  any  attack 
upon  his  troops  in  Hesse  as  a  declaration  of  war,  — 
first  of  all,  on  the  part  of  the  Elector;  and  that  he, 
the  King,  hoped  Austria  would  not  allow  herself  to  be 
led  into  a  fratricidal  war  by  such  a  Government  as  that 
of  Hesse-Cassel.  The  Confederate  Diet  hereupon 
yielded  to  tlie  supplications  of  the  Elector,  and  agreed 
to  a  temporary  i)ostponement  of  military  operations. 

Thus  Manteuffel's  fears  increased,  lest  liis  work  of 
bringing  about  peace  sliould  suffer  sliipwreck  in  very 
sight  of  the  haven.  Fresh  sources  of  apprehension 
arose  rapidly   one  after  another.     On  tlie  19th,   there 


54  OLMUTZ. 

came  a  note  from  the  little  Duchy  of  Brunswick  that 
almost  took  his  breath  away.  It  read  as  follows :  The 
report  had  reached  them  that  the  so-called  Confederate 
Diet  was  planning,  after  its  orders  should  have  been 
carried  out  in  Hesse-Cassel,  to  send  its  army  to  exe- 
cute a  similar  chastisement  upon  Holstein,  and  that 
this  army  was  to  cross  over  land  belonging  to  Bruns- 
wick ;  the  people  of  the  latter  Duchy,  however,  had  no 
intention  to  submit  to  such  presumption  on  the  part  of 
an  illegal  body,  and  asked  whether  Prussia  would  grant 
to  her  ally,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  the  necessary 
assistance  and  protection. 

With  terror,  Manteuffel  thought  how  pleasing  this 
protest  against  the  Confederate  Diet  would  sound  in 
the  ears  of  the  King,  and  what  anger  his  support  of  it 
would  excite  in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg. 

There  followed,  almost  at  the  same  moment,  indica- 
tions of  a  general  European  complication  that  would 
involve  incalculable  consequences.  The  French  Prince- 
President,  Louis  Napoleon,  had  stationed  an  "  army  of 
observation  "  of  forty  thousand  men  upon  his  eastern 
frontier;  and  the  French  newspapers  asserted  that 
France  would  suffer  neither  an  Austrian  protectorate 
over  Italy  nor  the  execution  of  the  ambitious  designs 
of  Russia  and  Austria  in  Germany.  What  would 
happen  if  these  threats  should  be  actually  carried  out, 
and  if  the  Prussian  war-party  should  depend  upon 
such   support  ? 

All  these  matters  came  up  for  discussion  in  a  session 
of  the  Ministei'ial  Council  held  on  the  20th  November, 


PRUSSIAN  ADDRESS  FROM  THE   THRONE.     65 

at  wliich  the  King  presided.  At  first,  the  Monarch 
approved  the  outline  of  the  Address  from  the  Throne 
prepared  for  the  opening  of  the  Chambers.  The 
Address,  as  far  as  the  German  situation  was  concerned, 
accorded  throufjhout  with  the  ideas  of  Ladenbero-,  and 
contained  the  following  sentiments  :  — 

The  King  will  take  up  again  his  plans  for  a  Union, 
so  soon  as  the  Constitution  for  all  Germany  shall  be 
reformed ;  in  this  latter,  Prussia's  position  must  be 
improved ;  in  the  Hessian  affair  Prussia's  remon- 
strances have  not  met  with  the  proper  consideration ; 
until  they  do,  Prussia  must  remain  under  arms  and 
thoroughly  equipped.  Such  words  could  not  fail,  in 
the  estimation  of  all  Europe,  to  sound  very  much  like 
war. 

With  regard  to  the  Brunswick  note,  the  King  was 
delighted  with  this  bold  protest  against  the  presumption 
of  the  so-called  Confederate  Diet.  Jt  was  decided  to 
send  a  despatch  to  Vienna  with  the  declaration  that 
the  Duke  was  fully  justified  in  his  refusal  to  allow  the 
troops  to  cross  his  territory,  and  in  his  request  for 
Prussia's  protection ;  and  that  there  was,  moreover, 
one  very  simple  means  of  smoothing  away  all  the 
dilliculties,  namely,  the  postponement  of  the  execution 
of  penal  measures  in  Ilolstein  until  after  the  whole 
matter  should  be  definitely  settled  in  the  congresses. 

The  King  remarked  to  his  Ministers  that  by  advo- 
cating this  metlii)d  of  procedure,  he  liad  no  idea  of 
sustaining  tlic  Holstciners  in  their  refractory  conduct 
toward  their  King-Duke.     On  the  contrary,  lie  advised 


56  OLMUTZ. 

the  sending  of  a  fresh  monition  to  the  Government  at 
Kiel  to  show  a  compliant  spirit  and  be  reconciled  to 
their  sovereign. 

The  King's  attitude  toward  the  French  threats 
against  Austria  was  the  same  that  he  maintained  at  the 
time  of  the  revolts  in  the  spring  of  1849  toward  the 
German  princes  who  opposed  his  su|)remacy.  He  was 
the  farthest  possible  from  entertaining  the  idea  of 
taking  advantage  of  his  enemy's  embarrassment.  He 
felt  an  almost  physical  antipathy  towards  the  Bonaparte 
family,  as  he  did  also  towards  the  Revolution.  Such 
assistance  was  a  source  of  great  danger,  he  said ;  it 
could  neither  be  asked  for  nor  accepted ;  it  should 
rather  be  opposed.  He  wished  to  make  an  attempt  to 
induce  Austria,  in  view  of  this  French  move,  to  join 
with  Prussia;  and  to  persuade  the  Vienna  Court  of 
the  necessity  of  a  complete  and  immediate  union  of 
action  with  Berlin.  The  Ministers  were  requested  to 
consider  this  matter. 

However  glad  Manteuffel  was  that  the  King  showed 
no  inclination  to  form  an  alliance  with  France  against 
Austria,  he  had,  like  his  colleagues,  many  misgivings 
about  saying  anything  to  the  Vienna  Court  about  the 
French  doings,  at  least  to  express  such  sentiments  as 
those  the  King  entertained.  For  the  danger  of  a 
rupture  with  Austria  had  been  evidently  increased  by 
the  last  votes  that  had  been  passed ;  and  how  would  it 
be,  if  Schwarzenberg  should  then  be  in  a  position  to 
communicate  to  the  French  potentate  Prussia's  hostile 
proposals  ? 


REPLY  OF  AUSTRIA.  57 

The  King,  meanwhile,  let  the  matter  rest  there  ;  but, 
as  we  shall  see,  he  by  no  means  gave  up  his  ideas. 

On  the  21st  of  November,  the  Chambers  were  opened 
by  the  reading  of  the  Address  from  the  Throne,  which, 
on  account  of  the  vigorous  expressions  it  contained, 
was  throughout  the  whole  length  and  breadth  of  Ger- 
many interpreted  as  a  challenge  of  war,  and  was  just 
for  that  very  reason  accepted  with  hearty  applause  by  a 
decided  majority  of  the  deputies. 

Prokesch  delivered  at  last,  on  the  following  day, 
Austria's  reply  to  Prussia's  demand  for  a  guaranty 
with  regard  to  the  military  roads.  It  had  been  written 
on  the  2Cth  in  Vienna,  and  was  based  upon  the  Con- 
federate vote  of  the  15th,  with  which  it  was  in  har- 
mony. It  stated  concisely  and  without  ambiguity, 
that  the  Confederate  troops  entered  the  country  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  preserving  order  and  of  restoring  the 
sovereign  authority,  and  that  so  soon  as  this  end  should 
be  attained  they  should  be  immediately  withdrawn. 
The  promise  was  given  that  tlie  military  roads  with 
halting-stations  in  Hesse,  which  were  built  for  the 
convenience  of  Prussian  troops  crossing  the  country, 
should  be  made  use  of  only  in  strict  accordance  with 
tlie  treaties ;  and  the  ho])e  was  then  expressed  that 
Prussia  would  no  longer  render  the  salutary  work  of 
restoring  the  monarchical  authority  difficult  by  further 
occupation  and  obstruction  of  the  roads,  to  which 
indeed  the  treaties  gave  tliem  no  right. 

The  despatch  was  wiiltcii  in  a  conciliatory  tone; 
Prokesch  also  fell  authoii/.cd  to  udd  conlidcntiallv   that 


58  OLMUTZ. 

if  Prussia  should  oiDen  the  roads  to  the  Confederate 
troops,  Austria  woukl  make  no  objection  to  Prussia's 
leaving  some  few  troops  at  the  halting-stations.  An 
immediate  and  satisfactory  answer  was  urgently  desired. 
A  note  written  by  Schwarzenberg  at  the  same  time 
portrayed  the  distress  of  the  troops  and  destitution  of 
the  jjopulation  in  the  vicinity  of  Fulda.  "  It  is  posi- 
tively impossible,"  he  said,  "  for  such  a  state  of  things 
to  continue.  Is  the  King  willing  to  take  upon  himself 
the  responsibility  of  such  an  amount  of  wretchedness 
and  misery  ?     We  cannot  think  so." 

Prussia  thus  received  the  most  satisfactory  assur- 
ances of  the  safety  of  her  own  provinces.  But  the  real 
wishes  of  the  King,  the  exclusion  of  the  Confederate 
troops  from  Cassel  and  consequent  prevention  of  the 
execution  of  the  proposed  penal  measures,  were  point- 
blank  refused.  The  critical  moment  had  come.  Pro- 
kesch  most  emphatically  declared  that  a  negative 
answer  from  Prussia  would  be  straightway  followed  by 
the  beginning  of  a  war, 

Prokesch  was  supported  in  his  assertion  by  the  no 
less  emphatic  avowal  of  Baron  Budberg,  the  Russian 
Ambassador.  The  latter  conversed  with  Ladenberg, 
Manteuffel,  and  Adjutant-General  Gerlach.  He  told 
them  that  tlie  Emperor  Nicholas  was  already  exceed- 
ingly annoyed  at  Prussia's  justification  of  Brunswick's 
behavior,  and  considered  his  own  honor  assailed  in 
every  attempt  to  place  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the 
execution  of  the  penal  measures  proposed  by  the  Con- 
federation ;  and  that  he  had  already  ordered  the  mobili- 


DISCUSSION  IN  THE  MINISTRY.  59 

zation  of  the  grenadier  corps  and  the  Cossacks  on  the 
Don,  since  he  saw  in  a  quarrel  over  Hesse-Cassel  the 
signal  of  a  war  for  himself.  This  was,  as  was  soon  to 
be  seen,  no  exaggeration.  Prussia  stood  before  a 
momentous  decision. 

On  the  23d  of  November,  Manteuffel  laid  the  Aus- 
trian despatch  before  the  Ministerial  Council,  remark- 
ino-  that  although  it  did  not  contain  all  that  had  been 
demanded  on  the  9th,  yet  matters  were  in  the  main 
settled,  especially  after  the  confidential  communication 
of  Prokesch.  Austria's  object,  he  said,  was  simply  the 
execution  of  the  penal  measures,  which  Prussia  had 
promised  not  to  hinder;  if,  then,  the  latter  kept  the 
military  roads  closed,  this  would  be  an  inconsistency 
behind  which  hostile  intentions  might  be  suspected; 
Prussia  would  be  unnecessaril}^  and  without  good  cause 
bring-ing-  on  a  war. 

Stockhausen  and  Simon  not  only  agreed  with  him, 
but  even  proposed  that  Prussia  should  withdraw  her 
troops  entirely  from  Hesse,  since,  as  they  said,  she  of 
course  did  not  wish  to  be  concerned  in  the  internal 
disorders  of  Hesse. 

None  of  the  other  iNIinisters,  liowever,  would  advo- 
cate such  a  line  of  conduct.  In  the  expression  of  their 
individiiul  o[)iiii()iis,  they  attacked  several  points  in 
Manteuffel's  deductions.  Ladenberg  went  so  far  as  to 
aver  that  the  wliole  business  of  the  so-called  guaranties 
was  a  piece  of  dissimulation  behind  wliich  lay  the 
design  to  attack  Prussia  unawares. 

"We     have    already     abandoned,"     lie    said,     "one 


60  OLMUTZ. 

principle  that  lay  at  the  bottom  of  our  sending  troops 
into  Hesse-Cassel ;  we  must  so  much  the  more  firmly 
insist  upon  the  other,  the  security  of  our  military  roads. 
The  Austrian  explanations  have  proved  to  be  entirely 
insufficient.  Nothing  is  said  about  lessening  the  size 
of  the  Confederate  army  in  Hesse,  which  is  unnecessa- 
ril}'  large  for  the  professed  purpose ;  and  it  is  very 
noticeable  that  no  mention  whatever  is  made  of  the 
project  of  sending  General  Legeditsch  to  Holstein. 
Indeed,  we  should  have  every  reason  to  ask  in  so  many 
words  the  very  grave  question,  whether  beside  the 
punishment  of  Hesse  the  troops  that  the  Coalition  have 
sent  into  that  country  are  not  perhaps  designed  to 
carry  out  some  further  purpose.  The  withdrawal  of 
our  divisions  under  such  circumstances  would  be  a 
defeat  that  could  not  be  made  good.  We  owe  it  to  our 
Chambers  not  to  decide  upon  such  a  measure  without 
their  consent." 

Thus  opinions  differed.  It  was  impossible  to 
come  to  any  conclusion.  It  was  resolved  to  hold 
another  session  of  the  Cabinet  forthwith,  at  which 
the  present  situation  of  things  should  be  laid  before 
the  King. 

A  proposition  had  already  been  made  in  the  session 
of  the  19th  to  remove  the  difficulties  by  a  personal 
Intel-view  between  Manteuffel  and  Schwarzenberg. 
The  Ministers  decided  at  the  time  to  refer  this  plan  to 
the  King.  Frederick  William  had  let  the  matter  lie 
undetermined.  But  now,  when  the  probability  of  war 
stood  before  his  eyes,  and  he  neither  wished  to  yield 


A  U  STRIA  'S   UL  TIM  A  TUM.  61 

nor  to  make  M'ar,  he  fell  back  upon  this  expedient. 
On  the  24th  of  November,  a  Count  Stolberg  was 
despatched  to  Vienna  with  the  commission  to  portray 
the  uncomfortable  position  of  the  Government  in  face 
of  public  opinion ;  to  rec^uest  Schwarzenberg  to  pass 
over  temporarily  the  two  special  questions  concerning 
Hesse  and  Holstein,  and  to  proceed  at  once  to  the 
convention  of  the  congresses  for  the  settlement 
of  the  German  question ;  at  the  same  time  to  ex- 
tend to  the  Prince  the  invitation  of  ]\Ianteuffel  to 
meet  him  at  any  place  convenient  to  the  Prince ; 
and  to  report  forthwith  concerning  the  acceptance  of 
the  same. 

Yet  before  any  reply  could  be  obtained  through  this 
channel,  Schwarzenberg  had  decided  to  put  an  end  to 
the  increasing  complaints  of  Taxis  and  the  Confederate 
Diet.  Taxis  received  orders  to  begin  his  march  upon 
Cassel  on  the  27th  of  November,  and  to  overcome  by 
force  of  arms  any  opposition  that  he  might  encounter 
from  Ciiiihen.  iSIanteuffel  also  received  on  the  25th 
the  following  note  fn^n  Prokesch :  — 

"  On  account  of  tlie  difficulties  connected  with  the 
furnishing  of  supplies,  the  imperial  Austrian  and  royal 
Bavarian  troops,  which  have  been  led  into  Hesse-Cassel 
for  tlie  purpose  of  restoring  the  sovereign  authority, 
can  no  longer  remain  in  their  present  position.  TIic 
undersigned  has  tlierefore  been  commissioned  by  the 
imperial  (Jovernment  to  request  in  its  name  that  within 
forty-eight   hours,    that   is,    before    the   noon   of    next 


62  OLMUTZ. 

Wednesday,  the  27th  of  November,  a  final  answer  may- 
be given  to  the  following  questions  :  — 

"  Inasmuch  as  the  guaranties  demanded  by  Prus- 
sia have  been  granted  by  Austria,  may  the  above- 
mentioned  troops  now  move  on,  without  opposi- 
tion, towards  Cassel? 

Have  tlie  proper  orders  been  sent  to  Lieutenant- 
General  Groben? 

The  undersigned  most  respectfully  etc. 

Pkoicesch." 

Manteuffel  hastened  to  report  this  ultimatum  to  the 
King  at  Potsdam,  and  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
received  the  following  reply  :  — 

"  Telegraph  at  once  to  Vienna  that  I  have  sent  you 
to  the  Prince  as  the  bearer  of  friendly  messages,  and 
that  I  expect  you  will  be  cordially  received.  Then  the 
inquiry  with  regard  to  the  place  of  meeting.  The 
same  word  may  be  sent  to  Prokesch." 

The  Minister  contented  himself  for  the  present  with 
telegraphing  to  Bernstorff  that  he  expected  an  imme- 
diate reply  from  Stolberg,  and  that  he  himself  was 
ready  to  set  out  at  a  moment's  notice.  Then,  in  order 
to  obtain  more  detailed  instructions,  he  called  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Cabinet,  at  which  the  King  presided,  and  the 
Heir-Apparent  Avas  present. 

After  a  specific  statement  of  the  dangers  connected 
with  the  opening  of  the  military  roads  to  the  Confeder- 
ate troops,  the  King  went  on  to  say,  — 

"To  avoid   compliance   with   Austria's    demands,  a 


THE  KING'S  SPEECH.  63 

personal  conference  of  Manteuffel  with  Schwarzenberg 
is  necessary,  whether  this  takes  place  in  Oclerberg, 
Olmiitz,  or  Vienna.  At  this  interview,  Manteuffel  must 
represent  to  the  Prince  the  impossibility  of  further  con- 
cessions, in  view  of  the  sentiment  that  exists  among 
the  people  and  in  the  army.  He  must  then  try  to 
transfer  nesfotiations  to  a  new  basis.  He  must  seek  to 
have  the  Hessian  question  referred  to  the  general  con- 
gresses ;  to  this  end  he  must  call  the  attention  of  the 
Prince  to  the  dangers  which  threaten  from  the  side  of 
France,  and  remind  him  how  in  1815  the  outbreak 
of  an  impending  war  was  hindered  by  Napoleon's 
return.  He  shall  express  the  hope  that  in  Hesse  the 
Elector  may  soon  return  with  his  troops  to  Cassel,  and 
that  then  all  foreign  soldiers  may  leave  the  electorate. 
He  shall  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  so-called 
Confederate  Diet  has,  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  deputy 
from  Luxemburg,  lost  every  appearance  of  being  the 
authorized  representative  of  the  Confederation. 

"The  desired  result  can  best  be  brouglit  about  in 
Hesse,  if  the  Hessian  officials  and  communities  can  be 
induced  by  Prussian  mediation  to  acknowledge  again 
tlie  authority  of  the  Elector,  to  pay  the  taxes,  and  to 
request  the  Elector's  return  to  Cassel.  The  end  woukl 
thus  be  attained  by  peaceable  means.  The  Confederate 
troops  would  not  need  to  proceed  over  our  military 
roads,  and  Prussia  could  demand  that  she  should  not 
be  interfered  with  in  her  efforts  for  peace.  Prussian 
plenipotentiaries  must  be  therefore  despatched  to  Hesse- 
Cassel  to  prosecute  this  work  of  mediation." 


64  OLMUTZ. 

The  special  points  were  then  settled  upon,  towards 
which  Manteiiffel  in  the  proposed  interview  should 
direct  his  exertions.     These  were,  — 

1.  Austria's  assent  to  the  six  propositions  brought 
forward  at  Warsaw. 

2.  The  immediate  convention  of  the  general  con- 
gresses. 

3.  The  reference  of  the  Hessian  and  Holstein  ques- 
tions to  the  decision  of  these  conoresses. 

Thereupon  Manteuffel  repeated  his  directions  to 
Bernstorff,  to  get  an  answer  as  quickly  as  possible 
from  Schwarzenberg.  On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  in 
accordance  with  the  intentions  of  the  King,  Manteuffel 
gave  instructions  to  the  Counsellor  Niebuhr  with 
regard  to  a  message  to  the  Elector  at  Frankfort,  and 
also  to  the  Privy  Counsellor  Delbriick  with  regard  to 
negotiations  with  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition  of  the 
Estates  at  Cassel. 

But  just  then  he  received  through  Prokesch  a  tele- 
gram from  Schwarzenberg,  which  rendered  everything 
again  uncertain.  The  Prince  wrote  that  he  would  be 
ready  for  a  meeting  so  soon  as  he  received  satisfactory 
news  concerning  the  opening  of  the  military  roads  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Prussians  from  Cassel.  Man- 
teuffel replied  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon  that  the 
object  of  the  meeting  was  precisely  to  try  to  decide 
about  all  these  points  of  controversy,  including  the 
Hessian  affairs,  in  which  certain  events  had  just  taken 
place  that  materially  increased  the  prospects  of  a  peace- 
ful solution.     Inasmuch  as  the  answer  to  the  questions 


THE  KING'S  LETTER.  65 

proposed  by  Prokesch  was  to  depend  upon  the  result  of 
the  meeting,  Manteuffel  asked  again  whether  Schwarz- 
enberg  would  withdraw  the  condition  upon  which  he 
gave  his  consent  to  an  interview. 

As  an  announcement  was  received  from  Groben  that 
Taxis  had  threatened  to  force  his  advance  in  the  event 
of  opposition,  the  Ministry  requested  the  King  to  call 
a  meeting  of  the  Council  that  very  day.  After  the 
three  despatches  had  been  read,  the  King  declared  with 
great  composure  that  his  intentions  were  not  in  the 
least  changed  in  consequence. 

He  read  to  the  Ministers  an  autograph  letter  to  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  to  the  effect  that  Prussia,  in 
view  of  the  mediatory  plans  undertaken  by  her,  had 
the  right  to  request  that  she  be  not  molested  in  her 
endeavors ;  and  that  since  the  advance  of  the  Confed- 
erate troops  north  of  the  military  roads  would  conse- 
quently be  unnecessary,  Prussia  saw  no  reason  Avhy 
she  should  allow  this  advance.  At  the  end  of  the 
letter  he  referred  to  the  threatened  danger  from  the 
movements  of  the  French. 

A  similar  letter  from  the  queen  to  her  sister,  the 
Archduchess  So])hia,  was  enclosed.  The  King  said 
that  Manteuffel  sliould  forward  both  of  these  letters 
tlirougli  tlie  liands  of  Schwarzenberg  to  the  persons 
addressed,  and  for  this  purpose  should  at  all  events 
bring  about  a  meeting.  Manteuffel  expressed  his 
readiness  to  obey  every  order  of  the  King,  but  observed 
that  he  did  not  expect  tliat  lliis  step  would  do  any 
good  ;  on    the   other   hand,   he  feared  lest,   in  case  his 


66  OLMUTZ. 

requests  were  not  granted,  his  journey  should  compro- 
mise the  honor  of  the  Government. 

The  King  did  not,  however,  share  his  fears. 
"  Schwarzenberg,"  said  the  King,  "  cannot  in  any  way 
refuse  an  interview,  if  Manteuffel  announces  himself  as 
the  bearer  of  these  two  letters  and  of  special  messages 
from  the  King.  It  doesn't  depend  so  much  upon  the 
success  attendant  upon  this  step  as  upon  the  step 
itself.  If  it  is  unsuccessful,  then  the  whole  responsi- 
bility of  the  war  is  thereby  thrown  off  Prussia's  shoul- 
ders."    The  King  then  closed  the  session. 

With  no  very  light  heart  did  Manteuffel  go  -from 
this  meeting  of  the  Council.  He  awaited  in  feverish 
suspense  further  news  from  Bernstorff,  before  he  should 
proceed  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  the  King.  At  last  a 
despatch  arrived,  Avhich  had  been  sent  after  eight 
o'clock,  and  the  contents  of  which  were,  that  Schwarz- 
enberg had  after  a  long  discussion  finally  made  up  his 
mind  not  to  decline  holding  the  interview,  but  intended 
first  to  get  the  approval  of  the  Emperor  before  fully 
deciding.  Bernstorff  hoped  to  receive  a  definite  reply 
the  same  evening. 

It  was  already  ten  o'clock.  After  the  lapse  of  an 
hour,  Manteuffel  felt  that  he  must  not  delay  any 
longer,  and  telegraphed  to  Bernstorff  that  he  was  about 
to  set  out  the  next  morning  with  a  special  message 
from  the  King  and  with  autograph  letters  from  Their 
Majesties,  to  be  delivered  at  the  proposed  interview.  As 
a  place  of  meeting,  he  suggested  Olmiitz,  and  asked  that 
a  reply  might  intercept  him  the  next  day  at  Breslau. 


DEPARTURE  FOR   OLMUTZ.  67 

An  hour  later,  Bernstorff's  anxiously-awaited  telegram 
came  to  hand,  which  was  worded  as  follows  :  "  At  the 
orders  of  the  Emperor,  Schwarzenberg  will  set  out  on 
the  28th  for  Olmiitz.  If  you  leave  Berlin  to-morrow 
evening,  you  will  arrive  at  the  same  time  with  him." 

According  to  the  later  reports  of  Bernstorflf,  Schwarz- 
enberg had  with  the  greatest  reluctance  agreed  to  the 
proposal  of  an  interview.  It  had  cost  the  Ambassador 
a  great  deal  of  pains  to  persuade  him  to  ask  the 
Emperor's  opinion,  rather  than  to  reject  the  proj)osal  at 
the  outset.  Finally  he  yielded;  and  on  the  27th  he 
sent  a  request  to  the  Confederate  Diet  at  Frankfort,  to 
postpone  the  advance  of  the  Bavarians  until  further 
notice. 

Meanwhile  Delbriick  and  Niebuhr  had  started  for 
their  respective  destinations.  Towards  noon  Manteuf- 
fel  sent  to  Prokesch  a  short  note  of  the  following 
import :  Since  he  was  about  to  leave  the  city,  in  order 
to  deliver  to  the  Austrian  Emperor  and  Prince 
Schwarzenberg  direct  messages  from  Tlieir  Royal 
Majesties,  this  note  would  ini[)ly  of  itself  the  necessity 
of  deferring  an  answer  to  the  note  of  the  25th  until  his 
return,  and  he  should  feel  assured  beforehand  of  the 
assent  of  the  Ambassador. 

Accordingly,  he  departed  in  the  evening  to  journey 
towaids  a  catastrophe  in  Prnssian  politics,  towards 
what  was  to  seem  to  him  to  be  a  threefold  salvation 
from  mortal  danger,  to  the  King  almost,  if  not  quite,  a 
triumpli,  bjit  to  the  rest  of  the  world  a  fearful  humilia- 
tion and  defeat. 


68  OLMUTZ. 

On  the  evening  of  the  28th  of  November,  the 
two  Ministers  arrived  at  the  hotel  Zur  Krone  in 
Olmiitz,  and  began  at  once  their  conference  at  six 
o'clock,  which  was  continued  and  ended  the  next 
day.  No  detailed  account  of  the  course  of  con- 
versation at  this  interview  has  ever  yet  been  made 
public ;  yet,  from  everything  that  preceded  and  fol- 
lowed it,  there  can  be  no  doubt  left  concerning  its 
main  features. 

Manteuffel  had  long  been  an  open  enemy  of  Prussia's 
whole  scheme  of  a  Union.  He  felt,  as  a  strict  official  of 
the  state,  a  radical  aversion  to  the  estates,  officers,  and 
functionaries  in  Hesse-Cassel ;  and  he  was  quite  ready 
to  subject  Holstein  to  the  rule  of  the  Danish  King, 
and  to  help  in  settling  the  succession  according  to  the 
latter's  wishes. 

He  might  very  well  say  to  Schwarzenberg :  What 
are  we  really  quarrelling  about?  Have  we  not  in 
everything  the  same  interests  and  the  same  aims  ? 
Does  anything  at  all  stand  in  the  way  of  our  coming  to 
an  agreement  but  your  unreasonable  wilfulness  in 
setting  up  again,  in  a  manner  very  insulting  to  the 
Prussian  King,  the  old  Confederate  Diet,  and  in  now 
commissioning  that  body  alone  to  restore  order  in  two 
countries  that  lie  within  our  sway?  Are  we  not 
wholly  at  one  so  soon  as  you  are  willing  to  co-operate 
with  us  in  these  matters,  —  with  us  who  have  there  the 
same  object  in  view  as  yourself?  And  isn't  it  better 
that  we  should  secure  subordination  in  Hesse-Cassel  by 
peaceful  mediation,  than  that  your  Bavarian  regiments 


DETAILED  DECISIONS.  69 

should  continue  by  their  dragoonades  to  arouse  the 
indignation  of  the  AA^iole  world? 

From  the  Austrian  point  of  view  there  could  be 
found  reasons  enough  for  assenting  to  these  sentiments, 
in  accordance  with  which  Austria  would  gain  every- 
thing that  she  had  desired  in  the  matter,  and  on  her 
part  needed  only  to  make  a  few  technical  concessions 
at  the  expense  of  the  Confederate  Diet,  which  Schwarz- 
enberg,  apart  from  this,  intended  to  subject  to  a 
thorough   reform. 

Yet  it  appears  that  the  Prince,  who  to  begin  with 
had  come  to  Olmiitz  against  his  will  and  only  at  the 
command  of  his  Emperor,  took  part  in  the  negotiations 
with  the  same  reluctance,  and  in  every  contested  matter 
demanded  unconditional  concession.  Indeed,  the 
Prussian  and  French  ambassadors  in  Vienna  reported 
to  their  Governments  during  the  following  days,  that 
Schwarzenberg  had  declared  Manteuffel's  offers  insuffi- 
cient, and  had  not  until  the  29th,  and  then  only  at  the 
command  of  the  Emperor,  been  willing  to  go  on  in  the 
negotiations.  So  that  it  was  due  to  the  personal  inter- 
position of  Francis  Joseph  that  an  enormous  shedding 
of  blood  was  at  this  time  prevented. 

So  far  as  the  particular  questions  were  concerned, 
the  Prince  had  already  in  Warsaw  yielded  to  Prussia's 
desire  to  commit  the  duty  of  reforming  the  Confedera- 
tion to  general  congresses  in  which  all  the  German 
Governments  should  be  represented.  lie  had  done  so 
with  good  reason  ;  for  this  method  offered  to  a  friend 
of   reform  —  and    the    Pjince    had    in    liis    niiiul    <jrcat 


70  OLMUTZ. 

schemes  of  reform  —  better  chances  for  success  than 
could  be  hoped  for  with  the  inflexible  formalities 
connected  with  the  Confederate  Diet. 

If,  now,  Prussia  should  show  signs  of  supporting  the 
Austrian  policy  with  regard  to  Holstein,  then  Austria 
might  indeed,  without  discarding  her  principles,  gratify 
the  King,  by  putting  the  management  of  the  affair 
into  the  hands  of  an  Austro-Prussian  commission, 
instead  of  one  appointed  by  the  Confederate  Diet. 
For  the  latter  had  as  yet  only  sent  a  monition  to  Hol- 
stein, and  had  not  yet  taken  any  further  steps  as  a 
body.  So  that,  in  yielding  to  the  wish  of  Prussia,  it 
would  not  in  this  case  seem  to  be  backing  down  from 
any  undertaking. 

The  case  was  different,  however,  in  Hesse-Cassel. 
If  Manteuffel,  although  against  his  own  convictions 
and  only  because  of  the  royal  orders,  could  assert  that 
further  concessions  in  the  electorate  were  impossible 
on  account  of  the  heated  passions  of  the  people  and  the 
army,  so  might  Schwarzenberg  with  equal  positiveness 
declare  that  it  would  never  do  to  compromise  Bavaria's 
military  honor  by  stopping,  at  the  command  of  Prussia, 
the  execution  of  the  Confederate  penal  measures  when 
they  were  in  full  swing,  and  letting  them  end  in  nothing. 
How  could  these  two  impossibilities  be  reconciled  ? 
The  way  was  pointed  out  by  the  conservative  policy 
and  principles  to  which  both  of  these  statesmen  were 
devoted. 

To  the  Confederate  Diet  had  been  committed  the 
task  of  putting  down  the  opposition  manifested  against 


THE  AGREEMENT.  71 

Hassenpflug's  September  decrees ;  after  this  had  been 
done,  its  troops  were  to  leave  the  country.  But  it  was 
very  evident  to  both  Ministers  that  the  Confederation 
ought  not  to  consider  its  duty  then  ended,  but  should 
rather,  by  reforming  the  Hessian  Constitution,  close  up 
forever  the  source  of  such  troubles. 

This  matter,  so  weighty  in  its  consequences,  Schwarz- 
enberg  was  ready  to  refer  to  the  general  congresses, 
and  in  accordance  with  Prussia's  desire,  to  an  Austro- 
Prussian  commission  a^^i^ointed  by  these  congresses. 
Manteuffel,  in  his  turn,  and  in  conformity  with  his 
utterances  of  the  23d,  agreed  to  allow  the  Confederate 
troops  to  cross  the  Prussian  position  on  the  military 
road,  and  to  carry  out  in  every  respect  their  orders. 
He  was  quite  delighted  with  the  idea  that  they  Avere  to 
bear  the  odium  of  the  chastisement  of  Hesse  alone  and 
without  Prussia,  quite  forgetting  that,  after  so  long  a 
resistance,  the  granting  of  their  requests  would  only 
occasion  exactly  the  same  bitterness  of  feeling  as  if 
Prussia  had  taken  part.  With  regard  to  Prussian 
troops  in  Hesse,  we  have  seen  that  Schwarzenberg  had 
already  said  he  should  make  no  objections  to  the  plan 
of  leaving  a  small  company  of  them  upon  the  military 
road ;  and  the  point  was  now  to  be  passed  over  in 
silence,  so  as  to  avoid  every  appearance  of  a  retreat  of 
the  Prussian  troops  before  the  Bavarians. 

The  possession  of  the  capital  city,  Cassel,  was  also  a 
difficult  question.  So  far  Austria  had  suffered  no 
Prussian  troops  there,  and  Prussia  no  Bavarian.  It 
was  now  agieed  that  the  future  garrison  should  consist 


72  OLMUTZ. 

of  one  Prussian  battalion,  and  one  composed  of  the 
troops  chosen  by  the  Elector,  whereby  it  was  tacitly 
implied  that  the  latter  should  be  Austrian.  On  the 
other  hand,  Schwarzenberg  insisted,  for  the  sake  of  the 
principle  involved,  that  the  consent  of  the  Elector  to 
this  arrangement  was  necessary,  which,  then,  should  be 
solicited  by  both  Governments  together.  Schwarzen- 
berg added  confidentially  the  promise  that  the  troops 
now  in  Hesse  should  advance  only  slowly,  and  not 
arrive  in  Cassel  before  the  consent  of  the  Elector  should 
have  been  attained. 

Finally,  Manteuffel  brought  up  the  six  Warsaw 
propositions  as  a  basis  of  the  reform  of  the  Confederate 
Constitution  to  be  undertaken  by  the  congresses.  But 
in  this  matter  Schwarzenberg  held  firmly  to  the  posi- 
tion taken  by  him  in  Warsaw.  He  again  accepted  the 
propositions  conceding  the  admission  of  the  whole  of 
Austria  into  the  Confederation,  the  formation  of  a 
Confederate  Council  consisting  of  seventeen  votes  and 
having  the  functions  of  the  old  Confederate  Diet,  the 
absence  of  any  popular  representation  in  the  Confedera- 
tion, and  the  right  to  form  unions  according  to  his  own 
interpretation,  to  which  Manteuffel  had  made  no 
objections,  of  Article  XI.  of  the  Act  of  Confederation. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Prince  inexorably  refused  to 
share  the  presidency  of  the  Confederation  with  Prussia  ; 
he  advocated,  indeed,  the  formation  of  a  strong  execu- 
tive, but  would  not  bind  himself  to  the  promise  of 
allowinjT  this  to  be  intrusted  to  Austria  and  Prussia. 
This  was,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  for  Prussia  just 


QUESTION  OF  DISARMAMENT.  73 

the  most  critical  point ;  so  that  in  this  matter  no  con- 
clusion was  obtained.  As  to  the  details  of  the  Con- 
federate reform,  both  Powers  were  to  attend  the 
congresses  entirely  free,  bound  by  no  obligations. 
SchwaVzenberg  finally  made  a  concession  of  no  great 
importance  by  accepting  Prussia's  proposal  of  Dresden, 
as  the  place  for  holding  these  congresses,  instead  of 
Vienna. 

Thus  the  Olmiitz  Agreement^  was  signed  by  both 
Ministers  on  the  29th  of  November,  1850.  Schwarzen- 
berg  then  laid  before  Manteuffel  the  following  memo- 
randum, to  which  the  latter  gave  assent  at  once  in  the 
name  of  Prussia  :  — 

His  Majesty,  the  King  of  Prussia,  is  hereby  requested 
to  appoint  some  day  near  at  hand  for  the  announce- 
ment of  his  decree  countermaliding  the  order  of  the 
6th  of  November  for  the  mobilization  of  the  troops. 
When  this  imformation  shall  be  received.  His  Majesty, 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  (with  the  certain  assurance  of 
the  consent  of  the  other  Governments  represented  in 
the  Confederate  assembly),  will  upon  the  same  day 
proclaim  the  cessation  of  all  preparations  for  war,  and 
ordain  the  following  measures  :  the  granting  of  fur- 
loughs to  the  battalions  of  the  militia  and  to  the 
fourth  battalion  of  every  regiment,  the  reversal  of  the 
order  to  enlist  recruits,  and  the  immediate  withdrawal 
of  the  troops  that  were  already  stationed  upon  the 
frontiers. 

1  Strangely  cnniifili,  no  oriijinal  copy  of  tlifs  Agreeiiiunt  uau  be  found 
among  the  Prussian  state  ducuinents. 


74  OLMUTZ. 

Schwarzenberg  observed  that  the  main  point  to  be 
considered  was  that  the  disbanding  should  take  place 
before  the  beginning  of  the  congresses :  Austria  could 
not  issue  the  invitations  to  these  until  the  army  should 
be  already  reduced  to  its  peace-footing  in  the  manner 
above  mentioned. 

When  we  consider  the  final  result  of  the  conference 
at  Olmiitz,  we  see  that  Manteuffel  had  not  at  all 
succeeded  in  putting  through  the  first  commission  with 
which  he  had  been  charged,  —  the  acceptance  by  Austria 
of  the  six  Warsaw  propositions.  A  memorial  drawn  up 
by  the  Privy  Counsellor  Abeken,  on  the  Olmiitz  Agree- 
ment, says  very  naively  concerning  this  point:  Parity 
with  Austria  was  in  the  first  place  not  to  be  secured ; 
and,  in  the  second  place,  its  refusal  would  not  have 
meant  an  actual  declaration  of  war. 

To  the  second  commission  included  in  Manteuffel's 
instructions,  the  early  opening  of  the  general  con- 
gresses, Schwarzenberg  had  given  his  assent,  and  had 
also,  with  regard  to  the  place  of  meeting,  yielded  to 
Prussia's  wishes  ;  but  he  had,  on  the  other  hand,  made 
the  previous  disarming  of  the  militia  a  condition  of 
their  convention. 

In  the  third  point,  the  reference  of  the  Holstein  and 
Hessian  questions  to  the  congresses,  Manteuffel  had 
been  wholly  successful  in  respect  to  Holstein,  but  only 
partially  so  in  respect  to  Hesse-Cassel:  the  punishment 
of  the  country  was  to  be  left  to  the  Confederate  Diet, 
and  the  question  ^f  the  Constitution  to  an  Austro- 
Prussian     commission.      Schwarzenberg'    allowed    the 


RESULTS   OF  THE  AGREEMENT.  75 

presence  of  Prussian  troops  upon  the  military  road, 
concerninof  which  the  above-mentioned  memorial  re- 
marks  that  if  Prussia  were  now  to  withdraw  her  troops 
from  Hesse-Cassel,  it  would  be  an  act  purely  of  her 
own  free  choice. 

The  King  passed  over  the  agreement  about  the  occu- 
pation of  Cassel  and  the  assent  of  the  Elector  as  an  un- 
important matter  of  courtesy ;  to  the  advance  of  the 
Bavarians  across  the  military  roads  he  also  acceded, 
although  with  a  heavy  heart ;  but  he  nevertheless 
would  not  give  up  his  endeavors  to  anticipate  the  penal 
measures  of  the  Diet  by  a  peaceful  mediation  between 
the  Elector  and  his  subjects.  This  did  honor  to  his 
humane  sentiments ;  but  since  it  was  not  consistent 
with  what  had  been  decided  at  Olmlitz,  it  would  have 
put  him  and  his  commissioners  in  an  unpleasant  situa- 
tion if  Austria  and  the  Confederate  Diet  had  insisted, 
regardless  of  his  endeavors,  upon  the  execution  of  the 
penal  measures  as  agreed  upon  at  Olniiitz. 

Thus  Manteuffel,  for  the  sake  of  sweet  peace,  had 
sacrificed  important  parts  of  liis  instructions.  There  is 
not  the  least  doubt  but  that  he  found  himself  unable  to 
maintain  his  independence  before  the  su})erior  presence 
of  Scliwarzenberg.  His  most  glaring  act  of  compliance, 
even  from  liis  own  political  staii(l[)()iiii,  \\as  liis  assent 
to  Schwarzenberg's  memorandum  about  the  common 
disarmament.  For  although  they  had  agreed  to  refer 
the  Hessian  Constitution,  the  pacification  of  Holstein, 
and  the  I'cl'orni  of  tlie  CJei-inan  Confederation,  to  certain 
bodies  named   by   Prussia,  yet  tlierc;    liad   not  been  the 


76  OLMUTZ. 

least  understanding  about  the  probable  result  of  these 
various  negotiations,  and  it  is  very  clear  that  Prussia 
armed  could  assert  her  wishes  with  very  much  more 
emphasis  than  if  she  were  disarmed. 

Schwarzenberg  had  been  very  cautious  in  this  respect. 
Whereas  the  memorandum  bound  Prussia  to  a  complete 
return  to  a  peace-footing,  it  left  Austria  free  to  main- 
tain still  three  battalions  of  every  infantry  regiment,  all 
her  cavalry  and  artillery,  the  forty  thousand  soldiers  of 
the  armies  engaged  in  Hesse  and  Holstein,  and,  if  the 
Lesser  States  so  desired,  all  their  forces  upon  a  com- 
plete war-footing.  Manteuffel's  assent  to  such  a 
memorandum  forces  one  to  the  belief  that  he  wished  to 
arrange  it  so  that  the  ratification  of  the  Agreement 
would  render  it  impossible  for  his  enemies  at  home  to 
make  any  opposition  to  the  policy  pursued  by  himself 
and  Schwarzenberg. 

When,  in  the  ministerial  session  of  the  2d  of  Decem- 
ber, the  ratification  of  the  whole  Agreement  was 
discussed,  the  Prince  of  Prussia  expressed  the  most 
serious  misgivings  concerning  the  wisdom  of  disarming 
before  the  end  of  the  Dresden  congresses.  Ladenberg, 
indeed,  advocated  the  rejection  of  the  entire  Agree- 
ment. The  King  considered  it  a  great  victory,  that 
Austria  had  now  yielded  assent,  not  only  to  the  general 
congresses,  but  also  to  the  plan  of  referring  the  Hessian 
and  Holstein  questions  to  commissions  from  both 
Powers.  He  quieted  his  fears  about  the  disarmament 
with  the  thought  that  Prussia  could  at  any  time  order 
again   a   mobilization,   whereas    the   bad    condition    of 


RATIFICATION  OF  THE  AGREEMENT.  77 

Austria's  finances  would  prevent  her  from  doing  the 
same.  Very  true !  If  Austria  had  not  bound  herself 
to  only  an  apparent  disarmament.  Upon  the  royal  ratifi- 
cation of  the  Agreement,  Ladenberg  withdrew  from  the 
Ministry. 

In  the  Lower  House,  the  deputy,  Bismarck-Schon- 
hausen,  declared  at  once  that  the  postponement  of  the 
disarmament  until  the  close  of  the  Dresden  congresses 
was  most  earnestly  to  be  desired.  Two  weeks  later 
General  von  Manteuffel  himself  designated  the  over- 
hasty  acceptance  of  this  measure  as  the  chief  cause  of 
the  unfavorable  result  of  the  later  negotiations. 

In  Vienna  the  news  of  the  preservation  of  peace  was 
everywhere  hailed  with  delight.  The  people  of  that 
city  were  as  indifferent  to  the  Confederate  Diet, 
Holstein,  and  Hesse  as  possible ;  but  a  Prussian  war 
seemed  to  them  exceedingly  undesirable.  Austrian 
paper  rose,  the  agio  sank,  and  their  hearts  were  quick- 
ened by  hopes  of  continued  comfort  and  ease.  The  old 
man  Radetzk}',  who  had  been  exceedingly  loath  to 
assume  the  command,  now  tlianked  the  Emperor  in  the 
warmest  terms  for  avoiding  a  conflict  with  their  good 
comrades  of  1813.  These  were  also  the  sentiments  of 
Generals  Hess,  Welden,  Chim,  and  Schonhals.  AVith- 
out  reserve  they  expressed  to  the  Prussian  Ambassador 
at  the  same  time  their  disapproval  of  Schwarzenberg's 
policy  and  tlicir  delight  at  the  happy  escape  from  the 
prospect  of  war. 

The  Olmiitz  settlement  filled  the  diplomatists  of  the 
Confederate  Diet  and  the  South  German  Governments, 


78  OLMUTZ. 

on  the  other  hand,  with  genuine  wrath.  To  be  sure, 
Prussia's  dreams  of  1849  were  over,  and  the  righteous 
punishment  of  Hesse  was  having  its  proper  course  ;  but 
as  for  the  rest,  the  Confederate  Diet  had  been  rudely 
set  aside,  Prussia,  whose  prestige  was  undiminished, 
had  been  united  with  Austria,  and  the  Lesser  States 
had  been  again  assigned  a  second  place.  However 
assuringly  Schwarzenberg  pointed  out  to  them  a 
glorious  future,  the  present  disappointment  was  hard 
to  bear,  after  all  the  alluring  portrayals  of  a  thorough 
annihilation  of  the  power  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 

But  in  Prussia !  How  many  men  in  the  country  had 
any  remote  idea  of  the  technical  questions  of  form,  the 
happy  solution  of  which  had  filled  the  King's  heart 
with  the  consciousness  of  victory?  For  them  the 
question  was  simply  :  Shall  the  Confederate  Diet  be 
allowed  to  trample  the  German  Nation  under  foot? 
Shall  Hassenpflug  treat  in  the  same  way  the  people  of 
Hesse-Cassel  ?  and  the  King  of  Denmark  the  German 
duchy  of  Schleswig-Holstein  ? 

The  Prussian  people  had  shouted  for  joy  —  for  what 
reason,  they  had  as  little  idea  as  the  rest  of  Europe  — 
when  their  King  set  his  face  against  all  this ;  and  to 
preserve  Prussia's  honor  and  Germany's  safety  they  had 
hastened  to  the  standards  with  glowing  enthusiasm. 
But  now  the  tide  had  turned ;  the  sword  fell  from  the 
hand  already  stretched  forth  to  strike,  and  bitter  tears 
rolled  down  the  cheeks  of  many  a  brave  warrior. 
Prussia  had  given  way  before  the  oft-conquered 
Austria,   and    before    a   scarcely   disciplined   band   of 


CRITICISM  OF  THE  AGREEMENT,  79 

Bavarians ;  and  it  was  to  be  considered  a  great  satisfac- 
tion that  in  retnrn  for  this  Prussia  woukl  be  allowed  to 
share  in  the  support  of  Hassenpflug  and  the  Danish 
oppressors.  From  a  thousand  hearts  the  cry  arose  that 
the  work  of  Frederick  the  Great  had  been  for  the 
second  time  undone. 

To-day,  a  generation  later,  the  glorious  re\dval  of 
Prussia  allows  us  to  consider  more  calmly  the  events 
of  that  time.  No  one  will  even  now  deny  that  the 
Olmiitz  Agreement  was  a  defeat  for,  Prussia ;  but  we 
can  regard  its  causes  in  a  different  light. 

In  the  first  place,  the  position  of  Prussia  was  infi- 
nitely  more  difficult  than  at  the  time  of  a  similar 
complication  sixteen  years  later.  In  the  Hessian 
matter,  as  well  as  in  that  of  the  Union,  she  had  now  to 
face  Austria,  the  four  German  Kingdoms,  and  Russia ; 
and  in  the  Schleswig-Holstein  question  all  the  Great 
Powers  of  Europe  opposed  her.  No  Government  could 
ever  be  blamed  for  yielding  at  the  right  time  and  in  the 
right  way  to  such  superiority  of  power. 

Moreover,  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  Kings  from  the 
Union,  this  had  in  Frederick  William's  mind  lost  the 
character  of  an  imperial  alliance,  and  had  in  its  dis- 
memberment become  distasteful  and  an  annoyance  to 
him ;  while  the  resistance  of  the  j)eople  of  Schleswig- 
Holstein  and  of  Hesse-Cassel  to  the  sovereign  authorit}^ 
of  those  countries  seemed  to  him,  no  matter  how  other 
matters  of  justice  and  right  stood,  to  be  under  all  cir- 
cumstances unlawful. 

Consistency    demanded    that   immediately  after    the 


80  OLMUTZ. 

rejection  of  the  propositions  by  the  Erfurt  Parliament, 
the  dissolution  of  the  Union  should  be  proclaimed,  and 
likewise  that  immediately  after  the  Danish  Peace  of  the 
2d  of  July,  Prussia  should  consult  with  the  other  Great 
Powers  concerning  the  future  constitution  of  the 
Duchies  of  the  Elbe  under  Danish  sovereignty.  This 
would  have  meant,  to  be  sure,  a  break  with  all  the 
traditions  of  1848,  and  Prussia's  entrance  into  "  the 
reactionary  camp ;  "  but  since  this  would  all  have  been 
done  voluntarily,  the  honor  of  the  Prussian  state,  so  far 
as  its  relations  with  foreign  Powers  were  concerned, 
would  have  remained  unsullied. 

Instead  of  this,  we  have  seen  the  King,  at  the  time 
of  the  division  in  the  Ministry  and  his  own  anger  at 
the  insulting  revival  of  the  Confederate  Diet,  persisting 
in  the  maintenance  of  his  old  positions,  which  were 
daily  becoming  more  untenable,  announcing  continually 
Prussia's  resistance  to  the  imputations  of  the  enemy, 
and  finally,  after  being  threatened  with  war  by  Austria 
and  Russia,  doing  now  just  what  he  himself  had  for 
months  been  anxious  to  do.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
this  cast  a  dark  shade  across  Prussia's  shield  of  honor. 
Her  friends'  respect  for  her  sank,  and  her  enemies  in 
Vienna  and  Copenhagen  in  their  exultation  believed 
that  anything  might  be  possible  after  that.  The 
Prince  of  Prussia  never  forgot  the  impressions  of  that 
day. 

It  has  often  been  asked,  whether  Stockhausen  was 
right  in  his  assertion  that  Prussia  was  not  equal  to  a 
struggle  with  so  many  opponents.     The  enthusiasm  of 


PROBABLE  RESULT  OF  A    WAR.  81 

the  Prussian  troops  and  the  mutinous  disposition  of  the 
Ilonveds,  who  formed  a  large  part  of  the  Austrian 
army,  miglit  convince  one  that  Prussia  would  have  in 
the  first  instance  repulsed  the  enemy.  But  even  if  this 
be  granted,  the  question  still  remains :  Would  the 
victory  have  been  so  overwhelming,  and  the  conduct  of 
the  war  and  the  diplomacy  so  energetic  and  efficient, 
that  after  a  few  weeks  she  could  have  dictated  the 
terms  of  peace  ? 

King  Frederick  "William  was  filled  with  spirit  and 
self-consciousness ;  but  even  his  warmest  admirers  have 
never  held  him  up  as  a  practical  politician  or  a  soldier  by 
nature.  Very  soon  after  the  conference  at  Olmlitz,  he 
said  to  the  English  ambassador,  the  Earl  of  Westmore- 
land, that  Austria  had  consented  to  much  more  than  he 
could  have  demanded,  and  that  the  greatest  piece  of 
good  fortune  in  the  matter  was  that  Prussia's  victory 
over  Austria  had  been  prevented,  a  victory  which 
would  have  been  inevitable  in  the  present  disunited 
condition  of  Austria.  Tliis  remark  accords  with 
Manteuffel's  famous  saying,  that  a  war  between 
Prussia  and  Austria  would  be  like  an  ancient  Japanese 
duel,  in  which  each  of  the  participants  ripped  open  his 
own  bowels. 

Wlien  tlie  leaders  cherished  such  sentiments,  a 
speedy  overtlu-ow  of  the  enemy  and  great  benefit  from 
the  victory  were  liardly  to  be  expected.  If  Austria  could 
have  kept  up  until  spring,  then  two  hundred  thousand 
Russians  would  have  entered  the  field,  the  Lesser 
States    would   have    (■()ni[)leted  their  preparations,  and 


82  OLMUTZ. 

the  situation  would  have  been  as  dangerous  for  Prussia 
as  that  in  1757  after  the  battle  of  Kolin. 

England  offered  only  polite  phrases.  A  coalition  with 
France  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  personal  senti- 
ments of  the  King  ;  and  Schwarzenberg  would  certainly 
have  had  no  scruples  in  obtaining  the  favor  of  Louis 
Napoleon  by  sending  to  him  those  royal  letters,  and  by 
the  offer  of  territory  on  the  Rhine.  From  a  military 
point  of  view,  one  cannot  help  coming  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  was  fortunate  there  was  a  Manteuffel  at  hand  to 
take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  purchasing 
peace  in  such  a  way  as  was  done  at  Olniutz. 

Meanwhile,  the  two  German  Powers  got  ready  to 
settle  the  German,  Hessian,  and  Holstein  questions  in 
common,  agreeably  to  the  recent  mutual  understanding. 
The  hopes  of  Prince  Schwarzenberg  rose  at  that  time 
very  high.  After  he  had  victoriously  annihilated  the 
Prussian  schemes  for  constitutions  and  a  restricted 
union,  he  had  no  doubt  but  that  he  should  be  able  to 
bring  Germany  as  a  whole  under  the  control  of  united 
Austria,  and  to  arrange  this  according  to  his  own 
devices. 


PLANS  OF  REFORM.  83 


CHAPTER  III, 

« 

THE   DRESDEN    CONGRESS. 

Ox  the  third  of  December,  a  furious  storm  of  indigna- 
tion arose  in  the  Prussian  Lower  House  against  the 
Ohiiutz  Agreement,  and  in  consequence  of  this  the 
Parliament  was  on  the  4th  adjourned  till  the  3d  of 
January. 

King  Frederick  William  impatiently  urged  the  open- 
ing of  the  "  much-desired  and  longed-for "  Dresden 
Congress,  from  which  he  expected  for  the  German 
Constitution  the  most  Utopian  results.  His  wishes 
were  still  along  the  same  lines  as  indicated  in  the 
instructions  of  the  Counts  Canitz  and  Brandenburgs : 
these  were,  as  we  may  remember,  recognition  of  the 
King's  right  to  form  a  closer  union  within  the  more 
comprehensive  Confederation ;  for  this  latter  a  Con- 
federate assembly  after  the  old  pattern,  bvit  with 
Prussia  sharing  in  the  presidency ;  over  the  assembly  a 
strong  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  Austiia  and 
Prussia,  wlio  slioidd  be  admitted  into  the  Confederation 
witli  all  their  provinces  ;  so  that  in  tlie  future^  there 
should  be  no  Prussian  or  Austrian,  but  only  German 
politics,  to  be  controlled  by  Prussia  and  Austria  acting 
conjointly. 

The  di(;am  of  German  Unity  wdiild  then  be  realized 


84  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

in  the  form  of  a  duumvirate,  the  joint  supremacy  of 
Austria  and  Prussia.  There  was  no  plan  projected  for 
a  German  Parliament.  The  King  intended  to  establish 
a  system  of  popular  representation  in  his  own  future 
Union ;  and,  moreover,  if  some  one  else  should  propose 
the  same  for  the  more  comprehensive  Confederation,  he 
was  resolved  not  to  oppose  this  at  the  outset,  but  to 
consider  the  question  further. 

An  outline  of  these  ideas  was  communicated  to  the 
associates  in  the  Union.  One  can  hardly  say  that  they 
were  received  with  warm  enthusiasm.  The  Petty 
States  had,  it  is  true,  keenly  felt  the  insufficiency  of  the 
Confederate  arrangements  in  the  tempests  of  1848,  and 
had  therefore  turned  gladly,  first  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  Cathedral  of  St.  Paul,  and  afterwards  to  the 
Prussian  Union.  But  after  the  experiences  of  the  last 
two  years  they  were  afraid  of  every  new  experiment, 
since  every  one  so  far  had  especially  endangered  their 
own  lot ;  so  that  without  venturing  any  direct  opposi- 
tion against  Prussia,  and  in  spite  of  all  their  former 
protests,  they  began  to  revert  in  their  minds  with  an 
unexpressed  longing  to  the  old  Confederate  Diet  with 
its  powerless  and  useless  but  yet  comfortable  existence 
in  the  Eschenheim  palace. 

Quite  other  plans  were  the  aim  of  the  imperious  soul 
of  Prince  Schwarzenberg  and  the  aspiiing  ambition  of 
the  Lesser  States  ;  and  after  the  events  at  Olmlitz  they 
believed  they  might  cast  aside  all  doubts  as  to  their 
success.  They  were,  to  be  sure,  sorry  that  there  had 
been  no  defeat  of   Prussia  upon  the  battle-field;  but. 


OPENING   OF  THE   CONGRESS.  85 

althouofli  the  Prussian  Kinsr  considered  the  Olmiitz 
Agreement  to  be  a  victory  for  his  own  dearest  princi- 
ples, his  enemies  received,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
impression  that  Prussia  before  all  things  feared  a  war, 
and  that  it  was  only  necessary  to  make  use  alternately 
of  conservative  phrases  and  moderate  threats  to  force 
from  her  all  that  they  wanted,  and  make  their  success 
sure. 

Their  eyes  were  not  by  any  means  fixed  upon  a 
simple  revival  of  the  old  Confederate  Diet.  They  had 
indeed  in  the  spring  called  it  into  life  again  as  an 
instrument  with  which  to  fight  Prussia.  But  Schwarz- 
enberg's  remark  at  the  time  was  very  seriously  meant, 
when  he  said  that  he  intended  no  barren  revival  of  the 
ancient  conditions,  but  only  to  secure  a  legitimate  basis 
for  a  very  thorough  reform. 

He,  too,  had  in  no  way  changed  his  aims  since  1849. 
He  would  now  no  more  than  then  listen  to  any  plan 
of  a  restricted  union  within  a  more  comprehensive 
alliance,  nor  of  any  popular  representatioii  in  tlie 
Confederate  legislation.  He  was  endowed  by  nature 
with  no  appreciation  whatever  of  freedom  or  of 
national  wants  ;  but  his  whole  nature  was  the  more 
thorouglily  inibuccl  willi  an  ambition  to  promote 
material  interests.  Accordingly,  he  rejoiced  to  recog- 
nize in  the  Prussian  programme  two  of  his  own  doc- 
trines ;  namely,  the  admission  of  entire  Austria  into  the 
Confederation,  and  the  formation  of  a  strong  executive 
to  control  the  whole. 

Yet   he    was  as  far  as   possible   from   entertaining  a 


86  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

thought  of  granting  to  Prussia  equal  rights  with  Aus- 
tria in  this  supreme  control.  On  the  contrary,  the 
presidency  of  the  Confederate  Diet  and  in  the  execu- 
tive should  be,  in  Schwarzenberg's  opinion,  exclusively 
in  the  hands  of  Austria;  and,  moreover,  the  executive 
should  not  consist  of  the  two  Great  Powers  alone,  but 
of  the  four  Kingdoms  with  them. 

By  this  latter  proposition  he  gained  for  his  policy, 
beyond  a  doubt,  the  favor  of  the  Lesser  States,  and  he 
then  allured  them  further  by  holding  up  before  them  the 
prospect  of  establishing  the  system  of  groups,  which 
meant  the  mediatization  of  the  Petty  States,  the  pros- 
pect of  the  entrance  of  Austria  into  the  Tariff-Union, 
and  finally  the  wholesale  limitation  of  the  rights  of  the 
estates  and  of  freedom  in  their  states,  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  could  best  be  done,  according  to  his  notion, 
by  the  military. 

If  all  this  proved  successful,  then  Germany  would  be 
split  up  into  six  absolutely-governed  states ;  Prussia 
would  be  thrust  back  into  her  former  rank  of  one  of 
the  German  Lesser  States,  and,  in  respect  to  her  rela- 
tions to  the  rest  of  Europe,  into  the  age  before  Fred- 
erick the  Great ;  German  Unity  would  be  realized 
simply  in  the  fact  that  all  the  German  states  would  be 
obeying  the  same  monarch  as  the  Galician  Ruthenians, 
the  Bohemian  Czechs,  and  the  Italian  Lombards. 

It  is  obvious  that  between  these  two  systems  there 
could  be  no  comj)romise,  no  reconciliation.  Which 
would  conquer?  And  if  neither,  then  what  would 
happen  ? 


OPENIXG   OF  THE   CONGRESS.  87 

The  solemn  opening  session  of  tlie  Congress  in 
Dresden,  which  took  place  on  the  23d  of  December, 
gave  the  impression  that  Prince  Schwarzenberg  was 
already  master  of  the  whole  situation.  As  a  matter  of 
course,  he  assumed  the  office  of  president,  and  made 
the  introductory  speech.  Thereupon  Herr  von  Beust, 
as  host,  gave  an  address  of  welcome,  and  then  the 
Prussian  Prime  Minister  rose  to  speak  for  the  first 
time.  Immediately  after  him  came  Baron  von  der 
Pfordten  as  representative  of  the  next  largest  kingdom. 
Prussia  found  lierself,  as  if  in  the  proper  order  of 
things,  right  in  the  midst  of  the  Lesser  States. 

Prince  Schwaizenberg  proposed  the  appointment  of 
several  committees  to  prepare  drafts  of  the  different 
Articles  of  the  Constitution.  This  was  approved  with- 
out discussion,  as  also  a  few  days  later  the  lists  of 
names  nominated  by  the  Prince  to  be  members  of  the 
various  committees. 

On  the  24th  of  December,  the  Prince,  in  company 
with  Herr  von  Manteuffel,  made  a  visit  to  Berlin,  in 
order  to  use  his  personal  influence  in  securing  as  rapid 
a  transaction  of  the  business  as  possible.  He  was 
received  most  cordially.  The  King,  following  the 
inclination  of  his  heart  toward  Austria,  promised  to  do 
everything  in  his  power  that  could  be  at  all  consistent 
with  tlie  interests  of  Prussia.  In  his  immediate  pres- 
ence, too,  owing  to  the  absence  of  Punisen  and  I^ido- 
witz,  llie  })ri'[)()nderating  sentiment  was  favorable  to 
Austria. 

Herr  von  Manteuffi'l  manifested  likewise  a  constant 


88  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

desire  to  come  to  an  understanding  without  delay.  He 
not  only  acquiesced  at  once  in  the  wish  of  Schwarzen- 
berg  and  recalled  from  Vienna  Count  Bernstorff,  who 
was  far  too  independent  to  be  agreeable  to  the  Prince, 
but  he  also  appointed  in  his  place,  and  at  the  suggestion 
of  Schwarzenberg,  a  man  who  was  well-nigh  the  most 
incapable  of  all  the  Prussian  diplomatists  of  the  time,  a 
certain  Count  Arnim-Heinrichsdorff.  No  less  pleased 
was  the  Prince  with  the  choice  of  the  second  Prussian 
representative  with  full  powers  to  Dresden,  the  former 
Minister  of  Finance,  Count  Alversleben-Erxleben,  who 
seemed  likely  to  be  useful  to  Austria  on  account  of  his 
thoroughly  conservative  tendencies. 

Nothing  definite  was  settled  in  Berlin.  The  first 
word  of  the  Prince  was  the  declaration  that  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  secure  the  functions  of  the  executive 
for  Austria  and  Prussia  alone,  since  all  the  Lesser 
States  opposed  this  plan  very  decidedly.  Manteuffel 
yielded  by  saying  that  in  that  case  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  come  to  some  understanding  about  a  directory. 
Against  the  admission  of  entire  Austria  into  the  Con- 
federation, Manteuffel  had  no  objections  to  make  ;  he 
inquired  about  a  system  of  alternation  in  the  presi- 
dency, and  was  contented  when  the  Prince  carelessly 
observed  that  he  personally  was  quite  in  favor  of  such 
a  plan.  (He  knew  well  enough  that  the  Kingdoms 
would  no  more  agree  to  this  than  to  the  placing  of  all 
the  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Great  Powers 
alone.)  The  Austrian  statesman  returned  then  to 
Dresden  animated  by  the  most  encouraging  hopes. 


THE  EXECUTIVE.  89 

There  the  committees  were  now  formed ;  and  the  first 
one,  appointed  to  determine  the  future  authorities  and 
territorial  extent  of  the  Confederation,  began  its  woil: 
with  ardor,  under  Austrian  presidency.  But  the  irre- 
concilable differences  in  jnirpose  made  themselves  felt 
in  the  very  first  sitting.  Two  supreme  organs  were 
to  be  created,  —  a  Plenum  for  the  legislation  and  a 
Directory  for  the  executive. 

Prince  Schwarzenberg  first  opened  the  discussion 
over  the  latter,  and  declared  that  if  the  executive  was 
to  act  vigorously  and  quickly,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  grant  a  share  and  vote  in  the  same  to  the  Petty 
States.  Therefore  he  proposed  a  college,  which 
sliould  be  composed  of  Austria  and  I'russia,  each  with 
two  votes,  the  four  Kingdoms,  each  with  one  vote,  and 
Baden,  the  two  Hesses,  Holstein,  and  Luxemburg  to- 
gether, with  one  vote,  —  seven  persons  and  nine  votes. 
The  more  executive  authority  Prussia  as  well  as  Aus- 
tria intended  to  vest  in  tliis  bod}--,  the  more  vital  for  the 
whole  of  the  Constitution  was  the  question  of  its 
comi)osition.  And  now  Prince  Schwarzenberg  pro- 
posed, one  might  say  with  incredible  coolness,  a  system 
of  composition  in  which  Austria,  in  case  of  conflict  in 
opinion  with  Prussia,  would  be  certain  of  controlling 
six  votes  out  of  nine!  Count  Alversleben  asserted 
upon  tbe  spot  that  this  system  was  impossible.  "Willi 
keen  perception  lie  skilfully  emphasized  tlie  fact  that 
that  meant  tlie  sacrifice  of  the  Petty  States,  the  allies 
U])  to  this  time  of  Piussia,  and  tliat  to  that  system  the 
King  wonhl  never  trivc  liis  consent. 


90  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

The  excitement  among  the  Petty  States  was  tremen- 
dous, and  only  partially  quieted  by  the  decided  asser- 
tion of  Alversleben.  In  the  second  sitting  various 
proposals  about  the  formation  of  the  executive  were 
discussed.  All  of  them  gave  to  it  nine  votes,  of  which 
each  of  the  Great  Powers  should  have  two,  the  re- 
mainder being  divided  in  the  Prussian  proposals 
among  all  the  other  states,  and  by  Austrian  among  the 
larger  states  only,  under  various  combinations.  The 
discussion  Avaxed  warm.  Each  proposal  found  its 
advocates  and  opponents.  The  members  grew  excited, 
and  there  was  disagreement  in  all  directions.  There 
could  be  no  thought  of  bringing  the  matter  to  a  vote. 

Count  Alversleben  was  a  firm  and  sedate  man, 
thoroughly  monarchical  in  his  principles,  and  a  Prussian 
patriot  of  the  truest  kind ;  he  had,  moreover,  been 
educated  from  his  childhood  in  ^parliamentary  business, 
was  prudent  in  every  particular,  and  very  far-seeing 
in  weighing  every  possibility.  The  first  trial  was 
enough  to  fix  his  opinion  of  the  whole  situation.  The 
cold-hearted,  ambitious  behavior  of  Prince  Schwarzen- 
berg  had  within  forty-eight  hours  produced  an  entire 
change  in  the  feelings  of  the  members.  Those  Avho 
had  been  hitherto  enemies  of  the  old  Confederate  Diet, 
the  small  states  of  the  Union,  saw  before  their  eyes,  as 
the  result  of  the  Austrian  reform,  their  own  complete 
suppression  ;  so  that  their  already  budding  longing  for 
simple  return  to  the  old  Confederate  Diet  blossomed 
forth  into  full  vigor. 

Alversleben  shared  in  every  respect  their  opinions. 


SCHWARZENBERG  AND  MANTEUFFEL.         91 

and  consequently  became  almost  unreservedly  their 
leader  for  the  whole  remaining-  time  of  the  Conofress. 
He  considered  the  Prussian  plan  of  reform  hopeless, 
and  recognized  in  the  Austrian  aims  a  mortal  danger 
threatening  Prussia's  rank  as  a  Power.  Accordingly, 
he  sent  reports  to  Berlin  concerning  the  feelings  of  the 
Petty  States,  and  received  the  approbation  of  the 
Minister  on  account  of  hij  opinion  that  Prussia  would 
have  no  longer  any  reason  to  oppose  a  proposition  that 
the  executive  should  be  committed  to  the  charge  of  the 
Close  Council  of  the  old  Confederate  Diet. 

The  Petty  States  were  not  more  excited  over  the 
proposal  of  Austria  than  Schwarzenberg  was  over  the 
Prussian  representative.  He  was  at  a  loss  to  under- 
stand such  decisive  opposition  at  the  very  outset,  after 
all  the  fine  thino-s  that  had  been  said  in  Berlin. 
"  Alversleben's  conduct,"  he  wrote  to  Prokesch,  the 
Austrian  ambassador  in  Berlin,  "  is  a  double  riddle  to 
me. 

Prokesch  turned  to  the  adjutant-general  and  confiden- 
tial friend  of  the  King,  Herr  von  Gerlach,  and  urgently 
begged  him  to  try  to  influence  His  Majesty  to  send 
Manteuffel  again  to  Dresden  with  unconditional  full 
powers  and  with  di'linilc  orders  to  effect  a  conclusion 
of  negotiations.  "  The  lepresentativcs  of  the  Gotha 
part}',"  he  said,  "are  taking  advantage  of  the  expected 
rupture  between  Austria  and  Prussia ;  disorganization 
is  gaining  ground  in  the  Congress." 

Scliwarzenbeig  turned  to  iNhinteuffi'l  liinisclf  in  a 
private   letter,   ami    in    it  he   allirmud  his    oft-repeated 


92  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

opinion  that  in  Germany  there  was  need  of  a  regular 
standing  army  at  home  of  about  one  hundred  thousand 
men  in  order  to  suppress  all  opposition  of  the  Estates, 
the  Press,  and  the  People  ;  and  that  whatever  states 
could  not  provide  their  contingent  of  troops  should  not 
be  allowed  a  share  in  the  executive,  in  which  condition 
were  all  the  Petty  States.  The  letter  produced  little 
effect  upon  Manteuifel.  He  considered  that  the  Lesser 
States,  too,  and  even  Bavaria  itself,  were  not  in  a 
condition  to  maintain  a  standing  army,  and  that  conse- 
quently, according  to  Schwarzenberg's  own  principles, 
only  the  two  Great  Powers  could  have  a  place  in  the 
executive. 

Yet  it  seemed  altogether  too  shameful  that  in  the 
much-eulogized  Congress  an  open  rupture  should 
occur  the  very  first  day.  It  was  only  too  evident  that 
then  nothing  would  remain  but  a  return  to  the  old 
Confederate  Diet;  and  from  what  has  preceded,  it  is 
easy  to  understand  that  against  this  the  innermost 
nature  of  the  King  rebelled.  Anything  that  was  endur- 
able should  be  preferred  to  this  wretched  disaster.  It 
was  therefore  decided  to  send  Manteuffel  to  Dresden 
to  try  to  effect  a  compromise,  although  only  upon  the 
basis  of  the  perfect  equality  of  the  two  Great  Powers  in 
the  presidency  of  the  Confederate  Diet  and  of  the 
executive. 

On  this  latter  point,  Schwarzenberg  talked  again  as 
graciously  as  in  Berlin  ;  and  concerning  the  participation 
of  the  Petty  States  in  the  executive,  he  allowed  him- 
self to  be  persuaded  to  yield  a  little  from  the  strictness 


ATTEMPTS  AT  RECONCILIATION.  93 

of  his  theories.  The  two  statesmen  agreed  in  the 
scheme  of  adding  to  the  nine  votes  proposed  by  Aus- 
tria two  more  for  the  Petty  States,  making  an  execu- 
tive of  nine  persons  wdth  eleven  votes  ;  and  this  w^as  to 
be  laid  before  the  committee  as  a  common  proposal  of 
the  two  Great  Powers. 

Prince  Schwarzenberg  could  regard  this  result  as  a 
victory :  for  even  with  eleven  votes,  he  would  be  cer- 
tain under  all  circumstances  of  the  majority  consisting 
of  the  six  votes.  With  regard  to  Prussia's  being  upon 
an  equal  footing  with  Austria,  he  had  spoken  very 
encouragingly,  but  had  this  time  no  more  than  before 
made  any  binding  promises.  He  had  indeed  succeeded 
in  obtaining  from  Manteuffel  almost  his  definite  con- 
sent to  the  establishment  of  this  new  executive  so 
soon  as  the  plan  of  the  eleven  votes  should  be  accepted 
by  the  Congress,  before  the  other  Articles  of  the  Con- 
stitution Avere  determined.  Manteuffel,  however,  paid 
him  back  in  liis  own  coin  with  gracious  words,  which 
were  not  Ijindinnr  at  all. 

Meanwhile  Schwarzenberg  returned  triumphantly  to 
Vienna,  leaving  Austria  to  be  represented  by  Count 
Buol-Schauenstein,  tlie  former  ambassador  in  St. 
Petersburg,  a  liauglity  man,  reckless  of  formalities, 
dogmatic  and  stubborn  in  disposition,  and  thoroughly 
penetrated  with  the  political  views  of  his  master. 

After  the  two  Great  Powers  liad  come  to  an  acrree- 
ment  about  the  constitution  of  the  executive,  the  first 
and  second  committees  held  a  joint  session  to  consult 
in    common    about    the    functions    of   the  future   Con- 


94  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

federate  authorities,  not  only  as  to  their  mutual  rela- 
tions, but  also  with  regard  to  their  relations  to  the 
individual  states.  Prince  Schwarzenberg  had  taken 
care  that  in  both  committees  his  friends  should  be  in 
the  majority ;  so  the  motion  to  consider  all  Austrian 
and  Prussian  lands  as  Confederate  territory  was  carried 
through  without  difficulty. 

The  project  of  an  executive  consisting  of  eleven 
members  met  with  the  same  success  in  the  first 
committee ;  but  in  the  joint  session  the  two  Mecklen- 
burgs  and  Holstein,  i.e.,  Denmark,  made  a  decided 
objection  to  it.  Denmark  desired  no  executive  what- 
ever, and  Mecklenburg  wished  to  put  it  solely  into  the 
hands  of  Austria  and  Prussia.  It  goes  without  saying 
that  this  objection  did  not  affect  the  report  of  the 
committee. 

The  functions  of  the  executive  were  very  much 
more  extended  than  those  that  the  Close  Council  of 
the  old  Confederation  exercised.  Yet  the  Lesser 
States  did  not  push  the  matter  so  far  as  Schwarzenberg 
intended ;  and  especially  the  Petty  States,  in  their  fear 
of  Schwarzenberg's  ambition,  invariably  strove  to 
hinder,  so  far  as  possible,  any  change  whatever. 
Accordingly,  it  was  decided  that  the  functions  of  both 
Confederate  authorities  should  be  determined  by  law, 
but  that  in  doubtful  cases  the  presumption  should  be  in 
favor  of  the  Plenum,  and  that  the  latter  should  be 
permitted  to  pass  judgment  on  matters  lying  outside  of 
its  functions. 

Then   came   the    question,    what    decisions    of    the 


THE  DECISIONS   OF  THE   COMMITTEES.         95 

Plenum  should  require  unanimity,  which  ones  a  quali- 
fied majority,  and  which  ones  a  simple  majority-vote. 
The  committee  showed  its  anti-Prussian  tendencies  by 
its  finding  that  in  the  matter  of  deciding  whether  any 
alliance  made  by  a  German  state  endangered  the  safety 
of  the  Confederation  or  its  individual  members  a 
simple  majority-vote  of  the  Plenum  would  be  sufficient. 
It  was  considered  desirable  to  have  at  hand  some  con- 
venient way  to  prevent  every  attempt  to  revive  the 
Prussian  Union. 

In  other  matters  the  general  sentiment  was  in 
favor  of  keeping  up  the  demand  of  the  law  for  una- 
nimity or  of  requiring  in  its  place  a  qualified  majority- 
vote.  Thus  the  principles  of  the  confessedly  abortive 
Confederate  military  organization  were  to  be  altered 
only  in  case  of  unanimous  consent;  for  an  increase  in 
the  military  burdens  was  opposed  by  Bavaria,  and  also 
by  Reuss  and  Schwarzburg.  Measures  respecting  a 
German  marine  were  to  require  a  majority  of  three- 
fourths.  The  Kingdoms  even  demanded  unanimity  for 
the  establishment  of  a  war-marine ;  and  only  after  great 
exertion  did  Count  Alvensleben,  supported  alone  by 
Hanover,  Oldenburg,  and  Ilanse-towns,  succeed  in 
preventing  the  motion  that  there  should  be  no  German 
fleet  at  all. 

The  f)ld  Confederate  principle  required  unanimity  for 
every  decree  that  concerned  organic  regulations  and 
common  interests.  When  motions  to  the  contrar}^  were 
brought  forward  and  in  part  accepted  by  the  committee, 
Denmark  made  an  exhaustive  protest,  witli  the  declara- 


96  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

tion  tliat  the  suppression  of  the  liherum  veto  would  be 
the  beginning  of  centralization  and  of  the  disorganiza- 
tion of  the  Confederation. 

It  would  not  be  of  interest  nowadays  to  enumerate 
all  the  motions  and  decisions  in  detail.  It  will  be 
enough  to  indicate  the  general  principles  which  under- 
lay them.  Xlie  control  of  the  Confederate  authorities 
over  the  affairs  and  Constitution  of  the  individual 
states  remained  upon  the  same  footing  as  determined 
by  the  Confederate  laws  of  1820  and  1832,  with  the 
exception  that  the  Executive  was  now  to  have  the  right 
in  especially  urgent  cases  of  taking  steps  for  the 
preservation  of  the  peace,  without  waiting  for  orders 
from  the  Plenum. 

No  less  consonant  with  Schwarzenberg's  sentiment 
was  the  motion  made  in  the  third  committee  by 
Bavaria  and  Saxony  for  commmon  tariff-laws  among 
all  the  Confederate  states.  Count  Alvensleben  was 
able  for  some  time  to  delay  the  discussion  over  this 
vital  question  of  the  German  Tariff-Union ;  nor  could 
the  committee  fail  to  recognize  the  material  obstacles 
to  an  immediate  admission  of  Austria  into  that  Union. 
The  committee  limited  itself  accordingly  to  a  series  of 
articles  about  preliminary  measures,  tending  to  increase 
the  facility  of  domestic  trade,  so  that  in  1858  a  definite 
result  might  be  reached  with  regard  to  common  tariff- 
laws. 

Unfortunately,  the  satisfaction  which  Schwarzenberg 
had  promised  to  the  Lesser  States  for  such  praise- 
worthy efforts  was  somewhat  marred  by  the  conduct  of 


THE  DECISIONS   OF  THE   COMMITTEES.        97 

his  good  friends,  Beust  and  Pfordten,  in  another  matter 
in  the  first  committee,  where  these  gentlemen  were 
very  active  in  exphiining  the  need  of  a  popuhxr  repre- 
sentation by  the  side  of  the  Confederate  Plenum. 
Count  Buol  afhrmed  on  the  spot  the  unchangeable 
opposition  of  Schwarzenberg.  Yet  it  was  disagreeable 
for  him  to  find  on  his  side  in  this  most  important  ques- 
tion, beside  Hesse-Cassel  and  Luxemburg,  only  the 
Mecklenburgs  and  Denmark,  who  were  otherwise  so 
excessively  repugnant  to  him,  while  all  the  other  states 
supported  the  proposition  of  Bavaria. 

To  be  sure,  Herr  von  Beust  explained  that  one  should 
not  think  of  a  parliament  after  the  fashion  of  that  of 
the  Cathedral  of  St.  Paul ;  no  one  Mould  wish  to  revive 
such  a  nightmare.  It  was  only  desired,  for  some 
branches  of  legislation,  to  have  delegates  present  fi-om 
the  chambers  of  the  individual  states,  that  their  advice 
and  counsel  misfht  be  asked.  Yet  Schwarzenbersf  re- 
mained  unyielding  towards  the  proposition,  even  in  this 
shape,  if  for  no  other  reason,  simpl}^  because  he  was 
determined  as  soon  as  possible  to  abolish  the  Austrian 
Constitution  of  1849,  and  then  there  would  be  no 
"  Imperial  Council  "  to  send  delegates  to  Frankfort. 

Thus  it  was  that  everything  depended  upon  Prussia's 
action  in  tlu;  committee.  Count  Alvensleben,  however, 
had  instructions  neither  to  bring  forward  nor  to  oppose 
such  a  proposition.  Accordingly,  Schwarzenberg  ener- 
getically urged  the  Berlin  Cabinet  to  unite  with  Aus- 
tria in  suppressing  this  evil  [)ur[)0se.  He  received,  too, 
effectual  sup[)()rt,  since,  as  we  are  aware,  Prussia  laid 


98  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

stress  upon  a  popular  representation  in  its  restricted 
Union,  but  not  for  the  more  comprehensive  alliance. 

When  one  surveys  the  results  of  the  discussion,  it  is 
impossible  to  call  them  satisfactory.  All  positive 
decisions  were  dictated  by  a  blind  fear  of  revolution ; 
on  the  other  liand,  the  most  crying  national  needs,  such 
as  a  reform  of  the  Confederate  military  organization 
and  the  creation  of  a  German  marine,  met  with  obstinate 
opposition. 

Meanwhile,  the  first  two  of  the  committees  succeeded 
so  far,  by  the  beginning  of  February,  in  the  main 
features  of  their  work  upon  the  projected  Confederate 
authorities,  that  Schwarzenberg,  in  his  impatient  zeal, 
decided  to  take  the  decisive  step.  He  requested  Herr 
von  Manteuffel  to  meet  him  on  the  16th  of  February  in 
Dresden,  and  then,  as  had  formerly  been  agreed,  to 
make  the  announcement  to  the  assembly  that  the  two 
Great  Powers  intended,  upon  the  basis  of  the  decisions 
of  the  committees,  to  convene  the  new  Confederate 
authorities  in  Frankfort,  while  the  members  of  the 
Congress  in  Dresden  should  continue  comfortably  to 
work  out  the  remaining  articles  of  the  Confederate 
Constitution. 

The  Prince  believed  that  no  one  would  have  the 
courage  to  oppose  the  Great  Powers  or  to  refuse  to 
send  deputies  to  the  new  Confederate  Plenum;  and  if 
any  instances  of  such  action  should  unexpectedly  occur, 
the  right  of  the  refractory  state  to  enter  the  Confedera- 
tion could  be  reserved  till  later,  and  the  Government 
be  otherwise  ignored :  its  isolation  would  soon  enough 
make  it  feel  uncomfortable. 


SCHWARZENBERG'S   WISHES.  99 

Let  us  here  call  to  mind  a  circumstance  which  Prince 
Schwarzenberg  had  forgotten.  A  year  before,  Prussia, 
who  at  that  time  stood  outside  of  the  Confederate  Diet, 
had  counted  it  an  advantage  of  the  general  congresses 
that  those  who  there  agreed  could  establish  their  Con- 
stitution without  the  dissenters,  whereas  in  the  Con- 
federate Diet  every  constitutional  measure  could  be 
defeated  by  the  veto  of  Homburg  or  Liechtenstein. 
Schwarzenberg  had  at  .that  time,  as  presiding  head  of 
the  Confederate  Diet,  rejected  this  theory  as  unlawful 
and  anti-national.  He  was  still,  as  ever,  the  chief 
defender  of  the  Confederate  laws  ;  and  yet  in  the  cool- 
est manner  possible,  and  in  spite  of  all  Confederate 
laws,  he  now  supported  that  Prussian  doctrine. 

The  reason  for  his  conduct  is,  it  is  true,  easy  to  be 
seen.  Ilerr  von  Manteuffel  had  hitherto  shown  him- 
self in  every  particular  compliant  and  willing  to  make 
advances.  It  was  advisable  to  take  advantage  of  this 
state  of  his  mind,  so  long  as  it  lasted,  and  to  put  into 
force  the  measures  so  fortunately  approved  of  by  him 
—  the  directory  of  eleven  and  the  admission  of  entire 
Austria  —  before  possible  events  in  Berlin  might  cause 
a  revulsion  from  this  position.  Afterwards,  Prussia 
might  assert  her  claim  to  parity  in  the  presidency : 
there  would  be  ways  enough  of  rendering  tliat 
harmless. 

But  pride  had  prepared  the  way  for  its  own  fall.  In 
Berlin  there  liad  been  strong  faitli  hitherto  in  tlie 
possibility  of  sincere  co-operation  witli  Austria;  and  in 
order  to  come  to  an  understanding,  and  thus  to  escape 


100        THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

the  old  Confederate  Diet,  Prussia  had  in  different 
matters  and  step  by  step  made  concessions,  some  of 
them  of  very  questionable  expediency,  always  with  the 
idea  that  any  definite  arrangement  would  be  reserved 
until  the  work  of  framing  the  Constitution  should  be 
completed. 

Now  this  most  important  point  w^as  to  be  thrown  aside 
by  the  new  proposition  of  Schwarzenberg,  according  to 
which,  the  new  Confederate  Government,  doubled  in 
influence  by  the  admission  of  entire  Austria,  and  with  a 
sure  anti-Prussian  majority,  was  to  begin  its  active 
operations  at  once,  before  either  Prussia's  equality  in 
authority  had  been  insured  or  her  free  right  to  form  a 
union.     This  could  never  be  allowed. 

Furthermore,  European  conditions  were  this  time  as 
propitious  for  Prussia  as  they  had  formerly  at  Olmlitz 
been  adverse.  Russia  took  only  a  slight  interest  in  the 
admission  of  Austria  into  the  Confederation :  France 
and  England,  however,  protested  openly  against  it ;  so 
that  not  only  would  this  measure  not  be  forced  upon 
Prussia,  but  it  could  not  be  realized  without  Prussia's 
active  help.  It  was  therefore  unanimously  decided  in 
Berlin  to  reject  Austria's  proposition. 

When  Manteuffel  requested  from  Count  Alvens- 
leben  a  report  on  the  matter,  the  latter  answered  on  the 
9th  of  February  :  "  In  the  course  of  the  discussion  it  has 
on  all  sides  been  repeatedly  acknowledged  that  before 
the  whole  has  been  gone  over,  there  can  be  no  binding 
votes  passed  upon  a  single  detail.  This  will  also  be 
brought  forward  as  the  objection  to  the  proposition  to  set 


OBJECTION  TO  AUSTRIA'S  PROPOSITION.      101 

the  new  Confederate  authorities  at  once  in  power.  The 
decisions  of  the  committees  are  not  to  be  printed  for 
distribution  among  the  members  until  the  15th  of  Feb- 
ruary. If  that  proposition  is  then  made,  there  will  be  a 
general  excuse  offered  that  further  instructions  will  be 
necessary  before  voting  upon  this  question,  and  it  will 
be  impossible  not  to  grant  a  delay  of  two  weeks  for  the 
reception  of  these  instructions.  The  accomplishment 
of  Schwarzenberg's  scheme  would  bring  the  new  execu- 
tive into  active  operation  a  few  weeks  earlier  than  if 
the  normal  course  were  pursued ;  but  it  would  produce 
a  very  bad  impression,  and  the  whole  odium  would  fall 
upon  Prussia.  For  the  world  is  accustomed  to  expect 
violent  conduct  on  the  part  of  Schwarzenberg;  but  it 
would  be  said,  Prussia  had  weakly  allowed  herself  to 
be  influenced,  and  had  abandoned  her  old  allies." 

The  same  sentiments  were  expressed  in  a  report  from 
Count  Bernstorff  to  the  King,  sent  from  Vienna  on  the 
11th  of  February :  "  According  to  Schwarzenberg's 
plan,  no  notice  is  to  be  taken  of  any  objection  from  the 
Petty  States.  Prussia  is  to  assist  in  this ;  that  is,  to 
drop  her  allies,  and  with  her  own  hand  help  form  a 
Directory  in  which  she  would  always  be  in  the  minority, 
and  which  would  be  of  great  advantage  to  her  bitterest 
enemies.  Russia  is  expected  to  support  Austria.  The 
two  Powers,  wliich  a  short  time  ago  were  ready  to  fight 
Prussia  on  account  of  violation  of  the  treaties  of  1815, 
now  urge  a  reckless  abolition  of  these  treaties.  If 
the  question  concerned  tlie  transference  of  the  execu- 
tive into  the  hands  of  tlie  two  (iieut  Powers  alone,  this 


102        THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

would  be  a  progressive  step  for  the  attainment  of 
which  it  would  be  worth  while  making  considerable 
sacrifice.  But  rather  than  establish  a  many-headed 
Director}',  in  which  Austria  would  not  share  the  power 
with  Prussia  but  with  the  Lesser  States,  it  would  be 
decidedly  better  for  Prussia  to  return  to  the  old  Con- 
federate Diet.  She  would  then  be  standing  upon  the 
basis  of  the  treaties  and  in  the  old  position  ;  and  beside 
her  German  allies,  she  would  have  upon  her  side  Eng- 
land, Denmark,  and  the  Netherlands.  Moreover,  it  is 
certain  that,  in  the  event  of  the  realization  of  Schwarz- 
enberg's  plan,  Holstein-Lauenburg  and  Luxemburg- 
Limburg  will  withdraw  from  the  Confederation.  To 
silence  this  opposition,  Schwarzenberg  will  perhaps  for 
the  present  let  the  Confederate  authorities  enter  upon 
their  duties  provisionally,  and  consist  for  the  time  of 
the  two  Great  Powers  and  the  four  Kingdoms  alone, 
while  to  the  other  three  Curias  by  themselves  will  be 
left  the  arrangement  and  division  of  their  votes.  In 
this  case  this  provisional  executive,  in  which  Prussia 
would  have  two  votes  against  six,  might  be  sure  of  a 
long  continuance." 

The  effect  of  these  reports  was  sweeping.  I  do  not 
find  that  a  single  dissenting  voice  was  heard  in  Berlin. 
Nor  was  there  now  any  difference  of  opinion  with 
regard  to  the  doctrine  that,  in  comparison  with 
Schwarzenberg's  plans,  the  old  Confederate  Diet, 
though  so  often  and  justly  condemned,  would  offer  a 
tolerable  expedient.  Manteuffel  was  accordingly  to  go 
to  Dresden,  and  at  once  to  state  to  Schwarzenberg  that 


CONFERENCE  OVER    THE  PRESIDENCY.     103 

the  recognition  of  Prussia's  claim  to  equal  power  witli 
Austria  was  the  indispensable  preliminary  condition  of 
an)'-  further  concessions. 

Agreeable,  then,  to  Schwarzenberg's  proposal,  the 
conference  between  the  two  Ministers  began  in  Dresden 
on  the  16th  of  February,  and  continued  through  the 
whole  week.  It  was  evident  at  the  outset  that  Prussia's 
claim  to  parity  in  the  Confederate  presidency  had  no 
prospect  of  being  satisfied.  To  begin  with,  Schwarzen- 
berg  asserted  the  establishment  of  the  new  authorities 
to  be  extremely  urgent,  saying  that  it  was  not  proper 
to  postpone  it  by  the  introduction  of  a  question  that 
after  all  was  not  so  very  simple.  He  promised  that  so 
soon  as  they  were  in  Frankfort,  the  participation  of 
Prussia  in  the  presidency  should  be  the  very  first 
matter  with  which  he  would  himself  charge  the  WQVf 
Plenum. 

As  evidence  of  his  good  intentions,  he  began  to  dis- 
cuss the  vai'ious  functions  that  would,  in  the  order  of 
business,  fall  to  the  president,  such  as  the  opening  of 
communications  received,  assignment  of  them  to  the 
proper  parties,  appointment  of  the  sessions,  etc.  ;  he 
considered  in  each  case  whether  Prussia  could  be 
allowed  to  share  in  the  same  or  not.  What  he  believed 
he  might  approve  of  here,  he  would  also  present  for 
acceptation  and  most  urgently  advise  in  Frankfort. 
More  than  this,  he  insisted,  would  not  be  consistent 
with  Ill's  duty;  a  certain  riglit  to  preference  in  honor 
the  dignity  of  the  Emperor  could  by  no  means  relin- 
quish. 


104  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

All  this  was  far  below  what  Prussia  desired  in  the 
way  of  perfect  equality  with  Austria  or  alternation  in 
the  presidency.  Manteuffel  then  went  to  Berlin  to 
make  his  report  personally  to  the  King,  but  returned 
with  instructions  to  yield  no  point  of  the  whole  extent 
of  Prussia's  demands.  Schwarzenberg,  thereupon,  con- 
ceded some  points  in  the  order  of  business.  Manteuffel, 
too,  avoided  for  the  time  the  statement  of  any  decisive 
ultimatum.  No  clear  understanding,  however,  was 
reached  ;  and  Manteuffel  was  obliged  to  declare  that 
until  this  should  be  accomplished,  a  definite  vote  of 
the  Congress  upon  the  reports  of  the  committees  would 
have  to  be  postponed,  and  more,  than  all,  the  installa- 
tion of  the  new  Confederate  authorities. 

On  the  23d  of  February  a  full  session  of  the  Congress 
was  held.  Austria  moved  the  acceptance  of  the  com- 
mittee's reports,  and  joined  with  this  motion  the 
proposition  to  install  the  executive  forthwith.  Prussia 
recognized  the  importance  of  the  matter,  but  just  on 
that  account  considered  it  necessary  to  give  the 
Governments  time  for  deliberation  and  instructions, 
and  therefore  moved  a  postponement  of  the  vote  for 
fourteen  days.  Inasmuch  as  Austria  could  bring  for- 
ward no  good  cause  for  objecting  to  this  postponement, 
Prussia's  motion  was  passed  unanimously. 

Bavaria  thought  it  would  nevertheless  be  interesting 
to  take  an  informal  vote  then,  in  order  to  get  some 
idea  of  the  opinions  the  deputies  then  held ;  and 
accordingly  such  a  trial  was  made.  It  became  evident 
by  this  how  successfully  Count  Alvensleben  had  used 


CONFERENCE   OVER   THE  PRESIDENCY.     105 

his  influence.  Of  thirty-five  states,  no  less  than  eigh- 
teen (beside  tlie  very  small  states,  all  the  Grand 
Duchies)  voted  against  the  reports  of  the  committees. 
Holstein,  Luxemburg,  and  Homburg  refrained  from 
voting.  To  every  unprejudiced  observer  it  was  evident 
that  this  more  than  anything  else  forever  doomed  the 
proposition  of  a  Directory  of  eleven  votes  to  which 
Manteuffel  had  agreed  six  weeks  before. 

The  question  unavoidably  arose,  what  would  happen 
if  further  deliberations  led  to  no  agreement.  The 
answer  lay  so  near  that  Baron  Pfordten  considered  a 
vigorous  protest  in  order.  "  Something  new,"  he  cried, 
"  must  be  achieved  in  Dresden.  Bavaria  will  never 
give  her  assent  to  a  vote  of  the  Congress  to  return  to 
the  old  Confederate  Diet,  since  that  would  be  a  viola- 
tion of  the  solemn  promises  that  have  been  made  to  the 
German  nation." 

Herr  von  Beust  seconded  the  patriotic  remarks  of  his 
friend  with  equal  warmth.  It  was  the  spontaneous 
expression  of  grief  at  the  disappointment  of  those 
alluring  hopes  which  Schwarzenberg's  scliemes  had 
offered  to  the  ambition  of  the  Lesser  States.  Otherwise 
it  had  no  significance.  For,  if  it  was  possible  to  pre- 
vent tlie  Congress  from  passing  a  vote  to  return  to  tlie 
old  Confederate  Diet,  it  least  of  all  became  the  members 
of  the  existing  Confederate  Diet  to  hinder  the  other 
states  from  entering  the  same. 

When  Manteuffel  left  Dresden,  he  i)romised  Schwarz- 
enberg  that  lu'  would  ;igain  n'])ort  to  the  King,  and 
then  send  the  I'rincc  without  delay  a  definite  statement 


106  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

of  Prussia's  views,  which  should  determine  once  for  all 
her  position  in  the  Congress.  This  he  did  as  early  as 
the  27th  of  February.  His  letter  to  the  Prince  had 
quite  another  tone  than  that  which  Schwarzenberg  had 
hitherto  been  accustomed  to  hear  from  his  Prussian 
colleague.  Manteuffel  began  with  the  asseveration 
that  he  was  not  expressing  his  own  personal  opinions, 
but  those  which  were  the  inevitable  result  of  stubborn 
facts  and  circumstances,  and  from  which  no  Prussian 
Cabinet  would  ever  swerve. 

He  then  went  on  to  say,  that  if  Austria  considered 
the  admission  of  her  entire  monarchy  into  the  Con- 
federation as  a  necessity,  so  did  Prussia  likewise  hold 
it  quite  as  indispensable  that  she  should  be  on  an 
equal  footing  with  Austria  in  the  presidency.  Prussia, 
he  said,  could  not  allow  this  to  depend  upon  the  result 
of  future  negotiations  with  the  new  Confederate 
authorities  after  they  were  already  in  Frankfort.  Be- 
fore the  new  Constitution  could  be  put  into  force,  these 
two  vital  questions  must  be  satisfactorily  settled. 
Accordingly,  he  enclosed  Prussia's  proposals  with 
regard  to  the  Confederate  presidency,  remarking  at  the 
same  time  that  no  opportunity  would  be  offered  for 
negotiating  and  discussing,  but  rather  that  this  state- 
ment marked  the  uttermost  limit  of  Prussia's  com- 
pliance. If  Austria  would  accept  these  proposals  and 
assist  in  causing  them  to  be  passed  by  the  Congress, 
then  Prussia  would  be  ready  to  support  a  motion  from 
Austria  concerning  the  formation  of  the  executive, 
which  would  have  more  probability  of  being  accepted 


FRUSTRATION  OF  AUSTRIA'S  PLANS.        107 

than  the  project  of  a  Directory  of  eleven  brought  for- 
ward by  both  of  the  Powers.  Nor  woukl  Prussia  refuse 
to  consider  in  an  unprejudiced  spirit  any  other  pro- 
posal, even  if  it  should  come  from  one  of  the  Petty 
States. 

Manteuffel  said  further  that  Austria  must  not  in  this 
matter  count  upon  the  sympathy  of  the  Conservative 
party  in  Prussia ;  for  these  Conservatives  were  true  to 
the  traditions  of  Old  Prussia,  filled  with  a  desire  for 
good  friendship  with  Austria,  but  more  than  all  with 
zeal  for  the  independence  and  honor  of  the  Prussian 
State. 

In  order  to  leave  no  doubt  whatever  concerning  the 
Prussian  resolves,  Manteuffel  closed  with  the  observa- 
tion tliat  if  no  understanding  with  Vienna  could  be 
reached,  Prussia  would  rest  upon  the  basis  of  the  old 
treaties  which  Austria  had  appealed  to  in  1850. 

"We  can  readily  believe  that  the  receipt  of  this  semi- 
official letter  tilled  Prince  Schwarzenberg  with  profound 
astonishment.  The  mere  fixing  of  an  ultimatum, 
quite  aside  from  its  contents,  was  more  than  Manteuffel 
had  ventured  to  take  upon  himself  in  any  matter  what- 
ever upon  which  he  had  conversed  with  the  Prince,  — 
then,  the  full  equality  of  Prussia  with  Austria  to  a 
greater  degree  even  than  had  lieen  verbally  expressed 
by  INIanteuffel  in  Dresden  —  further,  this  j)arity  set 
down  as  an  indispensable  condition  for  the  admission  of 
Austria  entire  into  the  Confederation  —  and  finally, 
Prussia's  undisguised  al)an(lonment  of  the  proposition 
for  a  Directory  of  eleven,  which  liad  meant  .Vustria's 


108        THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

certain  supremacy  in  the  new  executive  —  all  this, 
comprehended  in  the  contents  of  one  sheet,  far  exceeded 
the  bounds  of  Schwarzenberg's  patience. 

But  what  could  be  done  ?  Prussia  was  thoroughly- 
united  at  home,  and  had  not  only  the  majority  of  the 
members  of  tlie  Congress,  but  also  the  European  Powers 
upon  her  side.  In  a  word,  the  whole  object  of  his 
hopeful  exertions,  and  all  that  which  had  been  so  easy 
to  gain  from  Manteuffel  in  private  conversation,  had 
been  dashed  to  the  ground  the  last  moment  before  com- 
pletion. It  was  the  turning-point  in  all  the  transactions 
of  the  Dresden  Congress. 

Schwarzenberg's  first  step  now  was  to  send  a  circular 
on  the  2d  of  March  to  the  refractory  Governments,  in 
which,  quite  as  if  Manteuffel's  letter  had  not  been 
written,  he  represented  to  them,  in  view  of  the  doings 
of  the  session  of  February  23d,  that  it  would  be  an 
exceedingly  bold  step  for  the  Petty  States,  who  together 
made  up  only  one-tenth  of  the  population  of  the  Con- 
federation, to  venture  an  opposition  to  the  united 
wishes  of  the  two  Great  Powers  and  the  Kinsfdoms. 
"  Under  the  present  circumstances,"  he  said,  "  which 
themselves  speak  so  plainly,  we  believe  we  should  only 
lower  ourselves  in  the  eyes  of  our  Confederate  allies  by 
further  explanations."  The  small  states  knew,  of  course, 
how  things  were  in  Berlin,  and  hastened  to  send  thither 
a  copy  of  the  circular :  the  only  possible  consequence 
of  this  was  an  increase  of  the  suspicions  felt  towards 
Schwarzenberg's  violence  and  untrustworthiness. 

The  Prince,  then,  on  the  4th  of  March  answered  the 


PR  USSIA  'S  STA NDP 01  NT.  109 

Prussian  message  with  a  semi-official  letter  to  Man- 
teuffel,  covering  twenty-three  quarto  pages,  and  con- 
taining a  prolix  repetition  of  the  wliole  discussion  up 
to  this  point,  a  complaint  over  the  folly  of  coupling 
together  two  questions  so  utterly  unlike  in  essential 
importance,  as  the  admission  of  entire  Austria  and  the 
parity  of  Prussia,  and  finally  the  declaration  that 
Austria  was  ready  to  make  every  just  concession,  but 
that  the  honor  of  sending  the  "  Presiding  Deputy  "  and 
of  conducting  the  sessions  must  remain  in  the  hands  of 
Austria. 

The  whole  wrath  of  his  soul  he  then  poured  out  in  a 
private  letter  to  Manteuffel  on  the  same  day :  "  Our 
common  propositions,"  he  said,  "  to  which  the  represen- 
tatives of  nine-tenths  of  the  German  Confederation 
have  given  their  assent,  have  been  dropped  by  Prussia, 
probably  from  conscientious  scruples  concerning  strict 
adherence  to  Confederate  principles  and  rights.  This 
new  turn  has  filled  all  hearts  in  Paris  with  delight. 
I  have  sure  indications,  and  am  not  surprised  to  find, 
that  we  liave  more  than  one  Judas  in  our  midst.  In 
Dresden  there  will  now  spring  up  a  multitude  of  new 
memorials  as  instructive  as  they  will  be  absurd.  I 
must  therefore  abandon  the  idea  of  returning  thither  to 
listen  to  such  productions ;  such  a  sacrifice  my  country 
cannot  twice  demand  at  my  hands.  The  ears  of  the 
Gotha  faction  stick  out  in  spite  of  every  disguise." 

It  is  an  evidence  of  the  cahn  state  of  mind  which 
now  reigned  in  the  Prussian  Cabinet,  that  all  llicse 
cutting    expressions    of    affection    did   not   produce    a 


110        THE  DRESDEN   CONGRESS. 

strong  impulse  to  break  entirely  with  Austria.  On  the 
contrary,  however  decided  the  Prussians  felt  in  the 
question  of  a  German  Constitution,  they  had,  neverthe- 
less, an  ardent  desire  to  retain  in  other  respects  friendly 
relations  with  Austria,  partly  on  account  of  Russia's 
attitude,  and  partly  from  fears  of  encroachments  from 
the  side  of  the  French  Republic  under  the  leadership  of 
the  revolutionary  upstart,  Louis  Napoleon,  who  had 
just  made  the  suggestion  to  the  Prussian  ambassador 
that  the  German  and  other  European  questions 
should  be  settled  by  calling  a  congress  of  the  Great 
Powers. 

Manteuffel  sent  on  the  10th  of  March  a  second  letter, 
in  which  he  did  not  depart  in  a  single  point  from  his 
ultimatum  of  the  27th  of  February,  yet  expressed 
Prussia's  readiness  to  enter  into  a  mutually  defensive 
alliance  with  entire  Austria.  "The  more  serious 
European  complications  become,"  said  he,  "  the  more 
unyieldingly  shall  we  persist  in  our  close  relations  with 
Austria." 

This  made  a  great  impression  in  Vienna,  where 
Louis  Napoleon  was  regarded  with  as  much  suspicion 
as  in  Berlin.  In  the  Prince's  answer  of  the  17th  of 
March,  the  petulant  tone  of  his  former  letter  did  not 
appear  at  all,  but  in  its  place  expressions  of  hearty 
thanks  for  the  proposals  of  an  alliance.  The  Prince, 
however,  suggested  that  a  more  explicit  consideration 
of  the  matter  should  be  postponed  until  after  the  close 
of  the  Dresden  Congress,  which  he  hardly  liked  to 
believe  would  end  in  nothing. 


PRUSSIA   PROPOSES  AN  ALLIANCE.  Ill 

The  correspondence  between  the  two  Ministers  was 
kept  up  for  several  weeks.  New  propositions  about 
parity  and  about  the  executive  were  made  by  either 
side.  The  fate  of  them  all  was  the  same :  they  were 
rejected  by  Austria  Avhen  they  favored  Prussia's 
interests,  and  vice  versa.  They  suffered  shipwreck 
upon  the  same  rock  which  had  so  nearly  caused  the 
ruin  of  the  Congress  at  its  very  first  session  —  the 
rivalry  of  the  two  Great  Powers.  Until  this  was 
settled  in  some  way  or  other,  there  could  be  for  Ger- 
many no  other  constitution  than  the  loosely-connected 
confederacy  of  states  established  in  1815. 

The  actual  recognition  of  this  truth  was  first  shown 
by  Prussia,  who  summoned  on  the  27th  of  March  her 
former  allies  in  the  Union  to  send  deputies  to  the  Con- 
federate Diet  before  the  12th  of  May.  Soon  afterwards. 
Prince  Schwarzenberg  also  became  convinced  that  the 
hopes  built  upon  Dresden  were  vain,  and  returned  to 
Prussia's  offer  of  a  special  treaty  of  alliance. 

On  the  13th  of  April  he  sent  an  outline  of  such  a 
treaty  to  Berlin,  in  the  introduction  to  which  the  desire 
of  botli  monarchs  was  mentioned  to  enter  the  Confedera- 
tion with  all  their  possessions  and  dependencies  ;  but  in 
view  of  the  objections  made  to  this  by  England  and 
France,  "  quite  invalid  though  these  objections  were," 
for  the  present  the  formation  was  proposed  of  a  defen- 
sive alliance  for  the  protection  of  their  possessions.  In 
the  text,  ho\N'cver,  Prussia's  obligations  were  limited  to 
a  willingness  to  assist  with  all  her  powers  in  case  of 
an  attack  upon  the  Austrian  portion  of  Italy,  whereas 


112  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

Austria  offered  the  same  promise  of  help  in  case  any- 
Prussian  province  was  threatened,  without  discrimi- 
nation. 

From  this  outline  the  Berlin  Cabinet  erased  the 
introduction ;  added  to  the  Italian  the  other  provinces 
of  Austria  that  had  belonged  hitherto  to  the  German 
Confederation ;  named,  on  the  other  hand,  as  claiming 
Austrian  protection  and  aid,  the  Prussian  Confederate 
lands  as  well  as  also  East  and  West  Prussia ;  proposed 
mutual  help  in  case  of  insurrections  in  Galicia, 
Cracow,  and  Posen ;  and  held,  moreover,  this  treaty- 
open  to  Russia,  but  limited  the  whole  to  three  years. 
For  no  one  in  Berlin  felt  any  duty  or  inclination  to 
identify  Prussia  forever  with  the  policy  of  the  Court  of 
Vienna  in  the  Orient  and  in  Italy. 

Schwarzenberg  was  not  well  pleased  with  these 
alterations.  He  still  sought  to  gain  Prussia's  consent 
to  the  admission  of  all  the  provinces  of  both  Powers 
into  the  Confederation;  and  with  the  same  idea  he 
declined  the  mention  of  East  and  West  Prussia  in  the 
treaty,  since  that  implied  Prussia's  intention  to  withdraw 
these  provinces  from  the  Confederation.  He  declared 
it  superfluous  to  say  anything  about  mutual  aid  in  case 
of  Polish  insurrections,  since  that  was  already  included 
in  the  terms  of  the  treaties  of  1833. 

Finally  it  was  agreed  to  omit  everything  that  could 
excite  misgivings  in  the  minds  of  either  side,  and 
simply  to  promise  that  within  the  next  three  years 
each  of  the  two  Governments  would,  to  the  extent  of 
all  its  powers,  assist  the  other,  if  any  one  of 'the  hitter's 


SHALL   THE   COMMITTEE  BE  HEARD?        113 

possessions  inside  or  outside  of  the  German  Confedera- 
tion should  be  attacked. 

During  the  course  of  these  private  negotiations  be- 
tween the  two  Great  Powers,  the  committees  of  the 
Congress  in  Dresden  had  been  at  work  upon  their  tasks 
as  conscientiously  and  as  industriously  as  if  the  results 
of  their  labors  were  to  open  a  new  era  in  the  world's 
history.  In  the  middle  of  April  they  were  able  to 
announce  that  their  reports  would  be  ready  for  presen- 
tation by  the  end  of  the  month ;  whereupon  Prussia 
moved  to  close  the  Congress  on  the  6th  of  May  with 
the  simple  declaration  that  the  reports  of  the  com- 
mittees should  be  presented  to  the  Confederate  Diet  for 
the  discussion. 

But  Baron  Beust  could  not  endure  the  thought  that 
the  assembly  which  had  met  in  the  Saxon  capital  should 
prove  to  be  so  unsuccessful.  lie  hastened  to  Vienna 
to  urge  upon  Prince  Schwarzenberg  his  opinion  that 
although  the  Congress  might  not  accept  the  decisions 
of  the  committees  as  laws,  yet  it  ought  at  least  to  stamp 
them  with  its  approval,  that  they  might  then  be  laid 
before  the  German  Governments  to  be  followed  at  their 
option.  Inasmuch  as  this  would  inevitably  have 
brought  up  again  all  the  contested  points  between 
Austria  and  Prussia,  the  only  result  of  Beust's  plan 
would  have  been  the  breaking  up  of  the  Congress  in 
an  open  quarrel. 

Schwarzenberg  agreed  with  Beust's  desire  not  to  let 
the  Congress  close  witli  such  a  purely  negative  result, 
and  therefore  sent  to  Berlin  the  suggestion   to  appoint 


114  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

the  last  session  for  the  15th  of  May,  and  before  this 
time  to  draw  up  six  reform  decrees  of  unquestioned 
merit  and  desirability.  But  since  he  included  with 
great  assurance  in  his  enumeration  of  the  same  the 
proposition  of  the  third  committee  to  prepare  an  exten- 
sive tariif  league,  Prussia  sent  back  forthwith  her 
rejection  of  the  whole  suggestion. 

Upon  this  Schwarzenberg  was  again  beside  himself. 
"  The  Congress,"  said  he  to  the  Prussian  agent,  "  must 
not  be  allowed  to  be  so  wholly  unsuccessful.  Whether 
little  or  much,  something  must  be  accomplished.  I 
shall  persist  in  bringing  forward  my  six  points." 

On  the  2d  of  May,  Count  Buol  made  the  motion  in 
the  Congress  to  invite  the  Governments  to  express 
their  opinions  on  the  propositions  of  the  committees, 
and  for  this  purpose  to  appoint  a  session  to  be  held  upon 
May  15th.  Since  this  did  not  involve  a  vote  nor  a 
decree,  no  objection  could  be  made  to  it.  Yet  if  Prince 
Schwarzenberg  based  upon  this  any  hopes  of  attaining 
a  result  agreeable  to  his  wishes,  he  was  doomed  to  be 
thoroughly  disappointed. 

On  the  forenoon  of  the  15th,  every  member  of  the 
august  assembly  was  present.  Austiia  began  with  a 
prolix  and  eulogistic  criticism  of  the  work  of  the  com- 
mittees, and  at'  the  close  made  the  above-mentioned 
motion  to  accept  the  six  points  offered.  Prussia  re- 
plied to  every  question  with  a  short  and  very  con- 
cise explanation,  at  the  same  time  proposing  that  the 
decisions  of  the  committees  be  referred  to  the  Con- 
federate Diet.     Then  other  states  followed  with  various 


CLOSE   OF  THE   CONGRESS.  115 

opinions,  in  some  cases  very  diffusely  expressed.  The 
result  was,  that  upon  no  single  point  was  any  agree- 
ment reached  that  could  serve  to  direct  future  trans- 
actions. 

In  the  afternoon  the  formal  closing  session  took 
place.  To  Prince  Schwarzenberg  fell  the  duty,  this 
time  a  rather  melancholy  one,  of  making  in  his  address 
as  presiding  deputy  the  usual  complimentary  remarks 
about  the  assembly  and  its  aims.  The  climax  of  his 
speech  consisted  in  the  phrase,  which  has  so  long 
remained  fixed  in  the  nation's  memory,  that  although 
the  Congress  had  created  no  new  Constitution,  it  had 
provided  without  doubt  much  "  valuable  material  "  for 
further  negotiations. 

He  could  derive  a  little  consolation  from  the  fact 
that  on  the  following  day,  the  16th  of  J\Iay,  the  secret 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Prussia  was  signed  in  Dresden, 
and  thus  Austria's  supremacy  in  Italy  insured  for 
three  years  by  Prussia's  military  support.  But  the 
alluring  hope  of  a  final  mediatization  of  Prussia  was 
gone  forever. 

Thus  Austria's  system  of  an  "  entire  Germany " 
proved  to  be  quite  as  abortive  as  the  Imperial  Con- 
stitution of  the  Cathedral  of  St.  Paul,  the  League  of 
the  Three  Kingdoms,  and  the  Prussian  Union  I  •  The 
productions  of  the  revolutionary  movement  had  l)ecn 
thrust  aside  by  both  Great  Powers;  but  Prussia  and 
Austria  had  opposed  to  each  other  the  weight  of  their 
influence,  and  neitlier  had  been  able  to  overpower  the 
other.     'J'here  was  nothin'j- left  l)Ut  tlic  old  Confederate 


116  THE  DRESDEN  CONGRESS. 

Diet,  which  in  May  began  again  its  operations,  recog- 
nized on  all  sides. 

Whoever  passed  a  judgment  only  according  to  out- 
ward appearances,  might  well  believe  that  after  all  the 
enthusiasm  and  hopes,  after  all  the  ardent  discussions 
and  the  bloody  encounters,  Germany  had  arrived  at 
exactly  the  same  point  where  she  had  stood  on  the  1st 
of  February,  1848. 

No  one  looked  upon  this  result  with  more  satisfac- 
tion than  old  Prince  Metternich.  In  a  memorial  dated 
Nov.  10th,  1855,  he  said :  "  All  endeavors  which  party- 
spirit  during  the  years  1848  and  1849,  and  until  the 
present  day,  has  brought  to  bear  against  the  principles 
of  the  Confederation  in  its  lawful  shape,  have  proved 
themselves  to  be  empty  strivings,  directly  contrary  to 
the  nature  of  things.  The  questions  which  the  Aus- 
trian Cabinet  discussed  in  the  year  1813  were  then 
and  will  always  be  the  only  possible  legitimate  ones ; 
and  these  are  capable  of  no  other  practical  solution 
than  that  which  they  have  found  in  the  Act  of 
Confederation."  ^ 

1  Historische  Zeitschrift,  58,  p.  384. 


THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET.  117 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

In  one  particular  the  revived  Confederate  Diet  strove 
to  appear  unquestionably  the  continuation  of  the  old 
one ;  namely,  in  its  suppression  of  the  liberal  and 
democratic  tendencies  of  the  times.  These  had  devel- 
oped in  the  year  1848  a  power  hitherto  unheard  of  in 
Germany ;  and  now  the  corresponding  reactionary 
spirit  of  the  Confederate  Diet  left  its  prototype  at 
Carlsbad  far  behind.  In  this  common  cause  individual- 
istic tendencies  seemed  to  have  been  suddenly  eradi- 
cated. The  Governments  of  the  single  states  with  but 
few  exceptions  vied  in  conforming  to  the  conservative 
decrees  of  the  Diet,  or  in  prompting  such  decrees  them- 
selves. The  German  Central  Authority  had  never 
before  been  allowed  to  influence  so  largely  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  individual  states  as  now,  when  —  to  use 
the  words  of  Frederick  William  IV.  —  its  task  was  to 
wipe  away  from  the  German  Constitutions  the  foulness 
which  had  come  upon  them  in  that  year  of  shame. 

Some  things  of  that  nature  had  already  been  accom- 
plished when  the  Confederate  Diet  assembled  with  its 
former  full  number  in  May,  1851.  lu  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin,  in  spite  of  all  opposition  from  tlic  Grand 
Ducal  Governmriit,  tlu;  old   power  of  the   nobility  was 


118  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

restored  by  tTie  decision  of  a  tribunal  of  arbitration. 
Saxony  had  in  May,  1850,  when  in  her  Chambers  one- 
half  of  the  members  urged  the  plan  of  joining  the 
Prussian  Union,  and  the  other  half  pressed  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  Frankfort  imperial  Constitution,  dissolved 
the  Chambers,  declared  the  laws  of  1848  to  be  invalid, 
and  renewed  the  Constitution  of  1831. 

Wiirtemberg  had  followed  this  example,  when  her 
popular  representatives  refused  to  grant  to  the  Govern- 
ment the  money  necessary  for  the  preparations  which 
had  been  decided  upon  in  Bregenz  for  the  carrying  out 
of  the  chastisement  of  Hesse-Cassel :  the  representa- 
tives were  sent  home,  and  the  Constitution  of  1819  put 
into  force  again. 

In  both  Saxony  and  Wiirtemberg,  the  Ministers, 
after  resolutely  taking  the  reins  again  into  their  hands, 
maintained  a  vigorous  administration,  which  also  gave 
much  attention  to  the  fostering  of  material  interests. 
The  old  nobility,  once  more  reinstated  in  their  rights, 
was  thankful  to  them ;  and  a  great  share  of  the  citizens 
were  glad  to  be  rid  of  political  agitation,  so  detrimental 
to  commerce  and  to  trade. 

Similar  tendencies  made  themselves  felt  everywhere. 
It  would  fill  a  large  volume  to  tell  of  them  in  the 
German  countries  in  detail.  We  must  content  our- 
selves with  noticing  tlieir  general  direction.  Every- 
where we  meet  just  the  opposite  of  the  Democratic  tide 
of  1848. 

Let  us  repeat  briefly  the  most  important  aims  of 
that  former  movement. 


FORMER  DEMOCRATIC  DEMANDS.  119 

Wherever  the  attempt  was  not  actually  made  to  raise 
the  banner  of  a  republic,  the  aim  was  to  reduce  the 
monarch  to  the  position  of  an  executive  of  the  sovereign 
will  of  the  People  or  of  the  People's  representatives,  by 
limiting  his  power  in  legislation  to  that  of  a  merely 
postponing  veto,  by  giving  to  the  Lower  Chamber  the 
unbounded  right  of  refusing  the  taxes,  by  obliging  all 
officers  and  functionaries  to  swear  loyalty  to  the  Con- 
stitution, and  by  committing  important  branches  of  the 
administration  to  the  care  of  persons  chosen  to  those 
offices. 

These  powerful  bodies  representing  the  People  were 
then  in  their  turn  made  dependent  upon  the  People's 
sovereign  will  by  being  chosen  for  short  terms  by 
universal  suffrage,  by  the  granting  of  the  unlimited 
right  of  forming  societies  and  holding  meetings,  by 
unconditional  freedom  of  the  Press,  and  by  the  impos- 
ing of  limits  as  narrow  as  possible  upon  the  authority 
of  the  police. 

According  to  the  principles  of  equality,  all  peculiar 
rights  due  to  rank  were  to  be  done  away  with,  and  the 
nobility,  if  not  simply  abolished,  to  be  forced  to  give  up 
their  privileges  enjoyed  hitherto.  The  Church  should 
yield  obedience  in  outward  legal  matters  to  the  laws  of 
tlie  democratic  state,  science  and  education  should  be 
freed  from  every  ecclesiastical  influence,  and  no  one  be 
forced  to  make  a  confession  of  his  religious  faith. 

Tliis  system  liad  nowliere  probably  reached  the  stage 
of  being  fully  realized;  but  it  had  in  numerous  states 
so  far   penetrated   the   body   politic,    that   the   sudden 


120  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

overthrow  of  the  former  strongholds  of  authority,  the 
flood  of  new  laws,  often  provisional  and  incomplete, 
and  the  sanctioned  license  of  the  masses,  occasioned 
great  confusion  and  uncertainty  in  all  branches  of  the 
administration,  together  with  unlawful  proceedings  and 
acts  of  violence  of  all  kinds. 

That  in  hundreds  of  these  places  something  had  to 
be  done  is  as  clear  as  that  the  first  step  in  the  line  of 
remedy  was  necessarily  the  strengthening  of  magisterial 
authority.  In  the  more  comprehensive  organizations, 
the  task,  and  not  a  light  one,  was  to  discriminate 
between  the  legitimate  demands  of  the  times  and  the 
abnormal  excrescences,  to  remove  the  latter,  and  to 
incorporate  the  former  in  fitting  fashion  into  the 
monarchical  system. 

But  the  ancient  and  wise  doctrine,  that  the  best 
security,  both  for  order  and  for  liberty,  is  offered  by 
a  Constitution  composed  of  the  united  elements  of 
monarch}',  aristocracy,  and  democracy,  was  either  un- 
known to  the  party  that  was  now  forcing  its  way  into 
the  leadership  of  the  Reaction,  or  it  appeared  to  them 
ridiculous.  "  Politics,"  it  was  then  said,  "  is  nothing 
hut  a  contest  for  power ;  and  whoever  strives  for  the 
power  is  a  fool  to  grant  his  opponents  any  share  in  it. 
The  Democrats  have  sought  to  reduce  the  monarch  to  a 
mere  mouthpiece  of  the  popular  representation :  we 
will  either  have  no  representatives  of  the  people  at  all, 
or  at  most  allow  them  only  a  consulting  voice.  The 
Democrats  would  emancipate  officials  from  the  orders  of 
the  King,  and  the  people  from  obedience  to  the  authori- 


THE  RE  ACT  I  ON  IN  AUSTRIA.  121 

ties  :  we  will  put  the  people  under  the  control  of  the 
police,  and  the  police  at  the  beck  of  the  monarch. 
The  Democrats  have  mixed  up  nobility  and  proletariat 
in  one  mass,  and  given  over  the  Church  to  the  destruc- 
tive caprices  of  the  clubs  and  a  false  science  :  we  will 
give  back  to  the  nobles  their  local  and  political  rights, 
and  place  the  infatuated  people  again  under  the  guardian- 
ship of  the  reinstated  and  strengthened  Church." 

Thus  in  that  reactionary  movement  absolutistic, 
feudal,  and  clerical  tendencies  worked  side  by  side  in 
varying  combinations  and  with  varying  effectiveness. 

Austria  took  the  lead  and  set  a  vigorous  example. 
Since  the  Revolution  had  been  here  crushed  out  by 
tremendous  military  operations,  and  since  the  Prime 
Minister,  Prince  Schwarzenberg,  recognized  a  govern- 
mental system  as  useful  only  so  far  as  it  obliged  the 
people  to  render,  as  in  a  military  system,  unconditional 
obedience,  the  element  of  absolutism  here  outweighed  by 
far  all  others.  The  March  Constitution  at  Kremsier  had 
been  from  the  start  a  dead  letter ;  although,  to  please 
the  popular  fancy,  quite  as  lifeless  constitutions  for 
every  crown-land  had  been  on  paper  appended  to  it. 

Without  doubt  the  decisive  argument  was  the  fact, 
that,  in  view  of  the  complicated  state  of  affairs  in  Hun- 
gary, more  difficulties  seemed  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
the  execution  of  the  Constitution  than  of  its  abolition. 
Only  the  unassailed  omnipotence  of  the  Government 
seemed  to  be  able  to  insure  the  unity  or  even  the  very 
existence  of  the  loinpirc.  'riicrcforc  it  was  decnu'd 
best  to  pay  no  further  attention  to  the  special  pecnliiri- 


122  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

ties  of  each  province,  nor  to  the  so-called  fundamental 
rights,  nor  to  the  establishment  of  an  independent 
parliament. 

The  whole  monarchy  was  to  be  divided  into  adminis- 
trative districts,  all  organized  alike,  and  a  beaurocracy 
to  be  instituted  which  should  be  an  authority  over  the 
subjects  and  strictly  under  the  control  of  the  Imperial 
Government.  In  this  way  a  thoroughly  centralized 
system  was  to  be  called  into  life ;  and  to  secure  its 
stability,  wherever  a  "  state  of  siege  "  was  not  actually 
announced,  the  military  authorities  were  invested  with 
extensive  powers  in  order  to  insure  this  universal 
dominion. 

But  to  a  still  greater  degree  the  vast  official 
machinery  of  the  Catholic  Church  was  made  to  serve 
the  same  purpose.  The  most  alluring  prospects  were 
held  out  to  the  Roman  Curia,  Jesuits  and  Liguorians 
were  called  back  into  the  empire,  the  whole  department 
of  education  was  placed  under  the  supervision  of  the 
bishops,  and  all  secular  officials  were  instructed  to 
sustain  the  censorship  and  moral  precepts  of  the 
Church.  Schwarzenberg  believed  that  he  now  might 
say  like  the  first  Napoleon  :  "  With  my  soldiers,  police, 
and  clergy,  I  can  do  in  the  country  what  I  please." 

The  nobility,  especially  after  the  Hungarian  mag- 
nates had  again  dared  to  express  their  minds,  received 
only  fragmentary  crumbs  from  the  benefits  of  this 
system.  The  peasants  remained  free  from  socage  ser- 
vice ;  and  to  correspond  with  this,  the  nobles  were 
assured    the     liberty     of    establisliing    entails.     Their 


THE   CHANGE  IN  AUSTRIA.  123 

estates  were  separated  from  the  property  of  the  com- 
munity, and  the  prospect  was  held  out  to  them  of 
being  allowed  to  have  a  consulting  voice  in  the  govern- 
ment. Larger  political  privileges  were  not  granted  to 
them. 

Three  messages  from  the  Emperor  himself  on  the 
20th  of  August,  and  three  more  on  the  31st  of  Decem- 
ber, 1851,  announced  to  the  people  of  Austria  the 
abolition  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  doctrines  of 
absolute  centralization.  No  voice  was  raised  in  opposi- 
tion. The  Diets  were  dissolved,  the  Press  lay  fast  in 
fetters,  any  resistance  would  have  been  stifled  on  the 
spot  and  severely  punished.  Not  until  some  time  later 
did  the  sequel  prove  that  unlimited  authority  is  not 
always  a  source  of  strength. 

After  the  Imperial  Government  had  in  August,  1851, 
determined  upon  this  course  of  action,  an  urgent  appeal 
was  sent  in  September  to  Berlin,  advising  the  employ- 
ment of  tlie  same  means  in  Prussia  to  eradicate  com- 
pletely the  products  of  the  Revolution,  and  above  all 
things  to  put  out  of  existence  that  Constitution  of 
1850. 

Not  oflicially  in  the  ^Ministry,  but  yet  among  those 
personally  about  the  King,  such  ideas  had  already 
taken  delinite  form.  In  j)lace  of  a  Constitution  drawn 
up  and  generally  agreed  upon  according  to  the  com- 
pacts, a  royal  patent  was  proposed,  and  in  place  of  the 
elections  according  to  the  number  of  heads  (as  it  was 
termed),  tlie  liistorical  system  of  Estates.  The  King 
would  have  the  interests  of  the  State  to  care  for,  and 


124  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

the  Estates  the  interests  of  the  Estates.  In  short,  no 
imitation  of  Napoleonic  despotism,  such  as  Prince 
Schwarzenberg  aimed  at,  was  intended,  but  rather  a 
return  to  the  system  of  the  United  Provincial  Parlia- 
ment of  1847. 

Since  all  this  coincided  exactly  with  the  inmost 
convictions  of  Frederick  William,  the  temptation  for 
the  Monarch  was  very  great ;  for  any  revolutionary 
resistance  to  the  measures  was  at  this  time  as  much 
out  of  the  question  in  Prussia  as  in  Austria.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  was  in  Prussia  no  present  distress, 
no  disquietude  in  the  country,  no  great  strife  with  the 
Chambers.  There  was  no  excuse  nor  occasion  for  a 
coup  d'etat  beyond  the  personal  opinion  of  certain 
influential  men,  that  the  Constitution  of  1847  was 
better  than  that  of  1850. 

But  at  the  proclamation  of  the  latter,  the  King  had 
solemnly  thanked  the  Chambers  for  the  improved 
revision  of  the  Constitution,  had  told  them  that  they 
had  thus  made  it  possible  for  him  to  establish  a  royal 
re'jlme  upon  a  constitutional  basis,  and  had  then 
declared  with  a  solemn  vow  and  oath  his  sanction  of 
the  same.  Could  it  be  dreamed  of  that  only  two 
years  later  he  should  retract  these  declarations  as  being 
evident  mistakes,  and  upon  that  renounce  the  obliga- 
tions of  his  oath  ? 

The  King  wished  to  hear  what  one  of  his  Liberal 
friends  had  to  say  about  it,  and  had  the  question  laid 
before  Bunsen,  his  ambassador  in  London.  As  might 
have  been  expected,  Bunsen  sought  earnestly  to  dis- 


QUESTION  OF  A    CHARTER  IN  PRUSSIA.      125 

suade  him  from  a  coup  d'etat,  which  would  begin  with 
a  violation  of  an  oath,  and  which  in  its  results  would 
disturb  the  internal  peace  from  its  very  foundation. 

I  have  been  assured  by  reliable  authorities  that  the 
advocates  of  a  coup  d'etat  did  not,  however,  upon  that 
give  up  their  plan.  They  declared  that  the  "  Liberal 
babbler  "  in  London  was  not  capable  of  judging  in  the 
matter.  Their  opinion  was,  that  it  was  more  virtuous 
to  break  a  sinful  oath  than  to  keep  it.  They  questioned 
whether,  if  King  Herod  had  broken  his  solemn  promise 
made  to  Herodias  to  give  her  the  head  of  John  the 
Baptist,  it  would  have  been  a  sin  in  the  sight  of  God. 

Against  them  indeed  arose  a  Royalist  of  the  purest 
water,  a  man  who  was  at  that  time  looked  upon  by 
every  Liberal  as  an  enemy  of  all  freedom,  the  governor 
of  the  province  of  Pomerania,  Baron  von  Senft- 
Pilsach.  He  wrote  to  the  King  in  respectful  and  ear- 
nest words,  urging  His  Majesty  not  to  allow  himself  to 
be  misled  by  any  pious  sophistry  from  the  straight 
path  of  honor  and  fidelity ;  for  the  cool-blooded  and 
strong-hearted  people  of  North  Germany  would  never 
get  over  nor  forget  a  violation  by  a  King  of  his  royal 
oath. 

The  King  made  up  his  mind  that  this  was  the  truth, 
and  notliing  more  was  said  about  a  charter. 

Meanwhile  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Herr  von 
Westphalen,  persuaded  his  colleagues  very  soon  that 
the  desired  break  with  the  Revolution  might  be  easily 
and  successfully  accomplished  by  a  little  skill,  even  if 
the    Constitution    of    1850   were    allowed   to    remain. 


126  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

The  necessary  skill,  he  said,  consisted  in  a  perfectly 
harmless  interpretation  of  certain  articles  of  the  Con- 
stitution and  paragraphs  of  the  laws. 

An  exceedingly  useful  doctrine  was  then  adopted ; 
namely,  that  a  long  list  of  those  articles,  especially 
those  under  the  second  section  of  the  Constitution, 
which  treated  "  of  the  rights  of  Prussians,"  involved 
general  principles  that  could  receive  binding  force  only 
after  special  laws  should  be  passed  concerning  the  details 
of  execution ;  so  that  until  the  passage  of  these  latter, 
the  old  laws  concerning  these  subjects  would  remain 
in  force.  According  to  this  simple  doctrine,  the  legal 
force  was  taken  away  from  such  phrases  as  equality 
before  the  law,  abolition  of  the  privileges  of  the  Estates, 
religious  freedom  and  the  right  to  form  new  religious 
societies  holding  services  of  public  worship,  abrogation 
of  proprietary  police,  and  so  forth. 

I  shall  not  take  the  trouble  of  following  in  detail 
this  science  of  getting  rid  of  a  law  by  considering  its 
interpretation  as  applied  to  certain  particular  branches 
of  the  administration ;  for  our  purposes  it  will  be 
enough  to  mention  the  results  arrived  at  by  this 
process.  In  Prussia,  the  beaurocracy,  the  nobility, 
and  the  Church,  shared  about  equally  in  the  profits,  as 
they  did  not  in  Austria. 

Against  the  unlawful  demands  of  a  government 
official  there  was  in  fact  no  redress  whatever  possible 
further  than  to  enter  a  complaint  with  the  proper 
Minister.  The  right  of  the  police  to  make  regulations 
■with  threats  of  punishment  knew  no  limits.     The  dis- 


THE  REACTION  IN  PRUSSIA.  127 

trict  authorities,  in  virtue  of  their  right  to  supervise 
matters,  interfered  with  the  independent  government 
of  the  cities  as  they  pleased,  with,  without,  and  contrary 
to,  the  hiws.  Inasmuch  as  the  law  concerning  the 
liberty  of  the  Press  empowered  the  judge,  in  case  of 
abuse  of  the  same,  to  take  away  their  license  from  book- 
sellers and  publishers  in  certain  cases,  therefore  Ilerr 
von  Westphalen  argued  that  the  law  did  not  say  that 
the  withdrawal  of  their  license  should  be  confined  to 
these  cases,  and  accordingly  he  permitted  the  police  to 
take  away  the  license  wherever  it  seemed  to  be  desir- 
able. So  that  what  was  brought  about  in  Austria  by 
an  open  sic  volo,  sic  juheo.,  namely,  a  great  extension  of 
the  beaurocratic  power,  was  achieved  in  Prussia  by  a 
hitherto  unheard-of  interpretation  of  the  laws. 

In  the  same  way  the  feudal  party  made  sure  of  its 
portion  of  the  booty.  The  proprietors  of  large  estates 
received  again  the  police  authority  of  which  they  had 
been  deprived  by  the  Constitution.  The  old  provincial 
Estates  and  the  district  assemblies,  both  inconsistent 
with  the  princijjles  of  the  Constitution,  were  called 
into  existence  again,  and,  what  was  more  than  all,  the 
Upper  House,  the  members  of  which  had  hitherto  been 
elected,  was  now,  in  accordance  with  a  very  doubtful 
interpretation  of  tlie  law,  turned  into  a  House  of  Peers, 
in  which  counts  and  proprietors  of  manorial  estates 
were  in  a  decided  majority,  and  thus  possessed  a  sure 
bulwark  against  possible  later  attempts  to  legislate 
unfavorably  to  them. 

As  far  as  the  Church  was  concerned,  the  Constitu- 


128  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

tioii  was  ill  this  instance  literally  and  to  its  fullest 
extent  carried  out.  To  the  Catholic  hierarchy  was 
left  the  independent  arrangement  and  administration  of 
their  own  affairs  without  any  of  the  former  reservations 
about  the  rights  of  supervision  held  b}"  the  State.  The 
education  and  the  official  position  of  the  priests,  the 
control  of  the  property  connected  with  the  parish 
churches,  the  ecclesiastical  means  of  enforcing  morality 
among  the  laity  —  all  this  was  henceforth  wholly  in 
the  hands  and  at  the  will  of  the  bishops.  Religious 
houses  of  all  orders,  more  especially  of  the  Jesuits, 
filled  the  land,  and  gained  a  mighty  influence  among  all 
classes. 

In  both  Catholic  and  Protestant  districts,  the  local 
supervision  of  the  common  schools  was  once  for  all 
intrusted  to  the  priest  or  pastor  of  the  parish.  In  a 
word,  the  Crown  showed  itself  still  more  unselfish  in 
this  department,  and  more  ready  to  yield  in  limitations 
of  its  power  to  the  Church  than  to  the  nobility.  In 
the  Protestant  Church,  to  be  sure,  there  was  no 
hierarchy  that  could  assert  itself  after  the  fashion  of 
the  Catholic  system,  except  in  the  supervision  of  the 
schools.  Yet  among  the  Protestants  the  prevailing 
sentiment  made  itself  felt  in  many  ways.  The  inde- 
pendence of  the  Church  in  respect  to  the  State  was 
seen  when  a  clergyman  refused  to  obey  the  laws  of  the 
land  upon  the  ground  of  some  biblical  command  — 
for  instance,  in  the  question  of  marrying  a  divorced 
man  to  another  wife  —  and  then  was  defended  in  his 
position  by  the  civil  authorities. 


FEUDAL  AND   CLERICAL  RELATIONS.         129 

Further,  the  care  of  the  State  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  established  Church  was  evident  from  the  marked 
pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  unbelievers  and  the 
indifferent.  Societies  of  Dissenters  were  branded  as 
political  clubs  of  the  most  dangerous  sort,  and  every 
means  of  police  oppression  was  employed  to  extermi- 
nate them.  Every  ambitious  government  official  knew 
that  his  advancement  depended  upon  his  pious  habits, 
devotion  to  the  ordinances  of  the  Church,  frequent 
attendance  upon  divine  service,  interest  in  religious 
societies,  and  subscriptions  to  benevolent  institutions. 

The  edifying  effect  of  these  regulations  was  very 
soon  evident.  The  dominant  party  was  so  sure  of 
success  that  no  person  regarded  by  it  with  disfavor 
could  expect  to  be  spared.  This  was  carried  so  far 
that  even  the  Pleir-Apparent,  who  by  no  means 
belonged  to  that  j^arty,  was  in  many  instances  obliged 
to  experience  slight  but  yet  pointed  incivilities,  on 
account  of  his  difference  of  opinion. 

This  then  was  the  attitude  and  policy  of  the  two 
Great  Powers,  and  under  these  influences  the  new 
Confederate  Diet  assembled  with  the  task  of  healing 
the  State  Constitutions  which  had  been  sufferincr  since 
1848  from  Democratic  poison.  On  the  8th  of  July, 
1851,  Austria  and  Prussia  l)rought  forward  together  a 
motion,  whicli  in  tlie  first  place  included  several  })ropo- 
sitiohs  about  the  maintenance  of  a  body  of  troops  to 
insure  the  protection  of  the  Confederate  assembly,  and 
about  the  formation  of  a  central  police  organization,  and 
then  referred  to  the  right  and  duty  of  the  Confedera- 


130  THE  NEW   CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

tion,  in  accordance  with  Article  II.  of  the  Act  of 
Confederation  as  well  as  with  the  decision  of  a  com- 
mittee of  the  Dresden  Congress,  to  provide  for  the 
internal  safety  of  Germany,  and  therefore  not  to  suffer 
the  political  conditions  of  the  individual  Confederate 
states  to  militate  against  the  aims,  laws,  and  decrees 
of  the  Confederation,  as  unfortunately  was  too  often 
the  case  in  consequence  of  the  enactment  of  the  Frank- 
fort "  fundamental  rights,"  the  democratic  electoral 
laws,  the  revolutionar}^  inclinations  of  numerous  public 
officials,  and  the  license  of  the  Press. 

In  such  states,  it  was  contended,  the  superficial 
appearance  of  good  order  was  deceiving.  From  them 
proceeded  the  influences  that  unsettled  the  other  states 
in  their  fundamental  principles,  scarcely  yet  fixed.  It 
was  true  that  in  general  the  maintenance  of  internal 
peace  and  order  was  consigned  by  the  laws  of  the  Con- 
federation to  the  individual  Governments  ;  but  this  was 
no  rule  to  go  by,  when  it  was  necessary  in  these 
individual  states  to  exterminate  institutions  which 
were  contrary  to  the  laws  of  the  Confederation,  or 
threatened  to  thwart  its  essential  aims. 

Based  upon  these  considerations  the  motion  was 
made  as  follows  :  "  The  Confederate  assembly  shall  by 
a  special  decree  assert  its  fundamental  right,  in  case  of 
need,  to  demand  from  the  Governments  of  those  Con- 
federate states  whose  condition  seems  dangerous  to'  the 
common  welfare,  that  they  shall  bring  the  ordinances 
of  their  Constitutions  and  of  their  laws,  as  well  as  their 
own    personal    attitude    towards    questions    of  public 


MOTIONS  OF  THE   TWO  GREAT  POWERS.     131 

order,  into  conformity  with  the  fundamental  laws  of 
the  Confederation  and  with  the  duty  incumbent  upon 
every  member  of  the  Confederation  of  not  endangering 
the  common  safety. 

"  Furthermore,  the  assembly  shall  appoint  a  com- 
mittee of  its  own,  that  shall  as  speedil}^  as  possible 
report  upon  the  measures  best  adapted  to  the  carrjang 
out  of  these  principles.  If  the  demand  made  to  the 
Governments  be  not  voluntarily  complied  with,  then 
those  means  shall  be  employed  that  are  sanctioned  by 
the  laws  of  the  Confederation,  and  first  of  all,  com- 
missioners of  the  Confederation  shall  be  sent  with 
appropriate  powers  into  the  respective  states." 
Appended  to  this  was  a  second  motion,  wdth  the  reser- 
vation of  the  possibility  of  further  enactments,  for- 
bidding, in  the  name  of  the  Confederation,  the  printing 
of  any  communistic  or  republican  publications. 

It  was  a  very  comprehensive  and  radical  cure  that 
was  planned  for  the  healing  of  the  states  so  disordered 
by  the  democratic  epidemic  :  a  regular  corps  of  troops 
for  the  defence  of  the  Confederation,  Confederate 
police,  Confederate  ordinances  against  the  vicious 
Press,  Confederate  measures  against  the  odious  State 
Constitutions.  If  this  should  all  be  realized,  Germany 
would  liave  a  Central  Authority  over  the  individual 
states  with  a  power  greater  than  the  Majority  in  the 
Cathedral  of  St.  Paul  had  the  remotest  idea  of  vesting 
in  their  German  Emperor:  instead  of  being  a  definitely 
limited  imperial  government,  it  was  to  be  an  actually 
unlimited  ceiitial  Coiifcdcnitc  p(>lice  system. 


132  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

The  members  of  the  committee  to  whom  the  motions 
had  been  referred  for  consideration  (beside  Austria  and 
Prussia,  including  Bavaria,  Saxony,  Hanover,  Baden, 
and  Darmstadt),  weighed  the  subject  with  very  mixed 
feelings ;  they  were  quite  ready  to  suppress  the 
Democracy,  but  yet  were  not  without  anxiety  as  to 
where  the  powers  of  the  Confederation  were  to  end,  in 
view  of  such  indefinite  phraseology  as  "  the  common 
safety,"  "  the  monarchical  principle,"  "  the  highest  wel- 
fare of  the  Confederation." 

Their  report  of  the  16th  of  August  reveals  their 
hesitation  and  their  doubts.  They  hoped  that  the 
Governments  of  the  individual  states  would  of  their 
own  accord  take  hold  of  the  work.  They  considered 
it  impossible  that  any  Government  should  refuse  to 
acquiesce  in  the  demands  of  the  Confederation ;  so 
that  special  measures  of  the  Confederation  would  be 
necessary  only  in  case  other  obstacles  stood  in  the  way 
of  some  Government. 

They  therefore  urged  the  Governments  to  go  on 
their  own  accord.  They  even  rose  to  the  hope  that  if 
all  the  Governments  should  show  themselves  united  and 
energetic,  the  nation  would  then  acknowledge  that  in 
this  unity  the  power  was  to  be  found  for  the  sake  of 
which  brave  patriots  had  favored  a  Confederation 
having  a  single  head.  They  remarked  further  very 
discreetly  that  it  was  more  necessary  just  now  to  pre- 
vent any  occasion  for  the  interference  of  the  Confedera- 
tion in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  single  members  than 
to  insure  the  right  of  so  interfering. 


THE  REACTION  COMMISSION.  133 

Yet  in  spite  of  all  their  scruples,  there  was  no 
thought  of  opposing  this  first  motion  of  the  two  Great 
Power's,  further  than  to  modify  some  few  expressions. 
It  was  recommended  by  the  committee  and  accepted  on 
the  23d  of  August;  the  commission  proposed  in  the 
motion  was  straightway  chosen :  Austria,  Prussia, 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  Darmstadt.  So  far  as  the  Press  was 
concerned,  however,  the  prohibition  of  objectionable 
newspapers  by  the  Confederate  Diet  as  proposed  by 
the  Great  Powers  proved  unpopular,  and  another  com- 
mittee was  appointed  to  draw  up  a  Confederate  Press- 
law. 

The  Reaction-Commission,  as  the  Representatives  in 
the  Confederate  Diet  were  accustomed,  themselves, 
with  a  smile,  to  call  their  creation  of  August  23d,  very 
soon  found  their  hands  full.  Beside  Hesse-Cassel, 
whose  hour  of  agony  had  long  since  begun,  the  Con- 
stitutions of  Anhalt,  Bremen,  Hamburg,  Frankfort, 
Hanover,  Lippe,  Saxe-Coburg,  Liechtenstein,  Hesse- 
Homburg,  and  Waldeck  came  gradually  under  the 
treatment  of  the  Confederate  Diet. 

Here  again  it  would  bo  very  wearisome  for  the 
reader  of  to-d;.y  to  work  his  way  through  the  numerous 
writings  back  and  forth  in  these  controversies,  in  which 
the  primary  object  had  been  long  since  forgotten. 
In  most  cases,  aristocratic  corporations  that  had  lost 
their  standing  duiiiig  the  years  of  the  Revolution 
demanded  and  ()l)tained  restoration  at  the  hands  of  the 
Confederation.  What  respect  was  manifested  for  Con- 
federate   and  state  laws,  what  ]iractical  judgment  and 


134  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

what  party  zeal  were  frequently  manifested  in  the 
course  of  these  restorations,  we  will  at  least  illustrate 
by  one  example,  which  was  remarkable  in  many  respects : 
the  chastisement  of  Hesse-Cassel. 

We  have  already  seen  how,  at  the  very  outset,  this 
punishment  of  the  people  of  Hesse  wanted  all  lawful 
foundation.  The  Government  had  continued  to  refuse 
to  lay  before  the  Estates,  as  the  Constitution  prescribed, 
the  statement  of  the  budget,  and  yet  had  four  times 
imperiously  demanded  unusual  grants.  Actual  reasons 
for  this  delay  in  the  presentation  of  the  budget  were 
not  to  be  discovered,  and  the  Estates  merely  did  their 
duty  when  they  refused  to  grant  further  appropriations 
before  a  budget  should  be  presented.  Likewise,  when 
Hassenpflug  commanded  the  officers  of  the  Finance 
Department,  by  a  decree,  to  raise  the  taxes,  they  were 
quite  right  in  refusing  to  obey  an  order  against  the 
express  prohibition  of  the  Constitution. 

When  Hassenpflug  made  his  complaint  about  this  to 
the  Confederation,  it  was  most  certainly  the  business 
of  the  Confederate  Diet  in  the  first  place  to  direct  him 
to  fulfil  his  own  duty  and  present  the  statement  of  the 
budget.  Instead  of  that,  the  Diet  without  delay  con- 
firmed Hassenpflug  in  his  position  that  the  conduct  of 
the  Estates  meant  a  withholding  of  the  revenues,  that 
according  to  the  Confederate  law  of  1832  this  meant 
rebellion,  and  that  in  the  case  of  rebellion  the  Con- 
federate Diet,  according  to  Articles  XXVI.  and  LVII. 
of  the  Vienna  Final  Act,  liad  the  duty  of  lending 
aid,  if  tlie   distressed  Government   in  question  should 


BEGINNING   OF  HESSIAN  CHASTISEMENT.      135 

not  have  the  necessary  force  with  which  to  protect 
itself. 

Therefore,  in  order  to  restore  order,  the  chastisement 
of  Hesse  was  forthwith  decreed  in  spite  of  the  positive 
declaration  in  the  Vienna  Final  Act  that  such  meas- 
ures should  not  be  resorted  to  until  all  other  constitu- 
tional means  had  been  tried.  Of  such  means  to  be 
employed  in  just  such  cases  as  this,  there  were  many ; 
namely,  beside  the  Union  Court  of  Arbitration,  the 
court  for  deciding  similar  matters  provided  in  the 
Hessian  Constitution,  and  the  Confederate  Court  of 
Arbitration  appointed  by  the  law  of  1834. 

But  then  the  troubles  would  have  been  settled 
peaceably,  the  sending  of  Confederate  troops  to  Cassel 
would  not  have  been  possible,  and  this  fine  opportunity 
for  damaging  the  Prussian  Union  would  have  been 
lost !  Accordingly,  not  a  word  was  said  about  those 
courts  of  settlement.  On  the  contrary,  a  Bavarian 
army  corps,  increased  by  some  additional  Austrians, 
marched  into  Hesse-Cassel  under  the  direction  of  a 
civil  commissioner  of  the  Confederation,  Count  Rech- 
berg,  and  a  commissioner  of  the  Hessian  Government, 
Scheffer,  a  converted  Democrat,  who,  as  is  usual  in 
such  cases,  became  a  doubly  zealous  Absolutist. 

During  November,  as  we  have  seen,  active  opera- 
tions could  not  extend  farther  than  the  districts  of 
Hanau  and  I^^ilda  on  account  of  the  Prussian  interven- 
tion. Here  the  resistance  of  the  Hessian  oOicials  and 
taxpayers  was  broken  by  that  means  invented  by 
Louis  XIV.  in  his  persecution  of  the   French  Protes- 


136  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

tants ;  namely,  that  of  dragooiiades,  or,  as  the  Germans 
called  it,  Bequartierung  (quartering  soldiers  upo7i  one), 
in  contrast  to  the  regular  quartering  of  soldiers,  or 
Einquartierung .  Ten,  twenty,  or  thirty  men  were 
placed  in  the  house  of  a  rebel,  and  he  was  obliged  to 
entertain  them.  A  broad  hint  was  also  given  to  the 
soldiers  that  they  might  make  their  presence  as  dis- 
agreeable to  their  host  as  they  chose.  Of  course,  the 
sure  consequence  of  this  must  be  nuisances  of  all  sorts 
in  the  house  :  the  rooms  were  soiled  and  besmeared,  the 
inmates  were  not  infrequently  grossly  ill-treated,  and 
finally  the  man's  property  was  ruined. 

The  attempt  of  the  Prussian  King,  through  Herren 
Niebuhr  and  Delbriick,  to  mediate  between  tlie  Elector 
at  Wilhelmsbad  and  the  leader  of  the  Opposition  in 
Cassel,  began  favorably,  but  amounted  to  nothing  after 
all.  Then  came  the  decision  at  Olmiitz,  in  accordance 
with  which  Prussia  left  the  continuance  of  the  punish- 
ment of  Hesse  to  the  Vienna  Court  and  its  allies,  and 
the  further  settlement  of  the  affairs  in  Hesse-Cassel  was 
to  be  accomplished  by  commissioners  of  both  Courts 
and  their  allies  in  the  name  of  all  the  German  Govern- 
ments. To  this  end  Prussia  appointed  General  von 
Peucker,  and  Austria  appointed  Count  Leiningen.  To 
the  latter,  the  Confederate  Diet  at  once  committed  the 
direction  of  the  penal  measures  in  the  place  of 
Rechberg. 

Peucker  received  instructions,  with  a  view  to  stop- 
ping as  soon  as  possible  the  sufferings  of  the  Hessian 
people,  to  continue  the  conciliatory  efforts  in  Wilhelms- 


PEUCKER'S  ATTEMPTS   TO  MEDIATE.        137 

bad  as  well  as  in  Cassel ;  in  the  former  place  he  was  to 
propose  the  dismissal  of  Hassenpflug  and  the  return  of 
the  Elector  to  Cassel,  and  in  the  latter  place  to  urge 
the  levying  of  the  taxes  voluntarily.  The  legal  right  of 
the  matter  was  then  to  be  determined  at  the  Dresden 
Congress. 

In  Wilhelmsbad  the  General  accomplished  no  more 
than  Niebuhr.  There  could  be  no  thought  entertained 
of  Hassenpflug's  dismissal ;  and  the  Elector  would  not 
return  to  Cassel  until  the  rebels  should  have  been 
completely  subdued,  and  various  necessary  measures 
proclaimed. 

While  the  Bavarian  troops,  after  having  crossed  the 
Prussian  military  road,  were  slowly  approaching  Cassel, 
Peucker  hastened  thither  on  the  ITth  of  December, 
and  pressingly  urged  upon  the  highest  court  of  justice 
the  actual  necessity  and  the  lawful  propriety  of  sub- 
mitting, especially  after  this  had  been  demanded  by  all 
the  German  Governments  upon  the  basis  of  the  Olmiitz 
Agreement,  and  after  it  had  been  intimated  that  the 
legal  claims  of  both  sides  would  be  discussed  in 
Dresden. 

The  judges  were  inclined  to  yield.  Then  came  on 
the  19th  a  note  from  Leiningen,  in  which  the  disarm- 
in""  of  the  militia,  the  dissolution  of  the  committee 
of  the  Estates,  and  the  acknowledgment  of  the  war 
establishment,  were  demanded,  and  a  military  punish- 
ment at  the  hands  of  the  Bavarian  troops  threatened 
for  any  attcmjjt  at  resistance.  Thcicu[)()n  tlie  judges 
declared  unanimously  that  it  was  impossiljlc  to  submit 


138  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

to  these  terms.  The  entrance  of  the  Bavarians  into 
Cassel  and  the  overthrow  of  all  the  authorities  was  then 
most  imminent. 

Peucker's  protest  sent  to  Leiningen  obtained  onl}^ 
the  reply  that  he,  Leiningen,  had  no  instructions  as 
commissioner  of  Austria,  and  must,  as  commissioner  of 
the  Confederate  Diet,  carry  out  the  latter's  commands. 
Manteuffel  shrusrered  his  shoulders  and  said :  "  We 
gave  up  in  Olmiitz  all  right  to  have  anything  to  say  in 
the  matter."  The  King  was  indignant.  He  neither 
wished  to  see  Bavarian  troops,  contrary  to  the  Agree- 
ment at  Olmiitz,  in  Cassel,  nor  to  see  them  in  the 
execution  of  Hesse's  punishment  playing  a  part  in 
connection  with  the  Hessian  Constitution  (as  would 
happen  by  the  dissolution  of  the  committee  of  the 
Estates). 

On  the  other  hand,  Prince  Schwarzenberg  positively 
refused  to  promise  to  let  the  legal  merits  of  the  ques- 
tion be  decided  at  the  Dresden  Congress.  "  With 
rebels,"  he  said,  "  one  does  not  treat ;  one  forces  them 
to  submit."  On  the  19th  of  December,  meanwhile,  the 
highest  Court  of  Appeals  had  decided  to  yield  to  the 
order  of  September  4th  (the  raising  of  the  taxes). 
The  militia  were  also  ready  to  give  up  their  arms.  Yet 
on  the  22d  a  Bavarian  brigade  appeared  in  Cassel,  and 
in  the  most  oppressive  way  the  Bequartlerung,  now 
clearly  only  an  act  of  vengeance,  began. 

At  last,  on  the  26th,  Leiningen  announced  that  he 
had  received,  as  Austrian  commissioner,  his  instructions 
to  co-operate  with  Peucker;  but  this  did  not  prevent 


CONTINUANCE   OF  OPPRESSION.  139 

him  from  continuing  at  the  same  time  his  functions  as 
commissioner  of  the  Confederate  Diet. 

The  city  council  of  Cassel  received  directly  from 
Hassenpflug  orders  to  recognize  distinctly  their  duty  to 
levy  taxes  based  upon  the  directions  of  the  4th  of 
September.  They  replied  that  their  functions  had  noth- 
ing at  all  to  do  with  the  levying  of  taxes.  Then  they 
were  given  notice,  that,  since  they  had  once  received 
the  orders,  they  would  be  obliged  to  obey.  They  were 
then  maltreated  a  whole  week  by  excessive  consign- 
ments of  soldiers  in  their  homes.  The  Electoral 
authorities  further  sent  to  Leiningfen  a  list  of  one  hun- 
dred  and  thirty  names  of  persons  who,  it  was  said,  on 
account  of  former  misdoings,  richly  deserved  such 
treatment.  Leiningen  then,  in  accordance  with  instruc- 
tions from  Frankfort,  carried  out  the  oppressive  meas- 
ures in  several  instances. 

Meanwhile,  he  himself  put  an  end  to  these  disgraceful 
enormities  on  the  4th  of  January,  1851  ;  and  when,  on 
the  7th,  the  city  council  presented  the  desired  declara- 
tion of  acquiescence,  somewhat  modified  by  Peucker, 
the  submission  under  the  order  of  the  4th  of  September 
was  complete  and  the  object  of  the  chastisement 
attained.  Nevertheless  the  question  of  tlie  suspension 
of  the  committee  of  the  Estates  remained  the  same  ;  and 
there  followed  on  the  10th  the  establishment  of  Aus- 
trian and  Bavarian  councils  of  war,  passing  sentences 
in  the  case  of  any  transgressions  that  Leiningen  niiglit 
refer  to  them.  It  was  understood  tliat  they  sliouhl  also 
have   the  power  to  punish  such  niisdciueanors  as  had 


140  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

occurred  before  the  beginning  of  the  enforcement  of 
penal  measures  bj  the  Confederation.  No  proof  is 
needed  to  show  that  this  was  as  well  a  violation  of  the 
Hessian  law  of  the  land  as  an  exaggeration  of  the 
rights  and  functions  of  the  Confederation. 

Yet  it  was  generally  believed  that  the  submission  of 
the  Cassel  city  council  was  virtually  the  end  of  the 
disorders.     What  was  there  now  to  do  ? 

The  Austrian  Minister  resident  in  Cassel,  Count 
Hartig,  wrote  on  the  2d  of  January :  "  The  further  the 
chastisement  of  Hesse  progresses,  the  more  difficult 
does  Leiningen's  situation  become.  The  instruments  of 
the  Government  try  at  every  opportunity  to  use  these 
penal  measures  as  an  excuse  and  a  means  for  venting 
their  small  spite  upon  individuals,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  lay  the  blame  of  every  hateful  step  upon  the 
higher  authorities.  .  .  .  With  the  completion  of  her 
punishment,  Hesse's  affairs  enter  upon  a  new  stage, 
which  I  consider  a  more  serious  one  by  far.  Count 
Leiningen  is  already  convinced  that  if,  on  the  one  hand, 
no  government  is  possible  with  this  Constitution,  it  is 
also  true  that  with  these  conditions  and  elements  at  the 
head  of  affairs  a  government  is  equally  impossible." 

Now,  although  Hesse-Cassel  had  been  ruled  for 
nearly  twenty  years  under  the  Constitution  of  1831, 
Hartig's  assertion,  that  with  this  no  government  was 
possible,  had  in  the  minds  of  Schwarzenberg  and 
Manteuffel  already  won  the  credence  of  an  Article  of 
Faith.  No  less  certainly  did  they  believe  that  after 
the  law  of  IS^O  the  elections  to  the  Assembly  of  the 


CONTINUANCE   OF  OPPRESSION.  141 

Estates  had  taken  place  upon  the  basis  of  universal 
suffrage.  "  All  officials  and  functionaries,"  wrote 
Prince  Schwarzenberg  on  the  7th  of  January,  "  took  an 
interest  in  the  preservation  of  an  impracticable  Demo- 
cratic Constitution,  while  the  hands  of  the  Government 
were  tied  by  a  sovereign  Assembly  of  Estates  that  had 
been  instituted  by  general  elections." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  after  the  law  of  1849,  one-third 
of  the  Chambers  were  elected  by  the  large  landed 
proprietors,  and  the  other  two-thirds  by  electors 
possessing  a  certain  amount  of  property.  With  such  a 
knowledge  of  the  facts,  these  high  and  mighty  men 
decided  the  fate  of  a  brave  German  race.  In  their 
blind  theorizing  they  were  preparing  to  give  this  race 
over  into  the  power  of  a  Prince  whom  their  own 
representatives  had  just  declared  to  be  unfit  to  rule. 

The  two  Ministers  were,  however,  not  yet  quite 
ready  to  decide  to  overthrow  entirely  the  Constitution 
of  1831.  Tlio  King  of  Prussia,  indeed,  after  the  rebel- 
lion had  been  suppressed,  demanded  that  a  formal 
investigation  of  the  matter  should  be  held,  in  whicli 
both  sides  should  be  heard  with  regard  to  the  cause  of 
the  rebellion  and  the  legal  basis  of  Hassenpflug's 
Septeml)er  oidinances.  He  according  instructed  his 
Minister,  to  this  end,  to  propose  the  revival  of  the  Con- 
federate Court  of  Arbitration  of  1834.  This  might 
then  also  be  further  commissioned  by  the  Confederate 
Diet  to  investigate  the  question  as  to  how  far  the 
principles  of  the  Hessian  Constitution  were  in  accord 
with  the  laws  of  the  Confederation. 


142  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

This  was,  in  truth,  the  expression  of  a  sentiment 
that  the  constitutional  system  which  had  become  so 
precious  to  the  hearts  of  the  people  ought  not  to  be 
torn  away  with  arbitrary  wilfulness.  It  was  the  last 
pulse  of  sympathy  with  a  country  upon  whom  misfor- 
tune had  burst  with  fury,  because  she  had  preferred  to 
hold  loyally  to  the  Prussian  Union  rather  than  to  the 
unlawful  Confederate  Diet.  But  the  King  stood  quite 
alone  in  his  pity.  His  proposition  of  referring  the 
matter  to  the  Confederate  Court  of  Arbitration  met,  so 
far  as  I  can  discover,  with  neither  favor  nor  opposition. 
It  was  quietly  jjassed  by  and  ignored. 

Prince  Schwarzenberg  at  this  time  built  great  hopes 
upon  the  Dresden  Congress,  which  was  not  only  to 
determine  the  general  outlines  of  the  German  State 
Constitutions,  but  also  to  provide  a  strong  Confederate 
executive  to  insure  their  being  carried  out.  This 
executive  would  then  also  adjust  the  laws  and  the 
government  of  the  state  of  Hesse-Cassel.  Until  such  a 
fortunate  time,  however,  it  would  be  impossible  to  leave 
the  Hessian  Government  without  active  support.  It 
would  therefore  be  necessary  to  deal  for  the  time  with 
one  matter  after  another,  to  interfere  in  the  name  of  the 
Confederation  whenever  it  was  necessary,  and,  through 
the  agency  of  the  two  commissioners,  to  prevent  a 
return  of  anarchy. 

The  Prince  did  not  trouble  himself  about  technicali- 
ties. He  did  not  worry  about  a  legal  authorization  of 
such  a  method  of  procedure  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
missioners, however  impossible  it  would  have  been  to 


ARBITRARY  MEASURES.  143 

find  any  basis  for  the  same.  It  was  enough  that  they 
had  the  power  in  their  hands.  The  Elector  must  never 
be  left  defenceless  at  the  mercy  of  people  in  their 
exasperation. 1  If  there  was  no  other  way,  Leiningen 
could  resume  his  office  of  executor  of  the  penal 
measures;  for  although  they  were  virtually  at  an  end, 
this  had  not  been  proclaimed  officially. 

Very  soon  an  instance  occurred  where  the  principle 
had  to  be  settled.  The  time  set  by  the  Constitution 
for  the  convening  of  the  assembly  of  the  Estates, 
March  2d,  was  at  hand.  Hassenpflug  declared  that 
there  was  no  possibility  of  getting  along  with  this 
democratic  set  of  men  ;  they  would  immediately  irri- 
tate himself,  his  colleagues,  and  his  subordinates,  and 
would  thus  arouse  anew  a  rebellious  feeling  through- 
out the  whole  land.  The  convening  of  the  assembly 
must  therefore  be  prevented.  His  second  point  of 
doctrine,  however,  was,  that  the  electoral  Government 
was  bound  ])y  its  oath  to  stand  by  the  Constitution, 
and  therefore  could  not  forbid  the  assembly  to  meet. 
Nothing  was  left  but  for  the  Confederation  to  ward  off 
this  evil  from  the  country.  These  words  are  enough  to 
characterize  the  man.  He  had  sworn  to  be  governed 
by  the  Constitution  and  to  preserve  it.  Therefore  he 
had  scruples  about  violating  it ;  but  he  did  not  hesitate 
to  prompt  a  third  party  to  overlln-ow  it. 

1  When  Leiningen  inaugurated  the  military  tribunal,  he  referred 
among  other  things  to  the  fact  that  no  soul  greeted  the  Elector  on  the 
streets.  Peucker  made  the  quotation  :  Zxtr  Liehc  kann  ich  Dich  tiirht 
zvMiuien,  Dock  gcb'  ich  Dir  die  Freiheit  nicht.  (I  cannot  constrain  j-ou  to 
love,  yet  I  leave  you  no  choice.) 


144  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

Prince  Schwarzenberg  and  Herr  von  Manteuffel  had 
the  same  feelings.  General  Peucker  was  the  only  one 
who  offered  any  opposition.  He  vigorously  objected  to 
the  scheme,  and  reminded  them  that  Hassenpflug  him- 
self had  on  the  4th  of  September  given  as  the  aim  of 
his  ordinance  the  preservation  of  the  Constitution,  and 
that  the  Confederate  Diet  had  named  the  restoration  of 
lawful  order  as  the  object  of  their  penal  measures ;  so 
that  certainly  neither  could  have  meditated  the  over- 
tlirow  of  the  Constitution.  It  was,  however,  all  in 
vain.  Leiningen  received  orders,  if  Peucker  should 
not  be  willing  to  join  him,  to  carry  out  the  proposed 
measures  alone,  as  commissioner  of  the  Confederate 
Diet.  Manteuffel  sent  instructions,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  Peucker,  in  case  this  should  happen,  to  remain 
perfectly  quiet. 

The  prohibition  of  the  assembling  of  the  Estates 
opened  the  second  Act  in  the  violent  proceedings. 
The  penal  measures  already  executed  had  been  illegal 
enough ;  yet  they  had  been  wrapped,  however  flimsily, 
in  certain  casuistical  terms.  But  henceforth  there  was 
to  be  no  more  ceremoniousness.  It  was  believed  that 
in  Hesse-Cassel  the  Government  and  People  were  both 
alike  dangerously  diseased,  and  that  only  some  higher 
power  could  restore  them  to  health. 

On  the  21st  of  January,  Manteuffel  wrote :  "  It  will 
be  found  impossible  to  restore  by  force  the  lost  confi- 
dence between  People  and  Government  in  Hesse-Cassel. 
If  the  Confederate  troops  should  be  withdrawn,  the 
Government  could  not  possibly  preserve  its  authority, 


FURTHER  MEASURES.  145 

especially  since  it  would  be  hard  for  it  to  convince 
others  that  in  its  decisions  the  interests  of  the  country 
outweighed  every  other  consideration.  If  the  previous 
penal  measures  can  be  said  to  have  served  the  officials 
of  the  Government  as  a  means  of  satisfying  their  own 
private  passions,  how  will  these  officials  behave  when 
they  are  no  longer  subject  to  foreign  control,  nor  need 
fear  the  censure  of  any  lawful  authorities  at  home  ? 
The  Electorate  cannot  then  be  left  to  itself.  The  inter- 
vention of  the  Confederation  is  necessary,  not  only  to 
crush  out  the  opposition,  but  to  establish  a  condition  of 
things  that  shall  insure  the  maintenance  of  morals  and 
of  the  laws.  It  is  not  the  preservation  of  the  Hessian 
Constitution  that  is  at  stake,  but  protection  against 
wilfulness  and  j)assion." 

Such  impartial  considerations  gave  rise  to  the  propo- 
sition to  appoint  in  common  with  Austria  two  civil 
commissioners  well  informed  in  such  matters,  who 
should  first  execute  suitable  measures  in  the  exceptional 
cases  still  pending,  and  then  prepare  the  way  for  the 
settlement  of  the  question  as  to  how  the  unnatural 
state  of  things  in  the  country  might  be  remedied.  This 
meant  the  pi'oclamation  of  a  new  Constitution  and  of 
the  constitutive  power  of  the  Confedei'ation.  On  the 
27th  of  January,  Prince  Schwarzenberg  expressed  his 
assent  to  tliis  line  of  conduct. 

Ilerr  von  Manteuffel,  accordingly,  on  the  11th  of 
February,  iii  a  draft  which  he  intended  to  send  to 
Vienna,  developed  in  detail  the  points  of  view  from 
wliicli  the  coniniissioncrs  were  to  act.     Their  chief  task 


146  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

was  to  be  a  revision  of  the  Constitution  ;  in  place  of 
election  by  "number  of  heads,"  there  should  be  sum- 
moned genuine  conservative  representatives  of  the 
interests  of  the  landed  proprietors,  the  cities,  and  the 
]3easants ;  the  two-Chamber  system  \vas  advocated,  but 
more  especially  the  settlement  of  fixed  limits  to  the 
functions  of  the  Chambers.  Inasmuch  as  such  a  new 
arrangement  could  not  be  established  for  some  weeks, 
an  interregnum  should  be  declared  in  which  the  country 
would  be  governed  in  common  by  representatives  of 
the  Confederation  and  of  the  electoral  Government, 
until  the  new  Constitution  should  afford  the  necessary 
security  against  arbitrariness  and  despotism.  The 
commissioners  must  therefore  sustain  so  far  as  possi- 
ble the  sovereign  authority,  and  at  the  same  time  share 
directly  in  the  government  themselves,  exerting  in  the 
name  of  the  Confederation  that  control  over  the  admin- 
istration that  according  to  the  Constitution  fell  to  the 
assembly  of  the  Estates.  It  was  proposed  at  the  same 
time  that  the  commissioners  should  receive  their  powers 
from  all  the  German  Governments  that  is  to  say,  by 
decrees  of  the  Congress  at  Dresden,  where,  according 
to  the  King's  wishes,  a  Court  of  Arbitration  might  also 
be  instituted  to  decide  the  matter  finally. 

Prince  Schwarzenberg  had  misgivings  about  allowing 
the  Dresden  Congress  to  become  entangled  in  the  busi- 
ness ;  and  personally,  Herr  von  Manteuffel  also  had  his 
fears  concerning  it.  It  seemed  advisable,  to  be  sure,  to 
reserve  the  possibility  of  submitting  the  results  of  the 
commissioners'  efforts  to  the  new  Confederate  authori- 


THE   CONFEDERATE   COMMISSIONERS.       147 

ties  that  should  be  appointed  at  the  Congress  ;  but  for 
the  present,  each  commissioner  had  better  receive  his 
powers  from  his  own  Government  in  the  name  of  the 
Confederation.  Prince  Schwarzenberg  declared  that 
Austria  could  have  no  better  representative  in  this 
matter  than  Count  Leiningen.  As  for  Prussia,  General 
Peucker  was  far  too  scrupulous  about  justice  and  law 
to  be  expected  to  execute  such  commissions.  He 
received,  accordingly,  in  March,  his  frequently  solicited 
release  from  the  thankless  task.  His  successor,  Herr 
Uhden,  was  an  old  acquaintance  and  patron  of  Hassen- 
pflug,  and  had  been  JNIinister  of  Justice  during  the 
period  before  the  "  March  days."  He  was  a  man  that 
concealed  under  condescending  urbanity  a  deep-seated 
fanaticism  on  the  subject  of  feudal  theories  and 
practical    absolutism. 

When  lie  arrived  in  Cassel  on  the  12tli  of  March,  he 
found  the  electoral  Government  filled  with  suspicion 
towards  Prussia,  and  Hassenpflug  angry  over  his  trial 
in  Griefswald.  Uhden,  in  his  first  report,  expressed 
the  wish  that  that  trial  might  be  quashed ;  but 
Manteuffel  showed  only  little  inclination  to  procure  a 
non-suit.  To  start  with,  the  commissioners,  especially 
Uhden,  to  whom  Ueiiiingen  gladly  left  such  arduous 
labors,  buried  themselves  in  historical  studies  tliat  bore 
upon  tlie  question  of  revising  the  Constitution,  "  in 
order  to  gain  real  data  and  to  avoid  the  appearance  of 
following  abstract  theories." 

Counsellor  of  State  Scheffcr  j)rovid(Ml  the  scientific 
material    for    these    investigations.     r)y   the  niiddlc  of 


148  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET, 

April,  Uhden  had  already  drawn  up  an  electoral  law,  to 
which  Hassenpflug  gave  his  hearty  approval.  He  then 
mentioned  the  divisions  in  the  corps  of  officers  and  the 
urgent  necessity  of  relieving  the  officers  from  the 
constitutional  oath.  The  commissioners  readily  agreed 
to  this,  and  were  about  to  give  at  once  their  assent  to 
an  ordinance  from  the  Elector  to  this  effect.  But  then 
Hassenpflug  returned  to  his  doctrine,  that  inasmuch  as 
the  Elector  had  sworn  to  sustain  the  Constitution,  he 
could  abrogate  no  one  of  its  articles.  Consequently  he 
said  that  this  must  be  authorized  by  the  commissioners, 
and  only  be  proclaimed  by  the  Elector.  Uhden 
thought,  however,  that  such  an  arbitrary  striking 
out  of  an  Article  of  the  Constitution  exceeded  his 
powers ;  Manteuffel,  too,  dreaded  wearisome  discus- 
sions on  the  subject  in  the  Prussian  Chamber,  and 
came  to  an  understanding  with  Schwarzenberg  that 
the  question  should  be  referred  to  the  Confederate 
Diet,  whose  authority  was  soon  acknowledged  on 
all  sides. 

When  the  full  sessions  of  this  distinguished  assembly 
had  begun  to  be  held  in  Frankfort,  Uhden  announced 
on  the  2d  of  June,  that  before  the  new  Constitution 
could  appear,  the  preservation  of  the  peace  demanded 
not  only  the  ordinance  concerning  the  officers'  oath 
but  also  a  whole  list  of  arrangements  with  reference  to 
the  civil  officials,  the  higher  court  of  appeals,  the 
district  counsellors,  the  newspapers,  and  clubs.  All 
these  matters,  he  said,  could  not  be  regulated  by  the 
Elector,  who  was  bound  by  his  oath  to  the  Constitution  ; 


EVERYTHING  LEFT  TO  THE  GREA  T  POWERS.      149 

and  consequently  the  intervention  of  the  Confederation 
was  indispensable. 

Unfortunately  Uhden  was  obliged  to  confess  that  he 
knew  no  legal  excuse  for  such  interference ;  but  he 
said  that  the  actual  needs  of  the  situation  were  impera- 
tive. Otherwise,  uncertainty  and  insecurity  would 
continue,  loyal  liearts  would  become  discouraged,  and 
the  disaffected  emboldened  to  further  riotous  actions. 
He  did  not  advise  that  the  Confederation  should 
request  the  Elector  to  proclaim  at  once  new  laws  ;  for 
in  the  present  excited  state  of  the  country,  unfortunate 
results  might  well  be  feared.  The  best  plan  would  be 
for  the  Confederation  to  decree  that  the  Government 
should  work  out  a  code  of  laws  under  the  control  of 
the  commissioners.  Manteuffel,  having  agreed  with 
Schwarzenberg  on  this  point,  decided  to  make  a  motion 
in  the  Confederate  Diet,  the  passage  of  which  would 
prepare  the  Avay  for  further  action. 

This  time,  however,  tlie  evil-doers  were  not  to 
succeed  in  concealing  their  guilt  under  foreign  cover. 
The  two  deputies  in  the  Confederate  Diet,  Count  Thun 
and  General  von  Rochow,  were  obliged  to  inform  the 
commissioners  that  there  was  no  chance  for  such  a 
motion  to  win  a  majority.  "It  could  succeed,"  wrote 
Rochow,  "  only  on  the  express  condition  that  a  formal 
approval  of  the  course  of  conduct  hitherto  pursued  by 
the  Great  Powers  in  the  Hessian  affair  be  not  demanded, 
and  tliat  llu;  full  powers  granted  l)y  us  l)c  limited  to  a 
definite  length  of  time.  The  two  Powers  agreed  to 
these  conditions;  and   on    the    lltli   of    June,    1851,    a 


150  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

decree  was  passed,  by  a  majority  of  ten  votes  against 
seven,  that  the  further  conduct  of  affairs  in  Hesse- 
Cassel,  and  steps  toward  a  definite  settlement  of  the 
same,  slioukl  be  intrusted  to  Austria  and  Prussia,  and 
tliat  tliis  power  should  be  granted  for  the  present  for 
the  term  of  six  weeks;  if  the  matter  should  not  then 
be  ripe  for  settlement,  the  Confederate  assembly  would 
expect  a  report,  and  reserved  for  itself  the  right  of 
further  decision. 

The  two  Courts  did  not,  however,  have  the  remotest 
intention  of  being  deflected  from  their  course  by  this 
holding  back  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  Diet.  It 
had  committed  to  them  the  conduct  of  the  Hessian 
affair ;  this  seemed  to  them  to  mean  full  powers  to 
do  even  that  which  the  majority  of  the  Confederate 
Diet  did  not  wish,  and  for  which  Uhden  himself  could 
not  find  that  the  Confederation  had  any  authority. 
Unhindered,  the  commission  went  forward.  The  wel- 
fare of  the  Hessian  country  —  so  it  stood  in  the  decree 
of  the  11th  of  June  —  was  to  be  looked  after  and  the 
common  safety  of  Germany. 

Uhden  went  to  Berlin  and  laid  before  Manteuffel  the 
outlines  of  several  laws,  which  the  Minister  considered 
faultless,  and  wliich  Schwarzenberg  praised  unre- 
servedly. From  the  26th  of  June  on,  then,  and 
through  the  month  of  July,  a  storm  of  ordinances, 
issued  by  the  commissioners  and  proclaimed  by  the 
Elector,  poured  over  the  wretched  land,  of  which  three 
took  the  form  of  definite  laws  :  the  abolition  of  the 
constitutional   oath  for  officers ;    the   limitation    of  the 


DRAFT  OF  A   NEW  CONSTITUTION.  151 

responsibility  of  officials,  in  case  of  violation  of  the 
Constitution,  to  independent  acts,  thus  inculcating 
unconditional  obedience  to  the  commands  of  their 
superiors ;  and  finally  a  law  which  forbade  as  rebel- 
lion punishable  by  a  court-martial  any  criticism  by 
officials  concerning  the  legality  of  the  laws  decreed 
by  the  commissioners  of  the  Confederation. 

There  appeared  further  seven  other  ordinances, 
which  were  to  be  considered  provisional  until  deter- 
mined upon  by  the  Estates.  These  were  the  limitation 
of  the  functions  of  the  district  counsellors,  extension 
of  the  police  control  of  the  Government,  a  new  organi- 
zation of  the  whole  system  of  the  administration  of 
justice,  the  abolition  of  the  Estates'  right  of  presenta- 
tion in  appointments  to  the  highest  tribunal,  limitation 
of  the  right  to  summon  legal  help  against  misuse  of  the 
prerogatives  of  office  by  the  officials  of  the  administra- 
tion, and  finally  an  increase  of  the  cost  of  a  license  to 
possess  weapons. 

This  is  not  the  place  for  a  discussion  of  the  actual 
worth  of  these  laws.  Even  if  one  grants  that  certain 
of  them  promised  material  amelioration  of  the  existing 
evils,  the  illegality  of  their  promulgation  cannot  be 
gainsaid,  since  the  Confederation  itself  had  not  the 
authority  to  make  the  laws ;  and  neither  had  it  given 
to  the  Great  Powers  and  their  commissioners  full 
powers  to  institute  such  measures,  nor  would  it  have 
been  able  to  do  so.  And  even  if  it  be  possible  to 
justify  such  means  as  might  under  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances seem  to  be  necessary  for  the   preservation    of 


152  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

peace  and  order,  the  greater  part  of  these  ordinances 
had  in  their  content  not  the  least  connection  witli  such 
an  aim,  and  the  legal  incompetence  of  the  originators 
could  not  be  covered  even  by  the  excuse  of  a  con- 
straining salus  publica. 

By  the  side  of  these  acts  Uhden  and  Leiningen  went 
to  work  with  redoubled  zeal  upon  the  development  of 
the  new  Constitution,  holding  daily  conversations  upon 
the  subject  with  Hassenpflug  and  Scheffer.  It  is 
enough  for  us  to  consider  one  or  two  prominent  points. 
At  the  outset  the  "  true  "  Estates  were  defined  as  ^  the 
nobility,  the  cities,  and  the  peasants,  whose  representa- 
tives are  such  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  they  represent 
nothing  further  than  the  interests  of  their  own  class, 
and  consequentl}-  belong  naturally  to  that  class  them- 
selves. From  this  follows  the  principle  in  general  that 
in  all  classes  the  electors  may  choose  for  a  representa- 
tive only  a  man  from  their  midst. 

"The  representation  of  the  Estates  falls  into  two 
divisions  or  Chambers.  The  first  Chamber  includes 
the  princes  and  persons  of  princely  rank,  the  vice- 
chancellor  of  the  university,  the  Catholic  bishop,  three 
Protestant  superintendents,  and  representatives  of  the 
religious  institutions  and  of  the  nobilit3%"  —  These,  as 
facts  afterwards  proved,  formed,  by  reason  of  the 
smallness  of  the  country,  a  dignified  and  illustrious 
company  of  seldom  more  than  fourteen  persons.  —  "  The 
second  Chamber  consists  of  sixteen  members  coming 
from  among  the  remaining  landed  proprietors,  and 
chosen    by    an    election    in    which    all   those    eligible 


REPRESENTATION   OF  THE  ESTATES.        153 

shared;  sixteen  representatives  of  the  small  farmers 
and  peasants,  chosen  by  the  chief  officials  of  the  villages 
and  their  compeers  in  the  electoral  district ;  and  finally 
sixteen  deputies  from  the  cities,  chosen  by  the  burgo- 
masters, city  fathers,  and  presidents  of  the  guilds." 

To  the  objection  that  this  would  as  good  as  exclude 
the  educated  classes  from  the  representation  of  the 
cities,  Uhden  replied:  The  element  of  intelligence 
would  be  represented  in  the  Chamber  by  the  com- 
missioners of  the  Government ;  intelligence  was  a  char- 
acteristic of  no  one  class,  and  consequently  was  not 
adapted  to  being  honored  by  a  special  representation. 
Without  any  such  scientific  explanations  and  euphem- 
isms, Manteuffel  had  also  intimated  on  the  11th  of 
February  that  barristers,  notaries,  physicians,  and  all 
such  peace-disturbers,  ought  to  be  kept  out  of  the 
Chamber. 

Quite  in  keeping  with  such  views  were  the  actual 
riorhts  that  were  allotted  to  the  "  true "  Estates. 
Without  their  consent  no  laws  could  be  passed  that 
concerned  personal  rights  and  property  or  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  no  taxes  could  be  imposed  or  existing 
ones  increased,  and  no  loan  be  made.  They  received, 
furthermore,  the  right  of  making  petitions,  of  giving 
advice,  of  entering  complaints,  and  of  .  demanding 
explanations :  whether  tlie  Government  was  to  be 
obliged  to  make  the  explanations  was  not  stated. 
Every  three  years  an  outline  of  the  administration  of 
tlie  finances  should  be  laid  before  the  Estates,  not  that 
they  should  decide  upon  anything,  or  oversee  the  public 


154  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

expenses,  but  only  that  they  might  know  about  them. 
By  these  reguhxtions  the  Government  was  allowed  free 
course  in  spending  the  public  revenues :  the  chief  aim 
of  Hassenpflug's  overthrow  of  the  Constitution,  next  to 
the  abolition  of  the  Union,  was  attained. 

Justice  forces  us,  however,  to  acknowledge  that  the 
commissioners  in  their  work  did  not  quite  exclusively 
have  the  interests  of  the  Elector  at  heart,  but  did 
actually  now  and  then  oppose  some  questionable 
demands  of  Hassenpflug.  Thus,  the  JMinister  com- 
plained that  they  would  not  grant  him  absolute  power 
to  remove  and  pension  all  officials ;  that  they  rejected 
his  opinion,  that,  in  case  the  two  Chambers  did  not 
agree  in  their  decisions,  it  fell  to  the  Government  to 
give  to  one  side  of  the  question  by  its  approval  the 
force  of  law ;  that  they  crossed  out  from  the  order  of 
business  for  the  Chamber  of  the  Estates  the  clause  to 
the  effect,  that,  after  the  pertinence  of  a  bill  as  a  whole 
had  been  admitted,  amendments  proposed  by  the 
Estates  to  the  separate  Articles  should  have  the  value 
only  of  petitions,  which  the  Government  might  or 
might  not  grant  as  it  saw  fit.  Such  a  degradation  of 
tlie  true  Estates  was  a  little  too  mucli  even  for  Herr 
Uhden. 

On  the  22d  of  July,  Hassenpflug  announced  to  the 
Confederate  Diet  that  by  continuing  the  strict  police 
regulations,  the  Government  could  now  guarantee 
internal  order  without  the  assistance  of  foreign  troops. 
Both  commissioners  thereupon  closed  their  labors  on 
Hessian  soil  and  repaired  to  Frankfort,  where  Uhden 


THE  REPORT  OF  THE   COMMITTEE.  155 

wrote  out  their  main  report  to  the  Confederate  Diet,  as 
well  as  a  long  list  of  memorials  about  the  provisional 
laws  and  about  the  new  Constitution,  all  together 
covering  more  than  one  hundred  pages  of  the  printed 
minutes  of  the  Confederate  Diet,  so  that  it  was  not 
until  the  beginning  of  October  that  the  prolific  author 
could  lay  his  productions  before  his  Government.  But 
new  points  of  disagreement  sprang  up  between  the 
commissioners  and  the  electoral  Government. 

Hassenpflug  proposed  to  the  Great  Powers  that  the 
Confederate  Diet  should  expressly  approve  the  new 
Constitution,  guarantee  its  enforcement,  and  direct  the 
electoral  Government  to  introduce  it  without  delay,  and 
this  because,  without  such  a  command  from  the  highest 
authority,  the  Elector,  on  account  of  his  oath  to  support 
the  old  Constitution,  would  be  hindered  from  having 
anything  to  do  with  the  new  one.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  commissioners  proposed  that  the  Confederation 
should  give  the  draft  of  the  Constitution  its  approval 
provisionally,  and  should  reserve  a  definite  decision 
about  it  until  the  opinion  of  the  assembly  of  Estates, 
which  was  to  be  summoned  on  the  basis  of  tlie  new  Con- 
stitution, should  liavo  been  heard  on  the  subject.  The 
Constitution  must,  however,  although  provisionally,  be 
introduced  at  once  with  full  binding  force.  Manteuffel 
agreed  with  this  sentiment  that  the  "  true  "  Estates  must 
be  given  the  opportunity  to  express  themselves  in  the 
matter. 

Prince  Scliwarzenberg  entertained  the  contrary 
opinion.      "The     Government    of     Ilesse-Cassel,"     he 


156  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

wrote  on  the  1st  of  December,  "  declares  that  its  old 
constitutional  oath  prevents  it  from  introducing  a  new 
Constitution  without  an  express  command  from  the 
Confederation.  But  to  such  an  extent  as  that  the  Con- 
federation has  never  yet  interfered  with  the  internal 
government  of  a  country.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is 
no  doubt  but  that  the  Constitution  of  1831  contains 
many  regulations  that  are  inconsistent  with  Con- 
federate rights ;  and  therefore  it  is  the  privilege  and 
function  of  the  Confederation  to  nullify  that  Constitu- 
tion.i  Then  the  way  will  be  open  for  the  Government 
to  introduce  a  new  Constitution,  not  only  provisionally 
but  definitely,  which  is  in  every  respect  to  be  pre- 
ferred." 

Manteuffel  finally  did  not  have  much  of  anything  to 
say  against  this  view  of  the  subject,  but  requested  the 
Prussian  deputy  to  the  Confederate  Diet  to  report  to 
him  what  Hesse-Cassel's  attitude  was  in  the  quarrel 
that  had  broken  out  between  Prussia  and  Austria  about 
the  Tariff-Union.  When  the  report  proved  to  be 
entirely  unfavorable  to  Prussia,  he  instructed  the 
deputy  to  insist  upon  only  a  provisional  introduction  of 
the  new  Constitution. 

At  last  a  compromise  was  effected  between  the 
different  views  of  the  subject,  and  the  Great  Powers 
introduced  the  following  motion  on  the  3d  of  January, 
1852 :  The  Confederate  Diet  shall  nullify  the  Constitu- 
tion of  1831,  approve  the  new  constitutional  draft  as  a 
whole,    and   express  to  the   electoral  Government  the 

1  More  truly,  to  expunge  such  objectionable  Articles. 


DIFFERENCE   OF  OPINIONS.  157 

expectation  that  by  the  immediate  proclamation  of  this 
Constitution  a  certain  termination  of  the  Hessian 
difficulties  may  be  hastened,  and  further,  that  the  defi- 
nite assent  to  this  Constitution  by  the  Confederation 
and  the  formal  guaranty  of  its  execution  shall  be 
deferred  to  a  later  vote  after  the  opinion  of  the  assem- 
bly of  Estates  with  regard  to  the  matter  shall  have 
been  lieard. 

This  motion  was  referred  to  a  committee  consisting 
of  Wiirtemberg,  Darmstadt,  and  Mecklenberg ;  the 
deputy  from  the  last  named,  Von  Oertzen,  being  the 
chairman. 

The  report  was  made  on  the  6th  of  IVIarch.  It  was 
again  evident,  as  on  the  11th  of  June,  that  the  ruling 
influence  of  the  Great  Powers  in  the  assembly  had, 
after  all,  its  limits.  The  committee  was  ready  to 
approve  of  the  jn'opositions  of  the  two  Powers,  as  far  as 
the  present  was  concerned,  but  wished  to  leave  the 
question  open  in  respect  to  the  future.  The  abolition 
of  the  Constitution  of  1831  seemed  to  the  committee 
feasible  on  account  of  the  numerous  clauses  contained 
in  it  that  were  contradictory  to  the  principles  of  the 
Confederation,  and  easily  possible  according  to  Art.  II. 
of  the  Act  of  Confederation  and  Art.  I.  of  the  Vienna 
Final  Act,  touching  the  maintenance  of  internal  secu- 
rity. This  naturally  involved  the  introduction  of  the 
new  revised  Constitution  provisionally  with  full  validity. 
At  the  same  time  the  committee  asserted  the  necessity 
of  submitting  this  constitution  to  the  criticism  of  tlie 
assemblv  of  the  Estates  ;  and  this  must  not  be  merely 


158  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

an  expression  of  opinion,  but  the  assembly  must  be 
requested  to  vote  upon  it.  Of  course  nothing  could  be 
more  satisfactory  than  for  the  Government  and  the 
Estates  to  agree  on  the  subject ;  but  if  this  hope  should 
prove  vain,  then  it  should  be  the  duty  of  the  Confed- 
erate Diet  to  settle  the  remaining  differences. 
Accordingly  the  committee  moved,  — 

1.  The  approval  of  the  ordinances  instituted  by  the 
commissioners. 

2.  The  nullification  of  the  Constitution  of  1831,  to- 
gether with  the  supplementary  laws  of  1848  and  1849. 

3.  That  the  electoral  Government  be  requested,  after 
consideration  of  this  committee's  report,  to  proclaim 
as  law  the  Constitution  decided  upon  by  the  com- 
missioners in  common  with  the  Government;  to  lay  the 
same  before  the  assembly  of  Estates  to  be  summoned 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Constitution ; 
and  to  report  the  result  to  the  Confederation. 

4.  That  the  Confederate  Diet  express  its  approval  of 
the  draft  only  as  a  whole,  and  reserve  any  criticism  of 
the  separate  provisions. 

5.  That  the  Confederate  Diet  await  a  report  affirm- 
ing the  pacification  of  the  country  and  the  disappearance 
of  all  signs  of  a  state  of  war. 

6.  That  the  Confederate  Diet  reserve  for  itself  the 
right  to  decide,  after  the  receipt  of  the  above-mentioned 
report,  upon  further  measures  for  the  definite  settle- 
ment of  the  matters  connected  with  the  Constitution  of 
Hesse-Cassel. 

The    motion    corresponded    with    the    original  senti- 


NEW  CONSTITUTION  IN  HESSE-CASSEL.     159 

ments  of  Manteuffel  and  the  commissioners.  Schwarz- 
enberg  was  the  more  willing  to  agree  to  it,  since 
Luxemburg,  Oldenburg,  Waldeck,  Schwarzburg, 
Weimar,  and  the  Saxon  Duchies,  together  with  the 
free  cities,  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  whole 
business,  and  also  some  other  voices  were  raised 
against  certain  clauses  of  the  motion. 

On  the  27th  of  March  the  motion  was  accepted  by  a 
Majority  of  ten  votes  ;  and  on  the  13th  of  April,  1852, 
the  proclamation  of  the  new  Constitution  took  place  at 
Cassel.  The  summoning  of  the  "  true,"  or,  as  it  was 
worded  in  the  Address  from  the  Throne,  the  "  actual," 
Estates  followed  on  the  16th  of  July. 

Everybody  believed  that,  after  the  horrors  of  the 
penal  measures,  and  in  view  of  the  continued  severe 
police  regulations,  as  well  as  of  the  laws  instituted 
by  the  commissioners,  it  would  be  very  easy  for 
Hassenpflug  to  secure  amenable  Chambers  and  there- 
with to  gain  for  the  Elector  and  himself,  for  an  indefi- 
nite period,  unhampered  control  of  the  public  revenues 
and  absolute  power  in  the  administration  of  the 
government- 
Even  though  everything  had  not  been  attained  that 
the  two  Great  Powers  had  longed  for,  yet  the  Con- 
federate control  over  the  individual  states,  directed  by 
those  Powers  and  made  effective  wherever  extermina- 
tion of  lil)eral  ideas  and  institutions  was  in  order,  had 
risen  to  such  a  height  as  Metternich  had  not  under- 
taken to  scale  either  in  1819  or  in  1834.  With  those  two 
formulas  of  "  the  Welfare  of  the  Country  "  and  "  the 


160  THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  DIET. 

Public  Safety,"  the  Confederate  power  under  the 
ofuidance  of  Schwarzenberg:  and  Manteuffel  cleared  all 
the  barriers  of  legal  rights  as  easily  as  did  in  1793  in 
Paris  with  the  same  phrases  the  Comite  de  Salut  Public 
and  the  ComitS  de  Surete  Generale.  That  form  of 
German  Unity  which  had  been  kept  along  through 
thirty  years  by  Metternich's  sagacity  and  Prussia's 
compliance,  the  duumvirate  of  Austria  and  Prussia, 
had  now  taken  on  an  unheard-of  strength  in  contrast 
with  the  independence  of  the  individual  states. 

But  it  was  all  an  empty  illusion.  So  far  as  the 
effect  of  the  new  system  was  concerned,  it  fared  the 
same  with  this  Central  Authority  as  with  its  prede- 
cessors of  1819  and  1832:  in  spite  of  its  being  so 
prolific  along  the  line  of  political  police  institutions,  it 
was  sadly  barren  in  all  other  departments.  Thus  its 
energy  aroused  among  the  people  on  the  one  side  bitter 
hatred,  and  its  impotence  on  the  other  renewed  con- 
tempt. In  spite  of  all  the  patronage  bestowed  upon  it 
by  princes  and  the  nobility,  as  was  the  fashion  then  at 
Frankfort,  the  Governments  of  the  individual  states 
resrarded  the  dictatorial  conduct  of  the  Central 
Authority  more  with  mistrust  than  with  gratitude. 
The  result  was  the  same  as  after  the  passage  of  the 
Carlsbad  Decrees, —  a  universal  strengthening  of  indi 
vidualistic  tendencies.  Rather  no  central  authority 
than  one  so  arbitrary  and  so  impotent ! 

Still  another  circumstance  was  a  very  decisive  factor. 
The  basis  of  the  system,  the  hearty  concord  between 
the   two    Great   Powers,    which   even    at   the   time  of 


NEW  CONSTITUTION  IN  HESSE-CASSEL.      161 

Metternich  was  in  important  subjects  very  problemati- 
cal, became  dead  at  the  roots  as  a  result  of  the  events 
of  1848  and  1849.  However  joyousl)'-  the  two  Courts 
marched  hand  in  hand  in  their  war  against  Liberalism, 
the  far-reaching  difference  of  their  relations  to  the 
interests  of  Germany  as  a  whole,  although  concealed 
for  thirty  years  as  successfully  as  possible,  appeared 
after  the  March  Revolution  in  its  true  light,  and  could 
not  be  asrain  banished  from  view.  It  forced  with  iron 
resistlessness,  the  leading  statesmen  of  both  sides,  strive 
against  it  as  they  might,  into  a  continued  struggle  over 
the  great  party-questions  of  1849. 


BOOK  VI. 


aERMANY  AT  TEE  TIME   OF  THE 
CRIMEAN   WAR. 


CHAPTER   I. 

DUALISM    IN    THE    CONFEDERATION. 

The  newly-born  Confederate  Diet,  even  after  all  the 
states  had  joined  it,  retained  the  stamp  of  its  origin  ;  it 
continued  to  be,  as  ever,  a  weapon  of  war  in  the  hands 
of  Austria  and  the  Lesser  States  against  Prussia. 
After  the  German  Parliament  had  been  given  up,  the 
whole  question  of  the  future  German  Constitution  was 
reduced  to  the  simple  one  of  supremacy  between  the 
two  Great  Powers  in  the  Confederation.  This  played 
its  role  directly  or  indirectly  in  almost  every  discussion 
of  the  Confederate  Diet,  in  spite  of  the  secret  alliance, 
in  spite  of  the  common  war  against  Liberalism,  in 
spite  of  the  instructions  sent  to  the  new  Prussian 
deputy,  Herr  von  Rocliow,  and  his  earnest  efforts  to  go 
hand  in  hand  with  Austria. 

For,  as  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  once  wrote  to 
the  Prussian  King:  Circumstances  are  stronger  than 
men.  As  circumstances  had  been  for  more  than  half  a 
century,  the  two  Powers  were  natural  allies  in  Euro- 
pean questions,  but  on  German  soil  their  vital  interests 
were  necessarily  different,  and  consequently  in  tlie 
most  important  matters  a  conflict  was  inevitable.  In 
these  disputes  Austria's  prospects  seemed  to  be  decid- 
edly favorable,  as  she  was  always  sure  of  an  unhesi- 

1G5 


166  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

tating  majority  in  tlie  Confederate  Diet.  From  the 
ranks  of  the  Petty  States  that  were  once  united  in  the 
Prussian  Union,  both  Hesse  and  Nassau  had  fallen  out, 
and  had  joined  the  Austrian  camp.  There  was  then  no 
need  of  a  very  large  following  to  secure  a  majority 
among  seventeen  votes;  nor  was  this  following  small. 
Since  the  Olmiitz  Agreement,  Austria's  favor  had 
been  considered  more  desirable  and  her  ill-will  more 
dangerous  than  Prussia's.  Many  noble  families  had 
their  sons  enter  the  imperial  service,  and  used  their 
influence  at  home  on  the  side  of  Austria.  Without 
question,  the  Court  of  Vienna  in  the  line  of  personal 
suasion  was  much  more  active  and  clever  than  the 
Court  of  Berlin.  Then,  again,  Austria's  presidency 
counted  for  a  great  deal  in  her  favor.  In  short,  the 
imperial  will  was  the  predominant  influence  in  the 
Confederate  Diet. 

Prince  Schwarzenberg  was  surely  not  the  man  to 
leave  unapplied  such  a  source  of  power.  He  was  very 
willing  to  acquiesce  in  the  agreement  with  Berlin  so 
ardently  sought  after  in  Rochow's  instructions,  on  the 
condition  that  Prussia  would  comply  as  readily  with 
Vienna's  views  as  Ancillon  had  formerly  yielded  to 
the  opinions  of  Prince  Metternich.  But  if  Manteuffel 
should  venture  to  have  any  will  of  his  own,  then 
Schwarzenberg  believed  that  in  the  Confederate  Diet 
itself  he  had  the  best  means  of  breaking  that  will  and 
of  keeping  Prussia  down  by  the  passing  of  majority- 
votes.  The  simple  result  of  this  would  be  an  attempt 
to  extend  gradually  the  authority  of  the  Confederate 


PARTIES  IN  THE  DIET.  167 

Diet,  and  in  this  way  to  limit  the  scope  of  Prussia's 
independent  influence. 

A  few  weeks  after  all  the  deputies  had  taken  their 
seats  in  the  Confederate  Diet,  Schwarzenberg  took  the 
first  important  step  towards  this  result,  by  securing,  on 
the  10th  of  July,  1851,  the  appointment  of  a  committee 
to  discuss  and  elaborate  the  material  brought  forward 
in  Dresden  on  the  subject  of  a  tariff-union  between 
Austria  and  the  other  German  states.  This  meant,  as 
we  know,  Austria's  determination  either  entirely  to 
break  up  the  Prussian  Tariff-Union,  or  to  share  with 
Prussia  in  the  leadership  of  the  same,  or  even  to 
thrust  Prussia  out  of  it  altogether.  The  Prince  was  in 
this,  also,  certain  of  the  support  of  most  of  the  Lesser 
States,  to  whom  nothing  seemed  more  desirable  than  to 
have  two  leaders  instead  of  one  in  matters  of  trade  and 
duties,  as  well  as  in  all  other  Confederate  interests. 
For  they  were  sure  of  the  protection  of  the  one  against 
arbitrary  measures  attempted  by  the  other;  and  in 
quarrels  between  the  two,  they  could  play  the  fine  part 
of  the  deciding  judge. 

These  developments  were  watched  from  Berlin  with 
calmness.  Prussia  had  at  Olmiitz  yielded  to  a  very 
unfavorable  conjunction  of  European  conditions.  She 
had  suffered  badly  in  her  political  reputation,  but  had 
escaped  any  material  damage.  She  felt,  therefore, 
driven  back,  but  not  overcome.  For  the  time,  she  gave 
up  any  attempt  to  rise  to  any  higher  position  in  the 
Confederation  than  she  had  formerly  enjo3^ed  ;  but  she 
by  no  means  intended  to  allow  herself  to  be  set  lower 
in  it  than  slie  luid  been  before  1848. 


168  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

As  far  as  her  military  power  was  concerned,  she  con- 
sidered herself,  to  say  the  least,  Austria's  peer  in  finan- 
cial possibilities,  and  in  the  internal  harmony  of  the 
State  far  ahead  of  her  rival ;  and  if  the  Court  of 
Vienna  reckoned  upon  arousing  against  Prussia  the 
mistrust  of  the  Lesser  States,  Prussia  believed  that  she 
herself  had  a  much  more  reliable  hold  upon  them  by 
sharing  with  them  the  interests,  both  material  and 
intellectual,  of  the  whole  German  population  outside  of 
Austria.  In  commercial  politics  she  was  quietly  busy 
with  the  inauguration  of  a  thorough-going  opposition 
policy.  As  deputy  to  the  Confederate  Diet,  however, 
the  King  appointed  in  the  place  of  Herr  von  Rochow, 
who  returned  to  St.  Petersburg,  the  former  dike-grave, 
Herr  Otto  von  Bismarck-Schonhausen.  When  the  latter 
presented  his  credentials  to  the  President  of  the  Diet 
on  the  29th  of  August,  1851,  he  took  his  first  step  in  a 
career  of  world-wide  reputation. 

Bismarck  was  now  in  his  thirty-sixth  year,  in  the  full 
bloom  of  his  vigorous  manhood.  A  tall  and  imposing 
figure,  which  towered  by  a  whole  head  above  the 
generality  of  the  children  of  men,  a  face  glowing  with 
every  sign  of  health,  a  glance  lighted  up  with  intelli- 
gence, in  his  mouth  and  chin  the  ex]Dression  of  an 
inflexible  will  —  such  he  appeared  to  his  contempo- 
raries, enlivening  every  conversation  with  original 
thoughts,  brilliant  figures,  and  striking  phrases,  mani- 
festing a  charming  affability  in  social  life,  and  in  busi- 
ness affairs  a  consummate  superiority. 

He   had  been    for  the    most   part    self-taught.     The 


OTTO   VON  BISMARCK-SCHONHAUSEN.       169 

original  freshness  of  his  nature  he  had  never  been  will- 
ing to  repress  by  stereotyped  courses  of  study  at  school 
nor  to  furbish  by  the  constraint  of  superficial  conven- 
tionalities. At  the  university  he  soon  gave  up  attend- 
ance upon  tedious  lectures,  and  as  a  jolly  Corps-Bursche 
enjoyed  to  tlie  utmost  the  pleasures  of  "  academical 
freedom."  But  in  spite  of  his  enthusiastic  devotion 
to  his  corps^  he  did  not  allow  this  to  be  his  chief  end 
in  life,  as  do  so  many,  who  afterwards  sink  aimless 
and  spiritless  into  the  ranks  of  the  Philisters :  on  the 
contrary,  no  day  passed  that  he  did  not  spend  some 
time  in  instructive  and  profound  reading,  which  stimu- 
lated and  trained  his  active,  aspiring  ideas. 

As  a  boy  even,  he  was  fond  of  geography,  which  had 
not  yet  been  developed  into  the  modern  conglomeration 
of  fragments  of  all  sciences,  but  confined  itself  espe- 
cially to  the  distribution  and  outward  conditions  of  the 
human  race  in  different  lands.  Bismarck  liked  to  tell 
how  this  thorough  study  of  the  map  of  Germany,  with 
its  bright  variety  of  colors  representing  the  territory  of 
thirty-nine  different  countries,  early  awoke  in  him  the 
feeling  that  such  a  map  portrayed  a  very  unnatural 
state  of  things.  Yet,  as  if  with  a  presentiment  of  his 
future  sphere  of  activity,  he  devoted  himself  especially 
to  historical  studies.  He  was  afterwards,  in  the  light 
of  his  own  broad  experience,  accustomed  to  sa}-,  that  for 
every  statesman  a  properly-directed  course  of  stud}'-  in 
history  was  the  most  important  element  in  the  founda- 
tion of  his  knowledge  ;  by  this  alone  could  he  learn 
what  might  be  attainable  in  dealing  witli  other  nations ; 


170  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERA  TION. 

and  the  highest  lesson  in  the  diplomatic  art  was  to  be 
able  to  recognize  the  limits  of  what  might  be  attained. 

His  whole  later  life  was  a  commentary  upon  this 
doctrine.  From  this  principle  he  derived  his  boldness 
in  setting  as  high  as  possible  the  objects  of  his  efforts, 
and  the  prudence  which  never  allowed  him  in  the 
intoxication  of  victory  to  stray  beyond  these  limits  set 
to  the  attainable. 

After  leaving  the  university,  Bismarck  went  through 
a  short  novitiate  in  the  government-service  ;  but  he 
could  not  long  endure  the  restraint  of  the  bureau,  and 
returned  to  his  free  life  upon  one  of  the  country-seats 
belonging  to  the  family,  where  he  kept  up  his  reputa- 
tion of  being  unwearied  in  the  chase,  fearless  in 
horsemanship,  and  invincible  in  the  drinking-bout, 
but  at  the  same  time  a  skilful  manager  and  careful 
administrator  of  the  estate.  With  all  the  impetuous 
overflow,  of  animal  spirits,  his  inner  life  was  being 
developed,  as  his  letters  show,  both  in  ripeness  of  judg- 
ment and  in  self-reliance,  upon  the  foundation  of  a 
deeply-serious  piety. 

Then  came  the  years  of  political  commotion,  which 
drew  him  too  into  the  current  of  public  life.  We  have 
seen  how,  in  the  United  Provincial  Diet  of  1847,  he 
took  a  bold  stand  in  defence  of  the  King's  purposes.  In 
his  very  first  speech  he  showed  a  remarkable  command 
of  language,  a  classical  power  in  the  art  of  expression, 
and  an  inexhaustible  skill  in  pertinent  repartee.  It 
was  characteristic  of  the  bent  of  his  mind,  that  even 
here  in  questions  of  internal  politics  his  thoughts  went 


FREDERICK    WILLIAM  IV.   A.\D  BISMARCK.     171 

far  out  beyond  the  limits  of  Prussia  and  were  bugy 
with  her  relations  to  foreign  States.  He  recognized 
the  usefulness  of  the  proposed  Berlin-Konigsberg  rail- 
way, not  so  much  from  a  mercantile  and  financial  point 
of  view  as  from  military  and  political  considerations. 
With  the  same  aims  in  mind,  he  urged  the  assembly 
not  to  demand  more  privileges  than  the  King  had 
offered  them,  and  thus  cause  a  rupture  with  the 
Government,  but  rather  by  a  constant  accord  with  the 
King  to  show  to  the  whole  of  Europe  that  they  were  a 
strong  and  united  people.  When,  then,  in  the  follow- 
ing year  the  waves  of  the  Revolution  broke  over  Prussia 
and  a  wild  spirit  of  anarchy  took  possession  of  Berlin, 
his  blood  boiled  with  loyalty  to  his  King,  and  he 
became  one  of  the  most  valiant  members  of  the  Kreuz- 
zeitung  party. 

His  personal  relations  with  the  King  now  became 
gradually  more  intimate.  The  King  had  alreadj^  in 
1847,  noted  with  pleasure  Bismarck's  discourses  in  the 
United  Provincial  Diet  upon  the  Christian  State  and  the 
King's  tenure  of  office  by  the  Grace  of  God.  I  am  not 
able  to  decide  whether  the  King  felt  any  sympathetic 
bond  between  himself  and  this  man  of  genius  so  utterly 
different  from  him  in  natural  disposition  ;  but  certain  it 
is,  that  Frederick  William,  whose  forte  was  by  no 
means  a  correct  knowledge  of  human  nature,  did 
perceive  the  remarkable  qualities  so  prominent  in 
Bismarck's  character,  and  resolved  to  train  him  himself 
to  some  high  position  of  usefulness  to  the  State.  "  He 
considered   me   an   Qg^^^^   said  Bismarck  later,   "  from 


172  DUALISM  IN   THE   CONFEDERATION. 

which  he  expected  to  hatch  a  minister."  He  surprised 
him,  then,  by  sending  him  to  Frankfort,  as  it  were  to  a 
school  of  diplomacy,  where  indeed  all  the  lines  of 
German  politics  met  in  a  focus. 

With  precisely  the  same  sentiment  that  the  King  enter- 
tained, one  often  hears  people  speak  of* Bismarck's  years 
of  apprenticeship  at  Frankfort.  One  might  as  well  talk 
of  a  young  fish  going  to  a  swimming-school !  To  be 
sure,  he  who  had  formerly  had  no  experience  in  the 
diplomatic  service,  now  entered  a  new  world,  and  had 
a  great  deal  to  learn  about  people  and  things.  But 
after  he  had  within  the  first  few  weeks  taken  his 
bearings  in  this  new  field,  he  evinced  in  his  very  first 
political  moves  his  skill  as  a  master-workman.  He  was 
a  statesman  by  birth.  Nature  had  generously  endowed 
him  with  all  the  necessary  attributes  of  a  great  leader. 
He  possessed  the  power  of  grasping  quickly  and  exactly 
the  relations  of  things,  of  exactly  perceiving  the  strong 
and  weak  points  of  every  position,  and  of  gauging  with 
penetrating  discernment  the  possible  usefulness  of  the 
most  different  sorts  of  men  for  the  furtherance  of  his 
aims. 

To  a  most  resolute  and  unswerving  determination  in 
the  pursuit  of  his  ends,  he  joined  an  elasticity  of  mind 
in  changing  his  methods  to  suit  the  occasion,  that  never 
played  him  false.  Without  ever  having  subjected  him- 
self to  a  systematic  course  of  instruction,  he  had  that 
faculty  which  Thucydides  praised  in  Themistocles,  the 
power  of  discovering  almost  immediately  the  wanting 
term  by  the  intuition  of  his  own  nature. 


BISMARCK'S  NATURAL   TALENTS.  173 

All  these  traits  appear  quite  as  marked  in  his  Frank- 
fort correspondence  as  in  his  later  spheres  of  action  in 
higher  offices.  One  marvels  everywhere  at  the  circum- 
spection with  which  he  considers  a  question  from  all 
points  of  view,  his  courage  in  presenting  the  merits 
of  the  cause,  his  inexhaustible  fund  of  unexpected 
strategic  movements  to  rout  and  confuse  his  adversary, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  ever-constant  pulse  of  an 
energy  always  tempered  and  controlled  by  reason.  He 
was  not  yet  in  a  ruling  position,  but  was  obliged  to 
obey  the  orders  of  his  superiors  in  office ;  yet  his  re- 
ports were  always  so  thoroughly  based  upon  actual 
facts,  and  so  irresistibly  forcible  in  their  logic,  that  the 
Minister  only  very  seldom  saw  the  possibility  of  a 
different  conclusion.  Herr  von  Manteuffel  very  likely 
often  grumbled  with  incipient  jealousy :  "  That  young 
Schonhduser  seems  to  be  rather  sure  of  what  he  is 
about," — yet  wrote  "all  right"  at  the  end  of  the 
report. 

In  the  early  maturity  of  his  talents  and  in  his  con- 
trol over  those  above  him  in  office,  Bismarck  reminds 
one  forcibly  of  General  Bonaparte's  course  of  action  in 
1796.  But  by  the  side  of  this  point  of  resemblance  there 
appears  in  every  other  point  only  the  greatest  possible 
difference  between  the  characters  of  tlie  two  men.  In 
place  of  tlie  tremendous  selfishness  which  overwhelmed 
every  other  sentiment  in  the  heart  of  the  Corsican 
Imjyerator^  the  Prussian  statesman  showed  a  patriotic 
devotion  to  his  country,  an  unreserved  recogiiilion  of 
his  duty  toward  his  King  and  toward  his  Fatherland. 


174  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

His  soul  was  inspired  with  the  mission  of  raising 
Prussia  to  a  position  of  power  and  prosperity :  his 
every  act  was  made  subservient  to  this  single  and 
ruling  task.  However  zealous  an  adherent  of  his  party 
he  had  been  formerly,  he  was  now,  in  the  fullest  sense 
of  the  word,  a  servant  of  the  State.  Before  his  duty  to 
the  State  every  other  consideration  must  retreat  to  the 
background.  Questions  of  the  greatest  importance, 
such  as  free-trade  or  protection,  feudal  or  democratic 
institutions,  religious  liberty  or  a  hierarchy,  questions 
which  thousands  of  men  regard  as  involving  the  most 
vital  interests  of  their  existence,  were  for  him  nothing, 
except  so  far  as  they  offered  an  occasion  for  Prussia's 
aggrandizement ;  so  that  his  adversaries  not  unfre- 
quently  upbraided  him  with  being  the  most  unprinci- 
pled time-server  of  any  age. 

As  Frederick  the  Great,  who  devoted  a  long  life  to  the 
service  of  the  interests  of  the  State,  was  in  his  inmost 
heart  convinced  that  the  State  was  only  a  means  for  the 
preservation  and  cultivation  of  the  ideal  blessings  of 
Beauty,  Truth,  Art,  and  Science :  so  Bismarck  held 
precisely  the  inverse  doctrine,  showing  himself  here  also 
a  utilitarian ;  and  however  much  he  did  indeed  appre- 
ciate those  blessings,  the  first  and  last  question  with 
him  was.  How  far  can  this  art  or  that  science  serve  the 
interests  of  Prussia  as  a  state  ? 

Although,  perhaps,  not  appropriately  referred  to  in 
this  connection,  it  may  be  mentioned  here,  that  although 
he  was  farther  removed  than  any  other  man  from 
religious  indifference,  yet  he  warned  his  former  party 


BISMARCK'S  POLITICAL  PRINCIPLES.        176 

associates  repeatedly  against  the  prevalent  doctrine  of 
uniting  Church  and  State.  "  You  do  not "  —  these 
were  his  words  —  "in  this  way  preach  the  people  into 
the  church,  hut  out  of  the  church ;  and  you  injure  the 
State  by  disgusting  the  people  with  their  religion." 

To  the  enemies  of  Prussia  in  the  Confederate  Diet  it 
was  naturally  very  uncomfortable  to  have  such  a  man 
in  their  way,  a  man  that  could  handle  all  the  weapons 
of  polemics  as  an  expert,  and  who  left  no  boast  of  his 
adversary  uncriticised,  nor  any  weak  spot  unnoticed. 
He  soon  won  the  reputation  of  being  an  exceedingly 
dangerous  opponent  in  the  lists.  Precise  diplomatists, 
and  not  only  those  in  Frankfort,  censured  him  for 
being  too  off-hand,  or  wondered  at  his  assuming  already 
with  the  coolest  mien  the  airs  of  a  future  prime-minis- 
ter. At  first,  indeed,  he  was  in  every  case  cordial 
towards  his  colleagues  in  the  Confederate  Diet,  and 
determined  to  preserve  a  good  feeling  between  himself 
and  them.  For  he  had  not  come  to  Frankfort  to  oppose 
Austria  on  principle  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  had  always 
hitherto  acted  upon  the  conviction  that  it  was  necessary 
for  Prussia  and  Austria  to  hold  closely  together,  and 
this  had  been  the  basis  of  his  assumptions  his  whole 
life  long. 

Accordingly,  he  endeavored  in  the  Confederate  Diet 
to  smooth  over  every  incipient  difference  of  opinion  by 
manifesting  especial  cordiality  towards  the  Presiding 
Deputy,  Count  Thun,  in  order  to  avoid  presenting  to 
the  smaller  states  the  spectacle  of  a  dissension  between 
tlie    two    Great    Powers.     But   only   too  soon  was  he 


176  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

forced  to  acknowledge  to  himself  that  the  necessary 
foundation  for  such  endeavors,  namel}^,  the  reciproca- 
tion of  this  feeling,  was  entirely  wanting,  and  that  it 
was  foolish  to  expect  Austria  to  recognize  Prussia  as 
her  equal,  or  to  hope  that,  considering  their  respective 
relation  to  German  questions,  she  would  ever  do  so. 
After  having  weighed  this  well,  his  future  course  of 
action  was  once  for  all  decided.  He  would  resist  to  the 
last  point,  ay,  even  further,  to  the  rupture  of  the  Con- 
federation, before  he  would  allow  Prussia's  honor  or 
her  just  rights  to  suffer.  Within  the  first  few  weeks 
the  opportunity  came  for  him  to  take  this  stand. 

Prussia  wished  to  be  able  to  assert  her  legal  right  to 
be  regarded  as  an  independent  European  Power  by 
again  withdrawing  East  and  West  Prussia  from  the 
territory  of  the  Confederation.  For  Austria,  who  was 
anxious  to  have  all  her  lands  included  in  the  Confed- 
eration, this  request  from  Prussia  was  untimely,  and 
hence  from  many  sides  exceptions  and  misgivings 
arose.  The  emphasis  with  which  Bismarck  repelled 
this  is  seen  from  his  appeal  to  Manteuffel  for  per- 
mission to  make  the  declaration,  that  if  the  gentlemen 
persisted  in  their  objections,  Prussia  w^ould  carry  out 
the  measure  independently  of  them.  It  did  not,  how- 
ever, come  to  this ;  for  the  threatening  attitude  of 
Bismarck  induced  the  majority  finally  to  pass  the 
vote. 

Another  question,  in  the  treatment  of  which  the 
majority  of  the  Confederate  deputies  showed  their 
anti-Prussian  sentiments,  concerned  the  j)ublication  of 


BISMARCK  IN  THE  DIET.  177 

the  minutes  of  the  sessions.^  Upon  the  motion  of  Aus- 
tria a  special  committee  was  appointed  to  select  from 
the  matters  discussed  in  the  assembly  those  that  miglit 
suitably  be  made  public,  and,  weighing  their  respective 
importance,  to  prepare  them  for  publication.  Herr  von 
Bismarck,  who  had  voted  against  the  motion  and  then 
had  not  been  chosen  as  a  member  of  the  committee, 
scanned  the  selection  made  in  the  very  first  publication, 
and  found  his  suspicions  confirmed  with  regard  to  the 
choice  made  and  the  exactness  of  the  report.  It  had 
evidently  been  a  move  made  to  secure  a  one-sided 
organ  of  the  Austrian  party  to  work  in  their  interests 
against  Prussia.  He  opposed  this  project  on  the  spot, 
not  only  openly  in  the  newspapers,  but  also  by  a  bold 
challenge  in  the  Diet  itself,  thus  preventing,  to  the 
painful  astonishment  of  liis  adversaries,  a  repetition  of 
this  unsuccessful  attempt. 

Even  more  disgraceful  and  in  every  way  melancholy 
was  the  quarrel  over  the  German  fleet  on  the  North 
Sea,  which  had  been  created  in  1848.  This  matter 
monopolized  for  many  long  months  the  attention  of  the 
Diet ;  and  from  a  stubborn  haggling  over  an  insignifi- 
cant sum  of  money,  it  developed  gradually  into  a  strife 
over  the  fundamental  questions  of  the  whole  Con- 
federate Constitution. 

The  German  fleet  liad  originally  been  built  for  the 
German  Imperial  Government,  which  it  was  expected 

1  In  tlic  following  I  have  taken  tlie  liberty  of  reproducing  a  few  jiages 
from  the  introduction  (edited  largely  by  myself)  to  the  iiuhlication  of 
archives  entitled  :   Prcuszon  im  Bundestafje. 


178  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

would  be  born  in  the  immediate  future.  With  this  in 
view,  Prussia  had  readily  paid  her  contribution,  which 
had  covered  the  greatest  part  of  the  cost  of  the  fleet, 
while  Austria  and  a  number  of  the  inland  states  were 
either  wholly  or  partly  behind  in  their  payments. 
Now,  it  was  the  opposition  of  these  latter  that  had 
caused  the  projected  Imperial  Government  to  disappear 
in  smoke ;  but  the  fleet  still  existed,  and  it  was  neces- 
sary to  decide  upon  means  of  raising  money  for  its 
support.  We  have  already  seen  that  at  the  Dresden 
Congress  the  inland  states  showed  no  great  inclination 
to  maintain  a  German  navy ;  unanimity  or  a  majority 
of  three-fourths  was  demanded  to  pass  any  measure 
concerning  it. 

Prussia  now  proposed,  that,  for  the  support  of  the 
fleet,  the  contributions  due  in  1848,  and  still  in  arrears, 
should  first  be  paid  in  and  expended.  But  the  states 
to  whom  this  applied  would  not  hear  to  it ;  and  at 
their  instigation  the  Confederate  Diet  by  a  majority- 
vote  on  the  7th  of  July,  1851,  voted  a  new  appropria- 
tion of  532,000  florins.  Prussia  objected  to  this  on  the 
ground  that  the  fleet  was  not  yet  an  organization 
sanctioned  by  the  Confederate  Diet,  and  that  conse- 
quently, just  as  the  South  Germans  had  demanded  at 
Dresden,  unanimity  would  be  necessary  in  any  vote 
concerning  its  maintenance.  The  same  thing  occurred 
again,  when  towards  the  end  of  the  year  the  majority 
decided  to  cover  the  deficit  by  negotiating  a  loan  from 
the  banking-house  of  the  Rothschilds :  this  project 
determined   upon  in   spite   of  her  opposition,  Prussia 


QUARREL   OVER   THE   GERMAN  FLEET.       179 

declared  to  be  unconstitutional  and  null.  The  Majority 
replied  that  no  Confederate  law  required  unanimity 
for  such  measures.  Prussia  in  turn  demanded  proofs 
that  according  to  Confederate  law  the  Majority  pos- 
sessed such  powers. 

This  put  the  quarrel  upon  a  very  dangerous  basis. 
The  Majority  believed,  that,  in  doubtful  cases,  the 
functions  and  powers  of  the  Confederate  Diet  were  to 
be  decided  by  itself,  that  is,  by  its  majority ;  for  other- 
wise the  smallest  Confederate  state  might  by  its  veto 
prevent  the  passage  of  most  important  measures. 
Prussia  responded  that  according  to  that  theory  the 
constitutional  sovereignty  of  the  individual  states 
would  be  left,  by  the  extension  of  the  powers  of  the 
Confederation,  without  defence  in  the  power  of  an 
arbitrary  majority.  These  two  principles  it  was 
equally  impossible  to  disprove.  Brought  thus  side  by 
side,  they  showed  very  strikingly  the  unnaturalness  and 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  principles  upon  which  the 
Confederate  Constitution  of  1815  had  been  founded. 

Moreover,  as  usual,  this  difference  in  the  legal  stand- 
points concealed  a  no  less  radical  difference  in  aims  and 
demands.  Prussia  would  gladly  have  made  further 
contributions,  if  tlie  new  North  Sea  fleet  had  been 
joined  with  tlie  Prussian  navy  in  such  a  way  that 
Prussia  might  be  the  common  commander  of  them  boft. 
Among  the  Lesser  States,  the  opinion  prevailed  that 
Austria  should  maintain  the  fleet  on  tlie  Adriatic, 
Prussia  the  one  on  the  Baltic,  and  the  other  states  the 
one  on   the   North   Sea.     Austria  might  perhaps  have 


180  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

favored  some  system  by  which  the  North  Sea  fleet 
should  remain,  as  well  as  the  Confederate  army,  under 
the  control  of  the  Confederate  Diet,  since  this  was 
virtually  in  the  hands  of  Austria.  So  it  happened  that 
scarcely  a  year  after  the  agreement  at  Olmiitz,  the  old 
standards  of  an  "entire"  Germany,  a  Union,  and  a 
Triad,  advocated  respectively  by  Austria,  Prussia,  and 
the  Lesser  States,  stood  again  opposed  to  each  other 
with  renewed  vigor.  The  representatives  of  these 
systems  did  not  yet  come  to  any  open  rupture ;  but  the 
fleet  went  to  ruin  under  their  quarrelling. 

When  the  project  of  the  Triad  came  to  be  voted 
upon,  the  result,  as  the  chairman  of  the  committee  on 
the  navy  was  obliged  to  confess,  was  undeniably  most 
melancholy.  For  it  was  not  enough  that  the  votes 
varied  so  widely  that  almost  every  one  followed  a 
different  direction,  —  at  least  in  minor  details, — but 
some  protested  beforehand  against  possible  com- 
promises. 

No  better  fate  awaited  the  attempt  to  establish  a 
restricted  association  of  states  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  North  Sea  fleet.  The  difficulty  here  lay  in  the 
simple  fact  that  the  smaller  coast  states,  however  gladly 
Hanover  would  have  accepted  the  position  of  Con- 
federate admiral  of  the  North  Sea,  were  not  able  to 
assume  this  responsibility  without  Prussia,  nor  had 
they  any  inclination  to  do  so  with  (i.e.,  under')  Prussia. 
Thus  the  matter  was  already  hopeless  when  the  Con- 
federation in  February,  1852,  decreed  the  dissolution 
of  the  fleet,  in  case  the  proposed  association  of  states 


SALE  OF  THE   GERMAN  FLEET.  181 

should  not  be  formed  by  April.  When  this  time 
arrived,  this  had  not  been  accomplished;  and  to  the 
sorrow  and  disgrace  of  all  Germany,  the  fleet  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  auctioneer.  The  ships  were  publicly 
sold  at  auction  by  the  Oldenburg  Counsellor  of  State, 
Hannibal  Fischer. 

This  was  at  about  the  time  when  the  Confederate 
Diet  was  displaying  its  efficiency  to  the  German  nation 
by  the  proclamation  of  the  new  Hessian  Constitution. 
Meanwhile  a  stubborn  diplomatic  struggle  was  arising 
over  the  great  commercial  question  between  Prussia  on 
the  one  side  and  Austria  with  her  associates  on  the  other. 

As  is  well  known,  the  coast  states  of  North  Germany 
had  not  hitherto  joined  the  great  Tariff-Union,  because 
the  import-tax  on  colonial  wares  and  wines  seemed  to 
them  too  high.  Instead  of  this,  Hanover,  Oldenburg, 
and  Brunswick  had  formed  a  special  tariff-league 
among  themselves  in  1834.  Brunswick  let  this  drop  in 
1841,  and  tried  to  gain  admission  to  the  great  Tariff- 
Union.  Many  efforts  to  induce  Hanover  to  do  the 
same  were  unsuccessful.  The  Court  of  Hanover  felt 
that  in  joining  the  Tariff-Union  the  sovereign  authority 
of  the  King  would  be  too  seriously  compromised ;  and 
tlie  financial  privileges  with  which  Hanover  wished  to 
be  favored  beyond  the  other  members  as  an  indenmifi- 
cation  for  such  a  sacrifice  were  so  great,  that  Prussia 
continually  declared  them  to  be  inadmissible. 

Since  1848,  however,  the  tables  had  gradually  been 
turning  in  these  relations. 

The  Hanover  "  Marcli  "  Ministry  of  Count  Bennigsen- 


182  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

Stiive  had  brought  about  numerous  changes,  in  keeping 
with  the  current  of  the  times,  in  the  Constitution  that 
had  been  given  to  the  country  in  1840  by  the  King 
Ernest  Augustus.  The  First  Chamber,  in  which  the 
deputies  from  the  nobility  of  the  separate  provinces 
formed  a  decided  majority,  was  opened  to  elected 
reiDresentatives  of  the  landed  proprietors  of  all  ranks. 
In  the  department  of  finance,  Ernest  Augustus  had 
re-established  the  old  system  of  keeping  the  royal  and 
the  state  treasuries  distinct :  the  royal  exchequer 
received  the  income  from  the  domains  and  other 
revenues,  and,  after  providing  for  the  expenses  of 
the  Court  and  the  establishment  of  members  of  the 
royal  family,  paid  over  the  remainder  into  the  state 
treasury  to  cover  tlie  expenses  attending  certain 
branches  of  the  administration.  The  legislation  of 
1848  reversed  this  relation,  by  uniting  the  two  excheq- 
uers, placed  the  administration  of  the  domains  as  well 
as  taxes  in  the  hands  of  the  Minister  of  Finance,  and 
determined  a  civil-list  for  the  King  during  his  life- 
time. Beside  these  and  numerous  other  changes  in  the 
Constitution,  a  new  organization  of  the  judicial  and 
administrative  authorities  was  projected,  and  also  a 
reformation  of  the  provincial  constitutions  by  lessening 
in  them  the  preponderance  of  the  nobility. 

In  the  autumn  of  1850,  it  is  true,  the  Ministry  of 
Bennigsen-Stiive  was  dismissed  by  the  King,  because,  in 
spite  of  its  individualistic  resistance  to  Prussia,  it  would 
not  share  in  the  Hessian  measures  of  the  "  Rump " 
Confederate   Diet ;    yet   the    new   Cabinet,  under  the 


AFFAIRS  IN  HANOVER.  183 

leadership  of  Baron  von  Miinchhausen,  kept  up  the 
policy  of  its  predecessors  in  internal  affairs,  and  began 
especially  to  put  into  effect  the  organizations  planned 
by  them.  But  these,  like  all  good  things  on  our  earth, 
cost  money ;  and  the  state  treasury,  as  everywhere,  had 
been  exhausted  by  a  variety  of  expenditures  during  the 
years  of  the  Revolution.  The  Estates,  indeed,  showed 
everywhere  a  remarkable  willingness  to  assist  the 
Government;  but  in  a  state  in  which  the  agricultural 
resources  had  hitherto  been  so  little  developed,  there 
was  a  limit  to  the  possibilities  of  raising  the  taxes.  So 
that  before  the  end  of  the  year  1850,  the  Government 
tried  the  expedient  of  augmenting  its  revenue  by  in- 
creasing the  duties,  but  failed  in  this  on  account  of  the 
opposition  of  the  Oldenburg  provincial  Estates. 

After  this  the  embarrassment  was  great;  and  when 
once  the  attention  of  the  Government  liad  been  directed 
to  tlie  German  Tariff-Union,  inducements  for  joining  it 
followed  fast  upon  one  another.  Especially  since  the 
withdrawal  of  Brunswick  the  care  of  the  frontiers 
had  become  very  expensive  and  complicated.  Connec- 
tion with  the  German  Tariff-Union  would  probably 
make  the  Hanover  railways  much  more  profitable  ,•  and 
many  branches  of  industry  which  had  been  for  some 
time  enjoying  an  increasing  prosperity,  longed  for  free 
admission  to  the  German  market,  and  strong  protection 
against  English  competition.  The  Prussian  Govern- 
ment was  fully  aware  of  these  symptoms,  and  in  the 
beginning  of  1851  made  up  its  mind  to  take  advantage 
of  them  in  cnerEfctic  fashion  for  its  own  interests. 


184  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

This  came  about  in  the  following  way.  Serious 
divisions  had  occurred  in  the  Tariff-Union.  Prussia 
inclined,  not  exactly  to  free-trade,  but  at  least  to  a 
reduction  of  the  tariff  and  other  means  of  facilitating 
commerce;  whereas,  the  South  German  States,  for  the 
sake  of  their  large  manufacturers,  desired  a  thorough- 
going system  of  protection,  and  thus  approached  the 
commercial  standpoint  of  Austria.  If,  then,  Austria 
should  now  execute  vigorously  her  plans  for  a  tariff- 
union,  Prussia  would  be  in  no  small  danger  of  suffering 
by  reason  of  either  a  secession  of  the  Southern  States 
to  Austria,  or  a  complete  overthrow  of  the  Tariff- 
Union  and  interruption  of  free  communication  between 
the  two  halves  of  the  monarchy.  This  last  must  at  any 
rate  be  prevented,  and  at  any  price ;  and  there  was  no 
better  means  of  doing  this  than  a  commercial  league 
with  Hanover.  If  this  could  be  accomj^lished,  then 
Prussia,  standing  upon  a  firm  basis,  might  await  the 
action  of  the  Southern  States. 

Accordingly,  Austria  had  scarcely  succeeded  in 
securing  in  the  Confederate  Diet,  on  the  10th  of  July, 
1851,  the  appointment  of  the  committee  on  commercial 
relations,  when  Prussia  sent  a  private  message  to 
Hanover,  proposing  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
regard  to  incorporating  the  customs-league  into  the 
Tariff-Union,  and  to  begin  the  same  so  soon  as  confi- 
dential information  should  be  received  that  a  sjDeedy 
conclusion  would  be  reached  based  upon  the  conditions 
accompanying  Prussia's  message.  These  were  indeed 
exceedingly  advantageous  for  Hanover  and  Oldenburg, 


HANOVER   AND   THE   TARIFF-UNION.         185 

the  concession  of  all  those  points  which  in  former 
negotiations  Prussia  had  constantly  declared  inadmis- 
sible :  a  great  reduction  of  the  duty  on  tea,  coffee,  wine, 
and  French  brandy,  free  importation  of  rails  for  the 
Hanover  railways,  and  a  prior  claim  of  seventy-five  per 
cent  in  the  distribution  of  the  Tariff-Union  revenues. 

In  Hanover  this  offer  was  accepted  without  much 
hesitation.  The  Director  of  Customs,  Klenze,  was  sent 
to  Magdeburg,  where  he,  with  the  Prussian  Privy  Coun- 
sellor, Uelbrlick,  prepared  in  the  greatest  secrecy  the 
separate  articles  of  the  treaty,  which  he  signed  on  the 
7th  of  September  in  Berlin,  and  which  confirmed  the 
admission  of  Hanover  and  Oldenburg  into  commercial 
alliance  with  Prussia  and  her  associates  of  the  Tariff- 
Union,  to  take  effect  on  the  1st  of  January,  1854.  On 
the  11th  of  September,  Prussia  announced  the  fact  to 
the  other  members  of  the  Tariff-Union. 

But  during  these  negotiations  an  internal  crisis  was 
impending  in  Hanover.  Several  of  the  societies  of  the 
nobility  had  sent  complaints  to  the  Confederate  Diet 
concerning  the  loss  of  their  old  rights,  begging  for 
assistance  in  the  recovery  and  defence  of  the  same  in 
the  provincial  as  well  as  in  the  general  assembly  of  the 
Estates.  The  people  of  Hanover  did  not  think  this  act 
of  the  nobility  of  any  importance,  inasmuch  as  the 
Confederate  Diet  in  1839  had  refused  to  consider  the 
complaints  of  several  cities  and  corporations  against  the 
unlawful  coup  d'Stat  of  Ernest  Augustus,  and  this  time 
the  laws  wliicli  had  offended  tlie  nobility  had  been 
enacted    with    the    consent   oi   thu    Kin<'-   and  of  both 


186  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

Chambers.  The  Ministry,  however,  who  had  protested 
so  emphatically  against  any  interference  of  the  Con- 
federate Diet  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  country, 
were  now  not  a  little  anxious,  since  they  were  well 
aware  of  the  especial  favor  and  partiality  of  the  King 
and  the  Crown  Prince  towards  the  nobility. 

When,  then,  the  Diet's  committee  on  commercial 
relations  summoned  experienced  men  to  its  aid  in  the 
discussions,  and  Klenze  for  this  reason  was  sent  to 
Frankfort,  the  latter  called  on  Bismarck  and  explained 
to  him  that  the  treaty  of  the  7th  of  September  had 
many  opponents  in  Hanover,  especially  among  the 
party  of  the  nobility ;  that  if  these  by  successes  in  the 
Confederate  Diet  should  effect  the  overthrow  of  the 
Ministry  of  Miinchhausen,  it  would  then  be  impossible 
to  secure  for  the  treaty  the  approval  of  the  Chambers  ; 
and  that  it  therefore  lay  in  the  interests  of  Prussia  to 
support  the  Miinchhausen  Ministry  in  the  Confederate 
Diet  as  well  as  at  the  Hanoverian  Court. 

This  gave  rise  to  a  characteristic  correspondence 
between  Bismarck  and  Manteuffel.  The  former,  who 
indeed  held  that  it  was  one  of  the  functions  of  the 
Confederate  Diet  to  decide  in  cases  of  complaint,  wrote, 
nevertheless,  on  the  9th  of  October,  in  a  private  letter 
to  the  Prime  Minister,  as  follows  :  "  However  strong 
my  personal  disinclination  may  be  towards  sacrificing 
political  rectitude  in  my  own  country,  yet  I  have  self- 
interest  enough  as  a  Prussian  not  to  be  quite  so  con- 
scientious with  regard  to  the  same  in  Hanover,  and 
would  humbly  offer  my  advice  that  only  such  a  minis- 


PRUSSIAN   VIEWS.  187 

tiy  should  be  supported  in  Hanover,  as  would  be  ready 
to  favor  our  policy  embodied  in  the  treaty  of  September 
7th,  let  the  political  color  of  that  ministry  be  what  it 
may.  Our  own  state  is  strong  enough  for  us  to  be  able 
to  countenance  and  encourage  in  Hanover  a  liberal 
ministry  sooner  than  one  that  sides  with  Austria." 

Manteuffel  took  counsel  with  his  under-secretary 
Lecoq,  a  man  of  few  talents,  and  unprepossessing,  but 
politically  devoted  heart  and  soul  to  the  party  of  the 
Kreuzzeitung  and  the  Von  Gerlachs.  To  him  it  seemed 
like  a  sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost  to  favor,  for  the  sake 
of  Prussia's  interests,  the  opponents  of  the  nobility  in 
Hanover.  Accordingly,  Manteuffel  replied  on  the  13th 
of  October.  "  Klenze,"  he  wrote,  "  has  already  made 
remarks  in  Berlin  to  the  effect,  that  the  nobility  are 
hostile  to  the  treaty,  and  that  the  overthrow  of  Miinch- 
hausen  would  be  dangerous  to  it.  But  that  opinion  is 
simply  his  personal  one.  Aside  from  the  financial 
advantages  to  be  derived  by  Hanover  from  the  treaty, 
the  nobility  would  certainly,  from  political  motives, 
recognize  in  the  treaty  with  conservative  Prussia  a 
sure  safeguard  of  their  own  future.  The  old  King  and 
the  Crown  Prince  also  favor  the  fulfilment  of  the 
solemnly  ratified  treaty.  It  is  only  to  be  hoped  that 
the  Confederate  Diet  will  be  cautious  and  deferential 
in  its  conduct  towards  the  Hanoverian  Government,  so 
that  the  actions  of  the  latter  may  still  liave  the  charac- 
ter and  stamp  of  independence.  Nor  can  anything 
more  be  n-ijuired  of  us,  in  order  to  avoid  the  clioice, 
j)ainful    enougl),    between    supporting  a  politically  un- 


188  DUALISM  IN   2 HE   CONFEDERATION. 

certain  [liberal,  crossed  out\  ministry,  and  endangering 
the  treaty  of  September  Tth." 

Prussia  kept  true,  then,  to  this  determination,  to 
refrain  from  exerting  any  positive  influence  upon 
Hanover's  internal  policy.  This  determination  was  all 
the  more  gratifying,  since  at  the  death  of  King  Ernest 
Augustus  on  the  18th  of  November,  1851,  his  blind  son, 
George  V.,  after  having  promised  with  his  royal  oath 
to  maintain  the  Constitution,  immediately  appointed, 
under  Baron  von  Scheie,  at  the  time  Hanoverian 
deputy  to  the  Confederate  Diet,  a  conservative  Minis- 
try, who  proceeded  in  the  next  assembly  of  the  Estates 
to  secure  the  recognition  of  the  tariff  treaty  in  both  • 
Chambers.  Klenze's  assertions  were  then  seen  to  have 
been  without  foundation,  and  to  have  arisen  purely 
from  party-ambition. 

Meanwhile  the  September  treaty  had  caused  no 
small  excitement  in  the  rest  of  Germany.  The  Lesser 
States  pretended  to  be  gravely  insulted  by  the  secrecy 
of  its  preparation  ;  it  was,  they  said,  a  cutting  slight  to 
their  dignity,  and  evidently  an  act  of  vengeance  for  the 
part  they  played  in  Prussia's  defeat  at  Olmiitz.  This 
complaint  was  fitted  to  produce  an  impression  upon 
political  children,  the  number  of  whom  was  indeed  not 
small  in  the  Fatherland.  Evidently  there  was  no  thought 
in  Prussia's  mind  of  vengeance  for  past  grievances,  but 
of  precaution  against  present  hostilities,  against  the 
Austrian  tendencies  of  the  Lesser  States,  who,  had  they 
been  aware  of  the  negotiations  before  the  settlement  of 
the  treaty,  would   without   any   doubt   have    made   a 


CHANGE   OF  GOVERNMENT  IN  HANOVER.      189 

previous  understanding  with  Vienna  the  condition  of 
their  consent.  This  was  immediately  manifest  when 
Prussia,  now  sure  of  her  position,  announced  in 
November,  1851,  that  the  Tariff-Union  woukl  cease  on 
January  1st,  1851,  and  at  the  same  time  expressed  her 
willingness  to  renew  it  upon  the  basis  of  the  September 
treaty.  To  this  end  all  the  members  of  the  Tariff- 
Union  were  invited  to  conferences  to  be  held  in  Berlin 
beginning  on  the  first  of  Ajnil,  1852. 

Thereupon,  Prince  Schwarzenberg  without  hesitation 
took  upon  himself  the  leadership  of  the  Opposition,  and 
summoned  all  the  German  States  to  a  conference  to  be 
held  forthwith,  in  January,  in  Vienna,  to  consider  in 
the  first  place  a  commercial  treaty  (Document  A),  and 
then  the  project  of  a  complete  union  of  Austria  and 
Germany  in  the  matter  of  duties  (Document  B). 
The  fundamental  idea  of  these  projects,  as  was  natural 
under  the  circumstances,  was  an  increase  of  facilities  in 
internal  trade  between  the  two  groups  of  countries, 
together  with  a  raising  of  the  duties  upon  imports  from 
all  other  countries,  according  to  the  standard  of  the 
Austrian  system,  that  is  to  say,  in  direct  contrast  to  the 
prineipk's  of  the  Hanoverian  treaty. 

For  the  more  than  probable  event  of  Prussia's 
remaining  obstinate,  a  third  plan  (Document  C)  was 
secretly  laid  before  the  old  friends,  Bavaria,  Wiirtem- 
berg.  Saxony,  both  Ilesses,  and  Nassau,  by  wliieh  these 
states  were  to  bind  themselves  "to  a  tariff-league  with 
Austria,  without  Prussia  ;  that  is,  to  witlidraw  fi'oin 
the  present    T;iriff-Union.     Wlien    tlio    dclcfrates    met, 


190  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

they  praised  the  purpose  and  aim  of  documents  A  and 
B,  but  differed  widely  in  their  views  upon  the  details 
of  the  schemes.  And  the  six  confidential  friends  came 
to  no  decision  about  Document  C,  further  than  that 
they  would  give  it  their  serious  consideration.  To  this 
end  they  met  together  alone  at  the  beginning  of  April 
in  Darmstadt,  and  agreed  to  hold  together  as  a  unit  in 
the  pending  negotiations,  and  to  recognize  all  the 
former  Tariff-Union  treaties  as  consequently  binding 
among  themselves,  but  under  no  circumstances  to  enter 
into  a  compact  with  Prussia  concerning  a  continuance 
of  the  Tariff-Union  before  January  1st,  1853,  unless  an 
understanding  should  be  already  reached  between 
Austria  and  all  the  Tariff-Union  states. 

To  this  Prussia  replied  in  the  Berlin  Conference, 
that  a  tariff-league  with  Austria  was  a  matter  of  time, 
which  could  be  effected  only  very  gradually ;  and  that 
Prussia  was  ready  to  discuss  a  commercial  alliance 
between  the  Tariff-Union  and  Austria  so  soon  as  the 
continuance  of  the  latter  was  assured  beyond  the  first 
of  January,  1854.  During  the  whole  summer  the 
deliberations  continued.  An  endless  amount  of  talk- 
ing and  negotiating  was  done  on  all  sides.  Gradually 
an  agreement  took  shape  between  Prussia  and  the 
Darmstadt  allies  about  the  essential  contents  of  the 
new  Tariff-Union  treaty  as  well  as  of  the  commercial 
treaty  with  Austria. 

But  the  technical  difficulty  was  not  yet  surmounted. 
Prussia  persisted  in  her  logical  demand :  first  the 
renewal  of  the  Tariff-Union,  and  then  a  treaty  between 


AUSTRIA'S  PROPOSALS.  191 

this  body  and  a  third  party  —  while  the  Southern 
States  remained  just  as  determined  in  their  chaim  that 
both  points  should  be  settled  at  the  same  time.  This 
resolved  itself  into  the  practical  question :  Shall  the 
treaty  with  Austria  depend  upon  the  needs  of  the  Tariff- 
Union,  or  shall  the  character  of  the  Tariff-Union  conform 
to  the  will  of  Austria  ?  At  last,  at  a  final  conference 
with  the  Darmstadt  faction  in  September,  Prussia  felt 
that  she  had  had  enough  of  arguing  in  a  circle.  She  de- 
clared the  conference  closed  and  negotiations  at  an  end. 

It  was  now  expected  in  Vienna  that  the  Southern 
States  would  carry  out  Document  C,  and  form  a  tariff- 
union  with  Austria,  thus  freeing  South  Germany 
finally  from  Prussian  influence.  According  to  Herr 
von  Beust,  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  would  not  have 
objected  to  doing  so ;  but  that  Darmstadt  agreement 
to  preserve  at  all  events  the  tariff  league  among  them- 
selves stood  in  the  way ;  for  Saxony,  in  view  of  her 
highly-developed  industries,  positively  refused  a  tariff 
alliance  with  Austria.  Public  opinion,  moreover,  in 
the  other  states  of  the  Coalition,  expressed  itself  in 
favor  of  maintaining  the  old  Tariff-Union,  in  spite  of 
all  protective  interests. 

It  may  be  remarked  in  passing,  that  Herr  von  Bis- 
marck contributed  not  a  little  to  this,  by  making  his 
influence  felt  from  his  post  at  Frankfort  through  the 
Press,  by  founding  societies,  by  sending  out  workers, 
etc.,  althougli  it  is  true  tliat  the  cliief  cause  of  this 
public  feeling  lay  in  the  nature  of  tilings.  The 
Governments  of  the  Coalition  were  helpless. 


192  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

Then  a  variety  of  causes  produced  an  unexpected 
cliange,  not  only  in  Vienna,  but  in  Berlin  as  well. 

In  Vienna,  the  talented  statesman,  whose  boldness 
and  energy  had  led  Austria  from  success  to  success, 
Prince  Felix  Schwarzenberg,  had  breathed  his  last. 
His  health,  long  since  undermined  by  indulgences  of 
every  kind,  was  completely  broken  down  by  his  exer- 
tions in  political  life.  Yet  in  spite  of  many  serious 
attacks  of  illness,  his  love  of  life  was  not  extinguished. 
On  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  April,  1852,  as  he  re- 
ceived an  invitation  to  a  ball,  at  which  he  expected  to 
meet  a  certain  belle  whom  he  adored,  he  cried :  "  Most 
certainly  I  shall  come,  unless  I  am  dead."  In  the 
course  of  the  day  he  held  several  meetings  and  con- 
ferences, and  sent  in  the  mean  time  a  choice  bouquet 
to  the  lady  mentioned.  As  he  was  preparing  his  even- 
ing toilet  for  dinner,  he  suddenly  fell  in  an  apoplectic 
fit,  and  did  not  again  recover  consciousness. 

We  will  not  attempt  to  determine  how  far  his  power 
might  have  succeeded  in  carrying  out  his  all-embracing 
plans  of  dominion ;  certain  it  is  that  his  pupil  and 
successor.  Count  Buol-Schauenstein,  although  most 
zealous  and  ambitious,  by  no  means  possessed  the 
ability  necessary  for  fully  realizing  and  completing  the 
political  schemes  of  the  deceased  Prince.  It  is  very 
true  that  an  imperious,  despotic  nature  may  produce  a 
great  impression  and  effect  much ;  but  nothing  is  more 
dangerous  than  for  an  unskilful  imitator  of  such  a  charac- 
ter to  try  to  continue  the  work  of  his  predecessor. 

In  the  matter  of  a  tariff-union,  Count  Buol  began  by 


COUNT  BUOL.  193 

being  excessively  domineering.  When,  in  June,  Herr 
von  Bismarck,  having  been  sent  by  the  King  to 
Vienna  on  a  special  mission,  waited  upon  the  Count, 
the  latter  declared  to  the  Prussian  envoy,  that  Austria 
would  not  allow  herself  to  be  treated  by  Germany  as  a 
foreign  country,  and  that  this  would  be  implied,  if  she 
were  offered  a  mere  commercial  alliance  without  the 
prospect  of  a  closer  tariff-union.  He  remarked  that  the 
consideration  of  such  matters  belonged,  moreover,  to 
the  Confederate  Diet,  adding  in  a  manner  not  over- 
polite  that  he  was  sorry  that  just  at  this  moment,  when 
he  had  sent  Count  Thun  very  important  instructions, 
Herr  von  Bismarck  was  not  to  be  found  at  his  post. 
In  this  same  strain  the  tone  of  his  diplomacy  made 
itself  heard  and  felt  at  all  the  German  Courts. 

In  the  autumn,  however,  he  found  many  reasons  for 
lowering  somewhat  the  pitch  of  his  anti-Prussian  zeal. 
In  France,  Louis  Napoleon  was  taking  one  step  after 
another  toward  the  imperial  throne ;  and  it  was  no 
longer  a  secret  that  he  considered  the  popular  vote  not 
the  source,  but  merely  the  acknowledgment,  of  his 
inherited  right  to  the  crown,  and  that  he  would  thus 
openly  withstand  the  treaties  of  1815,  which  excluded 
forever  the  House  of  Bonaparte  from  the  French 
throne.  From  this  quarter,  then,  there  appeared  to 
be  tlie  possibility  that  a  serious  European  danger 
might  arise,  and  therefore  it  would  be  desirable  to  be 
sincerely  on  good  terms  with  Prussia.  The  Emperor 
Nicholas  pressed  this  point  most  urgently  ;  and  when 
then,  to  Count  lUiol's   bitter   mortification    and  disap- 


194  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

pointment,  Document  C  seemed  likely  to  remain  a  dead 
letter  with  the  South  German  States,  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  offered  to  his  royal  uncle  the  hand  of 
reconciliation. 

His  good  words  fell  upon  good  ground.  For,  just  as 
in  Vienna  operations  in  connection  with  the  Darmstadt 
Coalition  had  proved  fruitless,  so,  too,  the  basis  of 
Prussia's  new  position,  her  friendship  with  Hanover, 
had  given  way.  The  young  King  desired  most 
ardently,  if  he  could  not  indeed  overthrow  the  whole 
legislation  of  18-18,  at  least  to  nullify  the  changes  made 
by  it  in  the  Constitution  of  1840,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  prevent  the  carrying  out  of  the  new  organization  of 
offices.  In  this  he  was  the  natural  ally  of  the  nobility, 
whom  he  also  favored  in  other  respects,  and  whose 
chiefs  easily  persuaded  him  that  the  September  treaty 
would  bring  about  the  complete  industrial  ruin  of 
Hanover  and  her  dependence  upon  Prussia,  from  which 
nothing  could  save  her  but  a  close  connection  with 
Austria.  The  Austrian  ambassador  consequently 
found  during  the  summer  a  ready  ear  in  advocating 
the  "  Darmstadt  theory,"  that  before,  or  at  least  simul- 
taneously with,  the  renewal  of  the  Tariff-Union, 
negotiations  with  Austria  must  be  brought  to  a 
successful   issue. 

A  special  circumstance  contributed  to  making  the 
feeling  in  Hanover  more  intense.  It  was  discovered 
that  Prussia  was  about  to  enter  into  a  compact  with 
Oldenburg,  by  which  the  latter  should  give  up  the  bay 
of   Jahde    for   the   establishment   of  a  Prussian  naval 


AFFAIRS  IN  HANOVER.  195 

station  on  the  North  Sea.  This  touched  the  Kino-  of 
Hanover  in  a  very  sensitive  spot.  It  was  one  of 
Hanover's  ancient  ambitions  to  gain  the  leadership  of 
the  fleets  bearing  the  German  flag  upon  the  North  Sea, 
and  now  Prussia  was  trying  to  get  a  foothold  in  this 
old  hereditary  domain  of  the  House  of  the  Guelphs. 
"  That  would  be,"  cried  the  Minister,  Bacmeister, 
"  with  Maofdebur":  and  Minden  the  third  of  the  strono- 
positions  with  which  Prussia  is  seeking  to  surround 
us." 

The  ill-will  against  the  September  treaty  soon  found 
a  way  of  manifesting  itself  practically.  In  this  treaty 
Hanover  had  promised  to  publish  before  March  1st, 
1853,  a  preliminary  tariff-system  preparatory  to  enter- 
ing the  Tariff-Union.  This  had  been  already  drawn 
up,  but,  in  spite  of  repeated  reminders  from  Berlin, 
King  George  had  not  published  it ;  so  that  in  the 
autumn  of  1853,  anxiety  began  to  be  felt  in  Berlin  lest 
it  sliould  not  appear  at  all,  and  the  whole  affair  in  this 
way  should  be  exploded.  This  was  the  last  straw 
which  induced  Prussia  to  meet  Austria's  advances  in  a 
friendly  manner. 

Accordingly,  the  Austrian  jNIinister  himself.  Baron 
von  Bruck,  went  to  Berlin  to  negotiate,  at  first,  about 
the  commercial  treaty.  Prussia  took  no  exceptions  at 
all  to  the  principles  laid  down  by  Austria  in  Document 
A,  by  which  in  the  internal  reciprocal  trade  between 
Austria  and  llic  'I'arifT-Uniou  tliere  was  to  be  imposed 
ii[)on  a  lf)iig  list  of  articles  a  lower  import-duty  than 
(.'ither  of  the  parties  intended  to  levy   upon  tlie  intnv 


196  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

duction  of  tlie  same  articles  from  other  foreign  coun- 
tries. If  at  any  time  either  of  the  parties  intended  to 
lower  this  tax  upon  the  importations  from  foreio-n 
countries,  this  was  to  be  announced  to  the  other  party 
three  months  before  its  accomplishment,  so  that  the 
latter  could  make  those  changes  considered  necessary 
in  the  internal  traffic ;  neither  party  should  favor  any 
foreign  country  with  a  change  in  the  tariff  that  would 
at  once  prove  disadvantageous  to  the  other  party. 

Thereupon  Bruck  brought  forward  for  discussion  the 
second  great  question,  the  possibility  of  a  reciprocal 
tariff-system.  Prussia  was  still  convinced  of  the 
economical  and  also  the  political  impossibility  of  such  a 
system,  but  allowed  herself  to  be  moved  by  the  force 
of  circumstance  to  yielding  in  some  degree :  six  years 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  present  treaty,  i.e.,  in  1859, 
negotiations  were  to  be  opened  on  the  subject  of  a 
closer  tariff-union,  which  it  was  to  be  hoped  might  then 
be  effected.  Hereupon,  on  the  19th  of  February  the 
commercial  treaty  was  signed. 

This  seemed  to  remove  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
a  renewal  of  the  Tariff-Union.  But  those  who  enter- 
tained this  hope  found  it  thwarted  now,  not  by  the 
South  Germans,  but  by  Hanover,  who,  it  is  true,  pub- 
lished the  required  preliminary  tariff-system  at  the 
same  time  that  the  Austrian  commercial  treaty  was 
made  public,  but  then,  in  addition  to  the  great  favors 
accorded  to  her  by  the  September  treaty,  demanded  a 
long  list  of  further  advantages,  thus  delaying  the 
negotiations  for  weeks,  much  to  the  annoj^ance  of  all 


COMMERCIAL   TREATY   WITH  AUSTRIA.      197 

the  other  states.  It  took  a  severe  reprimand  from  both 
of  the  Great  Powers  to  force  Hanover,  with  many  a 
murmur,  to  give  up  her  exorbitant  demands.  At  last, 
on  the  8th  of  April,  the  Tariff-Union  and  the  Austrian 
commercial  treaty  were  both  concluded  for  a  term  of 
twelve  years. 

Thus  the  crisis  was  terminated.  Prussia  had  for  the 
time  asserted  her  position,  but  had  been  obliged  to 
make  formal  as  well  as  material  concessions.  Above 
all,  she  had  not  been  successful  in  emphasizing  the 
principle  that  Austria  could  not  share  in  the  Tariff- 
Union  on  account  of  her  position  in  the  German  Con- 
federation ;  it  was  to  be  expected  that  six  years  later 
new  discussions  would  arise  from  the  same  source. 
Meanwhile,  a  truce  had  been  concluded,  and  very  soon 
a  new  turn  in  European  politics  proved  that  this  was 
most  beneficial. 

Just  here  it  may  be  in  place  to  give  a  short  account 
of  how  the  matter  of  the  Hanover  Constitution  was 
settled. 

King  George  was,  to  even  a  greater  degree  than  his 
father,  imbued  with  the  majesty  and  dignity  of  the 
royal  oflice.  In  the  case  of  Ernest  Augustus,  it  was 
the  possession  by  the  Crown  of  the  highest  military 
authority,  that  had  been  tlie  basis  of  his  political  abso- 
lutism. The  soul  of  the  son,  however,  who  was  a 
zealous  High-Churchman,  was  filled  with  a  belief  in 
the  mystical  sacredness  of  the  ro^-al  ofiice,  in  an  eternal 
decree  of  God,  according  to  which  the  House  of  the 
Ciuel[)hs  was  called  to  rule  over  its  possessions  until  the 


198  DUALISM  IN  THE   CONFEDERATION. 

end  of  time ;  tliis  sovereignty,  from  its  very  nature, 
could  be  neither  divided,  subordinated,  nor  limited. 

The  immediate  consequence  of  these  sentiments  was 
the  King's  disinclination  to  join  the  Tariff-Union  and 
his  desire  to  annul  so  far  as  possible  the  laws  of  1848. 
The  Minister,  Von  Scheie,  sympathized  greatly  with 
this  latter  wish,  and  did  his  best  to  bring  about  its 
realization  by  constitutional  means ;  he  could  not, 
however,  secure  the  necessarj^  consent  of  the  Chambers, 
and  resigned  on  the  9th  of  November,  1853. 

If  the  King's  ambition  was  to  be  satisfied,  there  were 
only  two  ways  in  which  it  might  be  done.  But  there 
stood  in  the  way  of  the  first,  the  proclamation  of  a 
new  Constitution  on  the  basis  of  royal  supremacy, 
the  solemn  oath  of  the  King  taken  at  his  coronation. 
The  second  method  would  have  been  to  call  upon  the 
reactionary  committee  of  the  Confederate  Diet  to  com- 
mand a  change  in  the  Hanoverian  Constitution.  But 
here,  too,  the  King  met  with  difficulties.  Indeed,  he 
allowed  himself,  like  the  Elector  of  Hesse,  to  be  per- 
suaded that  one  is  not  guilty  of  violating  one's  oath,  if 
one  can  induce  a  superior  authority  to  command  this 
violation.  But  it  was  repugnant  to  his  instinct  of 
sovereignty  to  recognize  in  the  Confederate  Diet  such 
a  superior  authority ;  and  so  a  year  and  a  half  was 
frittered  away  in  continual  wavering. 

Meanwhile,  the  reactionary  committee,  in  which 
Hanover  still  took  part,  drew  up  an  overwhelming  list 
of  points  in  the  Constitution  of  1848  that  were  said  to 
be    contrary    to    the    principles    of   the    Confederation. 


COUP  D'ETAT  IN  HANOVER.  199 

After  the  Confederate  Diet  had  recognized  in  its  decree 
of  April  12tli,  1855,  the  justice  of  the  complaints  of  the 
nobility,  and  had  commanded  the  purification  of  the 
Constitution  from  those  faults  mentioned,  the  King 
finally  made  up  his  mind  and  commissioned  his  Minis- 
try, that  of  Count  Kielmannsegge  and  Von  Borries, 
appointed  especially  for  this  purpose,  to  execute  the 
decree  of  the  Confederation. 

By  this  means  a  large  number  of  the  existing  rights 
of  the  Assembly  of  Estates  were  cut  off,  and  the 
nobility  reinstated  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  ancient 
prerogatives.  Every  attempt  at  resistance  throughout 
the  kingdom  was  effectually  suppressed  by  new  Con- 
federate laws  concerning  the  Press  and  societies,  and 
by  the  proclamation  in  1856  of  further  and  more  rigor- 
ous police  regulations.  The  nobility  were  ever  after- 
wards enthusiastic  for  the  King  who  was  so  kindly 
disposed  to  them  ;  but  apart  from  this  class,  respect  for 
the  Confederate  Diet  was  as  thoroughly  shaken 
throughout  the  country  as  was  the  feeling  of  devotion 
to  the  House  of  the  Guelphs. 


200      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE   NEW   AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN   ALLIANCE. 

The  settlement  of  German  affairs  suffered  in  1854 
long  delay  and  serious  detriment  by  reason  of  a  great 
European  crisis,  the  war  of  Russia  against  Turkey  and 
the  Western  Powers.  We  are  interested  here  only  in 
its  reflex  influence  upon  German  relations  ;  about  the 
course  of  events  in  general,  such  brief  observations  will 
suffice  us  as  are  necessary  for  an  understanding  of 
German  politics  during  those  years. 

The  Emperor  Nicholas  stood  at  this  time  at  the 
height  of  success,  of  eminence,  and  of  power.  In 
keeping  with  his  dignity  as  ruler  of  Russia  and  an 
autocrat  in  matters  of  church  and  state,  he  had  always, 
as  we  have  seen,  spurned  the  principles  of  modern 
liberalism,  and  had  opposed  with  the  greatest  energy, 
so  far  as  in  him  lay,  the  Revolution  of  1848.  This 
policy  had  everywhere  reaped  for  him  rich  rewards. 
By  his  suppression  of  the  Hungarian  rebellion  he  felt 
that  he  had  gained  the  unreserved  devotion  of  Austria. 
He  had  at  first  treated  the  Prussian  King  roughly,  but 
had  afterwards,  to  the  great  satisfaction  of  the  King, 
saved  him  from  the  snares  of  the  union  policy.  He  had 
assisted  in  keeping  up  the  dismemberment  of  Germany, 


GROWTH  OF  RUSSIAN  INFLUENCE.  201 

SO  desirable  for  the  Lesser  States  and  for  Russia  herself. 
His  threats  had  forced  the  German  Powers  to  give  up 
Schleswig-Holstein  to  Denmark ;  and  the  Czar  had 
profited  by  the  opportunity  of  confirming  his  ancient 
personal  friendship  with  several  of  the  leading  English 
statesmen.  The  only  Great  Power  in  Europe  that  was 
not  eager  to  profess  its  readiness  to  serve  him,  and  that 
was  then  the  hated  source  of  all  revolutions,  seemed  to 
him  weakened  by  anarchy  and  party  hatred.  He  had 
no  scruples  about  expressing  openly  his  contempt  for 
everything  that  was  French  by  directly  insulting  the 
new  chief  of  the  Republic. 

Thus  he  had  become  in  the  eyes  of  all  the  world  the 
repository  of  legitimate  government  and  of  conservative 
principles.  He  was  hated  and  still  more  feared  by  the 
Liberals  of  Europe,  but  profoundly  reverenced  among 
the  influential  circles  of  the  feudal  and  High-Church 
parties.  It  is  no  wonder,  that  in  such  a  position  he  was 
filled  with  an  unparalleled  self-satisfaction,  a  state  of 
mind  fostered  by  the  feeling  of  his  tremendous  strength 
as  well  as  by  his  firm  belief  in  the  sacredness  of  his 
acts,  and  which  was  indeed  almost  forced  upon  him  by 
the  devoted  admiration  of  those  portions  of  the  great 
European  world  which  he  considered  alone  worthy  of 
regard. 

In  the  year  1852  he  saw  the  European  Occident 
tolerably  well  arranged  according  to  his  instructions, 
and  liis  eyes  turned  longingly  again  to  that  goal  of 
ancient  Muscovite  ambition,  the  Ottoman  Orient. 

Here,  too,  he  believed  that  he  should  find  a  field  for 


202      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

the  exercise  of  his  vocation  of  ruler.  However  humbly 
and  unhesitatingly  the  Porte  had  been  willing  to  obey 
his  nod,  the  poison  of  revolutionary  ideas  had  also 
reached  Constantinople.  The  Porte  had  offered  a 
hospitable  reception  to  Polish  and  Hungarian  refu- 
gees, and  had  even  taken  a  number  of  them  into  its 
service. 

When  France  demanded  for  the  Roman  Catholics  in 
Jerusalem  a  greater  share  in  the  possession  and  the  use 
of  the  so-called  Holy  Places  at  the  expense  of  the 
Greeks  living  there,  the  Divan  after  some  resistance 
graciously  granted  the  request.  To  be  sure,  Russia 
made  such  violent  objections,  that  these  concessions 
were  immediately  reduced  again  to  ridiculous  insignifi- 
cance :  namely,  to  the  possession  of  the  key  to  a  church 
door  which  was  never  locked ;  but  even  then,  Nicholas, 
supported  by  England,  asserted  that  that  attempt  to 
wound  the  feelings  of  the  Greek  Church  involved  a 
very  serious  personal  insult  to  himself,  especially  since 
the  Greek  congregations  in  several  provinces  had  suf- 
fered severe  injuries  and  losses  by  the  arbitrariness  of 
the  Turkish  officials,  and  that  Russia  in  virtue  of  old 
treaties  had  the  formal  right  to  protect  her  associates 
in  religious  faith.  The  more  prudence  shown  by 
France,  in  now  giving  up  her  demands,  in  spite  of 
the  evident  utter  lack  of  foundation  for  the  Russian 
claims,  and  the  more  overwhelming  Russia's  power  in 
Europe  had  in  1852  grown  to  be,  the  more  plausible  to 
the  proud  despot  seemed  the  idea  that  an  auspicious 
time    had   come    for   solving   the    old   and    perplexing 


RUSSIA'S  PLANS  IN  THE  EAST.  203 

Eastern  Question  exclusively  in  accordance  with  Rus- 
sia's wishes. 

Or,  in  other  words,  he  gave  himself  up,  as  in  1829, 
to  the  thought  that  Turkish  rule  was  perishing  from 
internal  demoralization ;  that  the  Christian  subjects,  of 
whom  from  ten  to  twelve  millions  in  Europe  were  of 
the  same  faith  as  Russia,  were  about  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  the  Crescent ;  and  that  it  would  be  dishonorable 
and  wicked  to  deter  them,  and  not  rather  to  encourage 
and  support  them.  The  inheritance  of  the  Sick  Man 
would  then  come  in  question;  and  it  would  be  very 
desirable  at  the  settlement  of  the  same  to  prevent  so 
far  as  possible  any  one  whose  presence  as  a  neighbor 
would  be    undesirable  from  sharing  in  it. 

In  this  strain  he  conversed  in  February,  1853,  with 
the  English  ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg,  Sir  Hamil- 
ton Seymour,  and  explained  that  he  should  claim  for 
himself  only  a  protectorate  over  Moldavia,  Wallachia, 
and  Servia,  and  should  leave  to  England  Candia  and 
Egypt.  lie  hoped  that  this  offer  would  prove  irresist- 
ible to  England.  "  We  are  both  agreed,"  he  said,  "  and 
therefore  we  need  2iot  trouble  ourselves  about  any  one 
else.  And  wlien  I  say  Russia,  I  mean  also  Austria,  for 
our  interests  are  identical  in  the  East."  lie  did  not 
even  mention  Prussia  at  all.  Concerning  France,  he 
exi)resscd  himself  to  Sir  Hamilton  with  contemptuous 
animosity ;  which,  however,  did  not  prevent  him,  upon 
the  rcceii)t  from  London  of  a  cool  rejection  of  his  i)lans, 
from  ti'ving  the  effect  of  the  same  offer  upon  the  French 
Ani1)assador,  jNI.  de  Castelbajac. 


20-4      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

He  felt  so  sure  of  himself  that  he  made  ready  his 
fleet  on  the  Euxine  to  set  sail  from  Sebastopol,  collected 
a  large  army  in  Bessarabia,  and  sent  the  admiral  Prince 
Mentschikoff  with  a  decisive  ultimatum  to  Constanti- 
nople. This  ultimatum  turned  upon  the  acceptance  of 
a  treaty  in  which  both  Powers  were  to  promise  to  sus- 
tain all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  followers  of  the 
Russian-Greek  faith  in  the  Turkish  empire ;  so  that  in 
the  future  at  every  actual  or  nominal  injustice  the  Czar 
should  have  the  right  to  interfere.  It  is  clear  that  this 
meant  nothincj  more  nor  less  than  the  downfall  of  Tur- 
kish  independence  and  the  death  of  the  Sick  Man.  To 
the  Divan  was  left,  then,  only  the  choice  of  voluntary 
submission  or  annihilation  by  the  Russian  sword. 

But  in  this  case,  too,  pride  went  before  a  fall.  To 
the  Czar,  so  certain  of  victory,  was  decreed  a  long  list 
of  bitter  disajDpointments  from  all  sides. 

The  Divan  made  up  its  mind  that  an  end  in  the  midst 
of  horrors  was  more  glorious  than  horrors  without  an 
end.  The  Russian  ultimatum  was  rejected.  Nicholas 
replied  by  ordering  his  troops  to  occupy  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia,  not,  as  he  said,  for  any  purpose  of  war,  but 
to  hold  in  his  possession  some  material  pledge  that  his 
just  requests  would  be  complied  with. 

This  was  his  second  and  more  serious  mistake.  He, 
who  had  hitherto  controlled  Europe  according  to  his 
wish,  now  aroused  the  ill-will  of  Europe  by  his  own 
conduct. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  complications.  Napoleon, 
who  had  just  been  raised  to  the  imperial  throne    and 


OPPOSITION  OF  THE  OTHER  POWERS.        205 

was  at  this  time  surrounded  by  wise  counsellors,  saw  in 
Russian  vainglory  the  possibility  of  great  successes  for 
himself.  By  well-calculated  compliance  in  the  question 
concerning  the  Holy  Places  he  had  encouraged  the 
selfish  conduct  of  his  opponent;  but  when  Mentschi- 
koffs  action  had  rendered  a  rupture  unavoidable, 
Napoleon  sent  at  once  a  French  fleet  into  Grecian 
waters. 

The  English  Ministers  were  at  first  lulled  to  sleep  by 
the  pleasant  words  of  their  mighty  Russian  patron  ;  but 
at  the  occupation  of  the  principalities,  public  opinion  in 
London  asserted  itself  so  forcibly  against  the  Czar,  that 
the  Cabinet  followed  the  French  example  of  sending 
out  a  fleet  for  the  protection  of  Turkey. 

Not  less  important  was  the  effect  of  the  Russian 
doings  upon  the  Court  of  Vienna.  It  is  true  that  the 
personal  esteem  and  gratitude  which  the  young  Emperor 
felt  for  his  powerful  neighbor  remained  unchanged, 
but  only  too  plainly  did  the  Czar's  latest  measures 
endanofcr  the  most  vital  interests  of  the  Austrian 
empire.  Russian  territory  already  bounded  Austria  on 
the  north  and  east :  it  would  not  be  desirable  to  be 
henceforth  hemmed  in  by  the  same  giant  power  on  the 
south.  Special  considerations  gave  weight  to  this  feel- 
ing ;  for  the  freedom  of  the  navigation  upon  the 
Danube  would  by  the  Russian  possession  of  Wallachia 
become  quite  dependent  upon  the  will  of  the  Czar. 

It  was  then  learned,  too,  tliat  Russian  agents  were 
exciting  the  Christian  subjects  of  Turkey  to  a  rebellion 
against  the  Porte.     Now,  although  the  greater  part  of 


206      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

the  Turkish  Christians  held  to  a  common  faith  with 
Russia,  yet  they  were  of  a  common  race  with  the 
Slavs  in  the  south  of  Austria,  and  no  one  could  say 
how  easily  a  national  agitation  among  the  former  might 
spread  across  the  frontiers  of  the  empire.  To  be  sure, 
in  the  further  course  of  events,  Nicholas  gave  to  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  a  solemn  promise  in  his  own 
name  and  that  of  his  heirs,  that  no  such  encroachment 
should  take  place.  Count  Buol,  however,  without 
making  any  reflection  upon  the  sincerity  of  this  promise, 
had  doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  keeping  the  same, 
and  consequently  was  quite  ready  in  common  Avith  the 
other  two  Powers  to  attempt  to  settle  the  difficulty  by 
diplomatic  mediation. 

So  far  as  Prussia  was  concerned,  the  King  and  his 
Ministers  were  well  pleased,  that,  owing  to  Prussia's 
geographical  position,  they  had  no  immediate  interest  in 
the  outcome  of  the  complications,  yet  they  recognized, 
as  did  all  the  world,  the  inexcusableness  of  the  Russian 
offensive  acts,  and  felt  no  scruples  about  joining  in  the 
diplomatic  efforts  of  the  other  Courts.  So  a  conference 
of  the  four  Powers  was  held  in  Vienna  with  a  view  to 
bringing  about  upon  fair  terms  a  settlement  agreeable 
to  all  parties. 

The  first  attempt  failed :  Russia  at  first  accepted  the 
proposition  of  the  Powers,  but  after  a  closer  examination 
of  its  contents  rejected  it.  Thereupon  the  Porte 
declared  war  upon  the  northern  aggressor,  and  sent  a 
force  to  liberate  Wallachia :  bloody  encounters  on  the 
Danube  followed  with  varying  result,  and  immediately 


RUSSIA'S  ISOLATION.  207 

the  fleets  of  the  Western  Powers  appeared  in  the 
Bosphorus,  to  defend  Turkey  against  any  attack  from 
the  sea.  But  when  in  spite  of  this  Admiral  Naehimofl: 
annihihxted  a  Turkish  squadron  off  Sinope,  the  West- 
ern Powers  ordered  their  fleets  to  sail  into  the  Black 
Sea  itself,  with  the  declaration  that  they  would  not 
suffer  any  further  attack  upon  the  Turkish  coasts. 
Thereupon  Russia  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with 
France  and  England. 

In  Vienna  the  four  Powers  in  conference  acjreed 
upon  the  chief  points  that  would  be  necessary  for  the 
establishment  of  a  lasting  peace.  These  were:  in- 
violability of  Turkish  territory,  and  consequently,  as 
the  first  condition  of  peace,  the  evacuation  of  the 
principalities  by  the  Russians ;  modification  of  the 
treaties  of  1841  and  the  recognition  of  Turkey  as  a 
European  Power;  and  the  voluntary  promise  of  the 
Sultan  to  assure  protection  to  Christian  churches  of  all 
sects. 

The  Divan  consented  to  all  this  ;  but  Russia  insisted 
upon  her  original  demands,  and  would  not  hear  at  all 
to  any  officious  mediation  b}^  the  four  Powers,  for  she 
said  that  her  quarrel  with  Turkey  was  entirely  an 
internal  family  affair. 

Thus  within  the  space  of  a  year's  time,  the  political 
situation  in  Europe  liad  undergone  a  fundamental 
change.  At  the  l)eginning  of  1853,  Russia,  standing  at 
tlie  head  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  in  confidential 
friendship  with  England,  had  witliout  question  held 
the  position  of  leader  in  the  politics  of  the  continent, 


208      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

while  France,  regarded  with  mistrust  by  all  the  Courts, 
stood  entirely  alone.  A  year  later,  Russia  found  her- 
self facing  the  united  and  unanimous  opposition  of  all 
the  other  Great  Powers,  saw  her  conduct  uniformly 
condemned  by  them  all,  and  herself  threatened  by  two 
of  them  with  armed  chastisement. 

By  no  means  the  least  cause  for  annoyance  at  St. 
Petersburg  was  the  fact  that  at  the  head  of  this  league 
of  Governments  stood  just  that  most  hated  and  most 
despised  scion  of  the  Bonapartes  whose  energetic 
persistence  had,  step  by  step,  set  the  English  fleet  in 
motion,  and  whose  prudent  diplomacy  had  won  for 
him  the  leading:  voice  in  the  Vienna  conference.  Ensf- 
land  had  already  seconded  his  assertion  that  the 
butchery  at  Sinope  had  affected  the  honor  of  the  mari- 
time Powers  themselves,  so  that,  if  Russia  continued 
her  defiance,  it  would  mean  war  against  them  as  well  as 
against  Turkey.  If,  now,  the  two  German  Powers 
should  be  brought  to  a  similar  decision,  to  execute  by 
force  of  arms  their  verdict  expressed  in  the  resolutions 
of  the  Vienna  conference,  then  the  Holy  Alliance  lay 
indeed  in  ruins,  and  there  could  be  no  bounds  set  to 
Napoleon's  restless  and  visionary  ambitions. 

A  note  of  inquiry  was  sent  by  the  Western  Powers, 
at  the  end  of  February,  1854,  to  the  Courts  of  Vienna 
and  Berlin,  stating  that  they  intended  to  demand  from 
Russia  the  evacuation  of  the  principalities  by  the  30th 
of  April  at  the  latest,  and  to  consider  failure  to  respond 
to  this  as  a  declaration  of  war ;  they  wished  to  know, 
then,  what  attitude  in  the  matter  was  to  be  expected 


AUSTRIA   AND   THE   WESTERN  POWERS.     209 

in  that  case  on  the  part  of  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  of 
Berlin.  Immediately  afterwards  the  representatives  of 
the  maritime  Powers  laid  before  the  two  Courts  the  out- 
line of  a  convention  in  which  the  four  Governments 
bound  themselves  to  use,  for  the  carrying  out  of  the 
principles  laid  down  in  the  resolutions  of  the  conference, 
such  means  as  their  representatives  in  that  body  should 
decide  upon  and  advise. 

The  critical  moment  had  come.  But  here  the  paths 
separated. 

In  Vienna,  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  had  with 
great  distress  and  deep  sorrow  Avatched  the  gulf  daily 
growing  wider,  which  had  opened  itself  between  his 
own  and  Russian  interests.  But  so  it  was,  and  there 
was  no  help  for  it.  The  Russians,  after  crossing  the 
Danube,  began  to  press  on  into  Bulgaria.  Their  agents 
there  worked  with  redoubled  energy  in  trying  to  raise 
a  revolt  among  the  Christians.  In  Epirus  and  Thessaly 
there  was  already  an  armed  band  of  insurgents  set  on 
by  the  agents  at  Athens.  Austria  could  never  allow 
these  things  to  go  further.  Count  Buol  placed  an  army 
of  25,000  men  in  the  Banat,  induced  the  maritime 
Powers  to  adopt  vigorous  measures  at  the  Court  of 
Athens,  and  expressed  to  Russia  his  surprise  tliat  tlie 
high  and  mighty  protector  of  legitimate  rule  should 
now  himself  wish  to  unchain  Revolution. 

This  surprise,  however,  was  uncalled  for;  for  the 
Czar  was  not  only  Imperator  but  also  Pontifex  Maximus 
of  Russia,  and  consequently  an  insurrection  of  orthodox 
subjects  against  an  unbelieving  Government  seemed  to 


210      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

him,  as  formerly  to  the  prophet  Mohammed  and  to  the 
Roman  popes,  a  perfectly  legitimate  enterprise.  How- 
ever this  might  be,  Count  Buol  believed  it  best  to  stifle 
these  dangers  in  their  infancy,  and,  if  worst  came  to 
worst,  not  to  risk  an  open  rupture  with  Russia. 

His  courage  in  carrying  out  such  a  policy  was  the 
more  increased,  sinae  he  saw  the  Western  Powers  pre- 
paring for  an  armed  intervention,  so  that  Austria  would 
be  strongly  supported  in  any  steps  which  she  might 
take.  If  everything  went  well,  Austria  might  end  by 
acquiring  the  Danube  principalities,  or  at  least  holding 
the  protectorate  over  them  in  the  place  of  Russia.  He 
did  not,  however,  shut  his  eyes  to  the  unfavorable 
condition  of  Austria  internally,  both  financially  and 
politically ;  and  therefore  he  ardently  desired  to  have, 
in  case  of  war,  not  only  the  friendship  of  the  distant 
Western  Powers,  but  especially  the  assistance  of 
Austria's  nearest  neighbors,  Prussia  and  Germany. 
For  this  reason,  he  had  already  made  in  Berlin,  on  the 
8th  of  January,  the  proposition  of  a  treaty  of  alliance, 
which  began  with  the  declaration  of  common  neutrality 
and  ended  with  the  reservation  that  either  party  might 
act  freely  in  protecting  its  own  interests.  Prussia  had 
replied  at  that  time,  that  inasmuch  as  everybody  was 
united  everywhere,  and  threatened  by  no  one,  there  was 
really  no  need  of  any  formal  document. 

Meanwhile  the  irritation  felt  in  Vienna  at  the  pre- 
sumption of  the  Muscovites  increased,  the  further 
Russia  pushed  her  operations  on  the  Danube.  Large 
troops  of  soldiers  were  collected  in  Hungary,  and,  on 


DIFFERENCE   OF  OPINIONS  IN  PRUSSIA.     211 

the  25tli  of  February,  Austria  urged  upon  the  Western 
Powers  the  necessity  of  sending  a  peremptory  request 
to  St.  Petersburg  to  accede  to  their  demand  that  the 
principalities  be  evacuated:  otherwise  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  consequences  should  fall  upon  the  Russian 
Cabinet,  and  henceforth  Austria  would  act  only  in 
accordance  with  the  dictates  of  her  own  interests. 

We  shall  speak  of  Prussia  somewhat  more  in  detail. 

Here  the  Eastern  Question  had  from  the  very  begin- 
ning aroused  the  feelings  of  the  people  far  and  wide. 
Whoever  cherished  any  liberal  sentiments  whatever, 
whoever  had  any  enthusiasm  left  for  German  Unity, 
whoever  mourned  over  Olmiitz  and  Schleswig-Holstein, 
watched  with  exultation  Russia's  ambition  conjure  up 
threatening  and  ever-increasing  dangers  above  its  own 
head.  It  was  thought  that  a  new  era  of  freedom  would 
dawn  if  the  northern  champion  of  despotism  should  fall 
to  pieces  under  the  blows  of  united  Europe.  To  the 
great  majority  of  the  people  it  seemed  inconceivable 
that  Prussia,  upon  whom  Russia's  hostile  rage  had 
fallen  the  most  severely,  should  not  join  the  common 
stream.  Here  there  was  again,  they  thought,  an 
opportunity  offered  to  Prussia  to  raise  herself  by  a 
bold  policy  at  one  blow  to  the  chief  place  in  Germany, 
and  to  rid  all  Europe  forever  from  the  pressure  of 
Russian  supremacy. 

These  views  were  held  in  many  influential  circles. 
A  group  of  prominent  oflicials  and  diplomatists.  Counts 
Goltz  and  Pourtales.  and  the  privy  counsellors,  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  and  Mathis,  who  together  had  founded 


212      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

their  own  organ,  the  Preussisches  Wochenblatt,  for  the 
repression  of  feudal  tendencies,  urgently  advocated  co- 
operation with  the  Western  Powers.  Baron  Bunsen, 
then  Prussian  ambassador  in  London,  drew  up  with  the 
English  statesmen  the  outline  of  a  new  map  of  Europe 
on  which  the  boundaries  of  Russia  were  considerably 
pushed  back.  The  Minister  of  War,  Bonin,  saw  under 
the  existing  circumstances  no  reason  for  wishing  to 
avoid  a  rupture  with  Russia.  The  heir  to  the  throne 
himself,  the  Prince  of  Prussia,  inclined  to  this  side. 
He  thought  that  after  Russia  had  been  so  wilfully  the 
disturber  of  European  peace,  she  needed  to  be  taught  a 
lesson,  and  that  some  security  was  due  the  rest  of  the 
continent  against  a  return  of  such  dangers. 

But  those  men  in  Berlin  in  whose  hands  the  decision 
lay,  entertained  entirely  different  opinions. 

The  President  of  the  Ministry,  Herr  von  Manteuffel, 
who  by  no  means  looked  upon  his  Olmiitz  Agreement 
as  a  defeat,  felt  himself  repelled  rather  than  incited  by 
the  loud  signals  of  the  Liberals  thirsting  for  war.  Yet 
he  did  acknowledge,  and  still  more  decidedly  than  he, 
his  most  influential  counsellor,  Balan,  that  Russia  had 
committed  a  great  wrong;  and  consequently,  he  had 
without  hesitation  allowed  Prussia  to  take  part  in  the 
Vienna  conference,  and  to  give  her  assent  to  all  of  its 
decrees.  He  also  intended  to  continue  this  policy 
further.  Would  he  have  resorted  to  arms  ?  Who  can 
tell?  Certain  it  is,  that  in  accordance  with  his  cool, 
almost  apathetic  nature,  he  did  not  wish  to  pursue  a  bold, 
but  rather  a  safe  policy :  hence  it  was  very  natural  for 


OPPOSING  SENTIMENTS  IN  PRUSSIA.       213 

him  to  believe  that  a  persistent  agreement  among  the 
four  Powers  would  finally,  even  without  the  threat  of 
war,  induce  the  Russian  Monarch  to  yield,  and  so  bring 
about  a  restoration  of  peace. 

In  sharp  contrast  to  these  determinations  or  tenden- 
cies, stood  the  sentiments  of  those  personally  about  the 
King ;  among  whom  were  in  the  first  place  Adjutant- 
General  von  Gerlach,  also  Generals  Count  Drohna  and 
von  der  Grciben,  and  then,  though  of  less  importance, 
Adjutant  Colonel  von  Manteuffel,  the  Cabinet  Coun- 
sellor Niebuhr,  and  the  former  Minister,  Count  Alvens- 
leben-Erxleben.  These  men,  in  accordance  with  their 
conservative  principles,  were  definitely  and  decidedly 
inclined  towards  Russia.  They  were  filled  with  enthu- 
siastic admiration  for  the  mighty  Czar,  who  had  pro- 
tected Austria  in  1849  and  Prussia  in  1850  from  the 
demon  of  Revolution,  and  who  now  was  waging  a  holy 
war  to  plant  once  more  the  Cross  upon  the  Hagia  Sofia 
and  to  purify  Europe  from  the  contamination  of  Islam. 
They  did  not  exactly  wish  to  rush  into  battle  for  the 
sake  of  the  Czar,  but  would  do  everything  possible  to 
improve  Russia's  position.  Should  participation  in  a 
war  be  unavoidable,  then  Prussia  should  be  found  not 
on  the  side  of  revolutionary  France,  but  of  conserva- 
tive Russia. 

To  this  party  there  belonged  at  this  time  a  man,  who 
was  as  well  a  faithful  Christian  as  a  firm  royalist,  but 
who  was  free  from  the  extravagant  theories  of  the 
Kreuzzeitung,  and  a  thoroughly  practical  politician, 
namely,  the  Prussian  deputy  to  the  Confederate  Diet. 


214      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

Bismarck  decidedly  agreed  wicli  General  von  Gerlach 
in  the  wish  that  a  war  with  Russia  might  be  avoided ; 
but  certainly  in  this  case,  if  ever,  the  proverb  held 
good:  si  duo  faciunt  idem,  non  est  idem.  Bismarck 
weighed  the  consequences  of  such  a  war,  and  foresaw 
only  evil  results  for  Prussia.  He  argued  that  the  war 
would  involve  no  serious  dangers  for  the  Western 
Powers,  and  victory  would  bring  them  great  benefits. 
For  Prussia,  just  the  reverse  would  be  the  case.  The 
burden  of  the  war  would  fall  chiefly  upon  her,  and 
from  the  most  glorious  victories  she  would  reap  no 
advantages.  "What  are  we  after  in  the  East?"  said 
he.  "  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  great  reason  to  be 
careful  to  preserve  our  friendly  relations  to  Russia, 
which  may  in  the  future  be  exceedingly  advantageous 
and  even  indispensable  to  us.  Our  only  adversary,  as 
we  continually  see  in  matters  concerning  the  Tariff- 
Union  and  the  Confederate  Diet,  is  Austria ;  and  she  is 
the  only  Power  whose  defeat  can  bring  us  any  real 
good.  If  there  must  be  a  war,  then  we  have  to  enter 
the  lists  on  the  side  that  opposes  Austria,  unless  the 
Court  of  Vienna  is  willing  to  make  great  and  impor- 
tant concessions  to  us  in  German  affairs.  For  the  time, 
however,  strict  neutrality  is  the  best  plan,  especially 
since  this  is  also  the  desire  of  all  the  other  German 
states." 

The  Monarch,  upon  whom  in  this  matter  everything 
depended,  heard  every  day  the  expression  of  all  these 
different  opinions ;  and  each  one  found,  as  was  natural 
with  him,  an  echo  in  his  breast,  open  as  he  was  to  every 


THE  KING'S  STANDPOINT.     .  215 

passing  impression.  He  commended  England,  like 
Bunsen,  in  her  resistance  against  Russia's  conquest  of 
Turkey,  and  mourned  over  the  presumption  of  his 
brother-in-law,  which  had  sundered  the  firm  alliance  of 
old  conservative  Europe  against  the  Revolution  and  its 
representative.  Napoleon. 

But  as  ever,  religious  views  and  considerations  had  a 
much  stronger  influence  upon  him  than  political  princi- 
ples. England  had  always  seemed  to  him  the  most 
valuable  ally  on  account  of  their  common  Protestant 
faith ;  but  from  the  same  feeling  it  was  revolting  to 
him  to  see  in  Turkey  many  million  Christians  under 
heathen  rule,  and  he  prophesied  divine  judgment  upon 
every  one  that  drew  the  sword  on  the  side  of  the 
Crescent  and  against  the  Cross.  There  could  be  for 
him  no  sadder  nor  more  perplexing  turn  of  things  than 
that  England  should,  step  by  step,  enter  into  a  league 
with  Turkey  and  with  Napoleon,  and,  to  use  his  own 
expression,  be  drawn  into  the  incest  between  Paganism 
and  Revolution  ;  and  that,  too,  without  his  being  able 
to  justify  Russia's  conduct,  which  was  the  source  of 
all  the  trouble. 

His  first  efforts  .were  directed  towards  doing  what  he 
could  to  prevent  an  open  rupture.  He  had  already,  in 
June,  1853,  made  an  attempt  to  mediate,  which  had  the 
usual  misfortune  of  displeasing  all  parties.  Then  he 
assented  to  the  resolutions  of  the  Vienna  Conference, 
and  urgently  advocated  them  in  St.  Petersburg,  con- 
stantly hoping  that  Russia  would  yield  to  this  united 
pressure  from  tlie  rest  of  Europe.     But  when  this,  too, 


216      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

failed,  and  a  declaration  of  war  on  the  part  of  the 
Western  Powers  against  Russia  grew  more  and  more 
imminent,  in  the  confusion  of  his  contradictory  feelings 
he  arrived  at  decisions  of  the  most  peculiar  nature. 

He  had  firmly  made  up  his  mind,  in  this  "abomi- 
nable "  war,  to  remain  neutral ;  for  he  could  not  side 
with  Russia,  because  she  was  in  the  wrong,  nor  against 
Russia,  because  that  would  mean  fighting  for  Moham- 
med against  Christ.  Then,  on  the  other  hand,  he  had 
no  doubt  but  that  Napoleon  would  let  loose  against 
neutral  Prussia  all  the  bloodhounds  of  the  Revolution, 
and,  alas,  would  only  find  too  many  symjDathizers  in 
Germany  itself.  To  obviate  this  danger  he  determined 
to  turn  once  more  in  confidence  to  England.  For  this 
purpose  he  chose  one  of  those  anti-Russian  diplomatists, 
the  talented  and  intense,  although  perhaps  not  always 
prudent  nor  pliant,  Count  Albert  Pourtales. 

This  man  he  sent  to  Prince  Albert  with  a  letter 
dated  the  22d  of  December,  1853,  in  which,  among 
other  things,  he  wrote :  "  I  shall  make  every  attempt 
that  lies  in  Prussia's  power  to  be  ready  '  for  the  spring 
of  the  Tiger '  from  the  west,  to  protect  from  his  claws 
poor,  unfortunate,  guilty,  and  consequently  'half- 
stultified,'  half-conspiring  Germany,  and  to  fight 
against  that  godless,  anti-Christian  monster  of  Revolu- 
tion, that  is  arousing  the  '  Tiger '  in  Hungary,  Poland, 
Italy,  and  Germany.  It  has  been  my  most  earnest 
wish  and  honest  purpose  in  these  complications  to  en- 
gage in  the  mortal  combat  side  by  side  with  my  beloved 
England.     But  of  England  now  is  willing  from  sym- 


THE  MISSION  OF  POURTALES.  217 

pathy  with  Turkey  to  hurl  ruin  and  death  upon  Christian 
soldiers,  then  this  cherished  wish,  too,  must  fall  to  the 
ground." 

Accordingly,  Pourtales  was  to  try  every  possible 
means  of  making  the  idea  of  Prussia's  neutrality  accept- 
able to  the  English  Government,  indeed,  of  making  it 
seem  to  be  most  advantageous  for  the  common  cause- 
He  was  to  represent  that  it  was  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance to  have  some  neutral  party  at  hand  that  would 
be  always  ready  to  mediate  and  to  convey  messages  of 
peace  ;  that  Prussia's  neutrality  would  by  no  means  be 
a  passive  one,  but  she  would,  on  the  contrary,  be  con- 
stantly active  in  striving  to  introduce  wise  propositions 
to  the  Russian  Court,  and  if  definite  action  must  be 
taken,  Prussia  would  not  be  tardy  in  throwing  into  the 
balance,  if  need  be,  the  weight  of  her  own  influence ; 
but  that  in  order  to  be  able  to  render  such  important 
services,  Prussia  must  ask  that  England,  and,  through 
England's  influence,  also  France  should  guarantee  the 
preservation  of  the  integrity  and  also  the  inviolability 
of  Prussian  and  of  German  territory,  that  both  Powers 
should  refrain  from  any  interference  with  the  internal 
affairs  of  Germany,  and  that  they  should  beforehand 
assure  Prussia  of  their  assent  and  concurrence,  in  case 
the  latter  found  herself  compelled,  either  as  the  result 
of  revolutionary  agitations  or  of  the  leaning  of  indi- 
vidual German  states  towards  the  opposite  party,  to 
take  upon  herself  again,  and  perhaps  exceeding  the 
limits  of  the  existing  Confederate  rights,  the  duties 
which  she  had  fulfilled  in  the  year  1841>. 


218      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

The  English  Ministers,  after  this  communication, 
were  astonished  to  learn  that  Prussia's  neutrality  was 
to  be  more  valuable  to  them  than  the  assistance  of  a 
Prussian  army  of  30,000  men.  Their  astonishment 
increased  at  the  idea  that  they  were  to  assure  Prussia, 
as  a  reward  for  this  precious  neutrality,  the  unreserved 
right  of  changing  the  principles  of  the  German  Con- 
federation. But  the  highest  pitch  was  reached  when 
Baron  Bunsen  set  as  the  price  of  this  "  real  and 
autonomic  "  neutrality  ^  the  further  condition  that  Eng- 
land after,  in,  and  through  the  peace,  should  regain  for 
the  King  his  faithful  Neuchatel. 

We  have  narrated  already,  how  after  the  February 
Revolution  in  1848  the  Radical  party  in  Neuchatel 
banished  the  royal  authorities  and  set  up  a  democratic 
government  in  their  place.  The  King,  whose  protests 
were  of  no  avail,  finally  succeeded  in  1852  in  obtaining 
from  the  remaining  Great  Powers  an  agreement,  which 
recognized  unconditionally  his  sovereign  rights  and 
promised  to  institute  negotiations  of  the  Powers  upon 
the  subject,  whereas  the  King  pledged  himself,  during 
the  continuance  of  these  negotiations,  to  make  no  move 
on  his  own  part.  Since  that  time  the  Powers  had  not 
lifted  a  finger  in  the  matter ;  but  among  the  foremost 
political  thoughts  of  the  King  still  stood  the  desire  to 
possess  again  "that  dear  little  country  in  the  Jura," 
the  ever-faithful  Neuchatel,  of  whose  inhabitants  he 
was  "  prouder  than  of  all  his  other  subjects."  We  shall 
see   later,   what   weighty   consequences  this   abnormal 

1  The  King's  letter  to  Buiiseii,  January  9tli,  1854. 


PRUSSIA'S  NEUTRALITY.  219 

and  eccentric  sentiment  was  to  have  for  him  and  for 
Prussia. 

It  hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  the  mission  of  Count 
Pourtales  in  London  was  entirely  unsuccessful.  Quite 
as  bootless  was  the  endeavor  of  Baron  Bunsen,  with  all 
the  friendship  of  his  royal  patron  for  him,  to  bring  the 
King  over  to  the  standpoint  of  the  Western  Powers. 
When,  in  February,  1854,  the  formal  note  of  inquiry 
from  the  Western  Powers  came  to  hand,  the  King,  it  is 
true,  sent  an  urgent  request  to  his  august  brother-in- 
law  to  avert  a  terrible  disaster  from  Europe  by  evacu- 
ating the  principalities  ;  but  he  remained  immovable  in 
his  position,  that  he  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  a 
war  that  was  to  be  waged  for  Turkey's  sake  and  against 
Christians,  declined  categorically  the  convention  pro- 
posed by  the  Western  Powers,  and  declared  that  Prussia 
then,  as  ever,  was  satisfied  with  the  conditions  of  the 
agreement,  but  in  the  choice  of  means  to  carry  it  out, 
she  was  unwilling  to  bind  her  hands. 

Thereupon,  in  the  beginning  of  ]\Iarch,  he  sent  auto- 
graph letters  —  for  the  time  seemed  to  him  to  have 
come  when  diplomats  could  with  their  science  do  no 
more,  and  the  sovereigns  must  take  the  matter  into 
their  own  hands  —  to  Victoria  and  Napoleon,  imploring 
them  most  urgently  to  favor  reconciliation  and  peace, 
and  declaring  his  own  absolute  and  unreserved  neutral- 
ity. Whatever  may  be  thought  of  tlie  King's  motives, 
or  of  his  iudivi<lual  acts  and  tlie  fantastic  flourishes 
with  \\lii(  li  he  adorned  them,  no  unprejudiced  observer 
to-day  will  deny  tliat  in  view  of  the  situation  of  Prussia 


220      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

at  that  time,  her  relations  with  Austria  and  the  weak- 
ness of  the  German  Confederation,  neutrality  was  the 
only  policy  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  State. 

The  assertion  that  Prussia  would  have  been  able,  by 
a  powerful  attack  upon  Russia,  to  have  assembled  about 
herself  all  Germany,  and  thus  to  have  established 
national  unity  under  her  leadership,  might  have  gained 
credence,  had  she  not  had  in  such  a  war  two  allies 
who  would  have  been  very  glad  to  see  Prussian  battal- 
ions arrayed  against  the  Russians,  but  who  would  so 
much  the  more  regardlessly  have  crushed  out  every 
movement  in  Germany  towards  unity.  "  Only  no 
German  Unity,"  said  Napoleon  to  the  Duke  of  Coburg. 
"  No  idea  is  more  atrocious  than  that  of  German 
Unity,"  said  Count  Buol,  as  decidedly  as  did  once 
Metternich. 

In  short,  Bismarck's  reasons  as  briefly  given  above, 
leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  position  of 
neutrality.  The  noisy  cry  in  the  French  and  still  more 
in  the  English  newspapers,  that  Prussia  was  renouncing 
her  claim  to  a  position  as  a  Great  Power,  was,  to  be 
sure,  childish;  for  what  Great  Power  would  ever  act 
in  a  way  contrary  to  its  own  interests  ?  Yet  it  is  easy 
to  understand  their  clamor,  for  they  Avould  only  too 
gladly  have  thrown  the  main  burden  of  the  war  upon 
Prussia's  shoulders. 

If  Bismarck's  unceasingly  emphasized  counsel  had 
only  been  followed  in  Berlin !  If  in  spite  of  all  threats 
and  abuse  the  proposed  neutrality  had  only  been  main- 
tained with  persistent  courage  and  becoming  dignity  ! 


PRUSSIA'S  PROPOSITION   TO  AUSTRIA.       221 

But  the  fancied  picture  of  "the  spring  of  the  Tiger 
from  the  west"  left  the  Prussian  Government  no 
peace ;  ^  and  General  von  Gerlach  urgently  advised, 
since  England  offered  no  support,  that  Prussia,  in  order 
not  to  be  exposed  to  the  danger  wholly  alone,  should 
turn  to  Austria.  How  would  it  be,  if  Austria  should 
accept  the  offers  of  the  Western  Powers,  and  should 
then  draw  the  other  German  states  into  her  own  war 
policy  ? 

We  have  seen  that  in  January,  in  order  not  to  bind 
her  hands  in  any  direction,  Prussia  declined  an  offer  of 
a  neutrality-alliance  proposed  by  Austria.  The  King 
now  decided  on  his  part  to  send  the  same  message  to 
Vienna  in  the  hope  that  he  might  in  this  way  in  the 
East  restrain  the  Court  of  Vienna  from  en^ao-incr  in 
the  war,  and  in  the  West  insure  the  protection  of  the 
German  boundary  against  the  French.  On  the  11th  of 
March  he  wrote  to  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  and 
told  him  of  his  letter  to  Queen  Victoria,  saying  that 
although  he  had  taken  this  step  with  a  good  deal  of 
formality,  it  had  been  without  any  reasonable  hope  of 
meeting  with  success. 

"  Your  Majesty,"  he  went  on  to  explain,  "  will  under- 
stand how  my  letter  to  the  Queen  was  written,  I  miglit 
say,  Avith  my  conscience.  It  shall  be  a  testimony  to 
the  fact  of  my  having  recognized  the  vocation  which 
Divine  Providence  has  placed  before  me ;  namely,  of 
being  a  man  and  advocate  of  Peace,  in  season  and  out 

1  Napoleon  onco  said  to  the  Duke  of  Coburg,  that  ho  should  be 
probably  forced  at  last  to  wage  war  against  Prussia. 


222      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

of  season,  in  fair  weather  and  in  foul.  I  am  forced  to 
tell  people  the  truth,  to  represent  to  them  dangers  that 
may  be  imminent  and  the  fearfulness  of  assuming 
responsibilities,  no  matter  whether  I  find  attentive  ears 
or  not.  I  will  show  that  I  have  recognized  and  fulfilled 
my  duty.  God  the  Lord  will  then  direct  events.  At 
the  close  of  that  letter  I  declared  my  intention  to 
remain  absolutely  neutral,  and  my  firm  purpose  in  so 
doing  to  defend  Prussia's  independence  with  all  the 
forces  at  my  control  against  every  one  who  tries  to  play 
the  master  over  us." 

He  then  gave  expression  to  his  pleasure  at  hearing 
that  Austria  was  willing  to  accept  the  offer  of  a  con- 
vention with  the  maritime  Powers  "only  as  one  of 
four,"  meaning  not  without  Prussia.  "  Taking  for 
granted  that  this  refreshing  draught  is  no  deception, 
I  beg  of  Your  Majesty  to  send  us  word  at  once  con- 
cerning the  hopes  which  you  undoubtedly  connect  with 
those  blessed  decrees.  To  me,  some  proposal  result- 
ing from  a  genuine,  vigorous  union  of  Austria  and 
Prussia,  and  directed  to  all  the  Teutonic  states,  seems 
imperatively  necessary,  and  it  must  be  drawn  up  at 
once.  The  form  of  the  same  may  be  determined  by 
the  diplomatists ;  but  the  kernel  —  so  it  seems  to  me  — 
must  be  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  of  the 
three  great  groups  of  countries  in  Central  Europe, 
entered  into  for  the  time  of  the  impending  direful  war, 
and  guaranteeing  the  mutual  defence  of  all  our  frontiers 
during  its  continuance." 

He  closed  with  the  words :  "  Our  position  is  not  free 


MISSION  OF  GENERAL    VON  HESS.  223 

from  great  and  serious  dangers ;  but  I  have  good 
courage  and  trust  in  God.  For  Your  Majesty,  young 
in  years  and  fresh  in  valor,  this  will  be  much  easier 
still  than  for  me.  I  commend  myself  now  with  all  my 
heart  and  all  my  soul  to  your  inspiring  friendsliip  and 
good-will." 

In  Vienna  this  note  fell  with  great  weight  into  the 
balance.  There,  too,  people  had  been  looking  towards 
Paris  with  anxiety  and  fear,  and  indeed  had  much 
more  reason  to  do  so  than  had  Prussia.  But  then 
the  war  between  Russia  and  the  Western  Powers  had 
already  begun.  On  the  Danube  the  Russians  were 
preparing  to  make  a  more  effective  attack  upon  Bul- 
garia. The  necessity  of  preventing  this  and  of  freeing 
the  principalities  seemed  to  Count  Buol  more  and  more 
urgent.  How  would  it  be  if  Prussia  could  be  per- 
suaded to  incorporate  in  the  proposed  alliance  Austria's 
full  power  to  engage  in  such  action,  and  thus  to  gain 
Prussia's  consent  in  this  instance,  though  she  did  not 
take  part  herself  in  the  war,  to  the  protection  of  Aus- 
trian lands  outside  of  Germany,  as  had  been  the  case  in 
May,  1851  ? 

It  was  decided  to  make  the  attempt  immediately. 
The  Emperor  answered  the  letter  of  his  ro3-al  uncle  in 
a  very  full  and  explicit  note,  in  which  he  above  all 
expressed  liis  wish  that  universal  peace  might  be  pre- 
served, and  his  conviction  that  there  could  be  no  better 
means  to  this  end  than  the  defensive  alliance  of  all 
Central  Europe  proposed  by  the  King.  He  said  that 
he  would  accordingly   send   General  of  the  Ordnance 


.V. 


224      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

von  Hess  to  Berlin  to  lay  before  the  King  in  fullest 
frankness  Austria's  most  private  views  and  intentions 
with  regard  to  every  possible  turn  of  affairs. 

"  Each  of  the  contracting  parties,"  he  went  on  to  say, 
"  would  still,  after  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance,  retain 
its  full  right  to  act  independently,  except  so  far  as  the 
object  of  this  alliance  is  concerned ;  and  if  Austria 
should  wish  to  take  advantage  of  that  liberty  by  occu- 
pying certain  Turkish  provinces,  then  she  would  have 
the  right,  in  case  Russia  attacked  her  possessions,  to 
count  upon  the  full  support  of  the  Confederation.  It 
seems  to  me  of  the  highest  importance  for  us  to  have  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  extent  to  which  this  princi- 
ple can  be  applied. 

"Although  I  am  firmly  determined  to  continue  in 
the  unbound,  expectant  attitude,  which  I  have  main- 
tained hitherto,  and  not  to  allow  myself  to  be  moved 
from  it  by  the  entreaties  of  the  Western  Powers,  yet  I 
cannot  close  my  eyes  to  the  dreadful  possibility  of  my 
being  compelled  by  Russia's  inconsiderate  behavior  to 
protect  Austrian  and  also  German  interests,  by  ordering 
the  occupation  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia.  At  the 
same  time,  I  intend  by  no  means  to  declare  war  for- 
mally against  Russia,  nor  to  make  an  attack  upon 
Russian  territory.  The  Austrian  bayonets  would  in 
any  case  halt  at  the  Pruth." 

In  spite  of  all  the  spirit  of  peace  that  separate 
sentences  in  the  note  contained,  the  difference  was  very 
apparent  between  the  ideas  entertained  at  Vienna  as  to 
the  purpose  of  the  proposed  alliance  and  those  enter- 


AUSTRIA'S  PROPOSAL.  225 

tained  at  Berlin.  Bismarck,  who  had  not  yet  been 
heard  in  this  matter,  was  displeased  with  the  whole 
plan.  When  he  learned  of  it,  he  said  that  this  step 
ought  not  to  have  been  taken  with  Austria,  but  with 
the  other  Confederate  states  against  Austria;  for  what 
could  be  more  agreeable  to  Prussia  than  to  see  the 
coalition  of  Russia,  Austria,  and  the  Lesser  States, 
which  had  pressed  so  hard  upon  Prussia  since  1849, 
broken  up  forever? 

On  the  other  hand,  General  Gerlach  was  now  full  of 
the  greatest  hopes,  although  he  considered  it  necessary, 
in  view  of  Austria's  desire  to  move  ahead,  to  be  very 
prudent  in  negotiations.  That  there  was  good  reason 
for  this,  was  evident  when  Hess  reached  Berlin  at  the 
end  of  March  and  announced  his  proposals.  These 
embraced  simply  the  conclusion  of  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  between  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Ger- 
many for  all  time,  as  a  means  of  protecting  all  their 
possessions,  from  whatsoever  direction  any  danger  might 
threaten.  Austria,  he  said,  had  stationed  150,000  men 
in  Hungary,  and  would  soon  send  thither  100,000 
more ;  she  proposed  that  Prussia  should  now  equip 
100,000,  and  later  50,000  more,  and  that  the  other 
German  states  should  at  once  mobilize  one-half  of  their 
Confederate  contingent,  and  promise  to  send  the  other 
half  upon  receiving  orders  from  the  two  Great  Powers. 
Soon  afterwards  the  General  added  another  article,  to 
the  effect  that  the  allies  should  jointly  and  separately 
bear  the  expense  of  the  equipment  and  the  conduct  of 
the  war. 


226      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

Of  course  there  was  no  thought  of  all  this  on  the 
part  of  Prussia.  Balan  drew  up  a  counter-outline,  in 
which  the  alliance  was  limited  to  the  duration  of  the 
present  war,  its  more  detailed  regulations  and  the  ordi- 
nances concerning  the  beginning  and  the  extent  of  the 
equipments  being  left  to  further  consideration,  and  the 
item  of  the  expense  being  passed  over  in  silence. 

When,  upon  this,  Hess  brought  forward  the  draft  of  a 
common  despatch  to  St.  Petersburg,  in  which  the 
Russian  evacuation  of  the  principalities  was  demanded 
under  the  threat  of  armed  interference,  the  representa- 
tives of  Prussia  gave  their  assent,  but  demanded  a 
modification  of  the  form,  so  that  it  should  contain  no 
aggressive  challenge. 

While  Prussia  showed  such  caution  in  her  move- 
ments, the  Vienna  Court  was  trying  to  confirm  and 
even  strengthen  its  relations  with  the  Western  Powers. 
On  the  9th  of  April,  Count  Buol  summoned  the 
ambassadors  of  the  four  Great  Powers  to  a  conference, 
who  then  drew  up  a  protocol  to  the  effect  that  the 
Powers,  although  two  of  them  were  now  at  war  with 
Russia,  Avould  persist  in  the  principles  formerly  laid 
down;  namely,  the  preservation  of  the  integrity  of 
Turkey,  involving  the  evacuation  of  the  principalities 
by  Russia,  the  confirmation  of  the  rights  of  tlie  Chris- 
tian subjects  by  a  free  act  of  the  Sultan,  and  the 
admission  of  Turkey  into  the  number  of  the  European 
States :  in  no  case  was  a  Power  to  enter  into  any  agree- 
ment inconsistent  with  these  principles,  without  first 
laying  the   matter   before  them  all   for   consideration. 


NEGOTIATIONS  AT  BERLIN.  227 

When  this  protocol  was  presented  to  the  Prussian  King 
for  his  approval,  he  expressed  some  misgivings,  but 
finally  decided  not  to  retract  anything  that  he  had 
before  asserted,  and  signed  it. 

Meanwhile  an  understanding  was  arrived  at  in  Berlin 
about  the  separate  points  of  an  alliance,  mainly  based 
upon  Balan's  draft.  The  two  Powers  were  mutually  to 
guarantee  the  protection  of  all  their  possessions.  They 
were  to  promise  to  defend  the  rights  and  interests  of 
Germany,  and  also  to  assist  in  warding  off  a  foreign 
attack  upon  their  territories  when  one  of  them,  with 
the  consent  of  the  other,  should  find  itself  called  upon 
to  take  active  measures  in  defence  of  German  interests. 
Just  what  might  be  termed  such  an  occasion  was  to  be 
made  the  subject  of  special  consideration,  as  well  as 
also  the  matter  of  establishing  such  a  body  of  troops  as 
this  alliance  might  demand.  All  the  German  Con- 
federate Governments  were  to  be  requested  to  join  the 
alliance.  During  its  continuance,  neither  of  the  two 
Powers  was  to  make  any  other  alliance  with  other 
Powers,  that  would  not  be  fully  in  accord  with  the 
principles  of  the  one  in  question. 

Prussia  had  evidently  taken  care  not  to  lay  herself 
open  to  being  drawn  against  her  will  by  any  one-sided 
movements  of  Austria  into  complications  involving  Avar. 
The  second  article  implied  the  possibility  of  such 
movements,  but  bound  Prussia  to  defend  Austrian 
territory  only  in  case  Austria  should  previously  obtain 
Prussia's  consent  to  her  plans.  This  point  had  hardly 
been  settled,  when   General  Hess,  before  the   papers 


228      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

had  been  signed,  came  forward  with  the  declaration 
that  such  an  instance  was  already  at  hand ;  since  Aus- 
tria, in  the  interests  of  Germany  and  upon  the  basis  of 
the  protocol  of  the  9th  of  April,  was  about  to  demand 
of  Russia  the  evacuation  of  the  principalities,  and  was 
ready,  if  necessary,  to  back  her  request  by  force  of 
arms:  therefore  she  now  desired,  in  virtue  of  the 
second  article,  Prussia's  assent  to  the  step,  and  the 
promise  to  guard  Austria's  possessions  from  danger  in 
the  event  of  its  being  carried  out. 

In  view  of  all  that  had  taken  place,  this  declaration 
in  itself  ought  not  to  have  caused  any  surprise ;  but 
the  King  was  startled  at  its  suddenness,  and  as  he 
meditated  upon  the  possible  consequences,  he  almost 
repented  of  having  signed  the  Vienna  protocol.  Yet 
he  was  very  anxious  to  see  the  alliance  concluded; 
and,  moreover,  at  this  moment  he  received  from  Russia 
a  curt  refusal  to  accede  to  Prussia's  conciliatory  propo- 
sitions, which  both  in  the  form  of  the  reply  and  its 
contents  aroused  the  King's  displeasure  towards  his 
brother-in-law  to  an  unusual  pitch. 

So  that,  in  accordance  with  the  proposal  of  General 
Hess,  he  consented  to  an  additional  clause  in  the 
treaty,  to  the  effect  that  if  Russia  should  not,  in 
response  to  a  request  from  Austria  supported  by 
Prussia,  withdraw  from  the  principalities,  then  the 
measures  decided  upon  by  Austria  would  fall  under  the 
second  article.  A  common  aggressive  movement  would, 
however,  the  clause  went  on  to  say,  be  sanctioned  only 
in  case  of  an  attempted  incorporation  of  the  principali- 


CRITICISM  OF  THE   TREATY.  229 

ties  by  Russia,  or,  added  the  King  in  his  vexation  at 
the  Russian  reply,  in  case  of  an  attack  or  of  the 
crossing  of  the  Balkans  by  the  Russians. 

Accordingly,  the  treaty  of  alliance  together  with  this 
additional  clause  was  signed  on  the  20tli  of  April,  and 
at  the  same  time  it  was  agreed  that  Prussia  should 
under  given  circumstances  station  100,000  men  within 
thirty-six  days  upon  her  eastern  frontier,  and  possibly 
increase  her  army  to  the  number  of  200,000  ;  on  these 
points  it  was  said  she  would  come  to  some  understand- 
ing with  Austria.  Here,  too,  the  decision  of  the 
questions  whether  and  when  these  measures  might  be 
necessary  was  accordingly  not  left  to  Austria's  judg- 
ment alone,  but  to  the  united  conviction  of  the  two 
allies. 

In  fact,  this  was  an  alliance  of  a  very  peculiar  nature  : 
hearty  co-operation  together  with  the  greatest  circum- 
spection, brotherly  confidence  ever  on  guard.  Prussia 
saw  very  well  the  possibility  of  a  break  with  Russia, 
and  Austria  was  pleased  with  the  alliance  whenever 
she  thought  of  Italy  and  of  France.  Yet  the  chief  aim 
of  the  treaty  was  after  all  for  Austria  the  protection  of 
her  possessions  in  the  event  of  her  going  ahead  against 
Russia,  for  Prussia  the  assurance  of  her  neutrality  in 
the  face  of  possible  schemes  of  France  and  of  the 
Revolution.  To  Austria's  mind  the  alliance  was  a 
bulwark  against  the  East,  for  Prussia  it  was  a  defence 
against  the  West.  The  strength  of  Frederick  William's 
convictions  in  this  line  was  made  manifest  to  the  world 
by  his  treatment  of  those  men  who  had  been  hitherto 


230      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

the  representatives  of  the  opposite  tendencies :  at  the 
very  beginning  of  May,  Baron  Bunsen  was  recalled 
from  London,  the  Minister  of  War,  Von  Bonin,  was 
suddenly  dismissed,  and  the  Prince  of  Prussia  was 
given  leave  of  absence  from  all  his  military  offices  ; 
indeed,  the  latter  was  even  threatened  with  fortress- 
confinement  because  of  his  former  adherence  to  the 
Opposition. 

Meanwhile  a  circular  note  was  sent  from  Vienna  and 
Berlin  to  the  German  Courts,  announcing  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  alliance,  the  invitation  to  join  in  the  same, 
and  the  intention  to  bring  the  matter  before  the  Con- 
federate Diet.  But  at  this  point  there  was  in  store  for 
Austria  an  exceedingly  unpleasant  experience.  She 
was  forced  to  see,  even  more  strongly  than  in  the 
recent  tariff  war,  that  the  interests  of  Germany  were 
very  far  removed  from  those  of  the  Austrian  Empire, 
whereas  they  were  identical  with  those  of  Prussia.  In 
fair  weather  this  fact  might  easily  be  concealed  by  the 
mistrust  felt  by  the  Courts  towards  Prussian  projects 
of  union  or  of  annexation ;  but  when  any  really  serious 
dangers  threatened,  the  relations  of  things  could  not 
but  be  seen  in  their  true  light. 

The  Lesser  States,  like  Prussia,  felt  the  strongest 
disinclination  to  take  any  part  whatever  in  a  war- 
policy.  The  only  exception  was  found  in  the  person  of 
the  ever-restless  and  ambitious  Herr  von  Beust.  He 
had  not  forgotten  the  services  which  Russia  had  ren- 
dered to  German  individualism  in  1850 :  "  We  must 
hope  for  Russia's  triumph,"  he  said ;  "  we  have  need  of 


ATTITUDE   OF  THE  LESSER   STATES.         231 

her  assistance  against  Prussian  ambition."  Ever  since 
the  summer  of  1853,  he  had  been  urging  those  Govern- 
ments that  had  formed  the  Darmstadt  Coalition  against 
Prussia  in  the  tariff  quarrel,  to  establish  a  closer 
league  of  the  Lesser  States,  which  might  then  join  an 
Austro-Prussian  alliance  with  Russia. 

But  these  belligerent  plans  were  at  once  decidedly- 
discountenanced  by  his  friends  at  Munich  and  at  Stutt- 
gart. There  these  projects  were  met  by  a  univer- 
sal desire  for  rest  and  peace,  and  for  strict  neutrality 
on  the  Eastern  Question.  The  feeling  was  in  every 
respect  like  that  manifested  at  Berlin,  which  found  in 
any  meddling  in  Turkish  complications  only  serious 
sacrifices  for  Germany,  and  not  the  least  prospect  of 
any  gain. 

Consequently,  the  members  of  the  Darmstadt  Coali- 
tion met  again  at  Bamberg,  in  order  to  give  expression 
to  their  distrust  of  Austria's  ambitious  schemes.  They 
drew  up  on  the  25th  of  May  a  common  circular,  prais- 
ing in  the  usual  phrases  the  patriotic  magnanimity  of 
the  two  Monarchs  and  their  endeavors  to  unite  all  the 
power  and  strength  of  Germany.  The  states  would, 
therefore,  gladly  join  the  alliance,  but  they  hoped  that 
it  was  the  intention,  consistent  with  actual  neutrality, 
to  keep  not  only  Russian,  but  also  Turkish  and  the 
allied  troops  as  well,  out  of  the  principalities.  They 
said  that  it  was  [)resumed  that  at  future  peace-congresses 
the  German  Confederation  would  l)c  spcjcially  repre- 
sented as  such,  by  the  side  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  but 
that  during  the  continuance  of  the  war,  Germany 
would  liold  herself  so  far  as  possible  aloof. 


232      THE  NEW  AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN  ALLIANCE. 

Count  Buol  was,  as  may  easily  be  imagined,  quite  as 
much  astonished  at  these  declarations  as  he  was  en- 
raged. Whereas  King  Frederick  WiUiam  urgently 
besought  his  imperial  nephew  to  accept  graciously  the 
peacefully-inclined  attitude  of  the  German  Princes,  to 
preserve  as  mild  a  tone  as  possible  in  the  message 
which  was  to  be  sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  and  to  delay 
the  sending  of  the  same  until  after  the  German  Con- 
federation, as  such,  should  have  joined  the  alliance : 
Count  Buol  decided  upon  just  the  opposite,  to  confront 
the  Bamberg  expectations  with  an  accomplished  fact, 
and  to  send  at  once,  on  the  3d  of  June,  the  peremptory 
note  to  St.  Petersburg  without  consulting  either  the 
Confederation  or  Prussia  with  regard  to  its  form. 

To  prevent  any  Prussian  disaffection  at  this  pre- 
cipitation, the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  who  was 
staying  at  the  time  in  Prague  with  his  newly-married 
wife,  sent  a  most  hearty  and  urgent  invitation  to  the 
King  to  meet  him  at  Tetschen,  whither  Buol  and 
Manteuffel  were  then  also  summoned.  Here  the 
Emperor  succeeded  in  retaining  his  influence  over  the 
King,  to  whom  the  principles  of  the  Bamberg  con- 
federates seemed  correct  enough,  but  their  conduct 
rather  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  small  people  to  play 
the  grandee  ;  and  the  King  was  induced  still  to  navi- 
gate in  Austrian  waters. 

The  King  approved  the  form  of  the  Austrian  note  to 
Russia ;  a  Prussian  despatch  in  its  support  was  prom- 
ised, and  a  common  rej^ly  to  the  Bamberg  confederates 
was  settled  upon,   the   drift  of  which  was,   that  their 


MEETING  AT  TETSCHEN.  233 

co-operation  in  the  alliance  was  beyond  question 
counted  upon,  and  that  then  their  wishes  would  be 
regarded  so  far  as  circumstances  would  allow. 

Furthermore,  the  Emperor,  who  had  just  before  this 
ordered  a  fresh  levy  of  95,000  men,  took  no  pains  to 
conceal  from  his  august  ally  that  Russia's  refusal  to 
comply  with  their  demand  would  immediately  be  fol- 
lowed by  war,  and  that  in  that  case  he  should  be 
obliged  to  depend  upon  Prussia's  protection  of  Aus- 
trian territory.  The  King  expressed  his  hope  that  the 
best  results  might  be  expected  from  Russia's  willing- 
ness to  acquiesce. 


234  DISCORD. 


CHAPTER  III. 

DISCORD. 

Only  too  soon  was  it  made  evident  liow  unsteady 
was  the  foundation  upon  wliicli  the  alliance  of  the  20th 
of  April  had  been  based. 

To  start  with,  everything  depended  upon  the  decision 
of  Russia  about  evacuating  the  principalities,  and  this 
seemed  at  first  likely  to  turn  out  unfavorably ;  but 
soon  the  powers  at  St.  Petersburg  considered  the  evil 
consequences  of  such  a  method  of  procedure,  and 
thought  better  of  it.  The  Czar,  according  to  the 
reports  of  the  Prussian  commissioner,  was  over-bur- 
dened with  work,  continually  ill,  anxious  with  cares, 
and  alternately  excitable  and  irresolute.  The  custom- 
ary regularity  and  system  disappeared  from  the  con- 
duct of  business.  The  Czar  made  rash  decisions,  and 
then  noticing  the  silent  dissatisfaction  of  the  Chan- 
cellor, Count  Nesselrode,  let  the  matter  go,  and  allowed 
him  to  determine  and  carry  out  plans  as  he  best  saw 
fit.  So  the  Count  now  succeeded  in  getting  a  partial 
answer  returned  to  the  summary  note  from  Vienna. 
Russia  declared,  on  the  29th  of  June,  her  willingness 
to  withdraw  from  the  principalities,  if  Austria  would 
guarantee  that  Russia's  adversaries  would  refrain  from 
all  further  hostilities  towards  Russian  possessions ;  in 


NEGOTIATIONS  ABOUT  THE  EVACUATION.      235 

the  event  of  such  a  truce,  Russia  was  ready  to  enter 
into  peace-negotiations  upon  the  basis  of  the  Vienna 
protocol  of  April  9th. 

These  were  indeed  no  insignificant  concessions.  But 
Count  Buol  was  not  contented.  He  had  already,  on 
the  14th  of  June  (without  any  consultation  with 
Berlin),  concluded  a  treaty  with  Turkey  about  a 
common  occupation  of  the  principalities,  and  was  now 
pushing  large  bodies  of  troops  towards  the  Roumanian 
frontier.  On  the  9th  of  July  he  declared  to  the  Rus- 
sian Government,  that  he  would  recommend  Russia's 
desire  for  an  armistice  to  the  attention  of  the  Western 
Powers,  though  he  could  in  no  way  vouch  for  the 
nature  of  their  decision ;  but  let  that  turn  out  as  it 
might,  Austria  must  still  insist  upon  her  demand  that 
the  principalities  be  soon  evacuated.  At  the  same 
time  he  kept  urging  Prussia  to  consent  to  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  200,000  men,  and  half  of  the  Confederate  con- 
tingents. Indeed,  soon  afterwards,  to  Prussia's  great 
surprise,  he  announced  to  the  German  states  that  a 
motion  for  mobilization  would  presently  be  brought 
forward  in  the  Confederate  Diet  by  both  of  the  Great 
Powers  in  concert.  In  short,  every  action  of  the  Count 
betrayed  an  ill-concealed  thirst  for  war. 

Prussia,  on  her  part,  maintained  persistently,  as  was 
consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  country,  her  pacific 
attitude.  The  contrast  between  her  position  and  Aus- 
tria's, whicli  liad  seemed  almost  removed  in  the  April 
treaty,  now  stood  forth  in  sli;u[)  outlines.  In  Berlin 
the   Russian   reply    was    deemed  satisfactory  ;  Russia's 


236  DISCORD. 

demand,  that  if  she  should  withdraw  from  the  territory 
of  the  enemy,  her  own  territory  should  be  protected 
from  hostile  attacks,  seemed  founded  in  fairness ;  and 
the  Russian  note,  it  was  said,  could  certainly  be  made 
the  starting-point  for  a  general  settlement  of  the  terms 
of  peace.  Consequently,  Prussia  had  no  notion  of 
mobilizing;  the  only  thing  that  the  King  determined 
upon  was  the  raising  to  a  war-footing  of  the  number  of 
horses  in  the  cavalry  and  artillery.  He  himself  sent 
despatches  to  Paris  and  London,  saying  that  it  was 
now  the  business  of  the  maritime  Powers  to  declare 
their  aims  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Avar,  and  the  conditions 
which  they  on  their  part  would  impose  as  the  terms  of 
an  armistice  or  of  peace. 

At  this  time  there  came  to  Paris  and  London  also 
Austria's  inquiry,  what  verdict  the  Western  Powers 
passed  upon  Russia's  reply.  The  answ^er  was  just  what 
Count  Buol  expected.  So  soon  as  the  contents  of  the 
Russian  note  of  June  29th  were  known,  the  position  of 
the  Western  Powers  was  determined,  namely,  that  the 
only  proper  response  to  it  was  the  conclusion  of  an  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet, 
and  consequently  the  immediate  prosecution  by  Austria 
of  the  war  with  Russia.  The  draft  of  such  an  alliance 
was  prepared  in  Paris,  and  very  carefully  considered  in 
Vienna. 

But  then  came  an  unexpected  turn.  After  the  Czar 
Nicholas  in  his  last  note  had  shown  that  he  would  not 
be  dictated  to  by  foreigners,  he  ordered  immediately 
afterwards,  as  the  result  of  his  own  private  reflection, 


AUSTRIA   AND   THE    WESTERN  POWERS.      237 

and  "for  strategic  reasons,"  the  withdrawal  of  his 
troops  from  the  principalities  to  a  position  beyond  the 
Pruth,  thus  taking  out  of  Count  Buol's  hand  his  excuse 
for  declaring  war. 

Now  the  political  tendencies  of  the  German  Lesser 
and  Petty  States  in  the  Confederate  Diet  were  fully 
manifest.  Even  after  the  Tetschen  circular,  the  major- 
ity of  the  Governments  felt  no  enthusiasm  for  the 
proposition  to  join  the  April  alliance.  Then  the  opin- 
ion took  root  in  many  places,  that  it  would  be  better  to 
join  in  order  to  give  strength  and  support  to  Prussia's 
hinderance  of  Count  Buol's  projects.  Yet  the  prelimi- 
nary deliberations  of  the  several  committees  progressed 
with  the  pace  of  a  snail.  It  was  not  until  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Russians  had  already  made  the  ques- 
tionable additional  clause  of  no  effect,  that  it  was 
decided,  on  the  24th  of  July,  to  join,  but  still  with  the 
prudent  paragraph,  that  the  best  means  of  attaining 
the  end  should  be  made  the  subject  of  further  delibera- 
tions. In  order  not  to  allow  Prussia's  new  position  as 
leader  to  be  too  marked,  Austria  voted  in  all  cases  with 
the  majority. 

All  this  might  well  have  dampened  somewhat  the 
ardor  of  Count  Buol.  He  gave  up  for  the  time  the 
idea  of  a  formal  alliance  with  the  maritime  Powers  ; 
although  the  discussion  went  forward  with  reference  to 
the  conditions  which  ought  to  be  imposed  upon  Russia 
as  the  terms  of  an  armistice  and  of  peace-negotiations. 
An  agreement  was  soon  reached  upon  the  basis  of  the 
former  Vienna  protocol.     Count  Buol  also  consented  to 


238  DISCORD. 

the  demand  of  the  maritime  Powers  that  the  provok- 
ingly  peace-loving  Prussia  should  be  allowed  no  share 
in  any  of  the  deliberations,  and  that  Austria  should  be 
bound  by  the  articles  decided  upon,  almost  as  formally 
as  in  an  alliance.  By  the  interchange  of  similar  docu- 
ments, the  following  demands  were  agreed  upon  on  the 
8th  of  August,  with  the  reservation  of  further  requisi- 
tions as  the  course  of  events  in  the  war  might  prescribe  : 

1.  A  European  guaranty  of  the  rights  of  the  Danube 
principalities  in  place  of  the  former  Russian  protectorate. 

2.  Free  navigation  of  the  Danube  to  the  sea. 

3.  Revision  of  the  treaty  of  1841  in  the  interests  of 
the  European  balance  of  power. 

4.  Promotion  of  the  interests  and  rights  of  the  Turk- 
ish Christians  in  a  way  consistent  with  the  sovereign 
prerogatives  of  the  Sultan. 

None  of  the  contracting  parties  were  to  consider  any 
Russian  proposals  that  should  not  express  full  accept- 
ance of  these  principles. 

On  the  10th  of  August,  then.  Count  Buol  sent  these 
demands,  made  in  the  name  of  the  three  Powers  in 
common,  to  St.  Petersburg,  and  simultaneously  commu- 
nicated this  fact  to  Berlin  with  an  invitation  to  join  in 
this  work  of  peace. 

One  can  easily  imagine  the  impression  which  such 
news  made  upon  the  Prussian  Government.  The  confi- 
dential ally  of  April  20th  had  again,  on  her  own  account 
and  without  consulting  Prussia,  taken  a  step  which  for 
Austria  involved  a  new  declaration  of  war  against 
Russia,  and  which  was  only  too  likely  to  draw  Prussia 


THE  FOUR  REQUISITIONS.  239 

and  Germany  into  the  complicatiou.  Prussia's  resent- 
ment was  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  Western 
Powers  preserved  a  strict  silence  towards  her  with 
regard  to  the  matter.  "  It  seems,"  said  Herr  von 
Manteuffel,  "  as  if  we  were  to  be  punished  for  diif ering 
in  our  opinion  from  the  Western  Powers." 

Besides,  it  was  impossible  to  discover  the  least 
advantage  to  German  interests  in  the  four  requisitions. 
The  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  Danube  meant  at 
the  time  almost  nothing  to  the  Germans,  and  would 
not  be  likely  to  be  of  consequence  to  them,  unless 
perhaps  in  the  distant  future.  The  removal  of  the 
Russian  protectorate  over  the  Danube  principalities 
was  all  very  well,  but  the  replacement  of  the  same  by  a 
Pan-European  guaranty  might  be  attended  with  very 
unpleasant  consequences.  The  third  and  fourth  points 
concerned  matters  to  which  Germany  was  decidedly 
indifferent ;  and  furthermore,  they  were  stated  so 
indefinitely  that  everything  depended  upon  their  more 
exact  interpretation.  In  spite  of  all  this,  the  King 
decided  on  the  13th  of  August  to  recommend  to  the 
Czar  the  four  requisitions  as  a  starting-point  for  peace- 
negotiations  and  an  armistice ;  but  he  also  made  it 
known  in  Vienna  that  he  would  not  bind  himself  by 
promising  to  take  up  arms  against  Russia,  if  she  saw  lit 
to  decline  these  demands. 

While  this  correspondence  was  going  on,  the  Russians 
had  completely  withdrawn  from  Wallachia,  and  on  the 
20th  of  August,  Austrian  and  Turkish  troops  entered 
the  country.     Yet  there  was  anxiety  still  at  Vienna  as 


240  DISCORD. 

to  the  consequences.  Therefore,  Count  Buol  instructed 
the  deputy  to  the  Confederate  Diet,  Herr  von  Prokesch, 
to  sound  carefully  the  sentiments  of  the  German 
Courts  as  represented  at  Frankfort.  Prokesch,  then, 
just  before  the  usual  adjournment  of  the  Diet,  put 
the  question  in  a  session  of  the  committee  whether 
the  German  Governments  were  inclined  to  include, 
as  under  the  protection  of  the  April  alliance,  the 
Austrian  troops  in  the  Danube  principalities  as  well 
as  Austria's  own  proper  territory,  and  also  whether 
the  Governments  following  Austria's  example  were 
ready  to  bind  themselves  to  accept  and  carry  out  the 
four  points  of  the  requisitions.  The  other  members  of 
that  committee  could  only  reply  by  promising  to 
announce  the  answer  of  their  Governments  after  the 
vacation. 

At  the  beginning  of  September,  a  Russian  note 
appeared,  dated  August  26th,  rejecting  absolutely  the 
four  requisitions,  and  declaring  that  Russia  would  in 
the  future  confine  herself  to  the  defence  of  her  posses- 
sions, and  with  fixed  resolution  await  the  course  of 
events. 

The  Prussian  King  was  at  the  time  at  Putbus  on 
the  island  of  Riigen,  attended  by  Bismarck,  Alvens- 
leben,  and  Colonel  Manteuffel.  The  President  of  the 
Ministry  was  also  summoned  thither.  On  the  3d  of 
September,  as  a  negative  reply  to  the  questions  pro- 
posed by  Prokesch,  a  circular  to  the  German  Courts 
was  drawn  up,  to  the  effect  that,  after  Russia's  declara- 
tion that  she  wished  to   remain    upon   the   defensive, 


ATTITUDE  OF  PRUSSIA   AND  NAPOLEON.      241 

there  was  no  imminent  danger  threatening  the  Austrian 
troops  in  the  principalities,  and  therefore  an  extension 
of  the  April  alliance  for  their  protection  was  not  neces- 
sary ;  further,  that  the  four  requisitions  were  open  to 
many  objections,  and  the  King,  especially  since 
Russia's  refusal,  could  not  recommend  to  his  allies  any 
participation  in  them  that  might  give  rise  to  burdens 
and  to  obligations  ;  he  also  hoped  that  Austria  would 
refrain  from  an}^  aggressive  movement,  and  so  avoid 
new  complications. 

By  this  means,  in  view  of  the  well-known  sentiments 
of  the  Lesser  States,  all  hope  was  destroyed  for  Aus- 
tria of  influencing  the  Confederate  Diet  to  pass  warlike 
decrees,  unless,  indeed,  Frederick  William  should  allow 
himself  to  be  persuaded  to  change  his  position  at  the 
last  minute.  Accordingly,  Count  Buol  decided  for  the 
jjresent  to  remain  passive,  especially  since  the  English 
and  French  land-forces,  to  the  number  of  50,000  men, 
which  had  been  gathering  up  to  this  time  at  Varna, 
now  embarked,  on  the  5th  of  September,  with  a  portion 
of  the  Turkish  army  for  the  Crimea  to  besiege  the 
great  military  seaport  town,  Sebastopol ;  and  thus  no 
support  was  to  be  looked  for  by  Austria  from  that 
source  along  the  Danube  and  the  Carpathian  jNIoun- 
tains,  in  case  she  made  an  attack  upon  the  Russians. 

The  Western  Powers  were  exceedingly  angry  at  the 
course  events  had  taken.  Former  remarks  of  Buol's 
had  led  them  to  count  at  least  upon  Austria's  re- 
calling her  ambassador  from  St.  Petersburg  in  case 
Russia  refused  to  comply  with  the   four  requisitions ; 


I 


242  DISCORD. 

after  which  diplomatic  rupture,  military  operations 
would  probably  soon  follow.  But  nothing  of  the  kind 
was  done,  and  Russia  could  with  composure  bring  great 
masses  of  troops  together  to  crush  the  bold  assailants  at 
Sebastopol. 

Austria  turned  the  blame  off  upon  Prussia,  but  was 
only  half  successful  in  gaining  credit  for  this  in  Paris 
and  London.  The  two  Courts  kept  up,  of  course,  their 
resentment  against  the  Berlin  Cabinet;  but  yet  they 
confessed  that  Prussia  had  indeed  more  reason  than 
Austria  to  wish  to  preserve  Russia's  friendship,  and 
had  always  shown  consistently  only  one  color,  whereas 
Austria  was  always  playing  with  the  sword,  but  did 
not  draw  it  at  the  critical  moment.  Thus  they  poured 
out  the  vials  of  their  wrath  over  both  of  the  German 
Powers. 

Napoleon,  who  at  the  time  was  visited  by  Prince 
Albert,  confidentially  told  his  guest  that  although  he 
was  obliged,  naturally,  to  direct  his  policy  according  to 
the  course  of  events,  yet  the  inmost  wish  of  his  heart 
was  ever  the  liberation  of  Poland  from  the  Russian 
yoke,  and  Italy  from  the  Austrian,  a  wish  which  his 
endeavor  at  that  time  to  provoke  Austria  into  a  war 
with  Russia  placed  in  a  peculiar  light.  His  ambassa- 
dors at  the  German  Courts  remarked  significantly  that 
if  Russia  were  not  forced  by  Germany's  attitude  into 
making  peace  before  the  end  of  the  year,  then  it  would 
be  necessary  in  the  spring  to  call  in  revolutionary  help. 

In  keeping  with  this,  a  rumor  arose  in  several  places, 
to  the   effect   that   France,  in  a  secret  understanding 


PRUSSIA'S  FEARS.  243 

with  Austria,  was  collecting  troops  upon  her  own 
eastern  frontier,  with  a  view  to  letting  them  march 
through  South  Germany  towards  Poland  in  order  to 
attack  Russia  in  her  most  vulnerable  spot.  The  Eng- 
lish newspapers  kept  saying  that  if  the  sleepy  Germans 
did  not  soon  of  their  own  accord  fulfil  their  duty  towards 
Europe,  it  would  be  necessary  to  drag  them  in  disgrace 
into  the  arena.  The  English  diplomats,  too,  made 
similar  observations ;  so  that  Minister  von  Manteuffel 
began  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  blockade  of  the 
Prussian  coasts  by  the  allied  fleet.  Bismarck  laughed 
at  the  idea.  "  I  place  no  belief,"  he  wrote,  "  in  the 
probability  of  a  blockade  that  would  do  English  com- 
merce more  harm  than  it  would  us,  until  I  see  it 
actually  taking  place ;  and  as  to  the  passage  of  a 
French  army  across  Germany,  the  simplest  and  most 
effective  means  of  resisting  this  would  be  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  two  Prussian  and  two  South  German  army- 
corps.  If  we  show  ourselves  to  be  absolutely  without 
fear,  others  will  not  molest  us." 

Meanwhile,  the  King  was  disturbed  by  very  earnest 
and  half-threatening  letters  from  Prince  Albert,  which 
induced  him  to  favor  an  attempt  to  still  the  fury  of  the 
storm  rather  by  friendly  advances  than  by  mobilization. 
He  therefore  sent  one  of  his  adjutant-generals,  the  old 
General  von  Wedell,  to  Paris,  without  any  definite  in- 
structions, but  with  a  fine  letter  to  Napoleon,  overflow- 
ing with  affectionate  sentiment  and  respectful  phrases. 

The  effect  of  this  step  was  not  hap})}-.  Napoleon, 
appreciating  thankfully  the  kind  feeling  expressed  in 


244  DISCORD. 

the  letter,  nevertheless  had  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  ask  the 
Prussian  ambassador,  Count  Hatzfeldt,  whether  all 
that  was  indicative  only  of  the  personal  relations  be- 
tween the  two  Sovereigns,  or  meant  an  alliance  between 
the  two  Governments  and  common  action.  Count 
Hatzfeldt  considered  himself  at  libert}^  only  to  say  that 
the  intention  could  hardly  have  been  to  signify  that  if 
one  of  the  Governments  went  to  war,  the  other  would 
immediately  pounce  upon  their  common  enemy.  While 
Wedell's  mission  was  thus  unsuccessful  in  Paris,  it 
created  everywhere  in  Germany  the  impression  that 
Prussia  was  beginning  to  hesitate,  and  that  this  time, 
too,  Austria  was  again  proving  herself  to  be  the 
strongest   of   the  Confederate    Governments. 

This  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  on  the  28th  of 
September  a  despatch  from  Bucharest  was  received  at 
Vienna  with  the  inforrtlation  that  a  Tartar  had  brought 
the  news  of  a  great  defeat  of  the  Russians  at  Sebastopol, 
and  that  the  city  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the 
allies.  Count  Buol  in  his  exultation  twice  sent  burn- 
ing congratulations  to  Napoleon,  and  determined,  in 
the  midst  of  the  intoxicating  imjDression  which  the 
news  of  this  victory  was  making  upon  all  Europe,  to 
put  to  rout  completely  the  resistance  of  Prussia  and 
the  Lesser  States  to  his  propositions. 

On  the  30th  of  September  he  sent  word  to  Berlin 
that  Austria  must  now  proceed  in  Frankfort  even 
without  Prussia's  co-operation ;  and  on  the  1st  of 
October  announced  to  the  other  German  Courts  that 
Austria  would  make  in  the  Confederate  Diet  at  once  a 


AUSTRIA   AND   THE    WESTERN  POWERS.     245 

peremptory  claim  for  the  protection  of  her  troops  in 
the  principalities,  and  for  the  definite  acceptance 
of  the  four  demands  addressed  to  Russia.  Buol's 
calculations  proved  to  be  well  founded.  The  great 
majority  of  the  Lesser  and  Petty  States  were  com- 
[)letely  overawed,  and  assured  the  imperial  ambassadors 
of  their  most  ardent  friendship. 

Prussia  sent,  indeed,  on  the  13th  of  October,  a  warn- 
ing circular  to  them  all,  urging  them  not  to  be  led  into 
making  a  promise  of  such  a  nature  that  afterwards  any 
miserable  affray  between  Turks  and  Russians  on  the 
Pruth  would  involve  first  Austria  and  then  with  her  all 
Germany  in  the  war.  But  meanwhile  the  probability 
of  such  a  war  grew  less  every  day.  The  news  brought 
by  the  Tartar  very  soon  proved  to  be  a  fabrication  ;  for 
Sebastopol  had  in  fact  made  an  heroic  resistance.  So 
the  forces  of  both  parties  collected  about  this  point,  and 
there  was  no  talk  about  any  engagements  on  the  river 
Pruth. 

Russia  renewed  in  Berlin  the  declaration  of  her 
determination  to  limit  her  action  to  the  defensive,  and 
indeed  implied  a  willingness  under  certain  circum- 
stances to  accede  to  the  four  requisitions.  Milder 
messages  came,  too,  from  Vienna :  saying  (November 
9th)  that  although  Austria  might  be  obliged  in  case  of 
necessity  to  compel  the  acceptance  of  the  four  points 
by  force  of  arms,  yet  she  had  no  desire  at  all  to  make 
any  aggressive  movements,  and  would  make  no  agree- 
ments with  the  other  Powers  concerning  a  war,  without 
fii'st  informing  Prussia  and  Germany. 


246  DISCORD. 

Upon  this,  Herr  von  Manteuffel  inquired  several 
times  during  the  next  few  weeks  of  Count  Buol  with 
regard  to  the  latter's  relations  with  the  Western 
Powers,  and  received  only  the  reply  that  the  details  of 
the  application  of  the  four  points  were  being  discussed. 
Under  these  circumstances,  when  everything  seemed  to 
be  tending  towards  peace,  it  seemed  to  the  Berlin 
Court  that  there  would  be  no  danger  in  yielding  a  trifle 
to  the  wishes  of  Austria :  on  the  26th  of  November  it 
was  agreed  that  an  additional  clause  should  be  attached 
to  the  April  Alliance,  and  the  whole  was  immediately 
laid  before  the  Confederate  Diet  for  its  acceptance. 

In  this  additional  clause,  Prussia  extended  the  prom- 
ise of  protection  of  Austrian  territory  so  that  it  might 
also  apply  to  the  Austrian  troops  in  the  principalities, 
and  both  Powers  declared  that  they  would  together  try 
to  induce  Russia  to  accept  the  four  required  points. 
All  promises,  however,  of  resorting  to  war  in  the  event 
of  Russia's  refusal,  and  of  assisting  Austria  in  any 
armed  aggressive  step,  were,  as  before,  strictly  avoided. 
They  very  soon  were  seen,  too,  to  be  superfluous ;  for 
as  early  as  the  28th  of  November,  the  ambassador. 
Prince  Gortschakoff,  announced  to  Count  Buol  that 
the  Emperor  Nicholas  accepted  the  four  requisitions  as 
they  stood.  It  might  now  be  believed,  that  the  way 
was  opened  to  successful  peace-negotiations. 

But  a  new  surprise  was  in  store  for  the  Prussian 
Government,  indeed  a  much  greater  one  than  ever 
before,  and  prepared  for  her  by  her  "  close  ally "  of 
April  20th. 


BUOL'S   OFFER.  247 

It  had  not  been  the  exact  truth  that  Count  Buol  had 
stated  when  he  said  the  details  of  the  application  of  the 
four  points  were  being  discussed  with  the  Western 
Powers.  He  had  in  the  last  few  weeks  been  at  work 
upon  important  matters  of  quite  another  character.  It 
appears  that  he  had  become  weary  of  the  long  post- 
ponement of  the  crisis;  and  since  the  finances  were 
exhausted,  the  army  must  either  be  reduced  to  a  peace- 
footing  or  must  fight.  For  fighting,  however,  there 
was  need  of  more  certain  help  than  Germany  was  will- 
ing to  offer.  Therefore  he  turned  to  the  Western 
Powers,  and  begged  of  them  a  treaty  establishing  a 
closer  alliance.^ 

This  request  found  willing  ears  both  in  London  and 
in  Paris,  especially  because  the  tenacious  resistance  of 
Sebastopol  made  it  vitally  important  that  a  threatening 
attitude  on  the  part  of  Austria  should  prevent  Russia 
from  collecting  an  overwhelming  force  in  the  Crimea. 
Accordingly,  Count  Buol  declared  himself  ready  to 
take  part  in  the  war,  if  Kussia  should  decline  to  fulfil 
the  demands  based  upon  the  four  points.  The  West- 
ern Powers  did  not  at  first  wisli  to  limit  themselves 
still  to  those  four  requisitions,  but  finally  contented 
themselves  with  the  reservation  which  had  been  already 
made  on  the  Stli  of  August,  namely,  tliat  new  condi- 
tions might  be  added  according  to  the  course  that 
events  should  take  in  the  war. 

Count  Buol  then  further  proposed,  that,  so  soon  as 

'  Siioecli  of  Lord  Clarcndou  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  26th  of 
June,  1«!}5. 


248  DISCORD. 

war  broke  out  between  Austria  and  Russia,  an  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance  of  the  three  Powers  should 
come  into  force,  which  should  insure  for  Austria  the 
assistance  of  the  allies  by  land  and  by  sea.  He  also 
demanded  the  settlement  of  some  definite  date  upon 
wliich  this  alliance  should  begin  to  take  effect,  in  case 
a  general  European  peace  should  not  have  been  already 
concluded,  and  proposed  as  such  a  time  the  last  day  of 
that  year.  The  representatives  of  the  Western  Powers 
could  give  their  consent  to  all  this,  and  the  diplomatists 
came  to  an  agreement  about  the  middle  of  November. 

The  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  had  as  yet  raised  no 
objections.  When  Count  Buol,  however,  now  laid  be- 
fore him  the  accomplished  fact,  he  wished  to  hold  aloof. 
His  personal  feeling  for  the  Czar  Nicholas  rebelled 
against  a  step  that  according  to  all  human  calculation 
would  make  a  war  inevitable  with  the  Sovereign  whom 
he  had  formerly  so  highly  respected.  But  Count  Buol, 
it  is  said,  explained  to  him  that  the  interests  of  his 
empire  demanded  the  measure  ;  that  under  the  circum- 
stances the  choice  lay  only  between  a  break  with 
Russia  and  a  break  with  the  Western  Powers ;  and 
that  he  himself,  if  the  Emperor  persisted  in  his  passive 
delay,  would  be  constrained  to  ask  for  his  dismissal.^ 
Thereupon,  the  Emperor,  though  painfully  affected, 
granted  his  approval. 

Up  to  this  point,  no  one  in  Berlin  had  any  idea  of 
all  that  was  going  on.     Count  Buol  now  remembered 

1  Auffsbiirrjer  Allgemeine  Zeititng,  December  14th. 
Harcourt,  Les  quatre  niinlsth-es  de  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  pp.  76,  88. 


CONCLUSION  OF  THE  ALLIANCE.  249 

his  promise  of  November  9tli,  and  thought  —  for  indeed 
the  new  treaty  of  alliance  had  not  yet  been  officially 
signed  and  sealed  —  that  he  would  literally  fulfil  it  by 
a  messaire  to  Herr  von  Manteuffel.  So  the  Austrian 
ambassador,  Count  Esterhazy,  on  the  1st  of  December 
called  upon  the  Prussian  Minister  and  read  to  him  (but 
did  not  give  into  his  hands)  a  despatch  dated  the  28th 
of  November,  in  which  Count  Buol  informed  him  that 
the  Western  Powers  had  imperatively  demanded 
further  and  greater  requisitions  than  those  included  in 
the  four  points ;  that  Austria  had  stood  out  against  this 
until  she  had  become  convinced,  that,  in  order  to  make 
her  opposition  of  any  effect,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
enter  into  closer  relations  with  these  Powers ;  that 
this  involved  defmite  mutual  pledges  and  obligations ; 
and  that  the  result  of  the  negotiations  which  had  been 
held  so  far  had  pointed  to  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of 
alliance,  which,  to  be  sure,  had  not  yet  been  signed  nor 
drawn  up,  but  which  had  been  agreed  upon  in  its  main 
points.  Then  followed  a  resumS  of  the  above-mentioned 
details  of  the  agreement,  with  the  observation  that 
Austria  would  hold  tlie  treaty  of  alliance  open  to 
Prussia  if  she  chose  to  join. 

On  tlie  following  day,  the  2d  of  December,  the  am- 
bassador at  Vienna,  Count  Arnim,  telegraphed  that  the 
treaty  of  alliance  had  already  been  definitely  concluded. 

The  effect  of  this  circumstance  was  violent  excite- 
ment on  all  sides.  Russia  appreciated  the  correctness 
of  what  Prince  Schwarzenberg  had  once  said:  that 
Austria  would  astonish  the  world  by  her  ingratitude. 


250  DISCORD. 

Prince  Gortscliakoff  was  dumfounded  when  Count 
Buol  informed  him  in  a  few  words  of  the  contents  of 
the  treaty.  At  first,  he  was  about  to  ask  for  his  pass- 
ports ;  he  complained  that  he  had  been  deceived,  and 
that,  although  the  Russian  assent  to  the  four  points  had 
been  graciously  accepted  only  three  days  before,  a  com- 
pact of  war  had  been  immediately  afterwards  entered 
into,  which  was  especially  directed  against  Russia.  He 
declared  finally,  that  he  could  make  no  reply  until  he 
received  further  instructions  from  St.  Petersburg ;  and 
left  the  Minister,  filled  with  enduring  hatred,  not 
against  the  Western  Powers,  with  whom  Russia  was  in 
open  war,  but  against  the  faithless  Austria. 

Likewise  beside  themselves,  in  view  of  the  present 
imminent  danger  of  war,  were  the  ambassadors  in 
Vienna  of  the  German  Lesser  and  Petty  States,  and 
soon,  too,  the  German  Courts  themselves,  so  that  for  a 
moment  it  seemed  doubtful  whether  the  Confederate 
Diet  would  accept  the  additional  clause  of  the  26th  of 
November.  The  prevailing  opinion  in  Berlin  was,  that 
such  an  open  declaration  of  hostility  was  not  advisable ; 
and  so  the  Confederate  Diet,  on  the  9th  of  December, 
signified  its  approval,  although  it  was  done  in  a  way 
that  excluded  every  obligation  to  act  upon  the  offensive 
against  Russia,  and  the  Diet  instructed  its  military 
commission  to  propose  the  necessary  measures  for 
securing  the  safety  of  Germany. 

In  Berlin,  as  one  may  readily  imagine,  there  was 
only  one  opinion  concerning  the  craftiness  of  the 
Vienna  policy  and  the   unreliableness  of  such  a  Con- 


THE  KING'S  DILEMMA.  251 

federate  ally.  The  King,  seriously  offended  m  his 
inmost  heart,  at  first  declared  with  external  composure 
that  he  would  simply  persist  in  his  promises  made  on 
the  20th  of  April.  But  his  constantly-varying  tempera- 
ment and  his  ever-active  fancy  were  excited,  as  ever,  in 
different  directions.  Certainly  he  did  not  wish  to  have 
anything  more  to  do  with  Austria.  But  her  new 
alliance  became  a  source  of  anxiety  to  him  by  making 
his  fear  of  the  hostility  of  the  Western  Powers  doubly 
vivid.  The  rumor  already  gained  ground  that  Prussia 
would  not  be  admitted  to  the  future  peace-conferences 
unless  she  joined  the  new  Triple  Alliance. 

Such  an  exclusion,  however,  seemed  to  the  King  to 
be  quite  as  dishonorable  as  it  would  be,  after  Austria's 
conduct,  to  join  the  Alliance.  He  meditated  and  medi- 
tated how  he  might  avoid  both  courses,  and  settled 
upon  the  plan  of  declining  the  Vienna  treaty  on  the 
one  hand,  and  on  llie  other,  of  offering  to  the  Western 
Powers  a  special  Prussian  alliance  of  the  same  import 
as  the  instrument  of  December  2d,  and  of  promising, 
should  peace  not  be  effected,  to  station  an  army  upon 
her  eastern  frontier,  upon  the  borders  of  Russia.  He 
would  consent  to  do  all  this,  however,  upon  two  condi- 
tions :  first,  he  required  a  guaranty  that  the  kingdom 
of  Poland  should  not  be  restored  by  a  revolution  (for 
the  strategic  move  of  stirring  up  a  rebellion  among  the 
Russian  Poles  in  order  to  cripple  Russia's  forces  in 
that  ([uarter  would  be  attained  by  tlie  above-mentioned 
location  of  Pi'ussian  troops  upon  the  frontier)  ;  and 
secondly,    a    guaranty    that    no    foreign  troops    would 


252  DISCORD. 

presume  to  march  through  Prussian  or  German 
territory. 

He  wished  to  make  these  proposals  first  in  London, 
and  selected  for  this  purpose  a  diplomat  of  a  liberal 
complexion,  namely,  Count  Usedom.  The  King  recom- 
mended him  and  his  mission  to  Queen  Victoria  by  an 
autograph  letter  of  the  14th  of  December.  "  He  is," 
said  the  King,  "  the  bearer  of  weighty  matters,  which 
I  put  confidently  into  your  hands.  As  one  of  the 
world's  Great  Powers,  and  as  the  greatest  Protestant 
Power,  Great  Britain  must  not  leave  Prussia  to  the  fate 
that  is  planned  for  her.  Usedom's  mission  is  merely  an 
expression  of  confidence  in  Your  Majesty ;  you  your- 
self, Most  Gracious  Queen,  shall  then  decide  whether 
he  shall  consult  with  your  ministers.  The  ari'iere- 
pensee  of  severing  the  connection  between  England 
and  France  is  entirely  foreign  both  to  me  and  to  my 
Government." 

This  message  achieved  no  more  than  the  sending  of 
Count  Pourtales  before.  The  Queen  of  England  insti- 
tuted no  public  discussion  over  the  matter ;  and  when 
later  somethincr  of  the  contents  of  the  message  became 
known  in  Paris,  the  Minister,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  said  very 
sharply  that  all  this  seemed  to  have  been  done  in  order 
to  prevent  a  French  invasion  of  Poland,  and  to  defend 
for  Russia  her  weakest  frontier.  "  It  appears,"  he  said, 
"  as  if  Usedom  had  had  several  alliance-drafts  in  his 
trunk,  and  had  by  mistake  offered  in  London  the  one 
intended  for  St.  Petersburg." 

Thus  everything  came  about  as  Bismarck  had  pre- 


PRUSSIA   AXD   THE   THREE  ALLIES.  253 

dieted  on  the  19th  of  December  to  Baron  Manteuffel. 
He  had  written :  "  I  believe  that  any  one-sided  negotia- 
tion with  England  will  make  our  relations  with  the 
Western  Powers  rather  worse  than  better;  for  Eng- 
land will  only  turn  us  off,  and  we  shall  have  given  out 
of  the  whole  cloth  an  evidence  of  our  uneasiness." 

Simpler  and  more  practical  than  this  intermezzo  was 
the  action  of  the  Prussian  Government,  when  on  the 
16th  of  December  the  ambassadors  of  the  three  Powers 
officially  presented  the  document  of  their  alliance,  and 
requested  a  statement  regarding  Prussia's  willingness 
to  join  it.  In  his  answer  of  the  19th  of  December,  the 
Minister  von  jNIanteuffel  showed  how  much  good 
Prussia  had  already  accomplished  in  the  Eastern  Ques- 
tion ;  the  Western  Powers  had  used  arms,  Prussia  had 
confined  herself  to  diplomacy,  and  had  contributed  no 
less  to  the  results  that  had  been  secured ;  though 
different  means  had  been  employed,  the  same  end  had 
been  in  view ;  but  now  Prussia  was  to  join  in  the  Avar 
against  Russia,  unless  the  latter  before  the  close  of  the 
year  should  accept  the  conditions  of  peace  imposed  b}' 
the  allies ;  yet  it  lay  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  tliat 
Prussia  must  before  all  things  be  made  acquainted  with 
these  conditions  of  peace,  for  she  could  never  consent 
to  pledge  herself  to  assist  in  a  war  which  was  being 
waged  for  the  sake  of  gaining  unknown  ends  ;  every- 
thing depended  for  the  time  upon  the  construction  put 
upon  the  four  demands;  and  therefore  Prussia  begged 
the  Powers  to  acquaint  her  with  what  they  had  already 
determined  upon. 


254  DISCORD. 

There  could  not  be  mucli  objection  made  to  this. 
But  Prussia  would  have  immediateh'  introduced  the  de- 
sired information  into  further  negotiations,  and  against 
this  France  and  England  decidedly  protested.  Accord- 
ingly, Count  Buol,  on  the  24th  of  December,  replied 
that  he  could  not  say  anything  about  the  construction 
to  be  put  upon  the  four  points  by  the  Powers,  because 
they  liad  as  yet  come  to  no  agreement  upon  the  matter 
among  themselves,  and  that  furthermore  any  such 
agreement  was  impossible  so  long  as  the  war  was 
raging.  This  bold  statement,  that  conditions  of  peace 
could  not  be  formulated  so  long  as  the  war  lasted,  left 
in  Berlin  only  the  two  alternatives  of  believing  that  the 
logic  of  the  Viennese  was  a  strange  science,  or  that 
they  intended  openly  to  mock  the  Prussians. 

So  much  the  more  drastic  was  the  impression  that 
was  produced,  when  on  the  same  day  another  despatch 
from  Count  Buol  arrived,  likewise  dated  the  24th  of 
December,  in  which  Prussia's  holding  aloof  from  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  regretted,  and  in  which,  with  all 
the  coolness  possible,  the  request  was  made,  in  view  of 
the  evident  immediate  danger  to  Austrian  territory 
from  Russian  attacks  after  the  opening  of  the  new 
year,  that,  agreeably  to  the  military  convention  of  the 
20th  of  April,  the  mobilization  of  200,000  Prussian 
troops  determined  upon  in  such  an  event  should  now 
take  place.  Xotice  was  also  given  that  Herr  von 
Prokesch  had  received  instructions  to  request  the 
corresponding  mobilization  of  half  or  the  whole  of  the 
Confederate  contingents,  and  their  assignment  to  the 


BUOL'S  DESPATCHES.  255 

Austrian  and  Prussian  armies.  Evidently  Count  Buol 
flattered  himself  that  just  after  the  close  alliance  of 
Austria  ^vith  the  Western  Powers,  no  German  Govern- 
ment would  have  the  courage  to  make  any  resistance 
to  the  demands  of  the  Court  of  Vienna. 

Yet  after  all,  it  became  evident,  soon  after  the  send- 
ing of  the  two  despatches,  that  although  peace  would 
not  be  assured  by  the  end  of  the  new  year,  and  conse- 
quently the  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  would 
come  into  force,  yet  Austria  would  by  no  means  begin 
at  once  a  war  with  Russia.  However  angry  the  Czar 
Nicholas  might  inwardly  feel  at  Austria's  hostile  turn, 
yet  Russian  interests  too  evidently  depended  upon 
preventing  an  open  rupture.  Prince  Gortschakoff 
accordingly  received  instructions  to  begin  negotiations 
upon  the  basis  of  the  four  requisitions. 

The  first  conference  between  him  and  the  representa- 
tives of  the  three  Powers  took  place  on  the  28th  of 
December.  At  this  conference  certain  demands  were 
made  by  the  allies,  to  which  GortschakoiT  was  again 
obliged  to  reply  that  in  his  instructions  and  full  powers 
tliose  points  had  not  been  anticipated,  and  that  he 
therefore  must  ask  for  a  respite  of  two  weeks  that  he 
might  receive  fresh  information.  However  much  Count 
Buol  siglied  at  this  loss  of  time  and  money,  the  request 
could  not  be  refused,  especially  since  the  unusual 
severity  of  the  winter  made  all  military  operations  for 
the  moment  out  of  the  question. 

Furthermore,  a  dark  sliadow  had  already  fallen  over 
the    Count's  affection   for  the   Western   Powers,   from 


256  DISCORD. 

the  circumstance  that  Napoleon  —  we  ah'eady  know 
his  motives  —  had  in  the  course  of  December  held 
negotiations  with  Sardinia  with  regard  to  her  joining 
the  Alliance  and  her  sending  troops  to  the  Crimea. 
England,  owing  to  the  paucity  of  her  soldiers,  had 
eagerly  favored  this  scheme  and  promised  Victor 
Emanuel  a  magnificent  donation  of  money  ;  and  upon 
that,  the  treaty  of  alliance  was  signed  on  the  26th  of 
December  between  Sardinia  and  the  Western  Powers. 

Nothing  more  disagreeable  or  more  alarming  could 
possibly  have  happened  for  the  Court  of  Vienna.  The 
champion  of  Italian  Unity,  the  patron  of  all  Italian 
revolutionaries,  the  mortal  enemy  of  Austrian  dominion 
in  Italy,  was  to  win  claims  U]3on  the  gratitude  and 
support  of  the  "Western  Powers,  and  above  all  of  that 
Italian  conspirator  who  had  made  himself  the  absolute 
Imperator  of  France  !  "  Never  !  "  exclaimed  Count 
Buol  to  Baron  Bourqueney,  "  never  can  the  standards 
of  Piedmont,  though  side  by  side  with  those  of  France, 
become  for  us  any  other  than  the  banners  of  the 
enemy."  However  much  Drouyn  cle  Lhuys  empha- 
sized the  fact  that  the  treaty  was  purely  a  military  and 
temporary  one,  yet  Count  Buol's  mistrust  was  not  in 
the  least  allayed,  and  all  the  more  anxiously  did  he 
await  the  reply  of  Pi'ussia  to  his  despatch  of  the  24th 
of  December. 

This  reply  came  to  hand  on  the  5th  of  January,  1855, 
and  was  precisely  what  the  situation  of  things  made 
alone  possible.  It  was  to  the  following  effect:  the 
April  treaty  and  its  additions  aimed  only  at  the  ward- 


PRUSSIA'S  REPLY.  257 

ing  off  of  Russian  attacks,  and  there  is  less  reason  now 
than  ever  to  expect  that  such  an  attack  will  be  made ;  if 
Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  should  aggressively  invade 
Russian  territory,  that  is  no  concern  of  Prussia's,  nor 
could  Austria  in  that  case  lay  any  claim  to  assistance 
from  the  German  States ;  moreover,  the  additional 
clause  of  the  26th  of  November  presupposes  a  common 
support  of  the  four  points  by  both  Powers :  therefore 
so  long  as  Austria  continues  to  exclude  Prussia  from 
the  Vienna  conferences,  the  clause  does  not  in  the  least 
bind  Prussia ;  consequently,  there  is  no  reason  for  a 
mobilization  of  Prussian  troops ;  yet  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  Prussia  has  so  far  quietly  continued  to  prepare 
her  troops  for  the  possibilities  of  war,  that  if  necessary 
they  can  appear  upon  the  scene  in  much  less  time  than 
the  thirty-six  days  mentioned  in  the  treaty  of  April. 

Thus  Austria  saw  upon  one  side  the  threatening 
attitude  of  Sardinia,  and  upon  the  other  the  flat  refusal 
of  support  from  Germany.  Count  Buol's  courage  sank, 
and  in  the  heart  of  the  Emperor  Francis  arose  again  the 
old  unwillincrness  to  wasfe  a  war  with  Nicholas. 

Meanwhile,  Prince  Gortschakoff  was  prepared  on  the 
7th  of  January  to  lay  before  the  conference  the  assent 
of  his  Government  to  the  demands  made  by  the  allies 
on  the  28th  of  December ;  so  that  nothing  stood  any 
longer  in  the  way  of  bringing  forward  the  special 
conditions  of  peace. 

Count  IJuol,  however,  still  considered  it  advisable  to 
try  once  more  his  success  witli  the  remaining  German 
states.     He  sent  word  to  them  in  a  circular  note  dated 


258  DISCORD. 

the  14th  of  January,  that,  in  spite  of  Prussia's  differ- 
ence of  opinion,  the  imperial  presiding  deputy  of  the 
Confederate  Diet  had  received  the  order  to  propose  to 
that  body  the  mobilization  of  half  or  the  whole  of  the 
Confederate  contingents,  and  also  the  election  of  a 
Confederate  commander-in-chief.  To  provide  for  the 
very  probable  event  of  the  failure  of  such  a  motion  to 
pass  in  the  Diet,  the  Count  also  took  on  the  same  day 
another  step,  by  sending  a  confidential  note  to  several 
of  the  German  Courts,  in  which  he  asked  whether  they 
would  be  willing  individually  to  place  their  troops  at 
the  disposal  of  Austria,  in  return  for  a  guai'anty  of  the 
protection  of  their  present  possessions,  and  a  propor- 
tionate share  in  the  profits  of  the  war.  Certainly,  it 
would  have  been  hard  to  tell  what  advantages  Wiirtem- 
berg  or  Hanover  might  gain  from  a  war  in  the  Orient ! 

Although  the  Austrian  proposals  were  seconded  by 
very  harsh  and  urgent  notes  from  Drouyn  de  Lhuys, 
yet  the  result  of  these  measures  was  merely  a  new 
defeat  of  the  Vienna  policy.  Bavaria  and  Saxony 
answered  immediately  in  the  negative.  Several  of  the 
smaller  states  instructed  their  deputies  in  the  Con- 
federate Diet  to  vote  for  every  motion  brought  forward 
by  both  of  the  Great  Powers,  but  for  no  others.  Even 
ever-loyal  Darmstadt  was  not  willing  to  send  away  her 
troops  in  Austria's  service  into  unknown  lands. 
At  last,  Brunswick  alone  remained  at  Austria's  side. 

On  the  8th  of  February  the  vote  of  the  Confederate 
Diet  was  passed,  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  danger 
whatever  of  a  Russian  attack,  there  was  no  occasion  for 


REFUSAL   OF  GERMAN  ASSISTANCE.         259 

mobilization,  nor  for  the  election  of  a  Confederate 
commander-in-chief ;  yet  in  view  of  the  uncertain  state 
of  things  in  Europe,  the  Confederation,  conformably  to 
its  duty  to  care  for  the  independence  and  inviolability 
of  Germany  as  prescribed  by  Article  II.  of  the  Act  of 
Confederation,  ordered  the  contingents  to  be  so  far 
prepared  for  war  that  they  could  be  ready  to  march 
from  headquarters  within  fourteen  days  after  being 
called   out. 

This  note  translated  into  practical  language  meant : 
We  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  aggressive  war- 
policy,  but  will  defend  ourselves  against  every  one  that 
may  try  to  break  down  our  position  of  neutrality. 

The  anger  of  Count  Buol  over  this  unfavorable 
result  knew  no  bounds.  There  followed,  during 
February  and  March,  a  very  lively  correspondence 
between  Vienna,  Berlin,  and  the  Lesser  States,  which 
was  carried  on  in  an  irritated  and  threatening  tone  on 
the  part  of  Austria,  and  on  the  part  of  Prussia  with 
cool  non-compliance. 

The  situation  was  not  at  all  changed  by  this  corre- 
spondence, but  the  breach  between  Austria  and  Ger- 
many grew  constantly  wider. 


260  HE  SUITS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

RESULTS. 

Mea:n^while  the  opening  of  the  peace-conferences 
was  delayed  from  day  to  day,  and  from  week  to  week. 
Before  the  claims  in  detail  could  be  proposed  to  the 
common  adversary,  they  must,  of  course,  each  be 
agreed  upon  by  the  three  Powers  among  themselves. 
But  in  these  consultations,  difficulties  arose  over  almost 
every  word,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  mighty 
allies  no  longer,  as  on  the  2d  of  December,  had  the 
same  thing  in  mind.  The  Western  Powers  wished  to 
make  such  demands  as  seemed  to  them  imperative,  and 
then  to  continue  the  war  if  these  were  refused ;  where- 
as Austria,  after  her  recent  experiences,  wished  to  im- 
pose no  conditions  that  seemed  beforehand  likely  to  be 
rejected,  and  thus  likely  to  prolong  the  war. 

At  first,  France  opposed  this  tendency  on  the  part  of 
Austria  with  reference  to  several  articles,  while  Eng- 
land favored  and  upheld  it ;  and  after  that,  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys  declared  that  if  such  a  lame  conduct  was  to  con- 
tinue, France  would  conclude  a  simi:)le  peace  with 
Russia,  and  leave  to  the  allies  alone  the  business  of 
restricting  Russia's  power  in  the  Orient.  Then  came  a 
change  of  ministry  in  England,  Avhich  brought  in  ]ilace 
of  the  peaceful  Lord  Aberdeen  the  warlike  Palmerston 


ACCESSION  OF  ALEXANDER  II.  261 

at  the  head  of  the  Cabmet,  so  that  soon  the  English 
demands  were  more  pronounced  than  the  French,  and 
Count  Buol  coukl  find  no  other  excuse  for  Austria's 
holding  back  than  Prussia's  heinous  friendship  with 
Russia,  over  wliich  he  constantly  grumbled. 

In  the  midst  of  these  distressing  quarrels  came  then 
the  news  that  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  in  consequence  of  a 
neglected  attack  of  la  grippe,  which  had  developed  into 
pneumonia,  had  died  on  the  2d  of  March.  His  career, 
once  so  famous  as  he  stood  upon  the  pinnacle  of  glory, 
had  ended  in  darkness.  His  powerful  constitution, 
exhausted  already  by  chronic  disease,  had  been  at  last 
completely  broken  down  by  the  fearful  mental  strain  of 
the  last  year.  Fallen  from  his  position  as  paramount 
sovereign  of  Europe,  he  had  seen  the  errors  into  which 
his  vanity  had  led  him,  condemned  by  the  whole  world, 
his  gigantic  empire  become  more  and  more  defenceless, 
his  army  reduced  by  enormous  losses,  his  fleet  half 
destroyed,  and  his  finances  seriously  disordered. 

But  all  this  had  made  him  hold  only  the  more  tena- 
ciously, till  his  last  breath  was  drawn,  to  the  role  in 
which  he  had  his  whole  life  long  appeared  before  the 
world.  As  lie  had  from  no  motives  of  selfish  ambition 
drawn  the  sword  in  1828  to  protect  the  Christian 
Greeks,  and  as  he  had  in  the  same  spirit  in  1848 
opposed  the  Revolution,  so,  too,  he  announced  in  a 
manifesto  a  few  days  before  his  death,  that  it  had  been 
fully  free  from  selfish  considerations,  and  only  for  the 
liberation  of  the  orthodox  church,  that  he  had  begun 
the  war.     Truly,  this  was  not  hypocrisy  from  the  lips 


262  RESULTS. 

of  him  who  was  at  once  a  political  and  an  ecclesiastical 
autocrat.  If  in  the  event  of  a  successful  dischargee  of 
such  holy  duties,  an  extension  of  Russian  territory 
came  about  as  a  secondary  result,  then  it  was  only  a 
confirmation  of  the  truth  that  to  those  that  serve  the 
Lord,  all  things  work  for  good. 

Inasmuch  as  the  young  Emperor  Alexander  II.  declared 
on  his  accession  to  the  throne  that  it  was  his  intention 
to  continue  in  every  respect  the  policy  of  his  father,  this 
change  of  rulers  had  no  further  effect  than  to  postpone 
the  beginning  of  the  conferences  for  two  weeks,  to 
enable  Prince  Gortschakoff  to  secure  his  new  creden- 
tials. During  this  time  the  allies  came  to  an  agree- 
ment in  regard  to  the  details  relating  to  the  first  two  of 
the  four  requisitions :  the  position  of  the  Danube 
Principalities  and  the  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the 
Danube  River.  And  then,  after  the  arrival  of  a  Turkish 
plenipotentiary,  the  deliberations  could  finally  begin  on 
the  16th  of  March. 

It  became  evident  very  soon  that  no  serious  difficul- 
ties were  to  be  experienced  in  the  settlement  of  those 
""^two  points,  and  after  six  sessions  a  long  list  of  articles 
relating  to  them  received  the  approval  of  all  parties. 
But  it  was  different  with  the  third  point,  the  revision 
of  the  treaty  of  1841.  Every  one  knew  already  that  in 
more  than  one  detail  there  would  be  dissenting  opin- 
ions, and  that  consequently  upon  this  point  turned  the 
question  of  peace  and  war. 

The  treaty  of  1841  provided  that  in  times  of  peace 
no  war-ship  should  pass   the  Dardanelles.     But  since 


ENGLAND'S  PROPOSITION.  263 

that  time  Russia  had  built  upon  the  Black  Sea  a  fleet 
far  exceeding  in  strength  the  Turkish  navy ;  and  the 
true  question  at  issue  in  the  discussion  of  the  third 
point  was  the  abolition  of  this  Russian  preponderance 
of  power  upon  the  Euxine.  When  Prince  Gortschakoff 
gave  his  assent  on  the  7th  of  January,  it  was  with  the 
reservation,  strongly  emphasized,  that  no  sovereign 
right  of  the  Czar's  should  be  encroached  upon  by  the 
measures  which  were  to  be  introduced. 

The  question  was  now,  whether  it  would  be  at  all 
possible  to  gain  the  object  desired  and  to  respect  this 
reservation.  One  method  would  have  been  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  treaty  of  1841,  and  then  the  establishment 
of  permanent  naval  stations  of  the  Western  Powers  in 
Turkish  ports  on  the  Black  Sea :  Russia  would  at  that 
time  have  raised  no  objection.  But  England  found  in 
such  an  arrangement  numerous  difficulties,  and  pro- 
posed, as  at  once  the  simplest  and  most  effective  plan, 
the  neutralization  of  the  Black  Sea ;  that  is  to  say,  the 
exclusion  of  all  war-ships  and  naval  stations  from  this 
whole  region. 

England  made  this  proposition  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  Russia  would  most  probably  reject  it.  Accord- 
ingly, whoever  was  anxious  for  a  speedy  conclusion  of 
peace,  must  devise  some  mediatory  measure :  in  place 
of  complete  neutrality  some  limitation  of  the  navy  to 
be  maintained  by  either  country  upon  the  Black  Sea. 
This  end  miglit  be  attained  either  by  forbidding  an 
increase  in  the  size  of  the  fleets  as  they  then  stood,  or  by 
determining  for  each  of  the  two  countries  a  certain  per- 


264  RESULTS. 

missible  number  of  ships.  lu  the  latter  case  the  matter 
could  be  determined  either  by  the  conference  or  by  an 
independent  treaty  between  Russia  and  Turkey. 

The  affair  was  considered  so  important,  that  at  the 
end  of  March  both  England  and  the  Porte  each  sent  one 
of  their  most  prominent  ministers  to  the  conference ; 
namely,  Lord  John  Russell  and  Ali  Pacha ;  Drouyn 
de  Lhuys  also  secured  from  Napoleon  an  appointment 
to  undertake  the  same  mission.  Thus  the  conference 
of  ambassadors  became  a  conference  of  ministers ;  and 
one  that  was  to  be  of  great  moment,  not  only  for  the 
issue  of  the  Crimean  war,  but  also  for  European 
politics  during  the  whole  of  the  next  decade. 

Drouyn  de  Lhuys  was  a  well-informed  and  able  man, 
firm  and  consistent  in  his  convictions,  not  demonstra- 
tive in  his  actions,  brought  up  under  Catholic  influences, 
and  trained  in  the  old  school  of  French  diplomacy.  As 
a  statesman  he  was  thoroughly  conservative  and  free 
from  every  trace  of  that  kind  of  ambition  possessed  by 
the  first  Napoleon.  He  strove  neither  for  glory  in  wars 
nor  for  reforms,  but  was  convinced  rather  that  for  the 
maintenance  of  a  high  position  among  the  European 
states  nothing  could  be  more  beneficial  for  France 
than  the  order  of  things  sanctioned  in  1815  :  union  and 
consequently  strength  in  the  French  nation,  disunion 
and  consequently  weakness  in  her  neighbors,  that  is,  in 
Italy  and  Germany. 

His  repugnance  to  Italian  Unity  was  increased  by 
the  fact  that  it  was  connected  with  danger  to  papal 
dominion  ;    for    he    honored  the   Catholic   Church   not 


DROUYN  DE  LHUYS.  265 

only  as  the  guide  to  heavenly  bliss,  but  as  a  conserva- 
tive element  in  internal  government,  as  an  ancient  ally 
of  the  French  Nation,  and  as  contributing  largely  to  the 
great  influence  of  the  French  in  the  Orient.  In  Ger- 
many he  entertained  a  decided  dislike  for  Prussia  with 
her  Protestant  and  unifying  tendencies ;  for  both  of 
these  qualities  seemed  to  him  to  be  ineradicably 
grounded  in  the  nature  and  in  the  history  of  that  State, 
however  graciously  Frederick  William  IV.  granted  com- 
plete independence  to  the  Catholic  Church,  and  how- 
ever ostentatiously  he  pretended  to  have  great  respect 
for  the  sovereignty  of  the  German  princes. 

As  the  result  of  all  these  considerations,  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys  looked  upon  the  imperial  State  of  Austria,  the 
protector  of  the  Pope  and  the  anchor  of  the  German 
Confederate  Diet,  as  the  best  possible  ally  that  France 
could  find  in  Europe.  He  probably  also  thought  to 
himself  that  such  connections  would  prove  to  be  not 
only  a  support,  but  a  check  as  well,  to  the  restless  policy 
of  his  master.  Therefore  he  was  very  anxious  to  see 
the  league,  entered  into  with  Austria  for  the  Crimean 
war,  develop  into  a  permanent  alliance.  He  determined 
to  leave  no  stone  unturned  in  Vienna  in  the  endeavor 
to  remain  united  with  Austria,  whether  for  peace  or  for 
war. 

Prudent  diplomat  that  he  was,  he  went  first  to 
London  that  he  might  know  how  to  anticipate  possible 
English  obstructions  to  his  plans.  While  he  expressed 
himself  there  as  being  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  neutral- 
ization of  the  Euxine,  he  nevertheless  said  he  expected 


266  RESULTS. 

that  Austria  would  hardly  accede  to  such  radical 
demands,  and  consequently  would  not  consider  their 
rejection  as  sufficient  ground  for  the  declaration  of  war. 
He  declared,  however,  that  it  was  of  the  very  greatest 
importance  that  Austria  should  engage  in  active  war- 
fare, and  this  would  most  probably  be  brought  about,  if 
Russia  should  also  refuse  a  more  moderate  demand  in 
the  way  of  a  limitation  placed  upon  her  navy. 

Therefore  he  proposed :  That  Russia  and  Turkey 
shall  each  be  allowed  only  four  ships  of  the  line  upon 
the  Black  Sea,  four  frigates  and  a  corresponding 
number  of  smaller  vessels  ;  each  of  the  three  allied 
Powers  shall  maintain  the  half  of  that  number ;  Russia 
shall  be  denied  the  privilege  of  sailing  out  into  the 
Mediterranean ;  the  Porte  can  in  case  of  imminent 
danger  summon  all  the  allied  fleets  into  the  Black  Sea. 
The  English  lords  declared  themselves  in  favor  of  this 
whole  plan ;  and  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  then  started  for 
Vienna,  where  after  a  rapid  journey  he  arrived  on  the 
6th  of  April. 

Two  days  later  he  had  an  audience  with  the  Emperor. 
He  began  with  a  few  words  about  his  master's  firm  and 
honest  determination  to  co-operate  with  his  allies  either 
to  bring  about  a  lasting  peace  or  to  continue  a  just  war. 
"  Yes,"  exclaimed  the  Emperor,  "  let  us  secure  peace  !  " 
Thereupon,  the  Minister  explained  his  plans  in  refer- 
ence to  the  third  requisition :  in  the  first  place,  the 
neutralization  of  the  Euxine  ;  in  the  second,  limitation 
of  the  fleets.  He  called  attention  to  the  energy  with 
which  in  the  last  few  days  France  had  advocated  the 


DROUYN  AND   THE  EMPEROR.  267 

points  relating  to  the  Principalities  and  the  navigation 
of  the  Danube,  points  which  above  all  interested  Aus- 
tria ;  and  he  now  hoped  that  Austria  would  be  equally 
resolute  with  regard  to  the  third  point,  which  was  of 
vital  importance,  to  the  maritime  Powers. 

He  then  enlarged  upon  the  common  advantages  of 
a  close  union  between  France  and  Austria.  "  To 
strengthen  the  tie  that  binds  her  crown-lands  together, 
to  assert  her  high  position  in  Germany  in  the  face  of  a 
dangerous  rival,  to  stop  the  encroachments  of  Russia 
on  the  Danube,  to  suppress  anarchy  and  socialism,  and 
to  promote  the  internal  prosperity  of  the  empire  — 
these,"  said  he,  "  are  certainly  the  aims  of  Austrian 
politics  !  Now,  ^^  liat  ally  could  contribute  more  to  the 
attainment  of  these  ends  than  France  ?  The  great 
problem  is,  to  check  the  Revolution  without  the  aid  of 
Russia,  and  to  check  Russia  without  the  aid  of  the 
Revolution.  For  thirty  years  the  problem  has  been 
unsolved,  and  the  result  has  been  the  simultaneous 
triumph  of  Russia  and  of  the  Revolution.  To-day  the 
solution  is  to  be  found  in  the  alliance  of  Austria  and 
France.  What  has  brought  me  to  Vienna  is  not  at  all 
so  much  the  wish  to  conclude  peace  with  Russia  as  to 
confirm  and  render  fruitful  an  alliance  with  Austria. 
In  tlic  eyes  of  true  statesmanship,  the  Eastern  Ques- 
tion, in  spite  of  its  significance,  becomes  in  comparison 
witli  this  other  one  a  matter  of  only  secondary  impor- 
tance." 

The  Emperor  replied  to  this  with  a  few  general 
observations.     He  considered  it  impossible  for  Russia 


268  RESULTS. 

to  accept  the  plan  of  the  neutralization  of  the  Black 
Sea,  and  accordingly  favored  the  system  of  limitation 
of  the  fleets.  The  French  Minister  went  on  to  say, 
that  the  plan  of  campaign  brought  to  Paris  by  Count 
Crenneville  was  entirely  acceptable  to  Napoleon,  and 
that  it  might  therefore  at  once  receive  the  form  of  an 
element  of  a  mutual  treaty.  Francis  Joseph,  somewhat 
embarrassed,  answered  that  he  presumed  it  would  be 
necessary  to  wait  with  that  matter  until  the  end  of  the 
conference,  since  it  would  not  before  that  be  quite  cer- 
tain whether  Austria  would  be  called  upon  to  take  part 
in  the  war. 

After  this  conversation,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  attended 
the  conference  with  far  less  hope  of  accomplishing  his 
purpose.  He  saw  very  clearly  that  Austria  made  no 
objection  to  Russia's  being  pressed  with  warnings  and 
urgent  demands,  but  her  former  thirst  for  war  had  gone 
by.  The  plan  which  he  had  proposed  in  London,  of 
reducing  the  Russian  fleet  to  four  ships  of  the  line, 
etc.,  was  positively  declined  by  Gortschakoff,  and  the 
Western  Powers  now  awaited  with  suspense  a  declara- 
tion of  war  on  the  part  of  Austria.  Count  Buol,  how- 
ever, insisted  that  the  possibilities  of  finding  a  pacific 
solution  were  not  yet  exhausted,  and  made  to  the 
French  Minister  a  proposal,  by  which  indeed  the 
Russian  fleet  on  the  Black  Sea  would  fare  decidedly 
better :  it  should  not  be  limited  to  four  ships  of  the 
line,  but  simply  not  increased  bej'ond  its  footing  in 
1853. 

"  That   is,"  said  Buol,   "  Austria's  ultimatum.     We 


CHARACTER   OF  NAPOLEON.  2G9 

consider  it  unfitting  to  impose  harder  conditions  upon 
Russia,  but  the  rejection  of  our  offer  we  shall  answer 
with  a  declaration  of  war."  Drouyn  de  Lhuys, 
delighted  now  with  the  prospect  of  being  able  to  carry 
out  his  scheme  of  a  European  system,  agreed  to  this,  and, 
while  Gortschakoff's  language  was  growing  more  and 
more  defiant,  extorted  from  the  somewhat  more  cautious 
Lord  John  his  final  consent.  On  the  21st  of  April, 
accordingly,  both  Ministers  telegraphed  to  their  Sover- 
eiofns  for  ratification  of  their  action. 

For  the  cause  of  German  and  Italian  Unity  this  was 
a  very  critical  moment.  A  close  alliance  between 
Austria  and  France  would  have  meant  the  ruin  of 
these  national  hopes  for  a  long  time  to  come.  Fortu- 
nately for  both  people,  it  was  not  the  lot  of  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys,  any  more  than  of  Prince  Schwarzenberg  four 
years  before,  to  give  the  decisive  and  permanent  turn  to 
the  destinies  of  Europe. 

The  sentiments  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  coincided, 
it  is  true,  with  those  of  liis  Minister  in  so  far  as  he  who 
had  no  military  vein  in  his  body  did  not,  like  his  uncle, 
contemplate  the  conquest  of  the  world.  But  in  other 
respects  his  wishes  and  aims  stood  in  striking  contrast 
with  those  held  by  Drouyn  de  Lhuys.  The  Emperor 
resembled  his  uncle  in  possessing  no  spark  of  French 
patriotism :  brought  up  in  exile,  educated  at  the 
Augsburg  gymnasium,  having  received  his  military 
training  in  German  Switzerland,  having  drifted  as 
pretender  to  the  throne  and  conspirator  to  Italy,  Eng- 
land,  and   America,    and    having   been    acquainted   in 


270  RESULTS. 

France  only  with  the  walls  of  his  prisons,  he  was 
cosmopolitan  in  his  ideas  and  feelings.  The  govern- 
ment of  France  was  not  the  goal  of  his  efforts,  but  had 
become  the  means  to  a  more  remote  end. 

He  was  a  good  artillerist,  and  thoroughly  versed  in 
the  history  of  his  own  family :  but  furtlier  than  this, 
his  education  in  the  course  of  his  irregular  life  had 
been  superficial.  That  most  necessary  training-school 
for  a  statesman,  an  exact  historical  knowledge  of  the 
development  and  the  needs  of  the  European  nations,  was 
entirely  wanting.  So  in  the  long  years  of  his  exile, 
without  the  constraint  of  regular  occupation,  he  had 
given  a  loose  rein  to  his  restless  morbid  fancy.  He 
everywhere  believed  that  he  had  discovered  in  the 
existing  state  of  things  the  most  serious  defects ;  and 
he  convinced  himself  of  the  ease  with  which  a  scheme 
of  reform  comprehending  all  Europe  might  be  carried 
out,  always  on  the  supposition,  of  course,  that  the 
champion  of  the  reforms  was  strong  enough  to  bring 
them  forward  to  the  attention  of  the  European  Great 
Rulers  as  one  among  them  and  in  every,  way  their 
equal.  After  he  had,  then,  by  the  fame  of  his  name 
and  by  inciting  the  masses  and  the  soldiers,  in  a  way 
as  clever  as  it  was  unscrupulous,  raised  himself  to  the 
French  imperial  throne,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  begin  the 
realization  of  his  world-embracing  projects. 

The  first  necessary  condition  was  the  overthrow  of 
the  alliance  of  the  three  Eastern  Powers,  which  ham- 
pered him  in  every  direction ;  and  we  have  seen  how 
conveniently    the    vanity    of    the    Emperor    Nicholas 


NAPOLEON'S  POLICY.  271 

played  into  his  hands.  So  far  triumphant,  he  doiibted 
no  longer  of  his  furtlier  success.  He  considered  that 
the  very  nature  of  things  required  the  amalgamation  of 
Spain  and  Portugal  into  an  Iberian,  and  of  Sweden  and 
Denmark  into  a  Scandinavian,  Union.  To  his  mind, 
justice  and  humanity  demanded  the  freedom  of  Poland 
from  Russian,  and  of  Italy  from  Austro-Papal,  oppres- 
sion ;  for  Germany,  too,  the  removal  of  the  cramping 
influence  of  the  Eastern  Courts  would  be  a  blessinsf. 

Most  certainly  he  did  not  aim  at  the  national  unity 
either  of  Italy  or  of  Germany ;  on  the  contrary,  the 
former  seemed  to  him  likely  to  be  inconvenient,  and 
the  latter  truly  dangerous.  But  by  supporting  effec- 
tively in  the  one  country  the  small  yet  ambitious 
Piedmont,  and  in  the  other  the  state  of  Prussia,  which 
had  been  since  1850  very  much  undervalued,  he  hoped 
to  gain  for  himself  the  influential  position  now  held  by 
Austria,  and  then  to  be  able  to  bring  about  prosperity 
and  thrift  throughout  the  whole  wide  circle  of  the 
nations.  For  in  this  remarkably-organized  brain,  des- 
potic, revolutionary,  and  humanitarian  purposes  were 
incessantly  running  into  each  other.  As  the  Emperor 
Nicholas  coated  over  his  love  of  ruling  with  his  sup})res- 
sion  of  the  Revolution  and  his  propagation  of  the 
orthodox  Faith,  so  Napoleon  III.  did  the  same  with 
his  ideal  democratic  scheme  of  making  everybody 
happy. 

Italian  affairs  lay  naturally  nearest  of  all  to  his  heart, 
as  an  old  member  of  the  secret  Italian  league ;  and 
consequently,  opposition  to  Austria  became  the  main- 


272  RESULTS. 

spring  of  his  future  policy.  However  friendly  his  con- 
duct was  at  this  time  towards  Vienna,  in  order  to  incite 
Austria  into  an  open  war  with  Russia,  and  perhaps  in 
this  way  to  secure  even  now  the  restoration  of  Poland ; 
and  however  much  he  praised  to  this  end  his  Minister's 
wise  speech  to  Francis  Joseph,  —  yet  he  was  as  far  as 
possible  removed  from  sympathizing  with  Drouyn's 
endeavors  to  establish  a  permanent  alliance  with  Austria. 
He  had  no  idea  of  lowering  unduly  for  the  sake  of  that 
object  the  demands  to  be  made  upon  Russia ;  and  such 
seemed  to  him,  as  well  as  to  Lord  Palmerston,  to  be 
the  effect  of  the  proposal  of  Count  Buol  on  the  21st 
of  April.  He  telegraphed  immediately  to  Vienna  that 
this  could  not  for  a  moment  be  entertained. 

That  meant  the  discontinuance  of  the  conferences, 
and  also  the  separation  of  Austria  and  France.  Count 
Buol  declared  that  Austria  considered  any  increase  in 
the  severity  of  the  requisitions  inadmissible,  and  that 
since  the  Western  Powers  insisted  upon  such  increase, 
Austria  would  take  no  part  in  the  war.  Again  he  tried 
by  changing  its  form  to  make  his  proposal  acceptable 
to  the  Western  Powers.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  decided  to 
return  immediately  to  Paris,  and  try  to  change  by  j^er- 
sonal  persuasion  the  verdict  of  his  master.  At  his  final 
audience  with  Francis  Joseph,  the  latter  expressed  his 
hope  that  a  permanent  alliance  with  Austria  for  the 
common  protection  of  Turkey  might  eventually  appear 
in  the  eyes  of  Napoleon  also  as  of  more  importance 
than  a  greater  or  less  number  of  Russian  ships. 

This  hope,  however,  was  destined  not  to  be  of  long 


TERMINATION  OF  THE   CONFERENCES.     21Z 

duration.  A  few  weeks  later  it  was  announced  that 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys  was  no  longer  in  the  Ministry,  and 
on  the  2d  of  July  Napoleon  opened  the  session  of  the 
legislative  body  with  a  speech  that  unreservedly  com- 
plained of  the  conduct  of  Austria  :  "  We  are  still  wait- 
ing," were  his  words,  "  for  Austria  to  fulfil  her  obliga- 
tions, which  consisted  in  making  our  treaty  of  alliance 
offensive  and  defensive  in  case  the  negotiations  proved 
fruitless."  There  was  no  longer  any  doubt  in  Vienna 
about  Napoleon's  disfavor. 

Also  in  Germany,  the  discontinuance  of  the  peace- 
conferences  that  had  been  looked  forward  to  so  long,  and 
the  subsequent  relapse  of  Austria  into  utter  inactivity, 
produced  a  great  excitement  of  public  feelings.  With 
deepest  shame  the  people  saw  that  enigmatical  adven- 
turer, at  whose  feet  France  had  thrown  herself,  deciding 
the  destiny  of  two  great  sections  of  the  \vorld;  and 
where  was  Germany  ?  Indeed,  how  could  that  mighty 
nation  have  played  its  proper  part,  wretchedly  dis- 
membered as  it  was,  wanting  any  united,  strong,  and 
national  organ,  and  crushed  by  a  load  of  slothfulness, 
cowardice,  and  jealousy  ? 

For  the  first  time  since  1850  the  cry  for  a  reform  of 
the  Confederate  Constitution  went  again  through  the 
newspapers,  and  soon  also  through  parliamentary 
circles.  In  the  course  of  the  summer  of  1855,  motions 
and  resolutions  sounding  the  same  note  followed  in  the 
Chambers  of  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg,  and  Gotha.  That 
pregnant  word,  "  popular  representation,"  was  also 
heard  in  the  Confederate  Diet.     Count  PmioI,  at  that 


274  RESULTS. 

time,  as  we  know,  thoroughly  exasperated  over  the 
Confederate  Diet,  was  foolish  enough  to  allow  himself 
to  be  drawn  into  those  discussions.  To  the  complaints 
about  Austria's  Oriental  policy,  which  had  involved  an 
expense  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  million  florins,  and 
had  been  entirely  fruitless,  he  ordered  in  September 
the  newspapers  that  were  controlled  or  supported  by 
him  to  print  the  following  categorical  reply :  "  Most 
certainly  is  the  present  Confederate  Constitution  insuffi- 
cient, and  it  has  been  the  cause  of  the  recent  failure  ;  it 
ought  never  again  to  happen  that  in  the  time  of  war 
one  member  of  the  Confederation  should  be  left  in  the 
lurch  by  the  others ;  there  must  be  a  Confederate 
court  of  arbitration,  and  a  powerful  authority,  an 
Emperor^  must  watch  over  the  execution  of  its  decrees  ; 
above  all  things  it  must  be  agreed  that  the  claims  of 
Austria,  based  upon  historical  foundation  and  develop- 
ment, shall  receive  their  due  consideration." 

It  was  soon  very  evident  that  such  words  as  these 
were  not  especially  adapted  to  increase  Austria's 
popularity  in  Germany.  Inasmuch  as  Bavarian  news- 
papers had  published  them,  Minister  Pfordten  very 
deliberately  sent  a  note  to  Vienna  inquiring  whether 
these  newspaper  articles  expressed  the  sentiments  of 
the  Imperial  Government.  Buol  then  retreated  and 
answered :  "  The  Confederate  Constitution  is  surely 
open  to  many  improvements ;  and  in  any  case,  the  future 
of  the  German  federative  system  depends  upon  the  action 
of  the  Confederation  in  the  Eastern  Question." 

But  by  saying  this,  he  lost  favor  completely  in  the 


AUSTRIA'S  DESPATCH.  275 

eyes  of  his  estimable  Confederate  associates ;  and 
Manteuffel  was  applauded  on  almost  every  side,  when 
a  few  weeks  later  he  explained  that  no  more  ought  to 
be  required  from  a  confederation  of  sovereign  states, 
like  the  German  one,  than  it  can  accomplish,  and  fur- 
ther, that  in  no  case  could  a  critical  examination  of  the 
present  form  of  the  Constitution  have  the  least  possible 
connection  with  the  Eastern  Question. 

While  all  this  ink  had  been  flowing  without  further- 
ing the  German  Cause  a  single  step,  immense  streams 
of  blood  shed  in  the  East  had  brought  the  European 
crisis  at  last  to  a  close.  When  on  the  23d  of  September, 
1855,  after  a  gigantic  struggle  of  twelve  months,  Sebas- 
topol,  had  at  last  fallen,  and  the  martial  ambition  of  the 
Western  Powers  had  been  thus  satisfied,  and  when 
thereupon,  on  the  15th  of  November  at  the  close  of 
the  World's  Exposition  at  Paris,  Napoleon  gave  solemn 
expression  to  the  peaceful  sentiments  of  France,  then 
the  Vienna  Cabinet  made  a  new  attempt  to  mediate  ; 
and  to  begin  with,  it  sounded  the  Western  Powers  in 
regard  to  the  conditions  which  were  to  be  imposed  by 
them. 

The  result  was  an  Austrian  despatch  to  St.  Peters- 
burg dated  the  IGth  of  December,  containing  a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  four  requisitions,  and  emphatically 
insisting  upon  tlie  entire  neutrality  of  the  Black  Sea, 
and  upon  the  cession  of  a  small  tract  of  country  in 
Bessarabia,  whereby  the  mouths  of  the  Danube  were 
wholly  withdrawn  from  Russian  supremacy. 

At   the  same    time   the    Czar    Alexander,    after   the 


276  RESULTS. 

honor  of  the  Russian  banners  had  been  maintained  by 
important  victories  in  Asia  Minor,  determined  upon  a 
more  compliant  course  than  in  April,  and  sent,  on  the 
23d  of  December,  an  offer  on  his  part  to  Vienna,  which 
contained  only  insignificant  deviations  from  the  Aus- 
trian proposition.  Count  Buol,  however,  now  again 
anxious  to  recover  the  favor  of  the  Western  Powers, 
replied  by  announcing  the  unchangeableness  of  his 
conditions  and  the  immediate  cessation  of  diplomatic 
relations  in  the  event  of  a  refusal.  The  Russian 
Government  thereupon  overlooked  its  scruples,  and 
expressed  its  willingness  to  sign  the  preliminaries 
according  to  the  wording  of  the  Austrian  draft.  Yet 
the  angriest  possible  feeling  at  this  domineering  con- 
duct of  Buol  remained  deeply  rooted  in  all  Russian 
hearts ;  with  malevolent  eagerness  they  awaited  a 
rupture  with  their  ally  that  had  once  been  rescued  by 
themselves. 

The  definite  document  of  peace  was  then  to  be  drawn 
up  at  a  great  congress  of  the  Powers.  At  the  choice  of 
the  place  of  meeting,  the  pre-eminence  was  manifest, 
which  the  mighty  deeds  of  France  had  already  won  for 
the  Government  of  Napoleon ;  neither  Vienna  nor 
London  could  secure  the  fulfilment  of  its  wishes ;  the 
Congress  was  summoned  to  meet  at  Paris  by  a  vote 
which  was  at  last  unanimous. 

To  Austria's  great  displeasure,  Sardinia  appeared  at 
Paris  as  one  of  the  military  Powers :  on  the  other  hand, 
Prussia,  as  a  non-participant  in  the  war,  received  for 
the  time  no  invitation.     When  Austria  and  Russia  in 


THE  PARIS  CONGRESS.  211 

the  second  session,  on  February  28th,  1856,  proposed  that 
Prussia  also  be  summoned,  Lord  Clarendon  succeeded 
in  having  the  motion  passed,  that  this  should  not  be 
done  until  after  the  Congress  should  have  already  arrived 
at  an  understanding  about  the  main  points  at  issue.  In 
Berlin  this  was  keenly  felt  as  a  humiliating  isolation, 
and  the  Liberal  Opposition  lost  no  opportunity  to 
throw  this  in  the  face  of  the  Ministry  as  the  natural 
result  of  their  sorry  policy.  As  a  matter  of  truth, 
however,  it  was  nothing  more  than  a  senseless  expres- 
sion of  English  vexation  at  Prussia's  neutrality;  but 
by  her  fii-m  persistence  in  this  policy  in  spite  of  all 
threats  and  ado,  she  had  at  last  again  shown  herself  to 
be  an  independent  Great  Power.  If  the  plan  of  exclud- 
ing her  from  the  Congress  had  been  kept  up,  it  would 
have  been  no  worse  for  Prussia,  but  rather  for  those 
Powers  that  took  part  in  the  Congress,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  in  that  case  the  Berlin  Government  would 
not  have  needed  to  be  bound  by  the  decrees  of  the  Con- 
gress. Two  weeks  later,  however,  the  Congress  sent 
its  invitation ;  and  on  the  18th  of  March  the  Prussian 
plenipotentiaries  were  received.  Minister  von  Manteuffel 
and  Count  Hatzfeldt. 

We  have  no  reason  here  to  follow  in  detail  the 
course  and  the  result  of  the  negotiations  of  the  Con- 
gress. It  will  be  enough  to  take  note  what  shape  the 
mutual  relations  between  the  Powers  gradually  took 
during  the  same,  especially  in  the  last  few  sessions 
after  the  peace  had  already,  on  the  30th  of  March,  been 
concluded ;    for  in   these  sessions  several  other  Euro- 


278  RESULTS. 

pean  matters  and  troubles  were  talked  over  without 
any  binding  decisions.  France  had  from  the  very  first 
day  shown  herself  in  every  question  about  detail  as 
deferential  as  possible  to  Russia,  and  agreed  now  with 
her  proposition  for  the  future  union  of  Roumania, 
under  the  lively  protest  of  Turkey  and  Austria. 

Then  Count  Walewski,  the  successor  of  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys,  regretted  the  mismanagement  in  Naples  and  in 
Rome,  which,  he  said,  was  constantly  producing  numer- 
ous followers  for  the  cause  of  the  Revolution,  and  made 
necessary  the  hateful  presence  of  foreign  troops  in  the 
States  of  the  Church.  Thereupon  Sardinia's  great 
statesman,  Cavour,  complained  of  the  Austrian  garri- 
sons in  Tuscany,  Parma,  and  in  the  Legations. 

Count  Buol  solemnly  objected  to  the  continuance  of 
this  discussion,  which  did  not,  he  said,  in  any  way 
belong  here,  and  was  entirely  out  of  place ;  but  he 
received  no  attention  from  any  quarter.  In  the  last 
question  England  inclined  to  the  French  side,  and  in 
the  one  concerning  Roumania,  to  the  Austrian. 
Manteuffel  held  his  tongue  ;  yet  in  his  few  and  pru- 
dent remarks  one  could  not  fail  to  perceive  aversion  to 
Austria.  On  his  part  he  might  have  mentioned  here 
the  claims  of  his  King  to  the  restoration  of  Neuchatel ; 
but  he  carefully  avoided  bringing  forward  definite 
motions,  which  might  have  disturbed  the  social  good 
feeling  in  these  conversations.  The  most  obvious 
features  of  these  conferences  were  the  isolation  of  the 
Court  of  Vienna  and  the  lively  sympathy  of  France 
for  Sardinia. 


SATISFACTION  OF  THE  LESSER  STATES.      279 

Thus  the  covetous,  changeable,  and  at  last  inert 
policy  of  Count  Buol,  although  attended  with  enor- 
mous expense,  had  in  no  particular  reaped  any  harvest. 
in  Berlin  there  was  rejoicing  at  having  enjoyed  the 
blessings  of  a  continuous  peace  at  less  cost,  the  Govern- 
ment had  preserved  its  warm  friendship  with  St.  Peters- 
burg, and,  after  the  fall  of  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  received 
from  Paris  only  marks  of  affection  and  of  good-will.  In 
the  Confederate  Diet  Prussia  had  at  this  time  far  out- 
stripped Austria  in  influence.  Yet  she  was  soon  to 
learn  how  inconstant  was  the  friendship  of  the  Lesser 
States. 

The  course  of  events  in  the  Eastern  crisis  had  both  in 
Munich  and  in  Dresden  raised  to  a  high  degree  the 
feeling  of  self-satisfaction.  "  We  cannot,  it  is  true,  rule 
Europe,"  Baron  von  der  Pfordten  used  to  say,  "but  we 
are  strong  enough  to  be  the  little  weight  that  turns  the 
scales  of  Germany.  Just  as  in  1850  we  prevented 
Prussia  from  forcing  Austria  out  of  Germany,  so  now 
we  have  made  it  impossible  for  the  Court  of  Vienna  to 
gather  about  itself  Germany  without  Prussia.  We 
need  the  presence  of  two  Great  Powers  in  the  Con- 
federation. Then  is  the  Confederate  Diet  the  only 
salutary  representation  of  Germany  as  a  whole." 


280      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE   CLOSE   OF    THE    EEIGN   OF   FREDERICK 
WILLIAM   IV. 

The  general  political  situation  continued  to  be  very 
much  the  same  as  it  was  left  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
Paris  Congress.  Napoleon,  his  mind  already  occupied 
\\\i\\  Italian  plans  and  the  hostility  to  Austria  involved 
in  these,  showed  uninterrupted  friendliness  toward 
Prussia  and  Russia,  and  beheld  with  satisfaction  the 
feeling  in  regard  to  Austria  engendered  by  the  events 
of  the  Crimean  War ;  that  is  to  say,  in  Berlin  a  suspi- 
cious coolness,  and  in  St.  Petersburg  openly -expressed 
hatred.  When  Count  Buol  once  talked  of  the  restora- 
tion of  Austria's  old  relations  with  Russia,  Prince 
Gortschakoff  told  the  Prussian  ambassador  that  he 
would  have  nothing  to  do  with  Austria's  friendship, 
and  that  in  any  case  he  must  await  Prussia's  approval 
before  listening  to  any  advances  from  that  direction. 
In  the  Government  circles  at  Berlin  there  was  no  one 
who  would  not  have  looked  upon  such  an  arrange^ 
ment  with  entire  satisfaction. 

This  ill-feeling  showed  itself  strongly  on  every 
occasion.  The  Congress  of  Paris  had  left  many  par- 
ticulars in  the  provisions  of  the  peace  to  be  settled  by 
mixed  commissions,  among   others   the  new  boundary 


DIFFERENCES  AMONG   THE  POWERS.        281 

between  Russia  and  Wallachia,  and  the  internal  affairs 
of  the  two  Danubian  Principalities.  In  regard  to  the 
first  question  Russia  put  forth  a  claim  to  the  city  of 
Bolgrad  and  the  Serpent  Islands ;  in  this  she  received 
support  from  Prussia  and  France,  but  decided  opposition 
from  Austria  and  England. 

Still  more  decided  was  the  disagreement  between 
these  parties,  when  Russia,  Prussia,  and  France  re- 
newed the  demand  already  announced  at  the  Congress 
for  the  union  of  the  two  Principalities.  England  and 
Austria  entered  a  passionate  protest  against  this ;  and 
Prussia  especially  took  occasion  to  find  fault  with  the 
tone  and  the  methods  of  their  opposition.  The  haughty 
attitude  of  England  was  complained  of,  "  where  unfor- 
tunately there  was  no  prospect  of  improvement,  so  long 
as  Palmerston's  malignity  and  Clarendon's  infatuation 
gave  the  tone  to  the  English  policy."  No  less  dissat- 
isfaction was  felt  in  Berlin  at  the  attitude  adopted  in 
Vienna.  "  Austria's  behavior  toward  us,"  wrote  Man- 
teuffel  to  the  ambassador  in  Vienna,  "  shows  at  once 
undue  reserve  and  lack  of  consideration." 

In  fact.  Count  Buol  was  now  acting  on  precisely  the 
same  principle  which  he  had  followed  when  once, 
during  the  course  of  the  w^ar,  he  said  to  the  ambassador 
of  Wiirtemberg :  "Wiirtemberg  must  learn  that  it  is 
Austria's  right  alone  in  all  Germany  to  pursue  an  inde- 
pendent policy."  The  Count  made  complaints  at  Berlin 
tliat  tlie  Prussian  commissioner  allowed  himself  to  take 
part  witli  France  against  the  German  allies  of  his  Gov- 
ernment ;  and  he  also  sent  to  Frankfort  to  the  presiding 


282      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

deputy  of  tlie  Confederate  Diet,  Count  Rechberg,  a 
copy  of  the  negotiations  in  Paris,  in  order  that  Rech- 
berg might  use  them  to  prove  to  his  fellow-members 
the  un-German  tendency  of  Prussia's  action.  It  is 
easily  understood  that  under  these  circumstances  there 
was  no  talk  of  an  extension  of  the  April  Alliance  :  the 
idyllic  state  of  things  in  which  the  unity  of  Germany 
was  represented  by  the  harmonious  accord  of  its  two 
Great  Powers  was  as  far  removed  as  possible. 

In  the  mean  time  the  impressions,  made  among  the 
German  Lesser  States  by  the  demands  for  a  popular 
representation  in  the  Confederation,  urged  by  several 
Chambers,  and  for  an  Empire  with  Austria  at  its  head, 
urged  by  the  Press  that  favored  an  entire  Germany,  had 
by  no  means  disappeared.  King  Max  of  Bavaria  would 
hear  nothing  of  either  of  these  demands.  To  him,  the 
independence  of  Bavaria  and  the  maintenance  of  his 
royal  rights  in  his  own  state  were  the  most  important 
considerations  ;  and  from  this  point  of  view,  tlie  Con- 
stitution of  the  German  Confederation  was  entirely 
satisfactory  to  him.  So  much  the  more  did  he  complain 
because  this  excellent  institution  had  by  its  complete 
barrenness  fallen  into  so  great  contempt  among  the 
German  people ;  and  he  therefore  desired,  with  all  the 
ardor  of  which  his  mild  nature  was  capable,  to  assign 
to  the  Confederate  Diet  an  extended  sphere  of  useful- 
ness and  the  solution  of  important  questions  of  general 
interest. 

But  with  this  he  also  combined  another  idea.  In  his 
well-meant  efforts,  both  for  the  increase  of  the  Bavarian 


BAVARIAN  PROPOSALS  IN  THE  DIET.        283 

military  force  and  for  the  improvement  of  the  Bava- 
rian system  of  education,  he  found  himself  only  too 
frequently  hindered  by  Nativists  and  Ultramontanists 
in  the  Press  and  in  the  Chambers  :  he  thought  that  if, 
according  to  his  plans,  the  Confederate  Diet  should 
once  have  shown  itself  to  the  people  as  the  author  of 
great  material  advantages,  it  would  then,  as  in  1820 
and  in  1850,  be  able  to  act  for  the  strengthening  of  the 
princely  dignity  against  cross-grained  penny-a-liners 
and  parliamentary  haranguers.  His  Minister,  Baron 
von  der  Pfordten,  was  not  without  grave  doubts  in 
regard  to  these  plans  of  his  master,  which,  in  certain 
circumstances,  might  also  result  in  seriously  limiting 
the  independence  of  Bavaria ;  but  he  was  nevertheless 
obliged  to  send  to  Frankfort  on^the  10th  of  November, 
1855,  the  proposal  that  the  Confederate  Assembly 
should  consider  the  preparation  of  "  Acts  for  the  general 
good  "  concerning  a  German  system  of  commercial  law, 
a  common  citizenship  throughout  Germany,  common 
coins,  weights,  and  measures,  and  concerning  German 
emigration. 

Now  it  was  well-known,  that,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  its  Constitution,  the  Diet  was  authorized  to 
establish  institutions  of  common  utility,  but  for  every 
decree  of  this  kind  a  unanimous  vote  was  required. 
Such  a  vote  was,  however,  in  most  cases  impossible,  or 
could  only  be  brought  about  by  compromises,  by  which 
no  one  was  entirely  satisfied.  Once  decided  upon, 
however,  an}'  such  decree  was  unalterabl}'  fixed ;  for  its 
repeal  or  cliangc    demanded  again  a  unanimous  vote. 


284      CLOSE  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

Whenever,  therefore,  the  need  for  an  institution  of  this 
sort  had  arisen  heretofore,  those  interested,  Prussia 
especially,  had  preferred  to  attain  their  object  by  a  free 
and  easily  dissoluble  agreement,  either  by  arousing 
interest  in  the  matter  in  the  Diet,  or  by  acting  entirely 
independently  of  the  Confederation. 

Prussia  was  the  less  inclined  to  abandon  this  method, 
inasmuch  as  during  the  last  few  years  it  had  become 
more  evidently  Austria's  intention  to  use  the  majority 
of  the  Diet  (which  was  subservient  to  her)  in  inter- 
fering with  the  independence  of  Prussia's  policy. 
Bismarck  developed  this  principle  on  the  26th  of 
November,  immediately  after  the  appearance  of  the 
Bavarian  proposal,  in  a  detailed  report,  which  at  once 
met  with  the  entire  approval  of  Minister  Manteuffel. 
This  view  was  further  confirmed  by  the  fact,  that  Count 
Buol  expressed  himself  strongly  in  favor  of  the  Bava- 
rian proposal,  in  order,  as  Bismarck  observed,  to  draw 
the  objects  of  the  same  within  the  sphere  of  action  of 
the  Confederation,  and  if  possible  within  that  of  the 
presidency. 

Bismarck,  however,  out  of  consideration  for  public 
opinion  and  for  the  real  advantages  contained  in  the 
substance  of  the  proposal,  constantly  warned  the  Gov- 
ernment not  to  make  open  opposition,  but  during  the 
course  of  the  negotiations  to  manage  in  such  a  way  as 
to  take  the  solution  of  the  question  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  Diet  and  to  transfer  it  into  the  field  of  voluntary 
agreement.  When,  in  February,  1856,  Bavaria  pro- 
posed that   the   Diet  should  at   once   proceed   to  the 


BEUST'S  MEMORIAL.  285 

consideration  of  a  German  system  of  commercial  law, 
the  action  taken  by  Prussia  was  based  upon  the  view 
above  explained. 

But  Kinor  Max  was  not  lonjr  left  alone  in  his  efforts 
to  extend  the  authority  and  the  functions  of  the  Con- 
federate Diet.  How  could  it  be  expected  that  that 
most  active  statesman  of  the  Lesser  States,  Baron 
Beust,  would  not  have  something  to  say  in  the  matter  ? 

Already  in  October,  1855,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
above-mentioned  correspondence  brought  about  by 
Austria,  Herr  von  Beust  had  replied  to  Count  Buol 
that  Saxony  also  regarded  Confederate  reform  as  an 
urgent  necessity,  for  Germany  was  actually  under  the 
dominion  of  anarchy.  "  While  Coburg,"  he  said,  "  in 
questions  of  public  domain  disregards  the  decrees  of 
the  Confederation,  the  Sovereigns  of  Hanover  and 
Nassau  have  assumed  for  themselves  rights  beyond  all 
bounds.  In  the  same  way  a  sharp  contradiction  exists 
between  Article  XIII.  of  the  Act  of  Confederation, 
which  provides  for  constitutions  based  upon  the  Estates, 
and  the  inroads  made  by  Franco-English  constitution- 
alism :  either  the  latter  must  be  rooted  out  in  the  indi- 
vidual States,  or  it  must  also  be  introduced  in  the 
Confederate  Diet." 

That  Von  Beust  by  no  means  favored  this  latter 
alternative  was  shown  by  a  memorial  sent  by  him  at 
the  end  of  June,  1856,  to  the  chief  Ministers  in  Vienna, 
Berlin,  and  the  Lesser  States,  a  private  document,  as 
he  called  it,  concerning  which  he  asked  his  colleagues 
for  a  preliminary   judgment.     In    this   he    dwelt   first 


286      CLOSE  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

upon  the  revolutionary  character  of  those  demands 
which  sought  German  Unity  by  the  complete  subordi- 
nation of  the  Sovereigns  to  a  central  authority  in  both 
military  and  diplomatic  matters.  "  All  the  Govern- 
ments in  the  Confederation,"  he  declared,  "  should  join 
in  a  Confederate  decree  proclaiming  that  they  would  no 
longer  suffer  the  expression  of  such  demands.  The 
groundlessness  of  the  reproach,  that  the  Confederation 
accomplished  nothing  for  the  external  safety  of  Ger- 
many, has  been  clearly  manifested  in  1830,  in  1848,  and 
in  1854. 

"  The  defects  in  the  sphere  of  internal  policy,"  he 
continued,  "  are  of  more  importance.  The  fostering  of 
material  interests  is  certainly  greatly  hindered  by  the 
fact  that  unanimous  votes  are  required.  But  in  the 
line  of  the  constitutions  of  individual  States  much 
might  be  done.  We  have  no  intention  of  breaking 
entirely  with  the  representative  system.  But  even  a 
curtailing  of  the  sessions  of  the  provincial  parliaments, 
which  are  forever  talking  and  amending,  would  be  a 
great  gain.  In  the  consideration  of  the  budget,  these 
parliaments  should  only  be  allowed  to  vote  upon  any 
increase  in  special  items  of  exjDcnse  and  upon  the 
reports  of  the  auditors  of  accounts.  The  Chambers 
themselves  would  see  the  advantage  of  this  and  agree 
to  it.  The  general  adoption  of  such  principles  as  these 
would  also  afford  the  possibility  of  a  complete  assur- 
ance to  the  states  of  the  protection  of  their  rights.  In 
constitutional  disputes,  the  members  of  the  Confederate 
Diet  would  not,  from  the  nature  of  their  position,  be 


BEUST'S  MEMORIAL.  287 

fitted  to  give  an  impartial  judgment.  Only  a  Confed- 
erate court  of  arbitration  would  answer  the  purpose  in 
such  a  case  ;  but  in  order  to  make  such  a  court  possible, 
a  similarity  of  the  constitutions  based  upon  a  Confed- 
erate law  would  be  a  necessary  condition." 

All  this  amounted,  then,  to  a  simple  proposal  to 
suppress  by  police  measures  every  manifestation 
throughout  Germany  of  a  tendency  towards  unity  or 
towards  a  more  restricted  union,  and,  in  the  individual 
States,  to  subject  the  authority  of  the  Chambers  to  a 
decided  limitation ;  in  short,  as  Bismarck  said,  it  was 
a  proposal  to  renew  the  Carlsbad  decrees  of  1819. 
That  the  proclamation  of  such  a  plan  should  call  forth 
a  storm  of  indignation  among  all  the  liberal  parties 
was  natural  enough :  but  it  was  an  indication  of  changed 
times,  that  now  Herr  von  Beust's  plan  hardly  found 
any  recognition  even  among  the  Governments. 

His  friend,  Plerr  von  Dalwigk,  called  the  memorial 
an  admirable  literary  production,  that  contained 
much  that  was  true  and  little  that  was  new.  The 
King  of  Hanover  was  well  pleased  with  the  idea  of 
suppressing  the  enthusiasts  for  unity,  but  he  had  grave 
doubts  about  the  establishment  of  a  Confederate  court 
of  arbitration.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Stuttgart,  the 
creation  of  a  Confederate  court  of  arbitration  was  con- 
sidered mucli  to  the  purpose,  but  the  other  propositions 
were  held  to  be  unpractical.  The  Elector  of  Hesse 
would  not  listen  to  any  changes  in  the  existing  Consti- 
tution ;  the  limitation  of  tlie  rights  of  the  Estates  pro- 
posed by  Von  Beust,  he  liad  long  ago  carried  out  in  his 


288      CLOSE  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

own  country.  King  Max  of  Bavaria  took  exception  to 
Beust's  indifference  to  the  extension  of  the  activity  of 
the  Confederation  in  the  line  of  material  reforms. 
From  Berlin,  Minister  von  Manteuffel  sent  to  Beust  an 
abundance  of  appreciative  expressions,  together  with 
questions  implying  doubt,  and  closing  with  a  request 
for  a  more  detailed  exposition  of  the  practical  applica- 
tion of  his  principles.  Count  Buol  alone  expressed, 
towards  the  middle  of  August,  his  entire  satisfaction, 
and  declared  himself  prepared  to  take  part  in  prelimi- 
nary conferences  of  the  principal  Ministers  of  all  the 
German  States,  after  the  fashion  of  the  convention  at 
Carlsbad. 

But  before  any  action  could  be  taken  in  the  way  of 
introducing  these  endeavors  to  secure  German  national 
rights,  an  event  of  a  very  different  nature  occurred, 
which,  springing  from  an  insignificant  cause,  threw  the 
whole  of  Prussia  and  soon  all  Europe  into  feverish 
disturbance. 

We  have  seen  above  with  what  eager  longing  King 
Frederick  William  clung  to  the  idea  of  rescuing  his 
beloved  Neuchatel  from  the  clutches  of  the  Swiss 
democrats.  The  number  of  those  inhabitants  of  the 
little  country  that  shared  this  wish  was  not  small,  since 
the  rule  of  the  Prussian  kings,  during  the  century  and 
a  half  of  its  continuance,  had  been  always  mild  and 
beneficent,  and  had  not  disturbed  any  of  the  ancient 
customs  and  institutions.  In  1847,  things  in  Neucha- 
tel were  very  much  the  same  as  in  1747 :  in  the  coun- 
try, the  controlling  influence  of  the  great  nobles;  in 


THE  NEUCHATEL   COMPLICATION.  289 

the  towns,  the  rule  of  the  old  citizen  families,  in  which 
no  new  intruder  had  a  share ;  everywhere  a  peaceful 
repose,  with  moderately  comfortable  conditions  of  life, 
and  evidences  of  an  active  piety. 

In  1848  the  stream  of  revolutionary  democracy  had 
poured  over  all  this,  had  abolished  all  differences  be- 
tween the  Estates,  had  established  everywhere  muni- 
cipal governments  based  on  universal  suffrage,  and  had 
given  cantonal  citizenship  to  every  Swiss  after  two 
years'  residence ;  so  that  in  1856  almost  half  the  popu- 
lation of  Neuch§,tel  consisted  of  new  accessions  of  this 
description.  It  was  natural  that  so  far-reaching  a 
change  should  hurt  deeply  both  the  feelings  and  the 
interests  of  a  great  number  of  the  old  inhabitants  ;  and 
the  nobles,  especially,  addressed  urgent  petitions  to 
Berlin  to  be  delivered  from  the  democratic  yoke. 

The  London  Protocol  of  1852,  in  which  all  the  Great 
Powers  recognized  the  right  of  the  King,  raised  the 
expectations  of  these  people.  They  could  not  be  sur- 
prised that  during  the  great  war  in  the  Orient  there 
was  no  talk  of  Neuchatel ;  but  when  in  1856,  at  tlie 
Concress  of  Paris,  Prussia's  reference  to  Neuchatel  fell 
fiat  to  the  ground,  the  last  hope  of  foreign  aid  was 
extinguished,  and  the  malcontents  determined  in 
despair  to  help  themselves,  after  the  ancient  Swiss 
fashion,  by  a  sudden  uprising.  Some  of  their  leaders 
went  to  Berlin  and  laid  tlieir  plans  confidentially  before 
various  influential  persons.  Minister  von  Manteuffel 
urgently  dissuaded  them  from  their  project ;  the  King 
held  back  in  silence. 


290      CLOSE  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

This  silence  was  taken  for  consent.  On  the  night 
of  the  2d  of  September,  two  small  columns  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Meuron  and  Count  Friedrich 
Pourtales  put  themselves  in  motion,  surprised  and 
captured  the  Castle  of  Neuchatel,  arrested  the  authori- 
ties, and  on  the  next  day  published  their  manifesto  for 
the  restoration  of  the  royal  government.  But  the 
revolt  had  been  insufficiently  prepared:  there  was  no 
co-operation  among  the  towns  that  were  royalist  in 
their  tendencies.  The  Republican  party,  on  the  other 
hand,  rose  all  the  more  eagerly  in  La  Chaux  de  Fonds 
and  Val  Travers,  as  did  the  new  citizens  throughout 
the  whole  Canton.  Some  Swiss  Confederate  soldiers 
were  also  at  hand ;  and  on  the  4th  of  September, 
Meuron  with  his  men  was  overpowered,  and  the  royal- 
ist movement  was  everywhere  put  down. 

Two  commissioners  of  the  Swiss  Confederate  Council 
hastened  thither  from  Berne.  Some  five  thousand  men 
of  the  militia  of  Aargau  and  Vaud  took  military  pos- 
session of  the  little  country ;  a  number  of  arrests 
followed,  and  sixty-six  prisoners  accused  of  high  treason 
were  held  for  a  state  trial  before  the  Swiss  Confederate 
Court  of  Justice.  The  royalists  who  had  not  been 
imprisoned  were  pursued  by  party  hatred  in  the  same 
way  that  the  Elector  of  Hesse  had  in  1851  persecuted 
the  officials  who  remained  true  to  the  Constitution ;  that 
is,  by  quartering  upon  them  great  numbers  of  troops, 
the  maintenance  of  whom  ruined  even  well-to-do  per- 
sons, and  in  a  short  time  brought  the  poorer  peasants 
to  beggary. 


EXCITEMENT  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM.      291 

The  news  of  these  proceedings  now  struck  blow  after 
blow  upon  the  heart  of  the  King.  It  disturbed  and 
overwhelmed  him.  His  own  right  of  possession  became 
a  secondary  matter  in  his  feelings,  when  he  considered 
the  misfortune  of  those  brave  men  who,  out  of  loyalty 
to  him  and  reverence  for  his  right  as  recognized  by 
Europe,  had  risked  their  lives  in  a  hopeless  under- 
taking, which  he  had  not  indeed  instigated  nor  com- 
mended, but  yet  had  known  of  and  had  not  checked. 
He  was  beside  himself  with  grief  and  anger  at  the 
thought  of  seeing  his  faithful  followers  brought  before 
a  tribunal  as  common  criminals,  and  threatened  with  an 
imprisonment  of  many  years.  This  could  not  and  must 
not  be :  it  seemed  to  him  a  most  vital  point  of  honor 
to  use  all  means,  and  to  put  aside  every  other  consid- 
eration, that  they  might  be  rescued  and  set  free. 

He  was  at  that  time  in  East  Prussia,  and  at  once 
commanded  that  letters  should  be  prepared  to  the 
Sovereigns  of  the  four  Great  Powers,  urgently  request- 
ing that  they  would  support  his  demand  addressed  to 
Switzerland  for  the  unconditional  liberation  of  those 
who  had  been  imprisoned.  His  Ministers  were  at  the 
same  time  to  appeal  to  the  Cabinets  of  the  Powers  to 
the  same  effect. 

But  in  111  is  direction  the  King  was  doomed  to  unpleas- 
ant experiences.  The  Emperor  Alexander  of  Russia 
gave  assurances  of  warm  sympathy,  and  promised  to  do 
what  he  could ;  but  considering  his  geographical  })0si- 
tion,  lie  had  little  to  offer  but  good  words.  In  Paris, 
Count  Walewski   declared  that  the  King's   right  was 


\ 

292      CLOSE  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

undoubted ;  but,  he  said,  it  was  an  unfortunate  affair. 
Switzerland  also  felt  herself  in  the  right  in  regard  to 
the  existing  state  of  things,  and  would  hardly  interrupt 
the  course  of  legal  proceedings.  Napoleon,  moreover, 
at  that  time  in  Biarritz,  expressed  himself  to  the  same 
effect,  that  Neuchatel  would  be  no  gain  for  Prussia,  but 
a  burden,  and  for  Europe  a  constant  source  of  embar- 
rassment. 

The  answer  of  Count  Buol  sounded  in  Berlin  almost 
like  mockery :  Austria,  he  said,  would  gladly  support 
Prussia's  wishes,  but  she  saw  no  possible  means  of 
doing  so,  and  would  be  grateful  if  Prussia  would  point 
out  any  to  her.  The  English  Cabinet  was  indeed 
entirely  ready  to  interpose  in  behalf  of  mild  treatment 
of  the  prisoners,  but  had  no  other  advice  to  offer  than 
that  the  King  should  procure  their  freedom  by  speedily 
renouncing  his  sovereignty  over  Neuchatel.  An  appeal 
to  the  English  recognition  of  this  sovereignty  in  1815 
and  in  1852  made  no  impression.  "  Many  compacts 
and  protocols,"  said  Lord  Palmerston,  "  have  been 
destroyed  by  the  power  of  facts;  to-day  it  must  be 
confessed  that  peoples  do  not  exist  for  princes,  but 
princes  for  peoples,  and  that  the  right  of  a  sovereign 
vanishes  when  the  consent  of  the  people  is  withdrawn 
from  it." 

In  a  still  sharper  tone  did  the  Swiss  Federal  Council 
refuse  the  demands  of  the  Prussian  ambassador  for  the 
cessation  of  legal  proceedings,  unless  the  King  would 
first  renounce  all  claim  to  Neuchatel.  The  Radical 
party  at  that  time  held  control  in  Switzerland,  and  the 


PRUSSIA'S  DEMANDS  REJECTED.  293 

President  of  the  Federal  Council,  Stampfii,  was  a  Rad- 
ical among  Radicals.  "  Neucliatel,"  he  said,  "  acted  in 
1848  no  otherwise  than  did  onoe  the  Forest  Cantons 
against  their  Austrian  governors ;  in  such  a  way  the 
entire  Swiss  Nation  has  been  founded,  and  the  popular 
will  has  been  the  inviolable  basis  of  her  rights.  The 
Federal  Council  is  not  competent  to  stop  the  legal  pro- 
ceedings, and  even  if  it  wished  to  propose  such  a  thing 
to  the  Federal  Assembly,  it  would  be  swept  from  its 
seats  by  the  indignation  of  the  sovereign  people,  like 
chaff  before  the  wind.  Against  threats  of  an  armed 
interference,  too,  the  Swiss  Nation  will  rise  like  a  single 
man." 

Whoever  read  the  Swiss  newspapers  at  that  time 
found  all  this  abundantly  confirmed.  The  people  felt 
that  they  were  entirely  in  the  right,  and,  what  counted 
for  quite  as  much,  that  they  were  perfectly  safe.  At 
first  they  pretended  a  contemptuous  disregard  for 
Prussia.  Iler  cowardice  at  Olmiitz  and  her  dread  of 
war  during  the  last  few  years  were  talked  about,  and 
gross  insults  to  the  person  of  the  King  were  indulged 
in.  On  the  other  hand,  the  friendship  of  neighboring- 
states  was  dv/elt  upon,  and  the  active  commercial  inter- 
course with  the  South  German  States,  who  would 
certainly  not  be  desirous  to  see  Prussian  troops  fighting 
with  Swiss  on  their  frontiers  and  perhaps  in  their  own 
territory. 

Above  all,  the  Swiss  thought  it  unlikely  that  France 
would  suffer  such  proceedings,  would  allow  the  neu- 
trality    of     Switzerland,    which    protected    her    own 


294      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

boundaries,  to  be  violated,  or  would  look  calmly  upon 
the  marcli  of  a  Prussian  army  through  Baden.  Napo- 
leon had  once  dwelt  as  a  fugitive  upon  Swiss  soil :  the 
Swiss  Confederacy  had  boldly  protected  him  against 
the  threats  of  Louis  Philippe ;  it  seemed  out  of  the 
question  that  the  Emperor  should  ever  allow  a  Prussian 
attack  upon  Swiss  territory. 

The  legal  proceedings  against  the  prisoners  were 
therefore  allowed  to  pursue  their  course  uninterrupted, 
and  the  Swiss  Nation  shrugged  its  shoulders  with 
cheerful  indifference  at  the  stories  of  the  impotent 
wrath,  the  letters,  and  representations  of  the  Prussian 
King. 

In  the  mean  time,  however,  the  King  himself  had 
seen  where  the  critical  point  lay.  His  judgment  in 
regard  to  Napoleon  had  undergone  an  essential  change 
by  reason  of  the  course  taken  by  the  Crimean  War  and 
the  bearing  of  French  policy  since  that  time.  He  had 
reconciled  himself  to  the  idea  that  in  the  present  state 
of  affairs  Neuchatel  must  be  renounced,  and  that  an 
understanding  on  the  subject  was  at  once  to  be  entered 
into  with  the  Great  Powers ;  but  his  determination  was 
all  the  more  fixed  to  begfin  no  negfotiations  until  Switz- 
erland  should  first  have  set  free  the  prisoners  uncondi- 
tionally. If  the  Powers  should  leave  him  in  the  lurch 
on  this  point,  he  would,  by  means  of  Prussian  troops, 
possess  himself  of  Schaffhausen  and  Basle  as  pledges, 
until  his  just  demands  were  satisfied. 

On  the  IGth  of  September,  in  a  second  letter  written 
with  his  own  hand,  he  communicated  these  intentions 


THE  KING    WINS  NAPOLEON'S  SUPPORT.     295 

to  the  Emperor  Napoleon.  "  The  tone  of  my  official 
letter  to  Your  Majesty,"  he  said,  "  was  cold,  and  lacked 
the  warm  expressions  which  my  heart  and  my  confi- 
dence in  Your  Majesty  would  dictate.  The  moment 
has  come  when  it  depends  upon  Your  Majesty  to  win  a 
faithful  friend  that  can  be  counted  on  in  every  trial, 
and  who  is  an  admirer  of  those  great  abilities  which 
have  restored  safety  and  peace  to  Europe." 

After  he  had  dwelt  upon  the  good  qualities  and  the 
misfortunes  of  his  abused  followers,  he  declared  that, 
if  worst  came  to  worst,  he  should  not  hesitate  to  fight 
for  them.  "  I  know,"  he  said,  "  that  Your  Majesty 
might  stay  my  arm  at  the  instant  of  victory ;  but  I  do 
not  fear  this.  Yet  I  shall  be  ready,  so  far  as  the 
Powers  are  concerned,  to  make  any  concession  com- 
patible with  honor."  He  concluded  by  saying,  "  I 
write  this  letter  with  a  bleeding  heart  and  with  tears  in 
my  eyes." 

In  the  Berlin  Cabinet  these  outpourings  of  the 
King's  heart  on  political  questions  were  not  very  popu- 
lar ;  but  this  time  the  letter  gained  its  object.  "  The 
King's  letter,"  said  the  Empress  Eugdnie  to  Count 
Hatzfeldt,  "  moved  the  Emperor  deeply.  What  could 
have  been  more  desirable  for  him  for  his  future  plans 
than  such  a  disposition  on  the  King's  part?  The 
satisfaction  of  the  King's  wishes  would  render  likely 
the  long  continuance  of  a  close  understanding  between 
the  two  Powers." 

Napoleon  answered  at  once  on  the  24th  of  September 
from  Biarritz.     He  did  not  conceal  from  the  Kincf  that 


296      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

as  sovereign  of  France  he  could  not  look  upon  a  Prussian 
army  in  Switzerland  without  anxiety,  but  all  the  more 
decidedly  did  he  offer  his  aid  in  taking  peaceful  meas- 
ures to  oblige  Switzerland  to  release  the  prisoners.  In 
fact,  an  official  letter  was  sent  from  Paris  to  Berne,  in 
which  the  attention  of  Switzerland  was  energetically 
called  to  the  serious  danger  to  her  own  interests  in- 
volved in  the  continuation  of  the  legal  proceedings, 
and  which  conveyed  the  Emperor's  earnest  advice  that 
concessions  should  be  made  on  this  point.  Napoleon, 
the  letter  said,  would  then  do  all  in  his  power  towards 
a  final  solution  of  the  whole  question.  In  addition  to 
this,  however.  Count  Walewski  sent  word  to  the 
Federal  Council,  that,  in  case  of  refusal,  Prussia,  with 
the  support  of  the  South  German  States,  would  march 
an  army  into  Switzerland.  ♦ 

The  King  was  in  the  highest  degree  satisfied  with 
all  this.  He  desired  war  as  little  as  did  Napoleon  ;  but 
he  entirely  shared  the  Emperor's  hope  that  the  latter's 
mighty  word  would  be  sufficient  to  bring  about  a  favor- 
able decision,  certainly,  if  the  other  Great  Powers  were 
willing  to  express  themselves  to  the  same  effect.  In 
fact,  what  room  was  there  for  doubt  ?  The  liberation 
of  the  prisoners  did  not  involve  any  actual  danger  for 
Switzerland.  It  was  a  question  of  principle  and  of 
honor.  The  liberation  did,  indeed,  mean  recognizing 
that  the  prisoners  had  been  in  the  right,  and  Switzer- 
land in  the  wrong.  For  this  very  reason  the  King  had 
demanded  it,  and  Switzerland  had  refused  it.  But 
now  a  Power  which  was  in  no  way  concerned,  which 


SWITZERLAND  PERSISTS  IN  HER  REFUSAL.      297 

was  at  once  the  mightiest  neighbor  and  the  best  friend 
of  Switzerland,  called  upon  her  in  her  own  interests 
and  in  those  of  France,  not  at  Prussia's  demand,  but  at 
the  request  of  France,  to  abandon  legal  proceedings : 
what  reasonable  ground  could  prevent  Switzerland 
from  fulfilling  this  wish  ?  Without  any  loss  of  honor, 
she  could,  on  this  basis,  enter  into  a  negotiation  that 
could  result  in  nothing  else  than  the  King's  renuncia- 
tion of  his  claim  to  Neuch^tel. 

But  it  was  destined  to  turn  out  otherwise. 

In  spite  of  the  energy  with  which  Walewski  had 
spoken,  the  Federal  Council  did  not  believe  in  the 
seriousness  of  his  words.  The  liberal  or  democratic 
tendencies  of  the  masses  of  the  people  in  France  and 
Germany  had  been,  indeed,  since  1851,  kept  under  re- 
pression, but  they  nevertheless  existed  in  all  the  greater 
intensity,  and  showed  themselves  in  the  Neuchatel  ques- 
tion just  as  they  had  done  during  the  Crimean  war. 

There  was  an  overwhelming  preponderance  of  opinion 
in  favor  of  Switzerland  ;  it  was  held  to  be  both  absurd 
and  monstrous,  that  the  Prussian  people  should  be 
forced  into  a  serious  war,  for  the  sake  of  thirteen 
square  miles  of  isolated  territory,  that  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  the  Prussian  State.  Now  it  was 
very  well  known  in  Berne  how  much  attention  was 
paid  by  Napoleon  and  the  South  German  Courts  to  the 
public  oj)inion  of  their  people;  the  conviction  was 
therefore  felt,  that,  however  hostile  these  Governments 
might  be,  they  would  not  venture  actually  to  permit 
the  Prussian  army  to  cross  their  territory. 


298      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

There  was  another  consideration. 

Switzerland,  without  doubt,  would  even  now  have 
yielded  to  a  demand  made  by  the  Great  Powers  collec- 
tively. But,  as  we  know,  since  the  Congress  of  Paris, 
the  Great  Powers  had  been  divided  into  two  groujDS, 
and  this,  too,  made  itself  felt  also  in  the  Neuchatel 
question.  While  France  supported  the  Prussian  Cab- 
inet, the  Russian  ambassador  in  Berne  seconded  the 
French  with  uninterrupted  zeal.  The  representative  of 
Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  acted  with  extreme  coolness, 
proposed,  indeed,  the  liberation  of  the  prisoners,  but, 
after  this  had  been  refused,  took  no  further  steps.  And 
the  English  ambassador,  Gordon,  even  had  daily  con- 
sultations with  Stampfli,  as  to  how  the  King  of  Prussia 
could  be  forced,  first  to  renounce  his  claim,  and  so  to 
purchase  the  freedom  of  the  rebels. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  Federal  Council,  after 
two  days'  deliberation,  decided  to  say  in  reply  to  the 
French  Government,  that  the  liberation  of  the  prisoners 
could  only  take  place  after  the  beginning  of  a  negotia- 
tion, based  upon  the  King's  renunciation  of  his  right  to 
Neuchatel.  "  I  hope,"  said  Count  Walewski,  there- 
upon, to  the  Swiss  ambassador,  "that  this  refusal  will 
not  be  your  last  word :  it  is  not  advisable  for  any  one 
to  cast  to  the  winds,  through  obstinacy  or  carelessness, 
the  earnest  counsel  of  the  Emperor  of  the  French." 

The  King,  who  in  his  excitement  clutched  at  any 
straw  that  might  prove  of  use,  then  seized  upon  the  idea 
of  summoning  the  German  Confederate  Diet.  Count 
Buol    declared    this   to  be  an    excellent    measure,  but 


THE  KING   CONVENES   THE  DIET.  299 

said  that  everything  irritating  must  be  avoided,  every 
assertion  of  rights,  and  especially  every  threat.  The 
Count  had  now  the  peculiar  satisfaction  of  seeing  the 
Prussian  representative  in  the  Diet  induce  his  Govern- 
ment to  limit  its  proposition  entirely  in  accordance  with 
Austria's  wishes,  that  is  to  say,  to  the  participation  of 
the  Confederation  in  the  London  Protocol,  and  to 
the  demand  for  tlie  liberation  of  the  prisoners,  to  be 
made  in  the  name  of  the  Confederation  by  all  the 
German  ambassadors  in  Berne.  Only  by  implication 
did  the  proposition  contain  the  expression  of  a  hope, 
that,  in  case  of  necessity,  the  individual  Governments 
—  not  the  Confederation  —  would  allow  the  Prussian 
troops  to  cross  their  territory. 

In  regard  to  this,  Bismarck  had  called  Herr  von 
Manteuffel's  attention  to  the  fact  that  nothinof  ougfht  to 
be  required  of  the  Confederation  that  would  not  be 
unanimously  agreed  to.  "  It  would  be  extremely  dan- 
gerous," he  said,  "  to  declare  a  majority  decision  admis- 
sible and  binding  in  this  case ;  by  so  doing,  we  should 
expose  ourselves  to  the  possibility  of  being  obliged 
sometime  in  the  future,  to  recognize  the  validity  of 
majority  decisions  concerning  the  defence  of  Austria's 
possessions  in  Italy."  That  Napoleon  was  occupied 
with  plans  in  regard  to  these  possessions,  Bismarck  had 
already  perceived  after  the  Congress  of  Paris,  and  he 
had  communicated  his  view  to  his  Government. 

This  consideration  makes  Austria's  attitude  seem  all 
the  more  incomprehensible,  in  that  sliu  (li<l  not  take 
advantage  of  tliis  unusual  opportunity,  and  use  every 


300      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

means  to  encourage  Prussia  in  military  action  against 
Switzerland,  so  that  a  probably  unanimous  vote  might 
be  secured,  to  the  effect  that  loyalty  to  the  Confedera- 
tion imposed  as  a  duty  the  protection  of  every  member 
of  the  Confederation,  even  in  its  non-German  posses- 
sions. It  would  have  been  an  important  gain  for 
Austria  in  the  future,  and  would  not  have  involved  the 
least  danger  to  her  in  the  present.  For  nothing  is 
surer,  than  that  Switzerland  would  at  once  have 
yielded,  so  soon  as  Austria  should  have  joined  in  the 
threatening  attitude  of  Prussia  and  of  France. 

Instead  of  this,  however,  we  see  Count  Buol  every- 
where, in  Berne,  in  South  Germany,  and  in  Frankfort, 
offering  hinderances  to  the  wishes  of  Prussia,  whereby 
he  constantly  wounded  and  irritated  the  King's  mind, 
and  intensified  the  secure  self-confidence  of  the  Swiss. 
It  is  easily  understood,  that,  this  being  the  state  of 
affairs,  the  Federal  Council  rejected  the  request  of  the 
German  Central  Authority,  exactly  as  they  had  done 
all  former  demands. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon,  much  annoyed  at  the  rejection 
of  his  advice,  had  by  no  means  abandoned  his  activity. 
He  at  once  asked  the  King  for  a  private  communication 
of  the  conditions  upon  which,  after  the  liberation  of  the 
prisoners,  he  could  bring  himself,  in  conference  with 
the  Powers,  to  resign  Neuchatel.  He  received  the 
answer  that  the  King  reserved  further  details  for  the 
beginning  of  the  negotiations,  but  would  finally,  at  the 
request  of  the  Powers,  content  himself  with  these  three 
points :    the    continuance    of    the    title    of   Prince    of 


NAPOLEON'S  ACTION.  301 

Neucliatel,  the  recovery  of  the  princely  domams,  and 
the  restoration  of  the  old  citizens  to  power  in  the 
Neuchatel  towns,  together  with  a  guaranty  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  charitable  institutions.  This,  it 
was  remarked,  was  communicated  in  profound  confi- 
dence to  the  Emperor,  but  was  not  to  be  made  known  to 
Switzerland ;  so  far  as  that  country  was  concerned,  the 
King  was  determined  to  insist  upon  the  unconditional 
liberation  of  the  prisoners  as  a  preliminary.  Napoleon 
was  entirely  satisfied  with  this,  but  conceived  the  idea 
of  hinting  to  the  Swiss  Government,  through  the 
French  ambassador,  how  cheaply  he  could  obtain  for  it 
the  King's  renunciation  upon  the  release  of  the 
prisoners,  and  of  thus  inducing  it  to  fulfil  his  own 
wishes. 

But  this  good  intention  was  rendered  abortive  in  the 
moment  of  execution,  by  an  almost  comic  occurrence. 
Tlie  English  ambassador  in  Berlin  had,  by  not  wholly 
unusual  means,  become  acquainted  with  the  three 
points,  and  had  at  once  communicated  them  to  the 
Minister,  Lord  Clarendon.  Tlie  latter,  in  his  turn,  had 
speedily  made  them  known  to  the  ambassador  Gordon 
in  Berne.  The  news  then  sj^read  rapidly  through  tlie 
world,  that  England  had  proposed  to  the  Federal 
Council  to  call  in  the  mediation  of  the  two  Western 
Powers,  on  tlie  basis  of  the  three  points  and  of  the 
royal  renunciation,  which  would  be  followed  by  the 
cessation  of  legal  proceedings ;  it  was  also  added,  that 
the  Federal  Council  had  hastened  to  accept  this  friendly 
offer. 


302      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

The  best  card  in  the  Emperor's  game  had  thus  been 
taken  from  his  hand,  and  given  to  his  opponent. 
Napoleon  was  indignant,  and  now  announced  to  the 
Prussian  ambassador,  that,  as  English  interference  had 
taken  away  from  the  French  Government  the  means  of 
further  action,  he  would  throw  his  own  personal  influ- 
ence into  the  balance.  He  invited  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Swiss  Confederate  army,  General  Dufour, 
his  former  instructor  in  military  science,  to  come  to 
Paris ;  he  depicted  to  him  the  settled  determination  of 
the  King,  the  unavoidable  necessity  of  yielding  in  the 
matter  of  the  prisoners,  and  the  certainty  of  the 
consequent  royal  renunciation.  He  concluded  with 
the  definite  declaration,  that  after  the  liberation  of  the 
prisoners  he  would  support  Switzerland  in  every  way, 
but  that,  unless  that  liberation  took  place,  he  would  in 
no  way  hinder  the  march  of  a  Prussian  army.  At  the 
same  time,  the  representatives  of  France  at  the  South 
German  Courts  received  instructions  to  express  them- 
selves to  the  ministers  there  in  the  same  way ;  and 
Count  Walewski  quietly  suggested  to  Count  Hatzfeldt, 
that  Prussia  should  make  some  military  preparations : 
that,  he  said,  was  the  only,  but  also  the  most  effective, 
method  of  bringing  the  Swiss  to  their  senses. 

Since  in  taking  warlike  measures  the  thing  most  to 
be  considered  was  the  relations  with  France  and  the 
South  German  States,  the  President  of  the  Prussian 
Ministry  invited  Count  Hatzfeldt  and  the  representa- 
tive in  the  Diet  to  come  to  Berlin,  for  a  conference, 
on  the  2d  of  December.     At  this  conference,  Bismarck, 


PRUSSIA'S  decision:  303 

in  entire  agreement  with  Napoleon,  declared  that  the 
sole  means  which  would  be  effective  against  the  reluc- 
tance of  Switzerland  and  the  Powers,  Avas  a  serious 
commencement  of  preparations.  No  one,  he  said, 
desired  war;  and  for  that  very  reason,  Prussia  would 
obtain  what  she  desired  if  only  there  was  no  doubt  left, 
that,  in  case  of  her  failing  to  do  so,  war  would  ensue. 

It  was  finally  decided  to  act  on  this  theory.  To  be 
sure,  no  very  great  appropriations  were  yet  made  to 
cover  the  expenses,  but  various  arrangements  were 
made  such  as  are  usually  preliminary  to  a  mobilization. 
It  was  decided  that  each  of  the  nine  army  corps  should 
contribute  one  division,  with  its  militia,  to  the  cam- 
paign, making  in  all  about  160,000  men,  of  whom  six 
divisions  were  to  occupy  Schaffhausen  and  Basle,  and 
three  to  form  a  reserve.  Military  plenipotentiaries 
were  sent  to  Darmstadt  and  Carlsruhe,  to  Stuttgart 
and  Munich,  in  order  to  arrange  in  detail  for  the 
maintenance  and  lodgement  of  the  troops  on  the  march. 
All  this  was  not  made  public,  but  was  communicated  to 
all  the  Govei-nments  with  the  observation  that  an  ulti- 
matuni  would  at  once  be  presented  to  Switzerland,  and 
that,  if  the  prisoners  were  not  liberated  by  the  2d  of 
January,  the  mobilization  would  take  place  on  that 
day ;  and  after  that,  more  extensive  demands  would  be 
addressed  to  the  Swiss  Confederacy. 

A  secret  intrusted  to  so  many  naturally  found  its  way 
into  the  Press  ;  and  a  great  rattling  of  sabres  at  once 
took  place  in  the  Swiss  newspapers,  with  the  cry  for  an 
offensive  war  for  the  overthrow  of  all  the  thrones  in 


304      CLOSE  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

Germany.  The  Federal  Council  was  still  reluctant  to 
take  the  Prussian  threat,  or  Napoleon's  approval  of  it, 
in  earnest.  But  on  the  17th  of  December,  the  imperial 
Mo7iiteur  published  a  sharp  note,  portraying,  on  the  one 
side,  the  unquestionable  right  and  the  long-continued 
moderation  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  and,  on  the  other, 
the  violence  and  obstinacy  of  the  Swiss  Federal  Council, 
and  concluded  by  saying,  that,  in  view  of  this,  Switzer- 
land could  not  wonder,  if  she  received  in  the  future 
less  consideration  than  had  been  shown  her  hitherto. 

The  effect  of  this  public  avowal  was  great.  The 
Federal  Council  hastened  to  convene  the  representative 
gathering  of  the  sovereign  people,  the  Federal  Assem- 
bly. There  was  still  a  hope  that  the  Prussian  minie- 
balls  could  be  kept  away  from  Schaffhausen  ;  for  it  was 
known  that  Austria  was  employing  every  means  to 
hinder  the  movement  of  the  Prussian  army. 

In  fact.  Count  Buol  declared,  in  Berlin,  that  Prussia 
had  promised  in  the  London  Protocol  to  take  no  steps 
on  her  own  part  during  the  continuance  of  those  nego- 
tiations, by  which  the  Powers  were  to  endeavor  to 
secure  a  recognition  of  her  rights  in  Switzerland :  from 
which  it  followed  that  she  ought  now  to  despatch  no 
troops  without  first  obtaining  the  approval  of  the 
Powers.  The  answer  to  this  was  simple :  "  For  four 
years  the  Powers  have  neglected  to  begin  any  negotia- 
tions, and,  consequently,  we  now  shall  do  on  our  own 
account  what  seems  to  us  proper."  At  the  same  time, 
Count  Buol  declared,  that  the  passage  of  the  Prussian 
troops  through  the  south  of  Germany  could  be  author- 


AUSTRIA    OPPOSES  PRUSSIA.  305 

ized  only  by  the  Confederate  Diet,  and  not  by  the 
individual  States  ;  but  to  this  he  received  from  all  sides 
the  reply,  that  the  reverse  of  this  was  true  by  reason  of 
the  sovereign  independence  of  the  German  individual 
States. 

Quite  as  fruitless  were  the  Count's  diplomatic  efforts 
at  the  various  Courts.  When  the  anxiety  about  French 
intervention  had  disappeared,  the  ruling  feeling  in  these 
Cabinets  was  the  mere  satisfaction  that  a  severe  lesson 
was  at  last  to  be  given  to  the  revolutionary  element  in 
Switzerland. 

The  sole  result  of  Austria's  attitude  was  a  daily- 
increasing  bitterness  on  the  part  of  the  Prussian  King, 
whose  nerves  were  disturbed  anew  by  every  despatch 
from  Vienna.  In  spite  of  everything,  the  old  friend- 
ship was  not  yet  quite  stifled  in  his  heart.  At  the  end 
of  December,  he  sent  Colonel  Manteuffel  once  again 
with  a  long  autograph  letter  to  the  Emperor,  who  was 
then  in  Venetia.  In  Vienna  there  was  a  heated  discus- 
sion between  the  Colonel  and  Count  Buol,  in  which 
each  persisted  in  his  own  view ;  and  when  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  a  few  days  after  received  the  Colonel, 
though  his  manner  was  gracious,  he  spoke  substantially 
to  the  same  effect  as  his  Minister. 

At  tliis  same  time,  the  Swiss  Federal  Council  de- 
spatched one  of  its  members,  Furrer,  a  prudent  and 
moderate  man,  first  to  Frankfort,  where  he  had  a  long 
consultation  with  the  presiding  deput}'.  Count  Rech- 
berg,  and  then  to  tlie  three  South  German  capitals,  to 
inquire   with   regard    to    the    passage    of  the    Prussian 


306      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN, 

troops  through  South  Germany.  The  reply  was  every- 
where the  same :  the  passage  of  the  troops  had  been 
approved  of  and  provided  for ;  it  would  certainly  take 
place  after  the  period  specified  had  elapsed,  unless  the 
prisoners  should  be  set  free  within  that  time.  At 
Napoleon's  request  Prussia  had  extended  the  time  until 
the  15th  of  January ;  before  that,  the  Emperor  thought, 
the  pear  would  be  ripe. 

And,  in  fact,  so  it  was.  "While  the  Federal  Council 
with  great  haste  and  very  serious  expense  was  getting 
together  several  divisions  of  militia,  and  pushing  them 
toward  the  threatened  boundaries,  the  martial  ardor  of 
the  people,  in  spite  of  all  the  haughty  newspaper 
articles,  was  gradually  collapsing.  Fifteen  hundred 
soldiers  deserted  from  NeuchS.tel  across  the  French 
frontier,  in  order  not  to  be  obliged  to  fight  against  their 
King.  The  remaining  cantons  showed  little  desire  to 
engage  in  a  struggle  with  Prussia  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  carrying  to  the  end  the  drama  of  a  criminal  suit 
brought  against  sixty  royalists.  It  was  certainly  not 
pleasant  to  be  forced  to  yield  to  the  threat  of  a  Prussian 
attack ;  but  in  the  mean  time,  Napoleon  came  to  the 
assistance  of  his  old  friends  in  this  difficulty  with  a 
new  declaration.  This  was,  indeed,  only  a  repetition 
of  Avliat  he  had  said  in  October ;  namely,  that  after  the 
liberation  of  the  prisoners,  he  would  exert  himself 
actively  for  the  interests  of  Switzerland ;  but  by  means 
of  it  the  Federal  Council  could  now,  without  mention- 
ing the  Prussian  army,  bring  forward  in  the  Federal 
Assembly  a  proposition  for  friendly  acquiescence  in  the 


SWITZERLAND  DECIDES   TO   YIELD.  307 

wishes  of  France ;  that  is  to  say,  for  the  cessation  of 
legal  proceedings  and  for  the  liberation  of  the  prisoners. 
On  the  15th  of  January,  just  before  the  expiration  of 
the  period  fixed  by  Prussia,  the  Assembly  gave  this 
proposition  their  approval. 

The  danger  of  war  was  thus  averted.  Three  months 
earlier  the  sons  of  Tell  and  Winkelried  might  have 
obtained  this  result  more  cheaply  and  more  honorably. 
But  at  the  same  time,  as  good  men  of  business,  they 
had  some  ground  for  consoling  themselves.  The  longer 
and  the  more  intensely  the  King's  zeal,  and  with  it  the 
excitement  of  Europe,  had  been  concentrated  upon  the 
question  of  the -legal  proceedings,  the  more  certain  was 
it  that,  after  the  settlement  of  that  question,  a  general 
relaxation  of  interest  and  indifference  on  the  part  of 
the  other  Powers  would  ensue,  which  would  lead  to  a 
speedy  recognition  by  all  Europe  of  the  territorial 
rights  of  Switzerland. 

For  this  object,  Napoleon  eagerly  urged  the  assem- 
bling of  a  conference  of  the  Great  Powers  at  Paris. 
England  hesitated  for  a  time,  and  would  rather  have 
transferred  the  negotiations  to  London  ;  but  she  finally 
yielded,  and  on  the  10th  of  February,  Count  Walewski 
sent  the  invitations  to  the  four  Cabinets,  as  well  as  to 
Switzerland.  On  the  5th  of  March  a  meeting  of  the 
representatives  of  the  four  Great  Powers  took  place, 
and  at  this  —  since  the  King  on  the  4th  of  March  had 
with  an  aching  heart  once  more  expressed  to  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  in  a  private  letter  his  willingness  to 
make  a  sacrifice  —  it  was  unanimously  decided  to  ask 


308      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

the  King,  in  the  interests  of  Europe  and  of  Neuchatel, 
whether  he  would  be  willing  to  give  up  his  right  to  the 
possession  of  that  country.  In  regard  to  the  method 
of  carrying  on  the  negotiations,  it  was  agreed,  that,  if 
Prussia  imposed  conditions  to  her  renunciation,  the 
representative  of  Switzerland  should  be  summoned  to 
the  consultation,  the  arguments  and  counter-arguments 
should  be  heard,  and  then  each  point  should  be  voted 
upon  and  settled  by  itself. 

As  to  the  probable  outcome  of  all  this.  Count  Hatz- 
feldt  could  not  hold  out  to  his  Court  any  very  great 
hopes.  England,  he  said,  would  certainly  favor  very 
urgently  every  claim  of  Switzerland ;  the  other  Powers 
had  no  other  wish  in  the  matter  than  to  bring  it  to  a 
speedy  conclusion,  and  would  therefore  be  very  reluc- 
tant to  meet  England  with  any  serious  opposition. 

At  this  news,  the  King  was  once  more  greatly  dis- 
turbed. He  had  expected  that  the  Powers,  on  the  basis 
of  the  Protocol  of  1822,  would  begin  with  a  renewed 
recognition  of  his  right,  would  then  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  him  as  to  the  conditions  of  his  renuncia- 
tion, and  would  afterwards  present  the  result  of  this  to 
Switzerland  as  their  unanimous  decision.  Instead  of 
this,  he  saw  himself  obliged  to  treat  with  the  Swiss 
Democrats,  as  a  simple  party  in  the  same  cause  and  on 
an  equal  footing  before  the  tribunal  of  Europe.  He 
indulged  in  very  violent  outbursts  :  "  This  is  a  case," 
he  said,  "  in  which  we  must  speak  straight  out  from  the 
heart." 

On   the   18th   of   March   Count   Hatzfeldt   received 


CONFERENCE   CONCERNING  NEUCHATEL.       309 

instructions  to  make  a  complaint  in  the  Conference  that 
the  Powers  had  abandoned  the  ground  taken  in  1852. 
"  The  King,"  he  was  to  say,  "  has  right  on  his  side,  and 
consequently  it  belongs  to  him  to  fix  the  conditions  of 
the  sacrifice  he  is  to  make.  It  has  never  been  his  right, 
that  has  involved  dangers  to  Europe  or  to  Neuchatel, 
but  the  infringement  of  the  same  by  the  upholders  of 
the  Revolution.  He  will  not,  however,  enter  into  any 
further  discussion  of  the  matter  before  Europe ;  he  is 
willing  to  give  up  his  right  on  the  following  conditions 
which  he  presents  as  an  indivisible  whole ;  so  soon  as 
they  shall  have  been  accepted  by  the  Powers,  he  will 
make  them  known  by  an  open  letter,  together  with  the 
renunciation  of  his  sovereignty  over  Neuchatel." 

The  conditions  introduced  with  such  stormy  words 
were  themselves  exceedingly  moderate,  since  many  of 
the  wishes  formerly  expressed  by  the  King  had  been 
demonstrated  to  him  by  the  Neuchatel  royalists  them- 
selves to  be  impracticable.  For  himself,  the  King  asked 
for  the  continuance  of  the  title  of  Prince  of  Neuchatel, 
and  Count  of  Valendis,  as  well  as  the  payment  of  two 
millions  of  francs  —  the  capital  corresponding  to  the 
civil  list  of  one  hundred  thousand  francs  formerly 
received  yearly  from  Neuchatel.  Tlie  reniiiiiiing  arti- 
cles concerned  the  protection  of  the  Neuchatel  royal- 
ists. They  included  complete  amnesty  for  all  political 
offences  before  and  since  the  event  of  September ;  the 
assumption  by  the  Swiss  Confederacy  of  all  expenses 
arising  fiom  that  event,  so  that  Neuchatel  and  its 
inliabitants  shoukl  only  contribute  their  proportion  like 


310      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

all  the  other  cantons  ;  the  restoration  to  the  former 
ecclesiastical  authorities  in  Neuchatel  of  such  church 
property  as  had  been  secularized  since  1848 ;  a  guaranty- 
to  insure  the  inviolability  of  all  charitable  institutions 
and  bequests  throughout  the  country ;  and  finally,  at 
the  end  of  a  year,  the  convening  in  Neuchatel  of  a 
constituent  assembly  elected  only  by  the  long-resident 
citizens  of  the  canton,  the  new  arrivals  in  the  country 
being  excluded. 

When  Count  Hatzfeldt,  on  the  24th  of  March,  laid 
these  instructions  before  the  Conference,  the  introduc- 
tory remarks  caused  opposition  from  many  sides,  and 
produced  in  general  a  painful  feeling.  It  was  decided 
to  invite  the  Swiss  representative,  Dr.  Kern,  to  be  pres- 
ent on  the  25th  of  March,  that  the  Prussian  conditions 
might  be  communicated  to  him.  After  hearing  them, 
he  naturally  said  that  he  must  make  a  report  to  his 
Government;  the  actual  discussion  therefore  could  not 
begin  before  the  31st  of  March. 

In  that  session,  as  well  as  in  the  following  one  on  the 
1st  of  April,  great  differences  of  opinion  became  mani- 
fest. To  the  greater  part  of  the  articles  concerning 
the  protection  of  the  people  of  Neuchatel,  Dr.  Kern 
had  no  serious  objection  to  make ;  but  he  declared  the 
restoration  of  the  church  property  to  be  impossible,  as 
well  as  the  exclusion  of  the  new  citizens  from  the  elec- 
tions to  the  constituent  assembly ;  he  further  entered  a 
protest  against  the  King's  continuing  to  bear  the  title 
of  Prince  of  Neuchatel ;  and  he  rejected,  with  the 
greatest   imaginable   energy,   the  payment  of    the  two 


PROPOSITIONS   OF  THE  FOUR  POWERS.       311 

millions.  The  discussion  continued  both  days  for  four 
or  five  hours.  Finally  the  four  Powers  agreed  that  the 
continuance  of  the  title  would  do  harm,  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  a  money  compensation  should  be  commended 
to  the  consideration  of  the  Swiss.  "  Even  if  the  prin- 
ciple must  be  admitted,"  cried  Kern  at  this,  "  at  least 
let  us  not  have  this  crushing  sum  of  two  millions !  " 

It  was  evidently  impossible  for  the  two  parties  to 
arrive  at  an  agreement.  "  You  might  perhaps  have 
obtained  a  great  deal,"  said  Count  Walewski  to  the 
Prussian  ambassador,  "if  j^ou  had  not  imposed  on 
Switzerland  such  an  overwhelmingly  burdensome 
demand  of  money."  The  four  neutrals  now  decided 
that  the  next  thing  was  to  agree  among  themselves 
upon  a  programme  of  mediation.  They  spent  several 
weeks  on  this,  for  they  also  differed  among  themselves, 
England  always  taking  energetically  the  part  of  Switzer- 
land, while  the  three  others  favored  Prussia,  though 
Austria  was  the  most  inclined  to  yield  to  the  English 
claims. 

England  would  at  first  hear  nothing  of  the  Swiss 
Confederacy's  making  a  money  payment,  and  finally 
declared  it  would  be  a  great  concession  if  the  King 
were  to  receive  a  million.  The  Powers  were  unani- 
mously in  favor  of  striking  out  the  article  in  regard  to 
the  constituent  assembly:  on  the  other  hand,  the 
amnesty  and  the  costs  of  the  September  uprising  were 
settled  in  accordance  with  the  Prussian  proposal. 
Lastly,  tlie  church  property  was  to  remain  in  the  hands 
of  the  State,  but  the  churches  were  to  receive  compen- 


312      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

sation  for  the  loss  of  income  from  the  same.  The 
representatives  of  the  Powers  then  declared  it  indis- 
pensable —  since  the  renunciation  of  the  King  involved 
a  change  in  the  Act  of  the  Vienna  Congress  —  that  all 
these  provisions  should  be  drawn  up  in  a  formal  com- 
pact, and  signed  by  six  contracting  parties :  the  four 
neutral  Powers,  Prussia  and  Switzerland.  In  a  sepa- 
rate protocol  the  Powers  alone  were  to  recognize  the 
King's  right  to  continue  to  bear  the  princely  title. 
These  propositions  were  communicated  to  the  two 
parties  on  the  20th  of  April. 

All  this  disturbed  the  temper  of  the  King  afresh.  He 
could  not,  indeed,  from  his  own  standpoint,  deny  at  all 
the  necessity  of  adopting  the  form  of  a  compact ;  but 
the  thought  was  horrible  to  him  of  taking  such  a  step 
in  common  with  the  Swiss  rebels.  With  lofty  pride,  he 
said  that  a  protocol  concerning  the  princely  title  was 
superfluous ;  that  would  only  mean  his  keeping  what 
he  had  already ;  who  would  take  it  away  from  him  ? 
And  in  a  still  higher  tone  he  continued  :  "  I  demanded 
two  millions,  not  because  I  am  anxious  for  the  money, 
but  because  the  payment  would  have  involved  a  final 
recognition  of  my  right ;  this  principle  has  been  quite 
as  well  expressed  by  the  decision  of  the  Powers  ;  I  am 
satisfied  with  that,  and  make  no  further  demands  con- 
cerning the  payment;  I  will  not  haggle  about  money 
with  Switzerland." 

After  this  his  Minister  believed  that  he  would  now 
receive  instructions  to  accept  the  remaining  ^^I'opo- 
sitions  of  the  Conference.     But  the  intense  bitterness 


THE  KING'S  HESITATION.  313 

of  the  King's  feelings  would  not  allow  his  anxious 
mind  to  rest  by  day  nor  by  night ;  he  suddenly  gave 
orders  that  the  announcement  of  his  acceptance  should 
be  communicated  to  Paris,  with  the  condition  that  all 
his  rights  should  again  be  valid,  if  Switzerland  failed  to 
fulfil  the  smallest  point  of  the  compact. 

This  reservation  seemed  natural  enough,  and  Balan 
began  to  draw  up  the  papers.  Then  Frederick 
William's  feelings  changed  again,  and  there  came  a 
royal  letter,  to  the  effect  that  a  compromise  must  be 
attempted,  and  that  the  Conference  should  be  informed 
that  all  claim  to  payment  would  be  given  up,  if 
Switzerland  would  agree  to  the  articles  concerning 
church  property  and  the  constituent  assembly.  "  They 
will  refuse  it,"  said  the  King,  "  but  I  shall  have  done 
my  best,  and  afterwards  7ious  verronsy  So  it  stood  on 
the  26th  of  April. 

What  was  to  happen  afterwards  was  seen  soon 
enough.  On  the  28th  of  April,  the  Swiss  Federal 
Council,  in  confident  expectation  of  a  ratification  by 
the  Federal  Assembly,  unanimously  acce2)ted  the  outline 
of  the  compact  proposed  by  the  four  neutrals.  This 
decided  the  matter  unmistakably.  Bismarck,  who 
had  shortly  before  been  at  Paris,  had  on  the  24th  of 
April  already  pointed  out  to  his  Government  what 
must  follow.  For  Prussia,  lie  said,  it  was  a  matter 
of  small  importance  whether  the  King  accepted  the 
compact  or  not.  But  the  rejection  of  the  same  would 
leave  the  Neuchatel  royalists,  for  whose  protection  the 
wliole  matter  had  been  undertaken,  either  helpless  iu 


314      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

exile,  or  defenceless  against  all  sorts  of  party-machina- 
tions at  home.  Any  step  that  the  King  might  try  to 
take  in  their  favor  in  future  would  be  met  by  the 
Powers  only  with  the  regret  that  Prussia  had  rejected 
the  compact.  There  would  then  be  no  further  talk  of 
any  possibility  of  military  action. 

In  the  beginning,  the  King  was  reluctant  to  accept 
this  view;  but  on  the  28th  of  April  the  force  of  an 
accomplished  fact  put  an  end  to  his  doubts  and  his 
hopes.  Beside  this,  he  heard  from  all  sides  that  the 
acceptance  of  his  last  proposition  by  Switzerland  was 
out  of  the  question.  And  when,  on  the  6th  of  May, 
the  Emperor  Napoleon  in  a  confidential  letter  announced 
to  the  King  the  visit  of  Prince  Napoleon  to  Berlin, 
expressed  in  warm  terms  a  desire  for  true  friendship  in 
the  future,  and  for  loyal  co-operation  in  all  European 
affairs,  and  added  the  hope  that  the  compact  would  be 
accepted,  Frederick  William,  although  with  a  heavy 
heart,  finally  made  up  his  mind  on  the  10th  of  May, 
and  wrote  to  the  Emperor  in  reply  on  the  13th  that  he 
had  no  desire  to  take  money  from  the  Swiss,  and 
further  that  he  would  agree  to  the  outline  of  a  compact 
proposed  by  the  Conference.  On  the  16th,  correspond- 
ing instructions  were  sent  to  Count  Hatzfeldt,  and  on 
the  26th  all  parties  joined  in  signing  the  compact. 

This  was  the  outcome  of  an  affair  that  for  nine  long 
months  had  troubled  and  vexed  the  heart  and  the 
nerves  of  the  King  more  seriously  than  any  event  since 
the  March  days  of  1848.  He  had,  indeed,  obtained 
practically    everything  that  could  be    expected  under 


CONCLUSION  OF  THE   COMPACT.  315 

existinof  circumstances.  But  this  consideration  did  not 
remove  his  sorrow  at  the  loss  he  had  sustained ;  and 
the  sting  remained  deep  in  his  soul,  that  the  horrors  of 
Revolution  had  won  a  new  victory  with  the  sanction  of 
Europe. 

There  was,  however,  no  further  thought  of  any 
material  injury.  The  possession  of  Neuchatel  was  of 
no  value  to  Prussia ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  a  great 
advantage  to  be  hampered  no  more  by  the  anomalous 
position  of  that  country. 

The  indirect  consequences  of  the  long  struggle  were 
even  more  important;  and  among  them  the  develop- 
ment of  closer  and  more  friendly  relations  with  France. 
We  have  remarked  above,  that  Napoleon's  moderation 
in  the  use  of  his  victory  had  diminished  the  King's  old 
dread  of  the  revolutionary  upstart.  Now,  in  the  place 
of  this,  a  warm  personal  feeling  had  arisen  between  the 
two  sovereigns.  In  June,  Napoleon  declared  in  a 
private  letter  to  Frederick  William  that  he  hoped  the 
feelincT  -which  ten  months  before  had  led  the  Kingr  to 
offer  him  loyal  friendship  still  existed ;  he  said  that  on 
his  part,  he  remained  convinced  that  for  the  develop- 
ment of  Prussia's  power  and  greatness,  nothing  could 
be  more  desirable  than  a  close  connection  with  France, 
whose  interests  were  ever3^where  the  same  with  hers. 
The  King  answered  at  once,  concurring  amicably  in  all 
that  the  Emperor  had  written. 

Fiom  this  to  an  alliance  with  France  was  certainly 
a  long  step.  In  tlie  very  circle  of  men  tliat  were  jier- 
sonally  most  intimate  with  the   King,   the   leaders  and 


316      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

protectors  of  the  Kreuzzeitung  party,  so  powerful  in 
internal  politics,  aversion  to  tlie  Heir  of  the  Revolu- 
tion still  continued  undiminished.  General  von  Gerlach 
with  this  feeling  wrote  vigorous  letters  to  Bismarck, 
when  the  latter,  in  accordance  with  his  observations 
made  in  Paris,  mentioned  to  the  King  Napoleon's 
desire  for  harmony,  and  pressingly  urged  him  to  take 
advantage  of  this  good-will  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor. 
Bismarck  justified  his  view  in  several  brilliant  memo- 
rials, written  with  that  perfect  clearness  of  his  vision 
which  embraced  at  one  glance  the  past  and  present  of 
Europe.  With  convincing  energy  he  pointed  out  the 
error  of  considering  as  of  the  greatest  importance  in 
foreign  policy,  not  the  aims,  but  the  legitimate  origin,  of 
a  neighboring  sovereign ;  and  he  made  clear  by  his 
conciseness  and  the  incontrovertibility  of  his  arguments 
the  necessity  for  Prussia,  considering  the  chaotic  state 
of  German  affairs,  to  acquire  a  firm  support  by  means 
of  external  alliances,  and  especially  of  being,  or  seeming 
to  be,  upon  friendly  terms  with  France.^  How  much 
consideration  these  views  met  with  at  that  time  in 
Berlin,  I  do  not  know.  But  although  Gerlach  and  the 
Kreuzzeitung  continually  opposed  them,  their  accuracy 
was  daily  confirmed  by  the  behavior  of  no  less  persons 
than  Count  Buol  in  Vienna  and  Herr  von  Beust  in 
Dresden. 

The  cool  reception  which  in  the  summer  of  1856  had 
been  given  to  the  memorial  of  the  Saxon  Minister  on 
the  subject  of  Confederate  reform,  that  is  to  say,  on  the 

1  Preuszen  im  Bundestag,  vol.  4,  p.  2G4,  ff. 


HERR    VON  BEUST.  317 

subject  of  restrictions  to  be  imposed  Vi]}OY\.  the  Press  and 
upon  the  rights  of  the  Estates,  had  not  frightened  that 
ambitious  statesman  in  the  least.  He  knew  that  in  his 
efforts  for  these  objects  he  could  count  upon  Austria's 
support,  and  he  therefore  determined  in  the  spring  of 
1857  to  make  the  contents  of  the  memorial,  now 
formulated  in  definite  propositions,  the  subject  of  fresh 
negotiations. 

He  had  already  found  in  March  a  rival  in  the  person 
of  the  Baden  JVlinister,  Baron  Meysenbug,  who  appro- 
priated to  himself  one  of  Beust's  projDOsitions,  the 
establishment  of  a  Confederate  court  of  arbitration, 
and  brought  it  forward  officially  in  Frankfort.  "  The 
proposal,"  said  Bismarck,  "owes  its  origin  without 
doubt  to  a  desire  for  popularit3^  It  seems  at  the  first 
glance  very  fine,  that,  in  the  future,  constitutional 
disputes  should '  be  settled  no  longer  by  the  assembly 
of  diplomats  at  Frankfort,  but  by  an  independent  tri- 
bunal ;  unfortunately,  the  pleasure  caused  by  this  will 
not  last  till  one  has  read  to  the  end  of  the  proposal." 

In  fact,  everything  which  the  other  paragraphs  took 
away  from  tlie  Confederate  Diet,  Meysenbug  restored 
to  it  l)y  the  simple  clause,  that,  in  any  particular  case  of 
dispute,  the  Confederate  Diet  was  to  decide  whether 
or  no  the  authority  of  the  tribunal  extended  to  that 
case.  Instead  of  this.  Baron  Beust  would  have  pre- 
ferred a  provision  according  to  which  the  Confederate 
Diet  should  have  the  right  to  interfere  only  when  the 
tribunal  should  overstep  tlie  limits  of  its  authority ; 
but  he  did  not  allow  himself  to  be  deterred  l)y  this  from 


318      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

welcoming  his  co-worker  in  Baden  ;  and  at  the  end  of 
April  he  laid  his  plan  in  its  new  form  before  the 
Governments,  with  the  proposal  that  a  grand  con- 
ference of  ministers  should  be  assembled  as  soon  as 
possible. 

The  judgment  of  the  majority  of  the  Governments, 
nevertheless,  remained  the  same  as  in  the  preceding 
year.  In  JNIunich,  King  Max,  indeed,  angered  by  the 
resolute  obstinacy  of  his  Estates,  was  inclined  to  favor 
measures  like  those  suggested  by  Beust ;  but  his  minis- 
ters argued  that  it  was  better  to  carry  out  such  meas- 
ures on  his  own  account  in  his  own  country,  than  to 
run  the  risk  of  injuring  Bavaria's  sovereignty  by  pro- 
posing them  in  the  Confederate  Diet  as  a  law  for  all 
Germany.  "  I  do  not  see,"  said  Baron  Pfordten  to  the 
Prussian  ambassador,  "  that  we  have,  generally  speak- 
ing, any  ground  for  altering  anything  in  the  existing 
Confederate  Constitution.  So  far  as  Herr  von  Beust 
is  concerned,  if  a  subject  for  political  activity  is  not  at 
hand  for  him,  his  energetic  mind  is  only  too  ready  to 
find  it  for  himself." 

Bismarck  reported  to  Berlin :  "  All  that  Beust  pro- 
poses amounts  simply  to  a  new  edition  of  the  exception- 
laws  of  1819  and  1834,  an  extraordinary  means  for 
elevating  the  Confederate  Diet  in  the  eyes  of  the 
nation."  Minister  von  Manteuffel  adhered  to  this  view 
entirely,  and  expressed  it  without  reserve  to  the  Ger- 
man ambassadors  then  at  Berlin.  Upon  this  Baron 
Beust  communicated  to  him  a  copy  of  an  Austrian 
despatch,  in  which  Count  Buol  declared  to  the  Saxon 


HERR    VON  MEYSENBUG.  319 

Minister  his  warm  approval  of  all  the  proiDositions,  and 
at  the  same  time  his  deep  regret  that  he  was  hindered 
for  the  time  by  Prussia's  manifold  scruples  from  taking 
energetic  steps  to  carry  out  the  reform  ;  it  was  not 
Austria's  fault,  therefore,  if  this  time  as  well  no  desir- 
able advance  in  the  German  question  could  be  made. 

The  close  connection  of  the  Courts  of  Dresden  and 
Vienna  in  opposition  to  that  of  Berlin  was  thus  made 
as  evident  as  possible.  The  proceeding  caused  the 
Prussian  Court  all  the  more  dissatisfaction,  since 
shortly  before,  in  the  west  of  Germany,  a  similar  con- 
quest made  by  Austrian  influence  had  become  mani- 
fest, and  that,  too,  in  a  place  where,  considering  the 
near  relationship  of  the  princely  House  with  that  of 
Prussia,  it  was  least  to  be  expected,  namely,  in  Baden. 
Even  since  Herr  von  JNIeysenbug  had  undertaken  the 
management  of  affairs,  he  had  shown  everywhere  a 
tendency  to  turn  away  from  Prussia  and  to  look  to 
Austria.  In  the  affair  of  Neuchatel,  he  held  back 
much  longer  than  the  other  states  in  the  matter  of  the 
passage  of  Prussian  soldiers ;  although,  so  far  as  the 
Swiss  Radicals  were  concerned,  he  would  have  been 
quite  willing  to  see  tliem  punished  for  the  hostility 
they  had  displayed  toward  tlie  Jesuits  in  1847.  But 
an  open  dispute  was  at  length  brought  on  by  the 
complicated  negotiations  about  the  fortress  of  Rastadt. 

As  early  as  the  summer  of  1856,  there  had  been  a 
lively  discussion  in  regard  to  further  grants  of  money 
for  tlie  completion  of  the  fortress.  Austria  and  the 
South  Germans  had  shown  themselves  ready  to  give 


320      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

freely,  but  Prussia  and  some  of  the  Northern  States 
were  of  the  opinion  that  these  demands  must  at  length 
come  to  an  end.  After  a  sharp  debate,  a  compromise 
was  unanimously  agreed  upon;  but  the  struggle  was 
renewed  with  redoubled  vehemence,  when  in  May, 
1857,  Austria  and  Baden  proposed  in  the  Diet  that  the 
peace  garrison  of  Rastadt,  which,  according  to  a  unani- 
mous vote  of  1841,  consisted  of  2,500  Badeners,  should 
be  henceforth  doubled,  and  5,000  Austrians  added  to  it. 

In  the  beginning,  the  Prussian  King  was  not  indis- 
posed to  agree  to  the  change ;  but  Bismarck  pointed 
out  that  although  the  proposal  (offering  as  it  did  a 
guaranty  for  the  active  participation  of  Austria  in  the 
defence  of  the  upper  Rhine)  was  advantageous  to  the 
interests  of  the  Confederation,  yet  it  was  impossible  for 
Prussia  to  allow  such  a  permanent  increase  of  Austria's 
power  in  Baden  without  a  corresponding  gain  for  her- 
self. He  therefore  received  instructions  to  act  accord- 
ingly. 

The  proposal  had  first  to  be  reported  upon  by  the 
committee  on  military  affairs  and  by  the  military  com- 
mission on  technical  details ;  but  even  in  these  prelimi- 
nary deliberations  it  became  evident  that  a  fierce  battle 
was  in  prospect.  For  the  majority  were  favorable  to 
the  proposal,  and  they  made  no  effort  to  conceal  their 
opinion  that  their  decision  on  the  subject  would  be 
binding:  while  Bismarck  disputed  their  authority  as 
a  majority,  besides  opposing  the  motion  itself,  and 
demanded  that  any  change  in  the  existing  state  of 
things  should  be  decreed  unanimously.     Every  contro- 


PRUSSIA'S  ANSWER    TO  BEUST.  321 

versy  on  this  subject,  however,  concerned,  as  we  know, 
the  very  foundation  of  the  Confederate  Constitution 
and  brought  the  whole  existing  system  into  danger. 

With  such  uncertainties  in  prospect  for  the  future, 
Bismarck  was  asked  by  the  President  of  the  Ministry 
to  sketch  out  an  answer  to  the  above-mentioned  propo- 
sitions of  Buol  and  Beust  on  the  subject  of  Confederate 
reform.  In  tliis  work,  which  was  completed  on  the  1st 
of  July,  1857,  Bismarck  paid  back  the  Vienna  Cabinet 
with  interest  for  the  accusation  that  Prussia  was  the 
obstacle  to  reform.  With  abundant  praise  for  the  patri- 
otism and  insight  of  Beust's  eiforts,  he  pointed  out  to 
him  the  necessity  of  keeping  his  work  far  removed 
from  any  resemblance  to  the  Carlsbad  Decrees.  "  The 
chief  difficulty,"  he  said,  "in  regard  to  the  main  idea  of 
the  plan,  the  bringing  about  of  greater  uniformity  in 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  German  states,  lies  in  the 
peculiar  conditions  of  the  Austrian  monarchy.  These 
conditions  hinder  the  Government  from  granting  to  the 
parts  of  its  country  belonging  to  the  German  Confed- 
eration a  representation  of  Estates  which  should  be 
sufficiently  similar  to  that  of  the  remaining  German 
states  to  render  possible  the  general  application  of  uni- 
form principles  to  all  the  members  of  the  Confedera- 
tion. This  is  true  also  of  the  proposed  Confederate 
court  of  arbitration.  If  all  the  members  of  the  Con- 
federation would  submit  themselves  to  such  a  court, 
Prussia  would  gladly  give  up  the  objections  she  has 
hitherto  made.  But  it  is  evident  how  difficult  tlie 
solution  of  such  a  problem  would  be  for  Austria.     And 


322      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

to  establish  institutions  in  this  direction  that  would  be 
inapplicable  to  so  important  a  member  of  the  Confed- 
eration as  Austria  would  not  further  the  unity  of  the 
Confederation,  but  would  confirm  the  tendency  of  the 
different  parts  to  separate  from  one  another.  Above 
all  things,  therefore,  the  Saxon  Minister  must  inform 
himself  what  Austria's  position  is  in  respect  to  these 
questions." 

Herr  von  Manteuffel  prepared  his  despatch  to  Dres- 
den quite  in  accordance  with  this  outline,  and  commu- 
nicated the  contents  of  the  same  to  Vienna.  We  will 
not  attempt  to  describe  the  vexation  of  Count  Buol. 
There  was  nothing  to  be  said  against  this  exposition  of 
the  state  of  things,  but  it  was  all  the  more  annoying, 
because  it  disclosed  with  so  much  coolness  the  weak 
points  of  the  absolute  Imperial  Government,  or  rather 
because  it  presupposed  them  as  being  naturally  already 
well  known.  The  Count  made  up  his  mind  very 
decidedly  not  to  remain  in  debt  for  an  answer. 

Meanwhile,  for  the  moment,  the  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence was  interrupted  by  a  hasty  decision  of  the 
King  of  Prussia.  The  anxious  and  irritable  state  of 
mind  in  which  the  King  had  issued  from  the  Neuchatel 
trouble  had  since  that  time  been  constantly  made  worse 
by  the  increasing  difficulty  with  Austria.  For  in  this 
case,  as  so  often,  his  heart  was  moved  by  conflicting 
feelings.  He  saw  clearly  that  his  duty  as  a  ruler  for- 
bade him  to  yield  any  further,  but,  in  spite  of  all  the 
slights  he  had  received,  the  idea  of  a  complete  breach 
with  the  Imperial  House  was  still  most  distressing  to 


ILLNESS  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM.  323 

him.  The  fairest  recollections  of  his  youth  were  rooted 
in  the  brotherhood-in-arms  of  1813,  his  riper  years  had 
been  penetrated  with  the  spirit  of  the  Holy  Alliance, 
and  his  accession  to  the  throne  had  been  accompanied 
by  the  last  admonition  of  his  father,  that  he  should 
hold  firm  to  Austria  and  Russia. 

In  the  storms  of  the  revolutionary  time,  he  had 
indeed  often  been  angry  with  Austria,  but  in  the  end 
the  avoidance  of  war  had  been  to  him  the  greatest  of 
all  joys,  and  nothing  had  remained  in  his  memory 
except  their  common  action  in  the  suppression  of  the 
Revolution.  Since  that  time,  he  had  year  after  year 
experienced  a  long  succession  of  unvarying  acts  of  hos- 
tility, first  at  the  hands  of  Schwarzenberg  and  then  at 
those  of  Buol,  in  matters  connected  with  the  Tariff- 
Union,  with  the  Confederate  Diet,  with  the  German 
Cabinets,  and  with  the  European  Powers,  all  having 
one  end  in  view,  either  to  surpass  Prussia  or  to  cripple 
her,  to  disturb  her  prosperity  and  to  hinder  her  growth. 
Until  within  a  short  time  he  had  endured  this  diplo- 
matic skirmishing  with  indifference,  as  being  necessarily 
connected  with  the  politics  of  Kings ;  but  the  constant 
irritation  gradually  proved  too  much  for  his  nerves. 

In  this  situation,  the  idea  came  to  him  of  making  a 
last  attempt  in  person.  As  he  had  once  written  to 
Queen  Victoria,  that  where  the  skill  of  the  diplomats 
fails,  the  sovereigns  themselves  must  interpose,  so  he 
now  determined  upon  a  journey  to  Vienna,  in  order,  if 
possible,  to  restore  by  a  brotherly  interview  the  ancient 
friendship.     He  set  out  with  little  hope,  and  returned 


824      CLOSE   OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM'S  REIGN. 

completely  undeceived.  Filled  with  sad  thoughts, 
foreseeing  serious  misfortunes  in  every  direction,  he 
arrived  at  Dresden,  where  he  was  to  stay  for  a  short 
time. 

But  here,  too,  disagreeable  discussions  awaited  him, 
in  which  he  proved  unable  any  longer  to  control  his 
excitement.  Immediately  after  one  scene  of  such  a 
nature  he  swooned  away ;  what  he  had  endured  in  the 
last  few  years  had  consumed  his  strength ;  a  stroke  of 
apoplexy  had  fallen  upon  him.  Hopes  were  still  enter- 
tained, as  several  milder  attacks  of  the  same  sort  had 
occurred  since  the  tremendous  days  of  1848,  attacks  in 
which  memory  was  lost,  or  the  King  sank  into  a  silent 
state  of  apathy  from  which  it  was  dangerous  to  arouse 
him.  These  former  crises  had,  however,  passed  away, 
and  now  also,  after  a  short  time  of  uncertainty,  his 
condition  improved ;  he  reviewed  troops,  made  a  short 
journey,  and  presided  once  more  at  a  session  of  the 
Ministry,  at  which  one  occurrence  seemed  afterwards  to 
have  been  especially  tragic.  Since  the  March  days 
the  gloomy  idea  had  possessed  his  mind  that,  for  his 
own  atonement  and  penance,  God  had  appointed  him  to 
be  the  instrument  for  the  punishment  of  all  sinfulness. 
This  showed  itself  among  other  things  in  the  fact  that 
he,  who  was  by  nature  so  mild  and  cheerful,  could  after 
that  time,  only  with  great  difficulty  be  induced  to  grant 
a  pardon  in  serious  criminal  cases  (while  the  reverse  of 
this  was  true  of  his  successor).  At  the  sitting  above- 
mentioned  it  happened  that  the  Minister  of  Justice, 
Simons,  made  a  report  concerning  thirteen  death-sen- 


ILLNESS  OF  FREDERICK   WILLIAM.  325 

tences,  which  had  been  passed  during  the  time  of  his 
illness.  The  King  confirmed  eleven  of  them.  It  was 
his  last  official  act  as  a  ruler. 

The  brain  trouble  once  more  appeared ;  the  life  of  the 
spirit  was  enveloped  in  darkness ;  and  towards  the  end 
of  October  a  royal  decree  appeared,  appointing  the 
King's  brother,  William,  Prince  of  Prussia,  to  represent 
the  Sovereign  in  the  affairs  of  the  Government  for  the 
next  three  months.  To  this  decree  the  Prince  appended 
a  declaration,  that  he  would  undertake  the  charge  and 
that  he  would  carry  on  the  government  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  and  intentions  of  his  Majesty,  which 
were  well  known  to  him. 


BOOK  VII. 


FIRST  YEARS   OF   THE  RULE   OF 
KINQ    WILLIA3I  L 


CHAPTER  I. 

BEGINNING   OF   THE   REGENCY. 

WiLLiAivi,  Prince  of  Prussia,  was  sixty  years  old, 
when,  in  the  autumn  of  1857,  he  assumed  the  control 
of  public  affairs,  as  representative  of  his  royal  brother. 
In  later  years  he  used  to  say  often  in  his  homely  way, 
"  When  I  was  young  I  never  thought  of  the  possibility 
of  my  ascending  the  throne ;  I  learned  then  how  to 
command  an  infantry  division  properly,  but  I  never 
troubled  myself  about  affairs  of  state."  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  young  officer  did  give  himself  up  to  his  mili- 
tary duties  body  and  soul,  and  Prussia  gained  by  it; 
for  under  a  vigorous  leadership  the  military  calling 
affords  an  excellent  training-school  for  a  future  ruler, 
by  accustoming  him  to  quick  decision,  to  firm  command, 
and  to  unconditional  obedience.  It  is  true  that  his 
education  was,  for  a  long  time,  somewhat  one-sided, 
but,  owing  to  his  earnest  industry,  it  was  all  the  more 
thorough  within  its  sphere ;  and  thorough  work  of  any 
sort  calls  fortli  all  the  energies  of  the  mind,  making  it 
ready,  when  the  occasion  comes,  to  find  itself  at  home 
even  in  unaccustomed  occupations,  while  dilettante 
buzzing  in  all  directions  dissipates  the  force  of  the 
intellect  and  weakens  the  judgment. 

Wc  have  seen  how,  after  such  a  training,  the  Prince, 
329 


330  BEGINNING  OF  THE  REGENCY. 

having  reached  maturity,  began  his  political  activity ; 
how  he  retained  at  all  times  an  independent  view  of 
things ;  how  with  serious  misgiving  he  gave  his 
approval  to  the  Constitution  based  upon  the  Estates  ; 
and  then  how,  after  the  King's  decision  had  been  taken, 
he  entered  without  weakness  or  reserve  into  the  new 
path  and  allowed  himself  to  be  neither  led  astray  nor 
imbittered  by  the  insults  of  the  Berlin  street  and  news- 
paper mob  in  1848.  As  we  have  observed,  he  had  not 
always  been  contented  with  the  Prussian  policy :  he 
would  never  have  gone  to  Olmiitz,  he  would  never 
have  allowed  Prussian  troops  to  leave  the  field  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  without  a  fierce  contest.  Soon 
after  came  the  Crimean  war,  and  during  that  the  sharp 
collision  with  his  brother,  and  the  necessity  of  bearing, 
with  a. careless  countenance,  the  blows  aimed  at  him  in 
secret  by  the  ruling  party.  Thus  ripened  in  the  harsh 
school  of  life,  settled  in  his  political  judgment,  with  an 
enlarged  circle  of  interests,  he  now  stepped  into  the 
most  exalted  position  upon  earth,  a  figure  of  extraor- 
dinary dignity,  fii'm  in  step,  bearing  in  his  face  an 
expression  of  unsought  mastery,  of  mild  earnestness, 
and  of  hearty  good-will. 

Let  us  try  to  present  to  ourselves  a  little  more  nearly 
his  personality. 

He  was  a  devout  Christian,  who  with  simple  convic- 
tion took  his  stand  on  the  creed  of  his  forefathers.  He 
was  neither  a  sceptical  philosojjher,  like  Frederick  the 
Great,  nor  a  liturgist  or  theosophist,  like  Frederick 
William  IV.,  and  he  was  far  from  entertaining  the  idea 


KING    WILLIAM  OF  PRUSSIA.  331 

of  becoming  a  reformer  of  the  Christian  churches.  His 
piety  was,  as  the  Gospel  prescribes  in  tlie  sixth  chapter 
of  Matthew,  neither  attended  with  pride  nor  with  a  sad 
countenance,  neither  dogmatic  nor  intolerant.  But  it 
was  the  bread  of  life  to  him,  the  consolation  of  his 
sorrows,  the  standard  of  his  actions.  There  grew  up 
out  of  his  belief  an  unbounded  confidence  in  God, 
which  filled  his  whole  being  and  sustained  him  in  all 
difficulties,  quite  in  the  spirit  of  the  old  saying:  Be- 
cause I  know  that  I  am  powerless  in  God's  hand,  I  am 
strong  in  the  face  of  the  world.  Thus  he  was  anxiously 
conscientious  in  deliberation,  but  absolutely  fearless  in 
danger.  It  was  not  mere  chivalric  courage  arising 
from  nervous  excitement  or  from  the  love  of  honor; 
the  words  fear  and  danger  had  for  him  no  meaning  at 
all.  He  passed  through  life,  never  trembling,  and  never 
boasting,  firm  in  the  even  balance  of  his  soul. 

He  did  not  belong  to  the  inspired  or  daemonic 
natures,  which  either  by  supreme  spiritual  power  open 
new  patlis  for  their  age,  or  with  irresistible  passion 
hurl  down  themselves  and  their  people  from  giddy 
heights  into  fearful  abysses.  He  cannot  even  be  called 
clever,  in  the  sense  in  which  the  word  can  be  applied  to 
liis  elder  brother.  I>ut,  on  the  other  liand,  lie  was,  as 
a  contem[)orary  eln-onicler  sa3-s  in  praise  of  Rudolf  von 
Hapsburg,  a  man  who  put  things  through  (ausrichtiger 
Mami).  His  whole  nature  was  directed  toward  practi- 
cal action  and  qualified  for  it;  he  had  the  natural  gift 
of  perceiving  what  was  attainable,  and  an  unem- 
barrassed clearness  of  view,  which  was  shown,  above 


332  BEGINNING  OF  THE  REGENCY. 

all,  in  his  almost  unerring  judgment  of  men.  Be- 
sides this,  he  had  a  rare  combination  of  firmness  and 
flexibility  of  mind,  such  as  characterizes  the  statesman 
as  distinguished  from  the  doctrinaire.  Until  his  death 
he  remained  unshaken  in  his  conservative  principles ; 
yet  he  recognized,  without  contradiction,  that  the 
means  of  retaining  power  must  alter  with  altering 
conditions,  and  that  progressive  reform  is  the  perma- 
nent condition  on  which  alone  any  government  can  be 
maintained. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  he  was  thoroughly  con- 
vinced of  the  necessity  of  a  strong  monarchy  in  a 
country  like  liis  own,  which  had  been  built  up  by  its 
kings,  which  consisted  of  isolated  provinces,  and  which 
was  surrounded  by  jealous  neighbors.  In  such  a  coun- 
try he  felt  that  there  must  be  a  central  power  guided 
by  decided  political  traditions,  independent  of  the  daily 
variations  of  public  opinion ;  the  necessity  of  a  change 
of  ministry  with  every  change  of  the  majority  in  the 
parliament  would  be  a  mortal  danger,  not  only  inter- 
nally to  the  dignity  of  the  throne,  but  also  to  the 
external  safety  of  the  state- 
But  the  Prince  was  far  from  deducing  from  these 
arguments  the  necessity  of  an  absolute  government. 
"  I  will  not  examine,"  he  said  to  King  Max  of  Bavaria, 
"  whether  constitutions  are  good  things  in  themselves. 
But  where  they  exist  they  should  be  maintained,  and 
not  falsified  by  forced  interpretations.  I  have  watched 
long  enough  the  harm  done  by  Manteuffel's  ministry  in 
this  way.     The  constitutional  idea,  that  the  measures 


POLITICAL  PRINCIPLES   OF  THE  PRINCE.      333 

of  the  Government  should  be  made  public,  and  that  the 
people  are  entitled  to  a  share  in  legislation,  has  sunk 
deep  into  the  popular  consciousness.  To  oppose  this  is 
very  dangerous,  since  it  indicates  mistrust  of  his  people 
on  the  part  of  the  ruler.  Not  by  restrictions  on  the 
Constitution,  which  imply  just  such  mistrust,  but  by  a 
wise  slackening  and  tightening  of  the  reins  is  the 
power  of  the  Government  to  be  confirmed.  The  pro- 
cess may  be  compared  to  the  controlling  of  the  course 
of  a  river.  The  banks  must  be  strengthened,  the  dikes 
must  be  made  neither  too  near  nor  too  far  apart,  but 
above  all  you  must  not  build  square  across  the  stream. 
In  England  the  dikes  are  too  far  apart;  in  Hesse- 
Cassel  and  Hanover  too  near.  I  hope  we  shall  attain 
the  true  mean  in  Prussia."  ^ 

These  words  contained  no  political  theory.  But  it 
would  be  difficult  to  depict  the  obligations  ot  a  con- 
stitutional ruler  with  an  apter  expression  or  a  more 
liberal  sentiment. 

Not  less  decided  than  his  opinion  on  the  constitu- 
tional system,  was  his  view  in  regard  to  Prussia's 
position  in  Germany. 

Like  his  brother,  he  was  disposed  by  youthful  asso- 
ciations to  a  warm  friendsliip  with  the  House  of 
Austria ;  and  he  was  wholly  inclined,  by  reason  of  his 
conservative  and  loj-al  tendencies,  to  respect  the  rights 
of  the  other  German  princes  in  a  very  wide  interpreta- 
tion. Only  he  desired  to  receive  the  same  considera- 
tion that  he  accorded  to  others,  requiring  that  Prussia 

1  Autograph  Memorandum  of  the  20th  of  June,  ISGO. 


334  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

should  be  regarded  as  on  an  equal  basis  with  Austria, 
and  that  her  honor  and  the  conditions  essential  to  her 
existence  should  be  respected  in  the  German  Confedera- 
tion :  the  sacrifice  of  the  interests  of  his  own  country 
to  consideration  for  his  brother  princes,  which  Fred- 
erick William  IV.,  out  of  generosity  or  magnanimity, 
had  so  often  allowed  himself,  would  to  Prince  William 
have  been  impossible.  The  weak  points  of  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  German  Confederation  were  manifest  to 
him,  and  from  the  very  first  he  meditated  his  proposals 
for  reform,  though  certainly  with  little  hope  himself  of 
a  good  result.  He  had  learned  in  the  stormy  years  of 
the  past,  that  Austria's  opposition  and  the  individ- 
ualistic tendencies  of  the  Lesser  States  could  not  be 
overcome  by  parliamentary  decrees  nor  by  popular 
agitation.  He  saw  clearly  that  a  war  against  Germans 
must  be  fought,  but  only  in  the  case  of  unjust  attacks 
upon  Prussia,  and  not  an  offensive  war  merely  with  the 
object  of  transforming  the  Confederation ;  therefore  he 
believed  that  the  realization  of  German  Unity  would 
not  come  in  his  time. 

As  he  was  on  the  point  of  taking  the  field  against 
the  Baden  rebels  in  1849,  he  wrote,  on  the  20th  of 
May,  to  General  von  Natzmer  :  "  Whoever  aspires  to 
rule  over  Germany,  must  seize  it  for  himself ;  a  la 
Gagern,  there  is  nothing  more  to  be  done.  Whether 
the  time  for  this  Unity  has  arrived,  God  alone  knows. 
That  Prussia  is  destined  to  stand  at  the  head  of  Ger- 
many, lies  written  in  our  whole  history  —  but  the  when 
and  the  how?     There  is  the  point."     And  again,  on 


POLITICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  PRINCE.     335 

the  4th  of  April,  1851 :  "  Yes,  indeed !  In  November, 
1850,  we  had  a  second  1813,  and  perhaps  a  more  excit- 
ing one,  because  it  was  not  a  foreign  yoke  riveted 
during  seven  years  that  had  brought  about  an  uprising 
of  the  nation;  it  was  a  universal  feeling  that  the 
moment  was  come  when  Prussia  should  possess  the 
position  assigned  to  her  by  history.  —  It  was  not  yet 
time,  and  I  see  no  prospect  of  its  coming  so  very  soon. 
The  attempt  must  have  been  premature,  and  I  think 
that  we  shall  never  see  the  hoped-for  position  attained 
by  Prussia."  ^ 

Two  other  expressions  of  opinion  uttered  by  the 
Prince  may  here  be  given,  because,  supplementing  one 
another,  they  complete  the  full  circle  of  his  views  in 
German  matters. 

A  few  months  after  the  beginning  of  the  Regency, 
the  German  world  —  we  shall  soon  see  for  what  cause 
—  was  in  great  excitement.  The  Prince  received  at 
that  time  a  visit  from  the  King  of  Saxony,  with  whom 
he  was  intimately  connected  by  mutual  friendship  and 
respect.  The  King  observed  that  all  the  German 
princes  were  afraid  that  Prussia  would  swallow  them 
up.  The  Prince  energetically  denied  the  imputation, 
calling  attention  to  the  often  manifested  sentiments  of 
his  brother  and  himself.  Tlie  King  cried  in  reply : 
"  But  all  the  street  gamins  of  Berlin  are  talking  of  it." 
"  Yes,"  remarked  the  Prince,  "  the  street  gamins  must 
certainly  know  more  about  it  than  I."  He  rej)eated 
his  assurance,  but  declared  at  the  same  time  that  it  was 

1  G.  vou  Natzmer,  Uuter  deu  Ilohenzolleru.Vol.  IV.,  p.  141. 


336  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

indispensable  that,  on  the  other  side,  nothing  should 
happen  which  might  threaten  the  existence  of  Prussia. 
"  Look  here,"  said  he,  and  pointed  to  the  position  of 
Hanover  on  the  map,  "  under  no  circumstances  can  I 
permit  a  power  to  arise  between  my  provinces  that  can 
possibly  take  hostile  steps  against  Prussia." 

At  the  end  of  January,  1863,  he  had  a  long  conversa- 
tion with  the  English  ambassador,  Sir  Andrew  Buchanan, 
in  regard  to  the  affairs  of  Poland.  Buchanan  showed 
him  soon  afterward  his  report  which  was  to  be  sent  to 
London,  and  the  Prince  made  the  following  correction  : 
"I  did  not  say  that  neither  I,  nor  my  son,  nor  my 
grandson,  would  see  a  united  Germany ;  on  the  con- 
trary, I  said  that  I  should  probably  not  live  long 
enough  to  behold  such  a  thing,  but  that  I  surely  hoped 
that  the  unity  would  be  realized  in  the  time  of  my  son 
or  of  my  grandson." 

He  assigned,  then,  to  the  future  these  German  hopes 
which  always  stirred  his  heart  and  were  always  held  at 
a  distance  by  his  sense  of  duty,  while  he  applied  his 
whole  energy  to  his  immediate  preoccupation,  the 
administration  of  the  Prussian  Government.  The  un- 
selfish, unwearied  devotion  to  duty  which  he  displayed 
in  this  field  till  his  last  breath,  till  the  hour  when  he 
spoke  those  touching  words :  "  I  have  no  time  to  be 
tired,"  —  all  had  its  foundation,  like  his  fearlessness,  in 
the  underlying  religious  element  of  his  nature.  Per- 
haps without  knowing  the  words  of  his  great  ancestor, 
who  called  himself  the  first  servant  of  the  state,  he 
regarded  a  ruler  as  called  by  God  to  serve  the  welfare 


THE  PRINCE'S  DEVOTION  TO  HIS  DUTIES.     337 

of  his  people.  In  this  service  he  was  zealous,  but  more 
exacting-  towards  himself  than  towards  others.  He 
entered  into  business  with  indefatigable  industry ;  what 
had  formerly  been  indifferent  to  him  he  now  strove  to 
learn  as  belonging  to  his  office,  and  with  what  ardor  did 
he  learn  it ! 

When  the  great  reform  of  our  jurisprudence  was  in 
preparation,  he,  at  seventy  years  of  age,  ordered  a 
course  upon  the  general  science  of  law  to  be  read  to 
him ;  "  By  no  means,"  he  said,  "  for  the  purpose  of 
criticising  men  of  the  profession,  but  that  I  might 
understand  the  explanations  in  regard  to  some  difficult 
points,  and  might  have  some  idea  of  what  was  to  be- 
come law  by  means  of  my  signature."  After  his  death 
numerous  closely  written  sheets  were  found  among  his 
papers,  covered  with  extracts  from  all  branches  of  the 
drafts  of  laws  which  had  been  laid  before  him,  and  by 
this  means  he  had  made  their  meaning  and  importance 
clear  to  himself. 

In  comparison  with  liis  brother,  his  sesthetic  interests 
were  naturally  limited,  and  his  scientific  knowledge 
by  no  means  extensive,  but  in  these  lines  also  he  knew 
what  is  incumbent  on  a  king,  and  under  no  former 
government  has  so  much  been  accomplished  in  Prussia 
for  art  and  science,  as  under  his.  In  this  direction, 
also,  the  work,  undertaken  in  the  beginning  from  a 
feeling  of  duty,  soon  aroused  his  receptive  mind  to 
sympathy  with  the  object  itself.  When,  on  the  occa- 
sion of  some  military  manoeuvres,  he  was  travelling  in 
the    Rhine    Province,  atid    the  painters    of  Diisseldorf 


338  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

gave  him  a  brilliant  artists'-festival,  he  wrote  to  them 
on  the  following  day  these  hearty  words  of  thanks :  "  I 
was  led  from  the  troubles  of  the  present  into  the  past 
daj's  of  Germany  tinged  with  a  poetical  glamour :  I 
saw  myself,  after  the  rough  toil  of  the  martial  exercises 
dedicated  to  the  protection  of  the  Fatherland,  trans- 
ported into  a  fairy  realm  so  cunningly  devised,  that  I 
could  only  with  difficulty  tear  myself  away  from  such  a 
kingdom  of  enchantment." 

With  the  same  penetrating  comprehension  he  studied, 
further,  the  plans  for  the  new  building  in  which  the 
Reichstag  was  to  sit ;  and  it  is  well  known  how,  with 
his  practical  insight,  he  suggested  several  essential 
improvements  in  the  same.  To  his  personal  decision, 
made  in  opposition  to  the  recommendation  of  his 
Ministers,  the  world  owes  the  completion  of  the  exca- 
vations at  Olympia.  And  he  listened  for  an  hour  with 
lively  interest  to  a  report  on  the  historical  significance 
for  Art  of  the  Pergamene  altar,  made  to  him  by  the 
directory  of  the  Museum,  which  had  at  once  been 
raised  by  this  valuable  antique  to  the  position  of  an 
institution  of  European  importance.  Thus  it  was  in 
all  branches :  his  life  was  work,  work  in  every  depart- 
ment of  the  administration,  work  for  the  happiness  of 
others. 

Wherever  he  felt  there  was  occasion,  he  was  ready  to 
display  royal  pomp  in  full  measure ;  but  in  his  own 
habits  he  was  extremely  moderate  and  simple,  a  veteran 
soldier,  and  a  frugal  manager.  His  personal  relations 
were  at  all  times  distinguished  by  cordial  friendliness 


BISMARCK'S  OPINION  OF  THE  PRINCE.      339 

tempered  by  kingly  dignity;  lie  was  anxious  to  com- 
municate the  quiet  cheerfulness  of  his  own  spirit  to  all 
about  him.  For  the  opponents  of  his  policy  he  had 
always  the  lofty  maxim :  to  forget  nothing  and  to  for- 
give everything;  when  he  had  once  given  his  friend- 
ship, he  remained  unalterably  faithful ;  and  in  his  heart 
that  source  of  the  purest  joy  that  is  given  to  mortal 
man,  the  joy  of  making  others  happy,  never  failed. 

When,  twenty  years  later,  he  stood  on  the  pinnacle  of 
power  and  greatness,  and  an  abandoned  criminal  had 
dared  to  try  to  assassinate  him,  the  first  and  most  trusted 
of  his  servants  could  say  of  him,^  "  Here  we  have  an  old 
man,  one  of  the  best  men  on  earth,  and  yet  his  life  is 
aimed  at.  There  never  was  a  man  of  a  more  modest, 
more  noble,  and  more  humane  disposition  than  the 
Emperor.  He  is  totally  different  from  men  born  to  such 
a  lofty  station,  or  from  the  greater  part  of  them.  They 
lay  little  stress  upon  the  feelings  and  wishes  of  others ; 
they  think  that  much  is  permitted  to  men  of  their  caste  ; 
their  whole  education  seems  aimed  at  stifling  the 
human  side  in  their  natures.  The  Emperor  does  not 
regard  himself  as  any  such  Olympian ;  on  the  contrary, 
he  is  a  man  in  every  respect,  and  bows  himself  to  every 
human  obligation.  He  has  never  in  his  life  done  in- 
justice to  any  one,  never  liurt  any  one's  feelings,  never 
been  guilty  of  an  act  of  harshness.  He  is  one  of  those 
men  whose  amiable  disposition  wins  the  heart;  he  is 
constantly  occupied  with  the  welfare   of   those  about 

1  Princo  Bismarck  to  General  Grant.  According  to  Grant's  memo- 
randa, given  by  Simon :  L'Empereur  Guillaumo  ct  Son  Rdgne. 


340  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

him,  and  of  his  subjects,  and  is  endowed  with  all  the 
high  qualities  of  a  Prince  and  with  all  the  virtues  of  a 
private  man.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  finer  and 
more  beneficent  type  of  gentleman." 

The  task  that  fell  to  the  Prince  in  1857,  that  of 
governing  according  to  the  intentions  of  his  brother, 
was  neither  easy  nor  agreeable.  As  his  own  intentions 
had  a  very  different  direction,  great  self-denial  was 
required  for  him  to  adapt  himself  to  his  brother's  pur- 
poses. This  he  practised,  with  his  usual  uprightness,  to 
its  fullest  extent.  That  he  would  leave  his  brother's 
Ministers  quietly  in  possession  of  their  offices,  was  to 
be  expected ;  but  the  extent  to  which  he  carried  the 
observation  of  this  rule,  even  into  the  minutest  details, 
is  shown  by  a  single  example.  A  litterateur  of  bad 
reputation,  Lindenberg  by  name,  had  shortly  before 
been  guilty  of  wretched  intrigues  against  the  Prince, 
but  on  an  influential  recommendation  the  King  had 
held  out  to  him  the  prospect  of  a  petty  office  in  Posen. 
The  patent  now  came  up  for  confirmation,  and  the 
Prince  signed  it  without  changing  countenance. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  year  1858,  the  Government 
by  Deputy  was  extended  for  another  three  months, 
though,  indeed,  all  hope  of  the  King's  recovery  had 
even  then  vanished.  A  meeting  of  the  Parliament 
was  near  at  hand ;  and  the  Minister  of  Justice,  Simons, 
was  in  doubt  whether  a  government  by  deputy  so  long 
continued  was  constitutional,  and  whether  the  regency 
prescribed  by  the  Constitution  in  the  case  of  permanent 
incapacity  on  the  part  of  the  King  ought  not  now  to  be 


DEPUTY,  OR  REGENT?  341 

established.  It  was,  indeed,  well  known  that  at  the 
King's  Court  at  Sans  Souci  a  great  repugnance  to  this 
plan  prevailed.  Queen  Elizabeth,  who  watched  over  her 
husband  with  devoted  self-sacrifice,  feared  that  such  a 
course  would  produce  a  bad  effect  on  the  condition 
of  her  patient.  The  leaders  of  the  "  Kreuzzeitung " 
party,  hitherto  the  trusted  supporters  of  the  King,  the 
Gerlachs,  the  Uhdens,  the  Gotzes,  feared  lest  an  admin- 
istration of  the  Prince  should  bring  about  a  change  of 
policy  and  the  loss  of  their  influence.  It  was  said 
among  them,  that  he  must  be  a  bad  Royalist,  who 
would  dispute  the  King's  right  to  do  what  was  in  the 
power  of  every  property-holder,  to  choose  his  own 
administrator. 

In  view  of  this  fine  theory,  Simons  laid  before  his 
colleagues  an  opinion  given  by  Friedberg,  the  late 
Minister,  which  declared  the  Regency  necessary.  He 
then,  as  a  sort  of  middle  course,  proposed  that  the 
King  should  issue  a  decree,  out  of  his  own  sovereign 
right,  inviting  the  Prince  to  assume  the  Regency ; 
upon  this,  the  Prince  should  issue  a  decree,  declaring 
himself  ready  to  undertake  the  office,  in  consideration 
of  his  right  as  heir ;  and  finally  the  Parliamentary  pro- 
ceedings prescribed  by  the  Constitution  should  take 
place.  But  this  was  zealously  opposed  by  the  Ministers 
of  the  Interior  and  of  Education,  "Westphalen  and 
Raumer;  and  therefore  Manteuffel,  though  himself 
agreeing  with  Simons,  let  the  matter  drop. 

The  Prince,  who  likewise  expected  that  the  Regency 
■would  begin  in  April,  li;ul  meanwhile,  with  this  idea. 


342  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

meditated  a  transformation  of  the  Ministry ;  and  as  he 
disapproved  of  the  men  of  the  "  Kreuzzeitung,"  he  had 
cast  his  eye  on  the  former  Minister  of  Finance,  von 
Alvensleben-Erxleben,  a  strongly  conservative  official  of 
considerable  information  and  insight,  as  we  have  seen 
in  his  work  at  the  Dresden  Conference.  By  him  the 
Representative  in  the  Diet,  Von  Bismarck,  was  sng- 
gested  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  Prince,  who 
had  long  ago  become  convinced  that  Bismarck  had  grown 
far  beyond  the  range  of  vision  of  the  "  Kreuzzeitung," 
agreed,  and  Bismarck  also  declared  his  willingness  to 
accept.  But  before  the  end  of  March,  Alvensleben 
died  after  a  short  illness,  and  on  this  the  whole  plan 
fell  to  the  ground.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
Prince  accepted  the  prolongation  of  the  Government 
by  Deputy  without  opposition;  and  contrary  to  all 
anticipation,  the  Parliament  passed  over  the  question 
in  silence.  The  feudal  party  had,  for  the  present, 
accomplished  their  desires ;  but  the  Prince  could  not 
but  see  in  their  behavior  a  fresh  personal  slight,  and  he 
turned  all  the  more  decidedly  to  their  opponents,  at 
least  to  those  of  them  whom  he  could  count  upon  as 
cherishing  monarchical  sentiments. 

His  confidence,  at  this  time,  was  placed  chiefly  in 
Herr  Rudolf  von  Auerswald,  a  man  of  single  mind 
and  of  warm  love  for  his  Fatherland,  combining 
devoted  loyalty  to  his  King  with  moderately  liberal 
principles,  by  his  temperament  more  inclined  to  concil- 
iatory than  to  radical  measures,  in  the  strife  of  party 
more  ready  to  see  the  points  of  resemblance  than  of 


RUDOLPH   VON  AUERSWALD.  343 

difference,  and  in  every  negotiation  anxious  for  con- 
cession and  agreement.  His  connection  with  the  Prince 
dated  from  their  boyhood,  from  the  time  of  the  exile  to 
Konigsberg,  after  the  Peace  of  Tilsit.  Auerswald,  while 
Minister  in  the  summer  of  1848,  had  boldly  defended 
the  rights  of  the  Prussian  Crown  ag-ainst  the  encroach- 
ments  of  the  Diet  at  Frankfort  and  of  the  Prussian 
Parliament ;  but  in  1852  he  had  been  removed  from  his 
position  at  the  head  of  the  administration  of  the  Rhine 
Province,  on  account  of  his  opposition  to  the  "  feudal  " 
policy  of  the  Minister  Westphalen.  During  this  whole 
time  the  Prince's  affection  for  him  had  been  unchanged. 
In  the  summer  of  1858  the  Prince  invited  him  to  make 
him  a  long  visit  at  Baden-Baden ;  and  there  they  came 
to  the  decision,  not  to  allow  the  existing  Ministry  to 
remain  any  longer  in  office  than  was  absolutely 
necessary. 

The  advice  of  Baron  von  Schleinitz  was  to  the  same 
effect.  This  nobleman  had  been  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  under  Count  Brandenburg;  and  his  brilliant 
conversation  and  attractive  manner  had  made  him, 
since  1849,  an  always  welcome  guest  at  the  Court  of 
the  Prince  and  Princess  of  Prussia.  In  politics  he  was 
without  very  decided  opinions,  as  a  diplomatist  not  un- 
skilful, but  incapable  of  independent  decisions  and 
lacking  in  firmness ;  his  effort  was  always  to  avoid 
difficulties,  rather  than  to  overcome  them,  to  maintain 
Prussia's  position  as  far  as  possible,  but,  above  all 
things,  to  i^roceed  by  mutual  concession,  and,  especially, 
never  to  come  to  an   open  breach  with  Austria.     He 


344  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

now  proposed  that  the  Prince,  after  the  dismissal  of  the 
existing  Ministry,  should  form  his  Cabinet  of  new  men, 
as  yet  free  from  political  hostility,  and  should,  there- 
fore, give  up  all  thought  of  himself  and  Auerswald. 
No  decision  in  the  matter  was  reached  at  that  time  ; 
but  for  the  position  of  ofiticial  President  of  the  future 
Ministry,  Prince  Anton  von  Hohenzollern  was  pro- 
posed, a  man  of  patriotic  spirit  and  of  upright  and 
honorable  character. 

Meanwhile  another  prolongation  of  the  Government 
by  Deputy  had  been  brought  about,  as  if  it  were  the 
most  harmless  thing  in  the  world.  The  feudal  party, 
seeing  that  the  Prince  was  reluctant  to  act,  grew  so 
confident  that  they  publicly  declared  that  any  one  would 
be  an  enemy  of  the  King,  who  should  venture  to  pro- 
pose a  Regency  in  any  case ;  for  it  was  an  inherent 
right  of  the  Prussian  Crown  to  appoint  a  representative 
according  to  its  own  pleasure,  a  right  which  could  not 
be  limited  by  the  articles  of  a  Constitution  on  paper. 

But  the  hour  that  was  to  awake  them  from  their 
dreams  was  at  hand.  The  patience  of  the  Prince  at 
length  became  exhausted  ;  and,  on  the  8th  of  August,  he 
required  of  the  Ministry  an  opinion,  as  to  whether  the 
existing  state  of  things  could  be  prolonged  any  further 
without  infringing  the  Constitution.  The  crisis  was 
all  the  more  urgent,  as  the  parliamentary  period  was 
coming  to  an  end,  and  a  general  election  was  immi- 
nent. The  Ministry  held  several  councils  to  consider 
the  question.  Herr  von  Westphalen,  for  the  above- 
mentioned  reasons,  persisted  in  advising  a  rejection  of 


A   REGENCY  ADVOCATED.  345 

the  Regency,  and  proposed,  at  least,  a  postponement  of 
the  matter  till  after  the  elections  should  be  com- 
pleted. The  two  Ministers  von  Manteuffel  declared 
themselves  emphatically  on  the  other  side,  urging  that 
it  would  be  simply  abominable  to  hold  out  as  a  party 
cry  for  the  approaching  electoral  contest  the  question  of 
"  King,  or  Regent,"  which  had  already  been  hotly  dis- 
cussed by  the  Press.  The  majority  concurred  in  this 
view ;  and  the  Report  of  the  Ministry  decided,  on  the 
6th  of  September,  for  the  Constitutional  necessity  of  a 
Regency,  and  for  the  establishment  of  the  same  by  the 
methods  proposed  by  the  Minister  of  Justice. 

A  few  more  weeks  of  consideration  elapsed.  The 
Prince,  in  his  conscientiousness,  weighed  unceasingly 
his  duties  towards  the  State,  towards  his  brother,  and 
towards  himself.  The  nearer  the  hour  of  decision 
came,  the  greater  did  he^nd  the  burden  of  the  respon- 
sibility resting  upon  him.  He  sought  a  personal  in- 
terview with  the  Queen,  but  this  was  prevented  by  an 
accident.  jSIanteuffel  also  failed  in  obtaining  an  audi- 
ence from  the  Queen,  though  he  twice  requested  it. 
On  the  20th  of  September,  the  Prince  held  a  council 
of  the  entire  Ministry,  when  Simons  and  Westphalen 
once  more  discussed  the  pro  and  contra,  while  the 
Prince  himself  expressed  no  opinion  ;  but  immediately 
afterwards  he  informed  the  Queen  that  he  shared  the 
view  of  the  Majority.  She  was  obliged  to  yield  to  the 
inevital)le,  and  sent  word  by  the  Minister  of  the  House- 
hold, Voii  Massow,  to  his  colleagues,  that,  although  in 
great  anxiety,  she  was  ready  to   lay  the    question    of 


846  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

the  Regency  before  the  King ;  but  if  it  injured  his 
health,  the  Ministry  must  bear  the  responsibility. 

An  anxious  moment  followed.  By  the  advice  of  his 
physicians,  it  was  decided  that  the  King  should  pass 
the  winter  in  Italy.  On  a  day  when  his  mind  was 
clear,  on  the  7th  of  October,  the  Queen  told  him  that, 
as  they  were  preparing  for  a  somewhat  lengthy  absence, 
the  Prince  must  receive  fuller  powers,  and  become 
Regent.  The  King  calmly  expressed  his  assent,  and 
she  therefore  brought  him  the  document  to  sign.  The 
King  read  it  in  silence,  and  signed  it,  still  without 
uttering  a  word;  then  he  covered  his  face  with  his 
hands,  burst  into  a  flood  of  tears,  and  left  the  room. 

Thereupon  the  Prince  wrote  to  his  wife,  "  The  deci- 
sive step  has  thus  been  taken.  May  God  give  his 
blessing  to  the  solemn  work  which  now  begins  for  the 
Fatherland  by  my  hands !  l(^ou  can  imagine  in  what 
a  state  of  excitement  I  am,  and  how  I  could  only 
strengthen  and  confirm  myself  by  prayer,  and  recom- 
mend myself  to  the  gracious  goodness  of  God ! "  He 
then  related  to  her  the  course  things  had  taken,  and 
added,  "  Although  by  this  a  burden  is  lifted  from  the 
hearts  of  so  many,  for  me  now  first  begins  the  real  care 
and  trouble,  which  is  hardly  likely  (considering  the 
improbability  of  the  King's  recovery)  to  be  taken  from 
me  again.  I  close  with  the  request  that  you  will  pray 
for  me  and  for  the  Fatherland,  and  for  the  royal  pair 
in  their  grievous  sorrow. 

Your  affectionate 

William." 


THE  DECISION.  347 

The  rojal  proclamation  which  summoned  the  Prince 
to  assume  the  Regency  was  made  public  on  the  follow- 
ing day.  The  first  measure  of  the  Prince  was  the  im- 
mediate dismissal  of  Westphalen,  and  the  invitation  of 
President  von  Flottwell,  a  worthy  and  much-respected 
public  servant,  though  now  somewhat  feeble  with  age, 
to  take  his  place. 

Not  with  a  light  heart,  but  with  firm  determination, 
the  Prince  began  his  government,  which  was  to  be  on 
its  own  basis  from  this  time  forth.  Even  before  the 
end  of  October  he  summoned  the  Parliament  for  the 
recognition  of  the  Regency,  and  took  the  oath  to  respect 
the  Constitution.  He  pronounced  the  words  in  solemn 
earnest,  although  more  than  one  provision  of  the  Con- 
stitution had  been  long  ago  regarded  by  him  with 
anxiety. 

He  intended  then,  as  he  once  wrote  afterwards  to  the 
Grand  Duke  of  Weimar,  to  show  the  world  that  it  was 
possible  to  govern,  even  under  an  objectionable  consti- 
tution, if  one  only  remained  firm  upon  a  conservative 
basis,  and  chose  honorable  men  as  helpers  in  carrying 
out  one's  system.  He  had  now  finally  decided  upon  a 
Hohenzollern-Auerswald  Ministry,  and  in  tliis  combina- 
tion there  was  certainly  no  place  for  Bismarck.  Minis- 
ters of  special  departments  without  pronounced  political 
tendencies  were  Ilerr  von  Flottwell,  Herr  von  Schlei- 
nitz,  and  the  Minister  of  War,  General  von  Bonin,  the 
Prince's  fellow-sufferer  in  the  disfjrace  of  1854.  Tlie 
party  of  the  Preussisches  Wochenhlatt  supplied  Herr 
von  Belhniann-nollweg  as  Minister  of  Education,  and 


348  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

Count  Piickler  as  Minister  of  Agriculture.  The  Depart- 
ment of  Finance  was  offered  to  the  President  of  the 
Board  of  Commerce,  Otto  Camphausen,  younger  brother 
of  Ludolf ;  but  he  declined  on  some  technical  pretext, 
because  he  had  no  confidence  in  either  the  strength  or 
the  permanence  of  the  Cabinet.  At  his  suggestion, 
Auerswald  invited  to  Berlin  Herr  von  Patow,  a  leader 
of  the  Liberal  opposition  against  Manteuffel. 

Shortly  before,  on  the  30th  of  October,  the  Ministers 
then  in  office  had  sent  the  Regent  a  memorial,  in  which 
they  explained  that  it  was  necessary,  for  the  good  of 
the  State,  that  they  should  retain  their  places,  but  the 
Regent  had  left  the  communication  for  a  time  unan- 
swered. But  now  that,  on  the  4th  of  November,  an 
understanding  with  Patow  had  been  reached,  the 
former  Ministers  were  to  be  told,  in  reply,  that  Prince 
HohenzoUern  had  formed  a  new  Cabinet,  and  that 
the  Departments  of  Trade  and  Justice,  hitherto  con- 
trolled by  Herren  von  der  Heyclt  and  Simons,  would 
for  the  time  be  managed  by  the  under-secretaries  of 
those  offices. 

But  suddenly  a  new  difficulty  arose.  Herr  von  Patow, 
during  the  negotiation  which  had  been  carried  on  with 
him,  had  suggested  that  he  doubted  whether  the  King 
would  approve  of  his  being  appointed.  This  caused 
the  Prince  a  sleepless  night.  He  asked  himself  whether 
Patow  was  not  too  liberal,  and  on  the  following  morn- 
ing he  announced  that  he  did  not  wish  to  have  him 
as  Minister.  For  a  few  hours  the  state  of  things  was 
critical,  till  Auerswald's  talent   for  adjusting   difficul- 


HOHENZ OLLERN-A  UERSWA LD  'S  AIINIS TR Y.      849 

ties  again  displayed  itself.  Patow  was  notified  of  his 
appointment  in  the  evening,  after  the  Prince  had  con- 
sented to  retain  the  two  former  Ministers,  Von  der 
Heydt  and  Simons,  so  bringing  about  a  strengthening 
of  the  conservative  element,  and  a  restoration  of  con- 
tinuity with  the  old  Ministry. 

I  have  related  these  particulars  thus  in  detail,  because 
they  bring  the  intentions  of  the  Regent  into  even  clearer 
light  than  does  the  solemn  declaration  with  which  he 
opened  the  first  session  of  the  new  Cabinet  on  the  8th 
of  November.  But  in  this  also  he  announced  emphati- 
cally, that  there  was  not  then,  and  never  would  be, 
any  question  of  a  break  with  the  past,  but  that  only  a 
careful  and  improving  hand  was  to  be  laid  where  any- 
thing arbitrary  or  unsuited  to  the  time  might  show 
itself.  The  welfare  of  the  Crown  and  of  the  Nation 
were  inseparable,  and  must  rest  on  a  conservative 
basis.  The  Government  must  not  let  itself  be  ureed 
by  so-called  liberal,  but  in  fact  exaggerated,  ideas, 
into  a  shadowy  region  of  uncertainty ;  true  political 
wisdom  was  founded  in  an  accurate  knowledge  of  ex- 
isting needs,  in  honesty  of  purpose,  in  respect  for  the 
laws,  and  in  consistency  ;  by  means  of  these  a  Govern- 
ment was  strong,  because  it  had  a  clear  conscience,  and 
had  thus  right  on  its  side  in  opposition  to  everything 
evil. 

But  wlien  the  Regent  touched  upon  the  different 
branches  of  the  administration,  the  methods  of  the 
former  Government  were  subjected  to  so  searching  a 
criticism  in  several  directions,  and  especially  the  amal- 


350  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

gamation  of  political  and  ecclesiastical  interests  was 
judged  with  such  severity,  as  begetting  not  piety,  but 
hypocrisy,  that  the  feeling  spread  far  and  wide  through 
the  country  that  a  new  day  had  dawned  for  Prussia, 
and  the  Hohenzollern  Cabinet  received  among  the 
people  the  title  of  "  Ministry  of  the  new  era."  Less 
attention  was  paid  to  the  Regent's  words  in  regard  to 
the  pressing  necessity  of  an  improvement,  even  though 
costly,  in  the  condition  of  the  army.  In  what  con- 
cerned foreign  politics  he  contented  himself  with  the 
statement  of  a  few  general  objects  to  be  aimed  at.  He 
should  seek  peace  and  friendship  with  all  the  Great 
Powers,  but  there  was  to  be  no  limiting  of  Prussia's 
independence  by  premature  agreements.  In  Germany 
Prussia  had  moral  conquests  to  make  by  the  wisdom 
of  her  own  legislation  and  by  the  employment  of  vari- 
ous means  tending  toward  unity ;  for  instance,  of  the 
Tariff- Union,  which,  however,  certainly  needed  reform. 
The  world  must  learn  that  Prussia  was  ready  every- 
where to  defend  the  right.  All  these  statements, 
regarded  generally,  as  they  appeared  in  this  speech, 
seem  partly  meaningless  and  partly  dangerous ;  but 
in  the  intention  of  the  Regent,  they  all  had  their 
application  to  German  questions  then  hanging  in  the 
balance,  and  we  shall  soon  see  how  justly  and  accu- 
rately they  were  adapted  to  these. 

The  establishment  of  the  new  Ministry  with  some 
Liberal  names  connected  with  it  soon  had  a  great  effect, 
both  far  and  near.  In  Munich  a  sharp  struggle  be- 
tween the  Government  and  the  Second  Chamber  had 


BAVARIAN  EPISODE.  351 

been  long  going  on,  and  was  constantly  increasing  in 
bitterness,  so  that,  with  the  consent  of  the  King,  the 
Ministers,  Von  der  Pfordten  and  Count  Reigersberg, 
the  one  led  by  his  sanguinary,  and  the  other  by  his 
arbitrary,  disposition,  began  to  meditate  a  small  coup 
d'etat,  dissolution  of  the  Chamber,  proclamation  of  a 
new  electoral  law,  and  the  other  usual  accompaniments 
of  such  a  means  of  salvation.  Evidently  it  was  neces- 
sary to  stop  all  this  when  the  Prussian  crisis  came: 
with  a  Liberal  movement  going  on  in  Prussia,  an 
infringement  of  the  Constitution  in  Bavaria  was  quite 
out  of  the  question.  But  then  the  Bavarian  Ambas- 
sador in  Berlin  sent  most  joyful  news :  the  Manteuffel 
Ministry  stood  firmer  than  ever ;  he  had  learned  it  in 
the  last  days  of  October,  from  the  very  best  sources, 
naturally  from  Herr  von  Manteuffel  himself. 

After  this,  the  appointment  of  Hohenzollern  came  to 
Munich  like  lightning  from  a  clear  sky.  Pfordten 
hastened  to  the  King;  after  long  deliberations,  con- 
tinued during  several  months,  the  unavoidable  decision 
was  reached,  that  on  certain  points  concessions  must  be 
made  to  the  Chamber.  "  But  how  is  that  possible,"  the 
King  then  exclaimed,  "  after  all  that  has  passed,  without 
a  humiliation  of  the  Crown  ?  "  —  "  Nothing  is  simpler," 
replied  the  imperturbable  Pfordten ;  "  Your  Majesty 
puts  forth  a  manifesto :  '  My  Ministers  have  latterly 
had  various  difference  with  the  Chambers,  but  I  am 
determined  to  be  at  peace  with  my  people.''  " 

The  plan  was  adopted;  and  Pfordten  gave  up  his 
position  to  the  Representative  in  the  Diet,  Baron  von 


352  BEGINNING   OF  THE  REGENCY. 

Schrenck.  The  sentence  devised  by  the  Minister  who 
had  advocated  the  coup  d'etat  —  "I  am  determined  to 
be  at  peace  with  my  people  "  —  became  a  popular  watch- 
word which,  in  the  midst  of  the  ensuing  constitutional 
complications  in  Prussia,  was  pointed  at  by  every 
Bavarian  with  patriotic  pride,  and  without  the  slight- 
est suspicion  that  Bavaria's  undeniably  great  glory, 
never  to  have  had  her  Constitution  infringed,  was 
mainly  owing  to  the  Prince  of  Prussia. 

In  Prussia  itself  the  dawn  of  the  new  era  was  greeted 
by  the  great  majority  of  the  people  with  a  delight  be- 
fore which  the  angry  apprehension  of  the  feudal  jDarty 
and  the  studied  indifference  of  the  Democrats  sank 
into  insignificance.  It  is  characteristic  of  this  agita- 
tion, that  people's  minds  were  filled  with  exuberant 
hopes  of  universal  happiness,  but  there  was  no  trace 
of  the  usual  radical  or  republican  ideals.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  general  elections  to  the  Parliament,  the 
programmes  announced  contained  the  exact  contrary 
of  what  had  been  customary  with  the  preceding  admin- 
istration :  they  were  directed  especially  against  the 
points  on  which  the  pressure  of  the  old  system  had 
been  most  severely  felt,  against  political  arbitrariness, 
against  the  equivocal  interpretation  of  the  laws,  against 
ecclesiastical  narrowness  and  love  of  persecution,  against 
party-favoring  of  manorial  proprietors,  and  against  the 
violent  influencing  of  Parliamentary  elections.  All 
this,  compared  with  the  Regent's  speech,  could  cer- 
tainly be  regarded  as  an  intensified  echo  of  the  same. 

Another   not   less    significant   characteristic   in   this 


THE  ELECTIONS.  353 

electoral  agitation  was  the  ready  assent  which  was 
yielded,  when  the  Ministers  publicly  announced  that 
the  removal  of  abuses  that  had  endured  for  years  was 
not  an  easy  task,  that  it  was  much  more  difficult  to 
realize  even  reasonable  desires  than  to  express  them, 
and  that  the  country  must,  therefore,  give  the  Govern- 
ment its  confidence,  and  not  increase  the  difficulty  of 
its  task  by  being  over-anxious  to  accomplish  some- 
thing. Every  one  was  willing  to  agree  to  this ;  the 
caution,  "  only  do  not  urge  things  too  much,"  became  a 
watchword  of  the  Liberal  party.  Everywhere  the  tone 
was  given  by  the  leaders  of  the  old  Liberal  school. 
The  object  was  to  get  rid  of  the  feudal  opponents  of 
the  Government,  but  not  to  cause  embarrassment  by 
the  election  of  Radicals ;  and  the  result  was  a  thorough 
defeat  of  the  feudal  party,  a  complete  exclusion  of  the 
Democrats,  and  an  overwhelming  majority  for  the  new 
Ministry.  For  the  first  time  since  the  beginning  of 
constitutional  government  in  Germany,  Liberal  elect- 
ors and  representatives  counted  it  an  honor  to  be 
called  the  Ministerial  party. 

There  were,  indeed,  exceptions  to  this  feeling,  even 
among  the  prominent  Liberals  ;  there  were  men  who, 
in  view  of  the  different  elements  in  the  new  Cabinet, 
could  not  feel  secure.  Georg  von  Vincke  observed 
casually  that  the  Parliament  must  keep  a  doubly  care- 
ful watch  on  a  popular  Ministry,  and  Count  Schwerin 
declared  to  his  constituents  that  he  was  a  warm  friend 
of  the  Ministry,  yet  that  he  could  make  no  decisions 
at  their  nod,  but  must  act  on  his  own  independent  con- 


354  BEGINNING  OF  THE  REGENCY. 

viction  in  every  particular  case.  He  did  not  then  know 
that  in  a  few  months  he  would  be  Minister  himself. 
But  in  spite  of  these  few  individuals,  the  Prussian 
nation  in  general  was  strong  in  the  feeling  that  the 
new  era  was  a  liberal  one,  and  that  any  lack  of 
harmony  between  the  Ministry  and  the  representatives 
of  the  people  was  out  of  the  question. 

The  Prince  Regent  could  not,  at  any  rate,  help  being 
pleased  with  all  this  evidence  of  approval  of  his  Min- 
istry. But  the  very  disproportion  of  the  result  obtained 
at  once  raised  doubts  in  his  prudent  mind  as  to  the 
permanence  of  the  general  joy,  and  called  forth,  at  the 
same  time,  the  question,  how  far  it  would  be  possible 
to  justify  expectations  so  highly  raised. 

Influences  of  another  sort  were  at  work  upon  his 
decisions  in  regard  to  foreign  politics.  We  must  here 
return  once  more  to  the  summer  of  1858,  to  the  days 
of  the  Prince's  stay  at  Baden-Baden. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  Crimean  War  had  left  many 
problems  unsolved,  in  the  discussion  of  which  the  Great 
Powers  separated  into  two  parties,  Austria  and  Eng- 
land on  one  side,  France,  Russia,  and  Prussia  on  the 
other.  This  dispute  occupied  at  that  time  the  stage 
of  EurojDe,  and  everywhere  a  feeling  of  oppression  pre- 
vailed, that  seemed  to  forebode  a  storm.  The  alliance 
of  the  tliree  Eastern  Powers,  which,  since  1815,  had 
secured  the  condition  of  Europe  according  to  the  stipu- 
lations of  treaties,  was  now  thoroughly  dissolved ;  in 
regard  to  the  future  designs  of  the  French  upstart, 
who  had  so  suddenly  raised  himself  to  the  pinnacle  of 


THE  EUROPEAN  SITUATION.  355 

the  continent,  an  anxious  uncertainty  prevailed,  which 
was  not  at  all  diminished  by  the  fact  that  Bismarck's 
view,  expressed  in  1856,  that  Napoleon  was  thinking 
of  directing  his  immediate  action  against  Austria's 
supremacy  in  Italy,  was  now  very  widely  held. 

Cavour  was  at  Baden-Baden  in  the  summer  of  1858, 
and  there  talked  with  the  Prussian  statesmen,  though 
with  a  confidence  that  had  some  reservations.  He  said 
that  he  had  just  discussed  the  condition  of  Italy  with 
Napoleon  at  Plombidres.  The  Emperor  was  not  wholly 
free  to  act  in  the  matter,  as  he  had  to  take  into  consid- 
eration the  French  clergy  and  their  sympathy  with  the 
Pope,  and  consequently  with  Austria;  but  this  much 
was  certain,  that  in  case  of  a  break  between  Sardinia 
and  Austria,  Napoleon  would  be  found  on  the  side  of 
Sardinia.  A  Russian  diplomat,  Herr  von  Balabin,  who 
was  present,  observed  on  this,  "  If  you  march,  the  Rus- 
sian Guard  will  march  also."  The  Prince  of  Prussia, 
to  whom  the  Sardinian  statesman  described  the  melan- 
choly condition  of  Italy,  had  no  hesitation  in  declaring 
to  him  his  readiness  to  co-operate  for  the  amelioration 
of  the  same,  though  in  doing  this  he  certainly  had  no 
other  thought  in  mind  than  a  reform  of  the  partly  stag- 
nant and  partly  despotic  administration  of  the  Italian 
countries.  In  every  respect,  Austria's  position  was  by 
no  means  an  agreeable  one.  France  in  covert,  and  soon, 
perhaps,  open  hostility ;  Russia  in  a  state  of  unfeigned 
and  bitter  anger;  Prussia  sorely  irritated  by  the  Neu- 
ch§,tel  affair,  and  by  German  matters  in  general,  and 
verj'  near   an  open    breach,  —  such    was    the    state    of 


356  BEGINNING  OF  THE  REGENCY. 

Europe  during  the  government  of  the  Prince  of  Prussia 
as  Deputy. 

It  was  natural  that  every  friend  of  Austria's  should 
look  upon  a  restoration  of  the  good  understanding 
between  the  two  German  Great  Powers  as  the  most 
effective  means  of  protection  against  all  these  dangers, 
and  should  desire  to  see  such  a  restoration  brought 
about.  In  the  first  rank  of  those  who  held  this  view 
stood  England ;  that  is  to  say,  both  the  Tory  Ministry 
of  Lord  Derby,  and  Queen  Victoria  with  the  Prince 
Consort  personally  as  well.  The  Royal  Personages 
had  just  entered  into  close  family  connection  with  the 
Prince  and  Princess  of  Prussia,  through  the  marriage 
of  their  children,  Prince  Frederick  William,  and  the 
Princess  Royal,  Victoria  (January  17th,  1858) ;  and  by 
this,  between  the  two  mothers  especially,  a  bond  of 
warm  friendship  had  been  established.  Soon  after  the 
betrothal  of  the  young  couple,  the  Princess  of  Prussia 
wrote,  on  the  12th  of  April,  1856,  to  the  Duke  of 
Coburg,  "  May  God  bless  this  union  for  the  dear  chil- 
dren, for  our  family,  and  for  the  poor  German  Father- 
land, which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  can  only  be 
raised  from  its  present  condition  through  an  alliance 
with  England."  i 

But  in  1858  alliance  with  England  meant  nothing 
less  than  friendship  with  Austria.  The  movement  in 
this  direction  was  seconded  also  by  King  Leopold  I.  of 
Belgium,  who  in  former  times  had  thought  himself  out 
of  favor  with  the  Prussian  Court,  and  for  this  reason 

1  Ernst  II.,  Aus  Meiuem  Leben,  vol.  ii,  p.  347. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA.  357 

had  attached  himself  firmly  to  Austria,  but  who  now 
looked  with  anxious  suspicion  on  his  dangerous  neigh- 
bor in  the  Tuileries,  and  exerted  all  his  diplomatic 
influence  for  the  controlling  of  French  ambition,  and 
consequently  for  a  firm  accord  between  Austria  and 
Prussia.  Besides  this,  there  were  the  efforts  of  the 
South  German  Kings,  whose  hearts  sank  within  them 
at  the  horrible  thought  of  a  war  between  France  and 
Austria,  and  who  therefore,  for  the  time,  looked  upon 
the  otherwise  not  undesirable  coldness  between  the 
German  Powers  as  the  acme  of  misfortune.  The  King 
of  Wiirtemberg  went  himself  to  Baden-Baden,  to  use 
his  personal  influence  with  the  Prince  of  Prussia  in 
this  direction. 

Among  those  about  the  Prince,  Herr  von  Schleinitz 
was  disposed,  as  always  before,  to  speak  in  favor  of 
harmony  between  the  two  States.  Herr  von  Auers- 
wald  was  not  strongly  inclined  to  the  yellow  and 
black,  but  thought  peace  with  Austria  more  desirable 
than  terms  of  hostility.  The  Prince  had  no  objection 
to  make,  but  felt  that,  for  the  time,  in  the  settlement 
of  the  pending  difficulties,  everything  depended  on  a 
favorable  disposition  on  the  part  of  Austria,  and  that 
there  had  as  yet  been  no  sign  anywhere  of  anything 
of  the  sort.  Out  of  the  dispute  in  regard  to  the 
Rastadt  garrison  there  had  again  arisen,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  dangerous  question  as  to  whether  the  matter 
could  be  decided  by  a  majority-vote  in  tlio  Diet,  or 
whether  unanimity  was  required.  Bismarck  had  been 
anxious  tliat  the  protest  against  deciding  the  matter  by 


358  BEGINNING  OF  THE  REGENCY. 

a  majority  should  be  accompanied  by  a  threat  of  with- 
holding Prussia's  contribution ;  and  Manteuffel,  though 
he  had  erased  the  threat,  had  sent  the  protest  in  its 
full  energy  to  Vienna.  Then  came  the  further  news, 
that  Austria  continued  firm  in  her  intention,  on  the 
expiration  of  the  Tariff-Union,  which  was  now  near 
at  hand,  either  to  enter  the  same,  or  to  form  a  Tariff- 
Union  on  her  own  account  with  South  Germany,  and 
thus,  in  any  case,  to  break  up  the  Prussian  hegemony 
in  this  direction  also. 

Such  methods  were  not  likely  to  increase  the  friendly 
feeling  of  Prussia,  and,  in  consequence,  the  Prince  was 
not  at  all  disposed  to  listen  to  the  following  offer,  with 
which,  at  the  end  of  June,  the  Imperial  Court  surprised 
the  Prussian  Cabinet:  that  some  Prussian  battalions 
should  be  admitted  into  Rastadt,  if  Prussia  would 
promise,  as  in  1854,  to  guarantee  to  Austria  all  the 
latter's  German  and  non-German  possessions,  —  very 
much  as  if  an  elderly  lady  should  write  to  a  j^oung 
friend  that  she  would  give  him  a  fine  puppy-dog,  but 
expected  that  he  would  marry  her  in  return.  It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  say  that  the  Prince  declared  very 
decidedly,  that  he  hoped  for  a  good  understanding  with 
Austria,  but  that  he  was  not  willing  to  bind  himself  by 
too  hasty  agreements.  Schleinitz's  mild  advice  to  the 
Prince  fell,  therefore,  on  stony  ground ;  and  the  latter 
summoned  Bismarck  three  times  to  Baden-Baden,  and 
even  consented  that  Manteuffel  should  take  up  his 
abode  there  for  a  few  weeks. 

For  in  July  a  special  occasion  called  for  important 


SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.  359 

and  vigorous  action  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate 
Diet.  Since  the  beginning  of  1857  the  Assembly  had 
been  occupied  with  a  complaint  made  by  the  Holstein 
Estates  —  we  will  return  later  to  the  details  of  the 
matter — on  account  of  the  action  taken  in  contradic- 
tion to  constitutions  and  treaties  by  the  Danish  King 
against  the  Duchies.  After  long  deliberation,  and 
much  writing  hither  and  thither,  the  Diet  in  February 
finally  passed  decrees  which  imposed  definite  require- 
ments on  Denmark.  The  latter  took  time  for  her 
answer,  and  at  length,  on  the  15th  of  July,  declared 
herself  prepared,  not  indeed  to  fulfil  the  requirements, 
but  to  negotiate  about  them,  as  had  been  done  six  years 
before.  Austria,  considering  her  former  friendship  with 
Denmark,  and  the  South  German  Governments,  following 
in  Austria's  train,  declared  themselves  perfectly  satisfied. 
At  this  point,  however,  the  Prince  of  Prussia  inter- 
fered decidedly.  On  the  first  rumor  of  the  Danish 
answer  he  telegraphed  to  Berlin  that  it  was  insuffi- 
cient, that  the  Diet  must  resolve  on  energetic  measures, 
and  that  Prussia  must  take  the  initiative  in  them.  It 
was  the  memory  of  Olmiitz  that  now  burned  within 
him ;  it  was  the  feeling  that  had  made  him  say,  on  the 
8th  of  November,  that  Prussia  was  always  ready  to 
defend  the  right.  Bismarck  was  summoned  to  Baden, 
the  Prince  came  to  an  agreement  with  him  in  regard  to 
the  course  to  be  followed  in  the  Diet,  and  in  a  few 
weeks  a  decree  of  the  Diet  was  drawn  up,  which 
threatened  the  King-Duke  with  chastisement  if  he 
ijemaincd  obstinate. 


360  BEGINNING  OF  THE  REGENCY. 

The  Rastadt  difficulty  was  settled  by  a  compromise 
toward  the  end  of  the  year,  and  thus  the  outward  har- 
mony between  the  two  Great  Powers  was  restored. 
More  than  this  was  not  accomplished.  The  Prince 
Regent  persisted  in  his  determination  to  keep  his 
hands  free,  as  far  as  any  obligation  to  Austria  was 
concerned. 

Only  too  soon,  however,  events  occurred  which  ren- 
dered it  necessary  not  only  to  avoid  rash  obligations, 
but  to  adopt  a  positive  policy.  The  Regency  was 
exposed  to  a  severe  trial  on  the  very  threshold  of  its 
activity. 


FRANCO-SARDINIAN  ALLIANCE.  361 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   ITALIAN   "WAR. 

On  the  1st  of  January,  1859,  the  Emperor  Napoleon, 
at  the  formal  audience  of  congratulation,  said  to  the 
Austrian  Ambassador,  "I  regret  that  the  relations 
between  our  Governments  are  no  longer  so  good  as 
formerly,  but  I  beg  you  to  assure  your  Emperor  that 
my  personal  respect  for  him  remains  unaltered." 

These  words  echoed  like  a  thunder-clap  through 
all  Europe.  Every  one  took  them  as  the  forerunners 
of  a  declaration  of  war.  The  rates  fell  in  all  the 
Exchanges. 

Nor  was  every  one  in  the  wrong,  though  Napoleon 
shortly  afterwards  expressed  his  wonder  that  there 
sliould  have  been  such  a  misunderstanding.  He  said 
that,  on  the  contrary,  he  had  declared  that  in  spite  of 
some  difficulties,  his  peaceful  disposition  toward  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  was  unaltered. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  had  come  to  an  understand- 
ing with  Cavour  in  regard  to  a  war  against  Austria. 
It  liad  been  settled  at  riombieres  that  the  Sardinian 
King,  Victor  Emanuel,  should  have  Lombardo-Venetia, 
Parma,  and  Modena,  wliile  France,  in  return  for  assist- 
ance rendered,  should  receive  Savoy  and  Nice.  As  a 
pledge   of   this   alliance,  the    cousin    of   the    Emperor, 


362  THE  ITALIAN  WAR. 

Jerome  Napoleon,  was  to  marry  a  daughter  of  the 
King.  The  question  of  how  Italian  affairs  were  to 
be  arranged  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Austrians  from 
Italy,  was,  for  the  present,  left  to  the  course  of  events. 
Napoleon  thought  of  an  Italian  Confederation  under 
the  honorary  presidency  of  the  Pope ;  and  Cavour 
made  no  objection  to  this,  provided  no  foreign  prince 
should  be  numbered  among  the  members  of  the  Con- 
federation. 

As  for  the  bringing  on  of  the  war,  there  was  natu- 
rally no  intention  of  provoking  Europe  by  announcing 
off-hand  the  overthrow  of  the  territorial  conditions 
established  by  the  compacts  of  1815  ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  proceedings  were  to  be  based  firmly  on  the  ground 
of  these  compacts.  Napoleon  would  first  propose  to 
the  Court  of  Vienna  that  the  Pope  should  be  urged  to 
reforms  in  the  Papal  States,  as  a  consequence  of  which 
the  French  and  Austrian  garrisons  there  should  become 
unnecessary.  Then  Austria,  the  great  stickler  for 
formal  legality,  Austria  herself  would  be  accused  of 
a  breach  of  the  compacts  of  1815.  These  had  pro- 
claimed the  sovereign  independence  of  the  Italian 
States ;  and  now  Austria  had  concluded  alliances  with 
many  of  these  States,  by  which  powerful  influence  upon 
the  internal  affairs  of  those  States  was  conceded  to  the 
Court  of  Vienna,  and  their  independence,  consequently, 
seriously  trenched  upon.  On  this  point,  then,  it  was 
proposed  to  take  a  stand,  and,  on  the  ground  of  the 
Act  of  the  Vienna  Congress,  to  demand  that  these 
unauthorized  alliances  should  be  given  uj) ;  in  case  of 


EFFORTS   TO  BRING   ON   WAR.  3G3 

a  refusal,  an  eminently  proper  excuse  for  a  declaration 
of  war  would  be  provided. 

The  refutation  of  this  argument  would  certainly  not 
have  been  difficult.  If  those  Italian  States  were  inde- 
pendent, they  clearly  had  the  right  to  purchase  Aus- 
tria's powerful  protection  by  certain  limitations  of 
their  own  supreme  authority.  But,  unfortunately,  this 
reply,  in  itself  decisive,  could  have  but  little  effect  in 
the  mouth  of  Austria,  since  in  1850  she  had  used 
against  Prussia  exactly  the  same  argument  that  France 
was  now  trying  to  bring  forward :  she  had  then  said 
that  because  the  Act  of  Confederation  proclaimed  the 
German  princes  to  be  sovereign,  it  was  not  allowable 
for  those  princes  to  resign  certain  of  their  rights  of 
supremacy  to  Prussia,  as  Head  of  the  Union. 

While  Napoleon  was  silently  preparing  this  diplo- 
matic machinery,  Cavour  and  the  National  League  had 
been  occupied,  during  the  whole  autumn,  in  arousing 
the  popular  feeling.  In  all  parts  of  the  Peninsula 
arose  the  cry  that  Italy  must  be  freed  from  the  yoke 
of  the  foreign  oppressor,  and  that  the  severed  members 
of  the  Fatherland  must  be  united.  The  Press,  the 
del)ates  in  the  Chambers,  the  League,  all  worked 
together,  and  with  the  greatest  indifference  to  precau- 
tion or  concealment,  for  one  object :  to  harass  the 
enemy  in  Vienna,  and  to  provoke  him  to  unguarded 
steps. 

Tliis  effort  succeeded  to  their  wish,  and  even  beyond. 
In  Vienna  there  was  great  indignation.  The  slightest 
concession  was  thought  incompatible  with  the  dignity 


364  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

of  the  Empire.  The  Government  did  not,  indeed, 
wish  to  attack,  but  they  longed  for  the  moment  when 
the  enemy  would  offer  them  an  occasion,  that  they 
might  seize  it  and  strike  a  decisive  blow.  An  Aus- 
trian statesman  said  to  Herr  von  Bismarck,  "  Since 
Sardinia  has  become  a  constitutional  state,  our  offi- 
cials have  found  any  systematic  administration  in 
Lombardy  impossible ;  it  is  for  us  a  matter  of  life 
and  death  that  we  should  compel  Sardinia  to  get  rid 
of  her  Constitution,  and  renounce  ideas  of  Italian 
Unity."  Just  in  the  same  way  had  Metternich  called 
the  idea  of  German  Unity  abominable,  and  Schwarzen- 
berg  used  every  effort  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Consti- 
tution in  Berlin.  Certainly  it  is  neither  an  imposing 
nor  a  safe  position,  when  one  is  obliged  to  regard  the 
misery  of  one's  neighbors  as  a  necessary  condition  of 
one's  own  existence. 

However,  things  had  been  developing  in  this  direc- 
tion for  more  than  a  century,  and  the  Court  of  Vienna 
longed  for  war  with  no  less  passion  than  did  that  of 
Turin.  Hardly  had  Napoleon's  New  Year's  greeting 
resounded  through  Europe,  when  Austria  threw  thirty 
thousand  men  into  Lombardy,  and  added  re-enforce- 
ments week  by  week.  Upon  this,  Sardinia  naturally 
declared  herself  threatened  by  such  an  accumulation 
of  troops  upon  her  borders,  began  to  make  preparations 
on  her  side,  of  course,  only  for  defence,  and,  to  Aus- 
tria's infinite  disgust,  called  to  her  banner  volunteers 
from  all  Italy,  who  then  formed  a  special  division  of  the 
army,  under  the  great  revolutionary  leader,  Garibaldi. 


AUSTRIA'S  APPEAL    TO   GERMANY.  365 

This  time  the  Court  of  Vienna  was  led  to  make  use 
of  popular  agitation,  however  little  such  a  course  was 
adapted  to  its  usual  political  methods.  But  in  this 
connection  everything  depended  upon  obtaining  the 
help  of  the  German  Confederation;  for  the  announce- 
ment that  such  lielp  was  to  be  given  might  perhaps 
avert  tlie  French  attack  altogether,  and  would,  at  any 
rate,  draw  the  French  army  to  the  Rhine,  and  keep  it 
away  from  Italy.  While,  therefore,  the  Imperial  diplo- 
mats were  moving  heaven  and  earth  in  their  effort 
to  represent  to  the  Princes  that  the  support  of  the 
leading  Power  of  Germany  was  a  self-evident  patriotic 
duty,  in  which  assertion  they  were  readily  listened  to 
by  the  majority,  in  the  South  German  Press  the  watch- 
word resounded  day  after  day,  that  the  ancient  enemy 
should  be  crushed  with  Germany's  united  strength. 
Never  must  that  happen  again  which  had  happened 
in  1805  and  1807,  that  Prussia  should  leave  her  Aus- 
trian brothers  in  the  lurch,  and  then,  after  a  short 
interval,  be  herself  destroyed  in  her  isolation.  If 
Austria  was  attacked  in  Italy,  Germany  was  also 
indirectly  threatened  thereby,  for  the  Rhine  could  not 
be  defended  without  the  possession  of  the  Po.  The 
French  despot  had  stifled  all  freedom  in  his  own 
dominions ;  now  he  was  attempting  to  transplant,  not 
freedom,  but  revolution,  into  other  countries,  exactly 
as  former  Kings  liad  burned  Protestants  at  home,  and 
supported  them  abroad  against  Emperor  and  Church, 
by  this  means  succeeding  in  robbing  the  Empire  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine.     Whoever  should  be  a  laggard 


366  THE  ITALIAN  WAR. 

in  this  holy  war  would  betray  the  Fatherland,  and 
assist  in  dismembering  the  German  Nation.  Such 
words  were  thundered  forth  in  Munich  and  in  Augs- 
burg, in  Stuttgart  and  in  Darmstadt;  with  noisy  ter- 
rorism every  opposing  opinion  was  crushed,  and  the 
Governments  were  unceasingly  urged  to  speedy  arma- 
ment. The  effect  was  great ;  the  hearts  of  the  South 
German  people  were  set  on  fire.  Never  since  1848 
had  German  honor  and  German  unity  been  so  highly 
cried  up  as  in  this  newspaper  storm  which  had  its 
origin  in  the  Vienna  Press. 

Quite  different  was  the  feeling  in  the  North  of  Ger- 
many. There  neither  Schleswig-Holstein,  nor  Olmiitz, 
nor  the  dangerous  crisis  in  the  matter  of  the  Tariff- 
Union,  had  been  forgotten.  Among  the  great  majority 
of  the  Prussian  people  liberal  sentiments  and  the  desire 
of  national  unity  carried  in  their  train  a  dislike  of 
Austria,  while  Italy's  efforts  towards  freedom  and 
unity  found  a  lively  sympathy.  Moreover,  Napoleon's 
cleverly  calculated  attitude  contributed  to  confirm  the 
public  opinion  of  Prussia  in  this  tendency.  In  marked 
contrast  to  the  war  enthusiasm  in  Austria,  there  was 
in  France  no  talk  of  serious  military  preparations.  A 
small  army  was  assembled  on  the  frontiers  of  Savoy ; 
but,  apart  from  this,  profound  peace  reigned  in  the 
country,  and  the  fleet  lay  unprepared  in  the  harbor  of 
Toulon.  The  Prussian  Government,  therefore,  saw  in 
this  state  of  affairs  no  occasion  for  warlike  decisions. 
Even  supposing  that,  for  not  unnatural  reasons,  a 
violent  excitement  arose  in  Piedmont,  the  little  State 


PUBLIC  OPINION  IN  GERMANY  DIVIDED.      367 

would  not  venture  to  take  up  arms  without  Napoleon's 
aid ;  and  Napoleon  had  hitherto  demanded  nothing  fur- 
ther than  that,  on  the  basis  of  the  compacts  of  1815, 
there  should  be  an  improvement  in  the  state  of  things 
in  Italy,  —  a  state  of  things  which,  in  Prussia's  judg- 
ment also,  had  become  intolerable. 

The  Prince  Regent,  consequently,  had  not  a  moment's 
hesitation  in  deciding  that,  so  far  as  could  be  seen  at 
that  time,  the  German  Confederation  had  nothing  at 
all  to  do  with  the  matter,  and  hence  that  Prussia 
would  take  part  in  the  negotiations,  not  as  a  member 
of  the  Confederation,  but  independently  as  a  European 
Power.  Herr  von  Schleinitz,  in  spite  of  his  friendship 
for  Austria,  was  above  all  an  enemy  of  critical,  and 
possibly  dangerous,  decisions,  and  did  everything  in 
his  power  to  confii'm  his  master  in  the  view  the  latter 
had  adopted.  In  the  Confederate  Diet,  Bismarck  gave 
place  to  Herr  von  Usedom,  a  sympathizer  with  the 
new  era,  in  order  that  the  former  might  represent 
Prussia  at  St.  Petersburg.  These  two  gentlemen  were 
not  over-fond  of  each  other  in  general,  but  agreed  en- 
tirely in  regard  to  the  matter  then  in  hand,  Bismarck 
looking  upon  Austria  as  the  chief  opponent  of  Prussia, 
while  Usedom  was  enthusiastic  for  the  independence 
of  Italy.  Such  opinions  as  these  were  generally  held 
in  Beilin  among  the  leaders  and  the  majority  of  the 
deputies ;  no  one  had  any  desire  to  break  a  lance  for 
Austria's  misrule  in  Italy,  or  in  defence  of  the  Curia. 

As  for  the  otlier  two  neutral  Great  Powers,  Russia 
and   England,  there  was  in   St.   Petersburg   only  one 


368  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

feeling,  —  delight  at  the  prospect  of  a  humiliation  of 
Austrian  pride  ;  and  this  feeling  prevailed  to  such  a 
degree  that  the  Emperor  Alexander  did  not  conceal 
his  intention  of  himself  opposing  any  one  who  should 
show  a  readiness  to  assist  Austria.  In  England  the 
predominant  feeling  was  a  desire  for  peace ;  though  the 
Tory  party  then  in  power  inclined  rather  to  the  Aus- 
trian side,  while  the  Whigs  distinctly  favored  the  cause 
of  the  Italian  patriots.  The  Minister,  Lord  Malmes- 
bury,  at  once  made  an  attempt  at  mediation,  order- 
ing the  English  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Lord  Cowley, 
to  go  to  Vienna,  and  there  to  urge  emphatically  a  con- 
sideration of  the  French  proposals  for  internal  reform 
in  Italy.  The  Ambassador  was  received  with  the 
words,  "  We  need  no  mediators,  but  allies."  His  pro- 
posals to  guarantee  to  Austria  the  possession  of  the 
territory  she  then  held,  provided  she  would  agree  to 
the  reforms,  was  received  with  an  answer  half  accept- 
ing and  half  evading. 

But  before  the  negotiation  had  resulted  in  anything 
definite,  it  was  thwarted  by  a  proposition  coming  from 
Russia,  that  the  affairs  of  Italy  should  be  arranged  at 
a  Congress  of  the  Great  Powers,  to  which  representa- 
tives of  the  Italian  States  should  be  admitted.  The 
proposal  was  accepted  by  France  with  eagerness,  and 
by  England  and  Prussia  without  hesitation,  but  in 
Austria  it  aroused  the  bitterest  indignation.  What! 
Were  they  to  condescend  to  appear  before  the  tribunal 
of  the  European  Powers,  in  name,  indeed,  as  equal 
among  equals,  but  in  fact  as  defendants  against  the 


ATTEMPTS  AT  MEDIATION.  869 

detested  Sardinia  ?  Were  they  to  allow  strangers  to 
interfere  in  their  sovereign  rights,  which  had  been 
created  by  Europe,  and  exercised  for  a  generation? 
"  I  would  rather  go  to  the  gallows  than  to  this  Con- 
ference," is  said  to  have  been  the  exclamation  of  Count 
Buol. 

The  proposal  was  not  rejected  in  so  many  words, 
but  delays  were  introduced  in  matters  of  detail,  first 
in  regard  to  the  meeting-place  of  the  Congress,  and 
then  in  regard  to  its  preliminaries.  All  negotiation 
was  declared  impossible  so  long  as  Sardinia  did  not 
dismiss  Garibaldi's  volunteers,  and  place  its  army 
on  a  peace-footing.  Austria  would  then  disarm  as 
well,  and  take  part  in  the  Congress.  Russia  and  Eng- 
land thought  that  Piedmont  was  much  more  threatened 
by  the  force  of  its  enemy,  which  was  double  its  own, 
than  was  Austria  by  the  small  army  of  the  Piedmont- 
ese.  They  therefore  proposed  mutual  disarmament. 
Napoleon  all  the  time  kept  up  a  peaceful  appearance, 
accepted  every  proposal  of  mediation,  and  troubled 
Cavour  not  a  little  by  this  boundless  submissiveness ; 
but  at  the  same  time  the  Emperor  whispered  in  the 
ear  of  the  Sardinian  Ambassador,  "  Do  not  be  anxious ; 
all  this  Avill  come  to  nothing." 

He  had  judged  the  Austrian  Cabinet  rightly.  Count 
Buol  did,  indeed,  begin  to  hesitate  a  little,  in  the  fear 
of  taking  some  false  step,  wliicli  might  turn  the  favor 
of  Europe  towards  his  opponent.  But  the  decision 
lay  no  longer  in  his  liaiid.  The  leaders  of  the  officers 
of   high   rank    and    of    the    clergy,    the    Head   of    the 


370  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

Ministry  of  War,  Count  Griinne,  and  the  Archbishop  of 
Vienna,  Cardinal  Rauscher,  urged  the  Emperor  not 
only  to  reject  every  thought  of  concession,  but  to 
begin  as  soon  as  possible  the  Holy  War  against  Revo- 
lution as  proclaimed  openly  in  Berlin,  and  as  hypocrit- 
ically veiled  in  Paris.  Every  day  there  was  an  in- 
creasing impatience  to  turn  to  account  the  preparations 
which  had  been  so  energetically  begun,  and  which 
were  so  exhaustive  for  the  severely  taxed  Treasury, 
and  to  crush  Sardinia  before  the  French  military 
arrangements  could  be  completed. 

The  Archduke  Albert  came  to  Berlin  to  give  assur- 
ance of  the  love  of  peace  which  animated  his  Court, 
and  to  hold  out  the  prospect,  in  case  of  war,  of  the 
appearance  on  the  Rhine  of  an  Austrian  army  of  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  under  the  Emperor 
in  person,  requesting  at  the  same  time  a  similar  mani- 
festation on  the  part  of  Prussia  and  the  German  Con- 
federation. But  when  asked  the  object  of  such  a  war, 
and  some  more  particular  questions  about  its  manage- 
ment, he  had  nothing  to  answer,  and  therefore  the 
Prussian  reply  was  non-committal. 

Nevertheless,  at  this  very  moment  the  rage  for  war 
at  Vienna  broke  through  all  bounds.  Yet  once  more 
Count  Buol  uttered  a  warning,  and  delayed  the  mo- 
mentous step  for  three  days ;  but  then  the  decision 
was  given  against  him,  so  that  he  presented  his  resig- 
nation, and  was  soon  afterwards  replaced  by  the  Repre- 
sentative to  the  Diet,  Count  Rechberg.  Thereupon, 
on  the  23d  of   April,  an   Austrian  officer  appeared  in 


PRUSSIA'S  NEUTRALITY.  371 

Turin  with  the  ultimatum,  either  complete  disarmament 
or  war  within  three  days.  Cavour  breathed  again. 
He  sent  back  the  envoy  with  the  answer  that  the  ques- 
tion of  disarmament  could  only  be  decided  with  that 
of  the  Congress.  He  knew  now  that  all  Europe  would 
lay  the  blame  of  the  breach  of  the  peace  upon  Austria. 
And  so  it  was.  In  England,  where,  hitherto,  Napoleon 
had  been  regarded  with  great  mistrust,  people  became 
enthusiastic  for  the  resurrection  of  Italy.  Russia  mo- 
bilized four  corps  d'armee,  in  order,  if  war  should  occur, 
to  prevent  an  Austrian  triumph.  Prussia  declared,  in 
a  circular-letter  of  the  26th  of  April,  that  she  would  con- 
fine herself  henceforth  to  the  defence  of  the  Confede- 
rate territory,  and  beyond  this  would  remain  neutral. 

But  a  new  turn  of  affairs  was  at  hand,  which  once 
more,  to  a  certain  extent,  inclined  the  feelings  of  the 
Regent  toward  Austria.  While  the  French  troops 
were  being  transported  in  great  haste  towards  Italy, 
the  people  of  Parma  rose  and  drove  out  their  Govern- 
ment. On  the  3d  of  May,  Napoleon  declared  that 
Austria,  by  passing  the  Ticino,  had  broken  the  peace ; 
by  Austria's  fault  the  question  had  been  brought  to 
this :  either  Austria's  rule  must  extend  to  the  Alps, 
or  Italy  must  be  free  to  the  Adriatic.  This,  however, 
was  entirely  contrary  to  the  ideas  of  the  Prince  Regent. 
With  all  his  sympathy  for  the  wretched  condition  of 
Italy,  he  was  indignant  at  the  Napoleonic  insolence, 
which  undertook  of  its  own  authority  to  subvert  the 
arrangement  of  Europe  agreed  upon  forty  years  before. 
He  desired  salutary  reforms  in  Italy,  but  no  overthrow 


372  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

of  thrones,  no  displacement  of  boundaries.  It  was 
precisely  tlie  same  standpoint  as  that  from  which  he 
viewed,  and  wished  to  treat,  the  German  situation,  so 
similar  to  the  Italian.  However  firmly  he  was  con- 
vinced that  from  this  situation  German  Unity  must  be 
educed  b}^  the  sword  of  Prussia,  he  was  determined 
to  persist  in  the  path  of  legitimate  reform,  and  to 
respect  the  rights  of  his  German  brother  princes  so 
long  as  they  did  not,  on  their  side,  by  hostile  steps 
taken  against  Prussia,  force  the  sword  into  his  hands. 
He  purposed  to  set  the  same  limits  to  the  action  of 
the  French  Emperor,  and  to  interfere  energetically 
when  they  were  transgressed. 

In  this  manner  he  formed  the  plan  of  an  armed 
mediation  at  the  right  moment.  He  at  once  did  what 
every  state  does  on  the  outbreak  of  a  great  war  among 
its  neighbors,  —  put  the  Prussian  army  in  the  so-called 
state  of  readiness,  the  preliminary  of  mobilization.  He 
was  by  no  means  inclined,  by  a  premature  manifesta- 
tion, as,  for  instance,  the  placing  of  an  army  of  obser- 
vation on  the  Rhine,  to  divert  the  French  attack  from 
Italy  to  Germany.  Rather,  he  wished  the  armed  medi- 
ation to  take  place  only  when  the  French  army,  whose 
victory  over  the  Austrians  he  regarded  as  certain, 
should  have  advanced  so  far  into  Italy  that,  in  the 
case  of  a  declaration  of  war,  the  German  army  on 
the  Rhine  might  enter  upon  the  contest  with  a  deci- 
sive superiority.  For  the  time,  therefore,  he  allowed 
the  noise  and  outcry  of  the  South  German  Press  to 
pour  over  himself  and  his  Government,  perfectly  clear 


PRUSSIAN  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  VIENNA.        373 

about  his  course  for  his  own  part,  though  he  was, 
indeed,  somewhat  feebly  supported  by  his  Ministers, 
since  Prince  Hohenzollern  was  not  inclined  to  stand 
sufficiently  firm  against  the  pressure  from  South  Ger- 
many, and  Herr  von  Schleinitz  and  his  Under-Secretary 
of  State,  Von  Gruner,  were  somew^hat  beside  them- 
selves over  the  danger  of  deciding  upon  any  active 
proceedings. 

In  the  mean  time  the  war  went  on,  though  in  the 
beginning  very  slowly.  General  Count  Gyulay,  with 
one  hundi'ed  and  twelve  thousand  men,  crossed  the 
Ticino  into  the  Piedmontese  territory  on  the  29th  of 
April ;  and  as,  up  to  that  day,  only  a  small  French 
detachment  had  arrived  in  Piedmont,  it  was  generally 
believed  that  within  a  short  interval  he  would  have 
overwhelmed  the  Sardinian  army,  which  was  only  half 
as  strong  as  his  own,  have  entered  Turin,  and  closed 
the  passes  of  the  Alps.  But  nothing  of  the  sort 
happened.  When  he  had  occupied  the  nearest  Pied- 
montese province,  Lomellina,  he  remained  inactive 
week  after  week,  as  if  he  had  no  other  task  than  to 
await  there  tlie  arrival  of  the  French,  and  to  greet 
them  with  a  brotherly  embrace. 

At  this  time  the  Prince  Regent  decided  to  despatch 
the  younger  General  Willisen  to  Vienna,  not  exactly 
to  conclude  any  binding  agreement,  but  for  an  ex- 
change of  opinion  in  regard  to  Prussia's  purposed 
mediation.  Prussia,  said  Willisen,  was  willing  to  in- 
terpose for  the  maintenance  of  Austria's  authority  in 
her  Italian  possessions;  but,  in  order  to  give  her  action 


374  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

due  weight,  she  must  have  full  control  over  the  forces 
of  the  Confederation,  in  which  case  an  Austrian  army 
might  actually  undertake  the  defence  of  the  Upper 
Rhine,  and  a  South  German  contingent  be  assigned 
to  it.  At  first  the  Vienna  statesmen  took  a  lofty 
tone.  They  said  they  had  expected  something  better 
than  a  cold  mediation  from  their  German  brothers  in 
the  Confederation.  It  was  not  enough  that  Prussia 
should  raise  her  voice  for  Austria's  supremacy  in 
Lombardo-Venetia.  Austria  required  also  the  main- 
tenance of  the  compacts  of  protection  which  she  had 
entered  into  with  the  Italian  States ;  not  only  must 
Sardinia  be  made  incapable  of  doing  injury,  but  the 
insolent  Parisian  Usurper  must  be  overthrown,  and  in 
France  the  legitimate  King,  Henry  V.,  must  be  placed 
on  the  throne.  Only  by  such  measures  as  this  could 
the  blessing  of  universal  peace  and  order  be  restored 
to  Europe,  and  the  demon  of  Revolution  be  bound 
firmly  and  permanently.  They  therefore  allowed  them- 
selves to  hope  that,  with  Prussia's  co-operation,  the 
entire  strength  of  Germany  would  rush  to  arms  for 
these  legitimate  and  noble  objects. 

Willisen  could  answer  all  this  only  with  a  distinct 
refusal,  announcing  that  Prussia  would  bind  herself 
neither  in  regard  to  the  compacts  of  protection,  nor 
to  the  overthrow  of  the  Sardinian  Constitution,  nor  to 
a  change  of  dynasty  in  France.  But  while  these 
negotiations  were  going  on,  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  French  had  arrived  in  Piedmont,  by  whose 
assistance    a   decidedly  superior   force   had   been   able 


PRUSSIA   STATES  HER  POSITION.  875 

to  march  against  Count  Gyulay,  and  the  first  battle 
of  importance,  fought  near  Montebello,  had  turned 
out  unfortunately  for  the  Austrians.  Count  Rech- 
berg,  therefore,  decidedly  lowered  his  tone,  declared 
himself  ready  to  agree  to  the  Prussian  propositions, 
and  suggested,  accordingly,  that  by  exchange  of  diplo- 
matic communications  a  written  compact  should  be 
framed,  containing  mutual  obligations  to  the  following 
effect:  that  Austria  was  to  consent  to  give  Prussia 
undivided  control  over  the  Confederate  army,  and 
Prussia  to  promise  to  begin  her  mediation,  on  the 
basis  of  the  maintenance  of  Austria's  authority  in  her 
Italian  possessions. 

Such  an  arrangement  was,  however,  declined  by 
Herr  Schleinitz  in  a  despatch  of  June  14th,  which  the 
Prussian  Ambassador  was  to  read  to  Count  Rechberg. 
The  ground  of  the  refusal  was  the  natural  one,  that 
after  the  conclusion  of  such  a  formal  compact,  Prussia 
could  not  possibly  assume  the  part  of  a  mediator;  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  despatch  really  restated  the 
original  Prussian  position,  to  the  effect  that  Prussia 
would  undertake  an  armed  mediation  for  the  main- 
tenance of  Austria's  authority  in  her  possessions,  and, 
according  to  the  result  of  the  same,  would  act  further 
as  her  obligations  as  a  European  Power  and  the  high 
position  of  Germany  should  dictate.  On  tlie  same 
day  llie  Prince  Regent  arranged  the  mobilization  of 
six  corps  cVarmSe^  —  that  is  to  say,  a  force  of  one  hun- 
dred and  eighty  thousand  men,  —  and  made  a  proposal 
to  the  Confederate  Diet  for  the  formation  of   a  corps 


376  THE  ITALIAN  WAR. 

of  observation  of  sixty  thousand  men,  to  be  taken 
from  the  two  South  German  Confederate  contingents. 
It  seemed  as  if  such  a  preparation  might  have 
been  sufficient  to  prove  the  seriousness  of  Prussia's 
action. 

But  in  Vienna  a  different  view  was  held.  It  is  true 
that  on  the  4th  of  June  Count  Gyulay  had  lost  a 
battle  near  Magenta,  had  then  evacuated  Lombardy, 
and  had  withdrawn  beyond  the  Mincio ;  at  the  same 
time,  the  people  of  Tuscany,  of  Modena,  and  of  Bologna, 
had  driven  out  their  Governments,  and  had  furnished 
a  considerable  accession  to  the  Sardinian  army.  But 
in  spite  of  all  this,  the  courage  of  the  Austrian  Cabi- 
net was  still  unbroken.  The  soldiers  had  fought  well ; 
and  it  was  hoped  that,  with  better  leadership  and 
vigorous  re-enforcement,  a  brilliant  victory  would  fin- 
ally be  obtained.  The  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  has- 
tened to  Verona  to  take  command  in  person.  His 
Chief  of  Staff  was  General  Hess,  who  had  fought  with 
honor  in  Italian  battles.  Over  forty  thousand  fresh 
troops  were  added  to  the  army,  so  that  two-thirds 
of  the  entire  Austrian  military  power  were  now  assem- 
bled on  the  Mincio,  and  could  advance  against  the 
enemy  with  a  decided  superiority  in  numbers. 

While  such  hopes  were  entertained,  considerable 
coldness  was  felt  toward  the  German  Confederate 
Princes,  who  talked  a  great  deal  about  their  good 
intentions,  but  were  unwilling  to  undertake  any  obli- 
gation that  implied  active  assistance  ;  and  on  the  22d 
of  June  Pechberg  sent  a  despatch  to  Berlin,  in  which 


PROGRESS   OF  THE    WAR.  377 

he  asserted  that  it  was  Prussia's  duty,  as  a  member  of 
the  Confederation,  not  only  to  protect  all  Austria's 
possessions,  but  to  maintain  the  Austrian  compacts 
with  the  Italian  Governments ;  he  also  reserved  a  free 
right  of  action,  on  the  part  of  Austria,  in  all  the  trans- 
sactions  of  the  Confederate  Diet.  This  simply  meant 
persistence  to  the  fullest  extent  in  Austria's  own  de- 
mands, and  rejection  of  the  only  demand  of  Prussia. 
But  this  arrogance  was  soon  followed  by  retribution. 
On  the  23d  of  June  Francis  Joseph  led  his  army 
across  the  Mincio  toward  the  French  and  Sardin- 
ians, and  at  evening  reached  the  heights  of  Cavriana 
and  Solferino. 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th  he  was  there  attacked 
by  the  enemy,  and  an  obstinate  and  extremely  bloody 
contest  ensued,  in  consequence  of  which,  after  his 
centre  had  been  broken,  he  was  forced  to  retire  once 
more.  Over  twenty  thousand  dead  and  wounded 
covered  the  dreadful  battlefield,  and  the  two  im- 
perial generals  shuddered  at  the  sight  of  this  incal- 
culable amount  of  misery.  General  Benedek,  the  only 
one  of  the  Austrian  leaders  who,  on  the  unlucky  day, 
had  fought  with  success,  related  afterwards  that,  in 
the  council  of  war  on  the  following  morning,  he  had 
urged  an  immediate  renewal  of  the  battle,  arguing  that 
the  French  had  had  quite  as  severe  losses,  and  had 
fewer  fresh  troops  in  reserve  than  the  Austrians ;  but 
the  Emperor  cried  out,  with  tears  in  his  eyes,  "  Kather 
let  us  lose  a  province  than  go  through  such  horrible 
things  again  I "     The  army  retired  beyond  the  Adige, 


378  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

to  the  shelter  of  the  canon  of  Verona.     Lombardy  was 
surrendered. 

On  this  very  day,  the  critical  24th  of  June,  the 
Prince  Regent,  unaffected  by  the  rebuff  received  from 
Rechberg,  sent  a  despatch  to  London  and  one  to  St. 
Petersburg,  to  announce  the  beginning  of  Prussia's 
armed  mediation  on  the  twofold  basis  of  a  mainten- 
ance of  the  status  quo  as  far  as  territory  was  concerned 
and  of  the  introduction  of  political  reforms  in  Italy, 
and  to  desire  the  support  of  the  two  Great  Powers  in 
carrying  out  this  programme.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Regent  ordered  the  mobilization  of  his  entire  army, 
and  made  a  motion  in  the  Confederate  Diet  for  the 
assembling  of  the  two  North  German  Confederate  con- 
tingents. Within  two  Weeks  after  this,  nearly  four 
hundred  thousand  men  would  have  been  on  the  Rhine 
ready  for  battle,  a  force  nearly  tAvice  as  great  as  any- 
thing France  could  at  that  moment  produce  in  oppo- 
sition. If  Napoleon  hesitated  to  abandon  Lombardy, 
the  German  army,  even  without  the  Austrian  contin- 
gent, had  the  prospect  of  great  triumphs  before  it. 

But  just  then  a  change  took  place  upon  the  scene 
of  war  that  astonished  all  Europe. 

The  two  Emperors  were  both  equally  weary  of  the 
contest.  Napoleon  found  himself  before  the  celebrated 
Quadrilateral,  and  had  to  face  the  prospect  of  severe 
battles  before  he  could  conquer  it.  He  dreaded  serious 
difficulties  at  home  from  the  anger  of  the  Clerical 
party  over  a  war,  that  now  threatened  even  the  tem- 
poral supremacy  of  the  Pope.     He  perceived  that  his 


PRUSSIAN  PREPARATIONS.  379 

friend,  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  looked  very  unfavor- 
ably on  the  revolutionary  movement  in  Italy.  Even 
to  himself  Italian  national  feeling  appeared  in  a  much 
less  rosy  light  since  his  cousin,  Jerome,  to  whom  he 
destined  the  throne  of  Tuscany,  had  written  to  him 
that  he  had  not  been  able  to  secure  a  single  voice  for 
his  candidacy. 

In  the  midst  of  all  this,  there  came  to  him  from 
London  the  news  of  Prussia's  threatened  mediation, 
and  of  the  first  stipulation  of  the  same :  the  inviola- 
bility of  the  Austrian  possessions  in  Italy.  After  his 
agreement  at  Plombi^res,  and  the  manifesto,  "  Freedom 
as  far  as  the  Adriatic,"  this  stipulation  was  wholly  out 
of  the  question  for  him;  yet,  if  he  did  not  accept  it,  he 
ran  the  risk  of  a  perilous  struggle  with  all  Germany, 
without  the  hope,  which  he  had  had  in  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  that  Russia  would  attack  his  foe  in  the  flank. 
Under  these  circumstances  he  suddenly  adopted  the 
resolution  of  escaping  the  mediator  by  making  a  direct 
agreement  with  his  enemy.  On  the  evening  of  the 
6th  of  June  he  sent  his  adjutant,  General  Fleury, 
across  to  Verona,  in  order,  to  try  the  expedient  of  pro- 
posing a  truce  to  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph. 

The  envoy  found  a  state  of  mind  there  quite  similar 
to  that  in  his  own  camp,  —  an  eager  desire  for  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war,  grave  anxiety  about  disturbances 
in  Hungary,  decided  dislike  to  Prussia's  mediation. 
The  Cabinet  of  Vienna  cared  less  about  Prussia's 
promise  to  save  Lombardy  than  about  her  refusal  to 
uphold  the  compacts   of   protection  which   insured    to 


380  THE  ITALIAN  WAR. 

Austria  an  indirect  control  over  Central  and  Southern 
Italy ;  and  most  horrible  of  all  was  the  idea  that,  after 
Austria's  own  failure  in  Italy,  Prussia  might  perhaps 
win  great  victories  in  France,  and  raise  herself,  by 
that  means,  to  the  headship  of  Germany. 

Just  before  this,  on  the  4th  of  July,  Prussia  had 
made  a  motion  in  the  Diet  that  all  the  Confederate 
troops  should  be  placed  under  her  command;  and  on 
the  7th,  appeared  Austria's  counter-motion,  that  the 
Prince  Regent  should  be  chosen  General,  according  to 
the  principles  of  the  hallowed  Confederate  military 
organization,  that  is  to  say,  with  seventeen  Confede- 
rate commissioners  of  inspection  in  his  headquarters,  and 
with  the  condition  that  all  orders  should  be  subjected 
to  the  consideration  of  the  Diet.  This  meant  forbidding 
Prussia  to  make  war,  for  it  was  well  known  that  the 
Prince  would  never  condescend  to  put  himself  in  such 
a  position.  The  necessary  consequence  of  this  was  a 
greedy  acceptance  of  the  offers  of  peace  held  out  by 
Napoleon. 

As  early  as  July  8th  a  truce  till  the  15th  of  August 
was  concluded.  On  the  11th  of  July  a  personal  inter- 
view between  the  two  monarchs  took  place  at  Villa- 
franca,  when  Napoleon  attempted  to  reconcile  his 
Austrian  opponent  to  peace  by  means  of  a  story  of 
his  own  invention,  that  with  the  consent  of  England 
and  Russia,  Prussia,  as  mediator,  was  about  to  make  a 
demand  that  Venice  should  become  an  independent  State 
under  an  Austrian  Archduke,  that  Lombardy,  Modena, 
and   Parma   should   be   given    to    Sardinia,    and    Tus- 


PRELIMINARIES   OF  PEACE.  381 

cany  to  the  Duke  of  Parma  —  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he 
had  himself  made  such  propositions  in  London  —  but 
that  he,  Napoleon,  was  ready  to  grant  far  better  con- 
ditions to  the  Emperor,  whom  he  highly  revered.  He 
then  agreed,  without  objection,  that  Venice,  as  well  as 
Mantua  and  Peschiera,  should  remain  Austrian,  as 
heretofore,  and  that  only  Lombardy  should  be  given 
up.  He  was  ready  to  consent  to  the  restoration  of 
the  banished  Princes  of  Tuscany  and  Modena,  of  course 
on  the  condition  that  this  should  not  be  done  by 
force  of  arms.  Francis  Joseph  accepted  this  condition, 
in  the  optimistic  belief  that,  if  those  countries  were 
once  evacuated  by  the  foreign  troops,  the  inhabitants 
would  hasten  to  call  back  their  beloved  sovereigns  with 
joy.  The  Italian  States  were  then  to  receive,  with 
the  approval  of  Austria,  a  Confederate  Constitution, 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Pope ;  Austria  was  to 
grant  liberal  institutions  in  Venice,  and  the  Pope  was 
to  be  requested  to  introduce  the  necessary  reforms  in 
the  States  of  the  Church.  In  a  conference  of  a  few 
hours  these  preliminaries  of  peace  were  harmoniously 
discussed.  Napoleon  then  committed  tliem  to  paper 
with  liis  own  hand,  partly  at  the  dictation  of  Count 
Rechberg.  They  were  to  be  worked  out  more  in 
detail  at  a  conference  to  be  held  as  soon  as  possible 
in  Zurich. 

A  singular  peace  this,  by  which  the  victor  gave  up 
all  the  hopes  for  the  sake  of  ^^■llich  he  had  begun  the 
contest,  and  by  which  the  vanquished  lost,  indeed, 
an    Italian    province,    but    received    a    newly-assured 


382  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

supremacy  over  the  whole  of  Italy.  King  Victor  Em- 
manuel was  most  deeply  wounded  by  this  breach  of 
the  promises  made  at  Plombieres,  and  Cavour,  at  first 
utterly  overcome,  retired  immediately  from  the  Minis- 
try. At  no  price  would  he  have  shared  in  the  execu- 
tion of  this  treaty.  For  an  Italian  Confederation,  with 
the  Pope  as  President,  and  with  Austria  and  the  two 
branches  of  her  Imperial  Family  in  Tuscany  and 
Modena  as  members,  would  not  have  lightened  the 
burden  of  Italy's  servitude,  but  would  have  rendered 
it  permanent,  and,  above  all,  have  extended  it  to  Pied- 
mont. Before  this  Cavour  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
entered  into  the  idea  of  an  Italian  Confederation  con- 
trolled by  Italians ;  but  he  now  turned  his  back  upon 
every  scheme  of  the  sort,  and  the  more  harshly  Fate 
seemed  to  oppress  him  and  his  people,  the  more  did 
he  raise  demands  for  an  Italian  nation  in  the  future. 
"  Since  our  Princes  are  of  a  foreign  race  and  the  vassals 
of  foreign  potentates,  there  is  left  only  one  way  of 
salvation  for  Italy,  consolidation  into  one  sole  and 
united  State." 

No  longer  as  Minister,  but  as  leader  of  a  party,  he 
sent  words  of  encouragement  to  the  chiefs  of  the  revolt 
in  Parma  and  Modena,  in  Florence  and  Bologna,  ur- 
ging them  to  hold  their  position  at  any  cost,  to  make 
the  return  of  the  former  rulers  impossible,  to  prevent 
any  violent  or  communistic  disorders,  and  to  bring 
about  a  union  with  Sardinia  by  the  general  voice  of  the 
people.  Then  it  was  shown  how  much  the  Italians 
had  learned  in  the  school  of  life.     These  instructions 


POPULAR  MOVEMENT  IN  CENTRAL  ITALY.      383 

were  carried  out  with  exemplary  firmness  and  unani- 
mity ;  and  before  the  end  of  August  the  four  provinces 
had  determined  on  annexation  to  Piedmont,  and  had 
sent  their  homage  to  King  Victor  EmmanueL 

For  the  moment,  the  King  was  obliged  to  proceed 
cautiously.  He  received  the  announcement  of  the 
decisions  of  the  people  with  thanks,  and  promised  to 
recommend  their  wishes  most  earnestly  to  the  consider- 
ation of  the  Great  Powers.  We  need  not  describe  the 
indignation  aroused  in  Vienna  by  this  action.  The 
Pope  hurled  the  thunders  of  excommunication  at  re- 
bellious Bologna;  but  both  he  and  Austria  were  afraid 
to  take  action  in  common  in  the  matter.  Everything 
now  depended  upon  Napoleon,  who  saw  what  was 
going  on  with  vexation  and  embarrassment,  but  did 
not  know  how  to  prevent  it.  He  himself,  at  Villa- 
franca,  had  prohibited  any  restoration  by  force  of  arms. 
He  himself  was  ruling  in  France  on  the  basis  of  the 
universal  will  of  the  people.  How  could  he  oppose 
with  brutal  violence  that  universal  will  as  manifested 
in  Florence  and  Bologna?  He  had  allowed  the  floods 
to  swell  and  gather  together;  mighty  as  he  was,  he 
now  lacked  the  power  to  control  them  at  his  Avill ;  in 
spite  of  his  frown,  they  burst  irresistibly  through  the 
dams  he  had  ingeniously  devised.  A  broad  foundation 
was  laid  for  the  future  unity  of  Italy. 

The  excitement  which  the  progress  of  the  war  had 
aroused  in  men's  minds  was  hardly  less  in  Germany  than 
in  Italy ;  but  on  the  north  side  of  the  Alps  it  produced 
only  too  insignificant,   if   not   utterly  fruitless,,  conse- 


384  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

quences.  In  the  beginning  of  the  war  we  saw  the 
waves  of  excited  feeling  in  the  north  and  in  the 
south  of  Germany  clash  harshly  with  one  another. 
In  Prussia  Liberal  sympathy  for  Italy  had  decidedly 
the  upper  hand,  while  in  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  the 
Ultramontane  party  urged  on  the  whole  people  to 
enthusiasm  for  the  black  and  yellow.  Many  Liberal 
patriots,  both  then  and  afterwards,  have  complained 
that  Prussia  here,  as  in  the  Crimean  War,  threw  away 
the  opportunity  of  seizing,  by  a  quick  and  energetic 
war  policy,  the  leadership  of  the  national  enthusiasm, 
and  of  so  placing  herself  at  the  head  of  the  Fatherland. 
But  in  regard  to  1859,  it  would  first  of  all  be  necessary 
to  answer  the  question,  which  enthusiasm  the  Prince 
Regent  should  have  favored,  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
six  million  South  Germans  for  Austria,  or  that  of 
the  twelve  million  Prussians  for  Italy.  If  he  had 
chosen  the  former,  his  friend  in  the  Confederation, 
Austria,  would  have  taken  excellent  care  that  Ger- 
man Unity  and  the  Prussian  Headship  should  come 
to  nothing;  if  the  latter,  then  the  work  would  per- 
haps have  been  accomplished,  but  it  would  have  been 
branded  with  the  stain  of  foreign  aid,  and  France,  as 
an  ally,  would  doubtless  have  taken  care  to  inoculate 
it  with  the  virus  of  more  than  one  disease.  With  good 
reason,  then,  did  the  Prince  avoid  both  these  courses 
alike. 

The  reproaches  of  hesitation  and  uncertainty  which 
have  been  cast  upon  the  Prince's  policy  are  likewise 
without  justification,  and  spring  from  ignorance  of  the 


CRITICISM  OF  PRUSSIA  'S   COURSE.  385 

facts  of  the  case.  We  have  seen  that  his  determination 
was  fixed  from  the  very  first,  and  was  afterwards  car- 
ried out  step  by  step  firmly,  and  with  proper  adapta- 
tion to  the  changing  course  of  the  war. 

But  it  is  another  question  whether  the  programme 
of  the  proposed  mediation  was  the  right  one,  and 
accorded  with  the  actual  condition  of  affairs.  The 
result  showed  the  contrary.  Prussia  experienced  what 
has  so  often  happened  to  well-disposed  mediators :  the 
plan  of  mediation  proposed  appeared  so  unacceptable 
to  both  parties,  that  they  agreed  among  themselves 
upon  the  exact  contrary  of  this  plan.  The  Prince, 
guided  by  his  own  feeling  of  justice,  wished  to  secure 
to  Austria  the  possession  of  Lombardo-Venetia,  but 
to  combine  with  this  a  renunciation  of  her  hegemony 
in  Central  Italy.  Instead  of  this,  Austria  gave  up 
Lombardy,  and  Napoleon  held  out  to  her  the  continu- 
ance of  that  hegemony.  Clearly  the  Prussian  Cabinet 
had  not  at  that  time  sufficient  information  in  regard  to 
Italian  affairs  to  lead  them  to  the  only  reasonable  con- 
clusion, that  in  this  case  no  mediation  whatever  was 
possible,  and  every  reform  of  the  government  must 
necessarily  carry  with  it  the  overthrow  as  well  of  the 
Austrian  as  of  the  Papal  supremacy.  If  they  did  not 
wish  to  give  Austria  armed  assistance  unconditionally, 
there  was  nothing  left  for  them  but  unconditional 
neutrality,  until,  after  the  French  occupation  of  Vene- 
tia,  the  war  had  died  out  of  itself  at  the  frontiers  of 
the  German  Confederation. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  was  filled 


386  •      THE  ITALIAN  WAR. 

with  bitter  indignation  against  Prussia,  especially  after 
they  had  heard  the  insinuations  of  Napoleon.  Immedi- 
ately after  Villafranca,  Napoleon,  indeed,  announced  to 
the  world  that  he  had  made  peace  in  order  to  avoid 
the  threatened  outbreak  of  a  new  and  perilous  war 
with  Prussia  and  Germany ;  but  Francis  Joseph,  on 
his  side,  was  not  deterred  by  this  from  making  publicly, 
in  direct  contradiction  to  this  declaration,  the  charge 
against  Prussia  that  he  had  been  driven  to  sacrifice 
Lombardy  because  he  had  been  abandoned  by  his 
nearest,  his  natural  allies  in  the  Confederation.  The 
Prince  Regent,  who  had  just  ordered  his  army  to 
advance  toward  the  Rhine,  was  indignant.  Between 
the  two  Cabinets  there  arose  a  violent  diplomatic  quar- 
rel. The  bitter  feeling  grew  to  such  a  height,  that  a 
newspaper  statement  announcing  that  the  two  Gov- 
ernments were  about  to  renew  friendly  relations,  was 
emphatically  contradicted  on  the  Austrian  side,  both 
in  German  and  French  newspapers.  In  this  way  wild 
rumors  soon  began  to  be  rife  of  an  agreement  —  if  not 
an  alliance,  at  least  an  understanding  —  between  Vienna 
and  Paris  for  the  humiliation  of  Prussia.  As  far  as 
we  know,  this  was  groundless,  but  the  state  of  things 
was  serious  enough. 

It  was  natural  that  such  a  strained  situation  should 
produce  a  strong  reaction  in  the  public  opinion  of  the 
German  people.  On  all  sides  warning  and  threatening 
cries  arose.  Even  before  the  conclusion  of  the  peace, 
in  June,  assemblies  in  Nassau  and  in  Frankfort  had 
passed  resolutions  that  Austria  must  be  assisted,  and 


REACTION  IN  GERMANY.  387 

that  Prussia  should  receive  the  leadership.  About  the 
same  time,  in  Stuttgart,  the  SchwdbiscJier  3Ier1cur 
brought  out  a  declaration  on  the  part  of  Wiirtemberg 
patriots,  announcing  that  the  Fatherland  needed  Prus- 
sia's leadership  and  a  German  Parliament.  After 
Villafranca,  the  Hanoverian  deputy,  Rudolf  von  Ben- 
nigsen,  with  thirty-four  others,  published  a  declara- 
tion of  a  similar  nature,  and  defended  it  brilliantly 
in  the  Second  Chamber  against  the  attacks  of  the 
Minister,  Von  Borries,  so  that  the  declaration  received 
seven  hundred  signatures  within  two  weeks. 

With  this  encouragement  the  same  cry  ran  like  an 
electric  spark  through  North  and  Central  Germany. 
Whether  Prussia's  behavior  up  to  that  time  was  to  be 
praised  or  blamed,  it  was  undeniable  that  Germany's 
strength  without  Prussia  amounted  to  nothing;  that 
Germany's  Confederate  Constitution  without  an  in- 
strument of  the  national  will  must  remain  crippled 
and  powerless.  The  citizens  of  Stettin  transmitted  to 
the  Prince  Regent  a  petition  for  a  Central  Govern- 
ment; the  citizens  of  Gotha  sent  to  Duke  Ernest 
a  deputation,  which  asked  for  a  new  Constitution  for 
non- Austrian  Germany,  and  the  Duke,  Avho  had  alwa3'-s 
been  liberal  and  national  in  liis  tendencies,  gave  them 
a  favorable  answer. 

On  the  14th  of  August  an  assembly  met  in  Eisenach, 
which  resolved  upon  convening  as  large  a  number  as 
possible  of  German  patriots  in  Frankfort,  for  the  for- 
mation of  a  German  National  Association,  and  for  the 
renewal  of  the  work  of  German  Unity,  whicli  had  been 


388  THE  ITALIAN  WAR. 

abandoned  for  the  last  ten  years.  The  summons  had 
a  marked  effect.  In  Frankfort  appeared  Liberals  of 
all  shades,  and  from  all  parts  of  Germany.  They  all 
agreed  about  tlie  uselessness  of  the  Confederate  Diet, 
and  about  the  need  of  a  German  Parliament ;  but  when 
it  was  proposed  that  a  vote  should  be  passed  calling 
Prussia  to  the  control  of  national  affairs,  the  wrath  of 
the  South  Germans,  which  had  been  gathering  since 
the  spring,  burst  forth  so  violently  that  finally  the 
other  party  was  obliged  to  be  satisfied  with  proclaim- 
ing the  need  of  a  central  authority,  without  specifying 
who  should  be  invested  with  it.  Thus  the  National 
Association,  like  the  old  Assembly  in  the  Cathedral  of 
St.  Paul,  was  constituted  with  an  express  disregard  of 
the  question  on  which  everything  depended. 

The  Diet,  which  bristled  up  at  the  words,  "  German 
Unity,"  like  a  turkey-cock  at  the  sight  of  a  red  rag, 
succeeded  in  expelling  from  Frankfort  the  managing 
committee,  which  was  to  organize  the  activity  of  the 
Association ;  but  a  sure  retreat  was  found  for  it  in 
Coburg,  under  the  protection  of  Duke  Ernest,  who 
for  years  had  desired,  and  himself  often  urged,  the 
formation  of  such  an  association  on  a  national  basis. 
The  committee,  for  its  part,  labored  entirely  with  the 
object  of  a  non-Austrian  Germany  in  view,  and  sought, 
so  far  as  possible,  to  act  in  harmony  mth  the  Prussian 
Government;  but,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  they  found 
numerous  obstacles  in  the  way  of  this  good  inten- 
tion. Nevertheless,  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  did  not 
interfere   with    the    Association,    though    the    Prince 


THE  GERMAN  NATIONAL  ASSOCIATION.      389 

Regent  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  time  was  as  un- 
favorable as  possible  for  any  agitation  in  the  direction 
of  Unity. 

The  Court  of  Vienna  was,  indeed,  unwilling  to  cause 
Confederate  decrees  to  be  passed  against  the  Associa- 
tion, as  Herr  von  Beust  desired,  but  it  secretly  urged 
the  Ministries  of  the  different  states  to  repressive  meas- 
ures, and  with  great  effect.  The  Government  of  Hesse- 
Cassel  forbade  its  subjects  to  join  the  Association  under 
penalty.  The  King  of  Hanover  ordered  the  police  to 
keep  exact  lists  of  the  members ;  officials  of  every  sort 
who  were  found  acting  in  connection  with  the  Asso- 
ciation were  to  be  punished  according  to  strict  disci- 
pline; and  artisans,  merchants,  and  professional  men 
were  to  be  deprived  of  the  custom  of  the  Government 
officials.  "  The  present  situation,"  wrote  Herr  von 
Beust,  "  is  unexampled.  In  opposition  to  a  movement 
which  demands  the  overthrow  of  a  constitution,  it  is 
usual  either  to  alter  the  constitution  or  to  combat  the 
movement.  In  this  case,  neither  one  nor  the  other  is 
done.  The  end  must  be  a  sudden  collapse."  Police 
measures  against  the  wicked  Association  were  there- 
fore adopted  in  Saxony,  Mecklenburg,  and  Wiirtem- 
berg,  and  in  the  south  also  the  great  majority  of  the 
population  was  hostile  to  the  national  party. 

Once  more,  and  in  striking  contrast  to  Ital}^,  the 
strength  of  individualism  was  shown  on  German  soil. 
There  was  a  great  deal  of  enthusiasm,  both  before  and 
afterwards,  for  the  ideal  of  German  Unity,  but  at  the 
first   step   towards   realization   a   storm    of   conflicting 


390  THE  ITALIAN   WAR. 

views  arose.  Men  wished  to  be  German,  but  to  be 
Bavarian,  Swabian,  Saxon  as  well,  and,  above  all 
things,  neither  Prussian  nor  Austrian.  To  be  sure, 
there  was  between  the  state  of  things  in  Italy  and 
that  in  Germany  one  essential  difference.  In  Italy, 
with  the  exception  of  Sardinia,  the  ruling  Houses 
were  foreign,  and  especially  in  Tuscany  they  had 
grown  somewhat  out  of  touch  with  the  country,  while 
the  States  of  the  Church  were  distinguished  for  at 
once  the  most  incapable  and  the  most  oppressive  gov- 
ernment in  Europe.  In  such  a  condition  of  affairs, 
the  events  of  every  day  kept  the  instinct  for  national 
unity  and  freedom  alive  and  active,  in  spite  of  the 
tendency  to  individualism,  which  here,  also,  was  cer- 
tainly not  without  force.  But  in  Germany,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Princes  were  all  native,  and  belonged 
to  the  German  stock ;  and  if,  in  Hanover,  Hesse- 
Cassel,  and  Nassau,  the  Governments  repressed  all 
independent  initiative  with  a  rough  hand,  yet  in  Sax- 
ony and  Bavaiia,  in  Wiirtemberg  and  Darmstadt,  the 
mass  of  the  citizens  felt  themselves  well  off,  and  the 
Governments,  to  keep  them  in  this  state  of  mind,  were 
of  their  own  accord  attentive  to  the  wishes  that  found 
expression  in  the  Press  and  in  the  Chambers.  In 
these  countries,  therefore,  the  people  loved  unity  in 
theory,  but  individualism  in  practice. 


QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY.       391 


CHAPTER  III. 

QUESTIONS   OF   REFORM   IN   GERMANY. 

The  Prince  Regent  soon  had  occasion  to  give  expres- 
sion to  his  ideas  in  regard  to  the  question  of  reform  in 
the  Confederation,  which  had  been  once  acjain  so 
energetically  revived.  He  still  and  always  continued 
to  believe  in  a  German  Empire  of  the  future,  but  for 
the  moment  the  announcement  of  any  such  purpose 
seemed  to  him  in  the  highest  degree  dangerous.  In 
view  of  the  difficulties  existing  with  Austria,  of  the 
irritated  sensitiveness  of  the  Lesser  States,  and  of 
the  noisy  aversion  manifested  by  the  people  of  South 
Germany,  he  felt  that  to  press  any  demand  for  German 
Unity  might  be  sowing  the  seed  of  internal  dissension, 
at  the  very  time  when  the  vagaries  of  the  Napoleonic 
policy  and  the  ambiguous  attitude  of  Russia  made 
mutual  confidence  and  the  firm  consolidation  of  all 
Germany's  forces  an  absolute  necessity. 

What  was  with  him  the  consequence  of  the  momen- 
tary situation,  in  the  mouths  of  the  majority  of  his 
^Ministers  took  almost  the  form  of  a  fixed  confession  of 
faith.  Count  Schwerin,  a  leader  of  the  former  Liberal 
Opposition,  who,  a  few  months  after  the  beginning  of 
the  Regency,  liad  taken  Flottwell's  place  as  INIinister 
of  the  Interior,  proclaimed    in  loud    tones   the  watch- 


392        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

word :  not  unity,  but  union.  Herr  von  Schleinitz 
entered  heartily  into  a  programme  so  free  from  danger, 
and  sent  express  instructions  to  the  Prussian  ambassa- 
dors at  the  German  Courts  to  hold  entirely  aloof  from 
all  demonstrations  on  the  part  of  the  National  Asso- 
ciation. 

When  the  citizens  of  Stettin  in  August  sent  to  the 
Prince  Regent  their  address  in  regard  to  the  creation  of 
a  Central  Government  for  Germany,  the  Minister  was 
disposed  to  make,  by  an  open  refusal,  the  Prussian 
standpoint  clear  to  them  and  to  all  who  shared  their 
views  ;  the  outline  proposed  by  Schwerin  was,  however, 
somewhat  modified  in  a  positive  direction  by  the  Prince 
Regent.  The  conviction  that  an  energetic  concentra-  ' 
tion  of  Germany's  powers,  and  consequently  a  remod- 
elling of  the  Confederate  Constitution,  was  necessary, 
was  recognized  as  thoroughly  justified.  Only  it  was 
not  wise  to  allow  one's  self,  by  aspiring  to  the  very  best, 
to  be  led  out  of  the  path  which  was  prescribed  by 
consideration  for  the  rights  of  others  and  by  a  due 
regard  to  what  was  at  the  time  attainable.  He  said 
that  Prussia  believed  that  more  could  be  accomplished, 
for  the  present,  by  increasing  the  military  effectiveness 
of  Germany  and  by  a  better  enforcement  of  the  laws 
than  by  premature  efforts  for  a  thorough  reform  in  the 
Confederation. 

But  even  this  carefully-guarded  criticism  of  the 
existing  state  of  things  caused  great  dissatisfaction 
among  the  German  Courts.  It  was  thought  in  Dresden, 
in    Hanover,    and   in    Brunswick,  that   when    Prussia 


DISSATISFACTION   WITH  PRUSSIA.  393 

herself  proclaimed  the  insufficiency  of  the  Confederate 
Constitution,  it  was  an  express  encouragement  of  the 
National  Association ;  although  she  recognized  the 
rights  of  the  Princes  for  the  present,  she  threatened  the 
very  existence  of  those  rights  for  the  future.  The 
general  anxiety  was  great.  Count  Rechberg  struck  a 
blow  at  the  Duke  of  Coburg,  that  he  might  reach 
Prussia  through  him,  and  in  the  sharpest  terms  issued 
a  formal  protest  against  Duke  Ernest's  approval  of  the 
address  from  Gotha,  and  sent  it  in  writing  to  Berlin, 
leaving  it  to  the  Government  there  to  take  further 
measures.  The  state  of  things  was  not  improved  when 
the  Prince  Regent  expressed  perfect  confidence  in  the 
loyal  disposition  of  the  Duke,  who  had  only  declared  to 
his  people  of  Gotha  what  had  been  agreed  to  by  all  the 
German  Princes  ten  years  ago,  —  the  necessity  of  a 
reform  in  the  Confederation  ;  such  an  expression  of 
opinion,  the  Prince  said,  afforded  no  ground  for  taking 
any  action  upon  a  protest. 

Further  than  this,  it  was  soon  known  that  the 
Prussian  Government  was  aiming  at  a  reform  of  the 
Confederate  military  organization,  that  most  sacred 
palladium  of  tlie  independent  rule  of  the  Lesser  States. 
The  irritation  of  the  diffei-ent  Courts  increased ;  the 
wish  was  felt  everywhere  to  come  to  some  understand- 
ing in  regard  to  means  of  defence  against  such  wicked 
innovations,  but  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  indi- 
vidualism, tlie  same  took  place  on  a  small  scale  among 
the  Lesser  States  that  happened  in  the  Confederate 
Diet  on  a  great  one  :    they  knew   what  they   did  not 


394        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

wish ;  but  as  to  what  they  did  wish,  opinions  differed. 
Baron  Beust  urged  his  sluggisli  colleagues  to  take 
decided  measures  against  the  National  Association,  but 
declared,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  police  would  not 
answer  the  purpose  ;  that  the  nation  must  be  convinced 
rather  by  action,  and  that  great  reforms  were  possible 
even  on  the  basis  of  the  existing  Constitution  ;  if  it  was 
in  any  way  practicable,  he  was  anxious  that  the 
Prussian  Cabinet  should  be  forestalled  in  this  matter  of 
reform.  In  pushing  this  cause  the  Baron  was  indefati- 
gable ;  he  had  a  conference  in  Munich  with  representa- 
tives of  Bavaria  and  WUrtemberg ;  the  Wiirtemberg 
Minister,  Hiigel,  then  had  a  meeting  with  representa- 
tives of  Baden  and  Darmstadt  in  Heidelberg ;  while 
Beust  in  Vienna  tried  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  Count  Rechberg  in  regard  to  harmless  reforms. 

But  the  blind  King  George  of  Hanover  would  have 
nothing  whatever  to  do  with  these  plans  of  Beust.  He 
thought  that  a  better  constitution  than  that  of  1815 
could  not  possibly  be  invented  ;  it  was  best  therefore  to 
beware  of  tampering  with  the  existing  state  of  things. 
His  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Count  Platen,  was, 
indeed,  very  doubtful  about  such  an  extreme  attitude  ; 
but  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Herr  von  Borries,  spoke 
all  the  more  decidedly  in  support  of  his  royal  master, 
and  roused  a  great  storm  in  the  Liberal  Press,  by 
declaring  that,  before  the  German  Princes  would  allow 
any  diminution  of  their  hereditary  sovereignty,  they 
would  not  hesitate  to  accept  foreign  aid. 

Like   King  George,  the  Elector  of  Hesse,  after  the 


VIEWS   OF  THE  DIFFERENT  STATES.  395 

pleasant  experience  of  1850,  was  filled  with  unlimited 
leverence  for  Confederate  traditions,  not  suspecting 
what  a  dark  cloud  was  looming  up  at  that  moment 
against  himself  on  the  horizon  of  the  Confederation  he 
was  so  zealously  defending.  In  Nassau,  also,  where  a 
strong  bureaucratic  and  clerical  Government  was  at  the 
helm,  there  wa§  a  feeling  iii  favor  of  rejecting  all 
reform ;  but  if  the  other  states  took  the  lead,  tliis 
Government  would  not  hold  aloof. 

In  Baden,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Minister,  Von 
Meysenbug,  who  was  well  disposed  toward  Austria,  was 
not  unfavorable  to  the  plans  of  Herr  von  Beust,  but 
the  Grand  Duke  Frederick  was  firm  in  the  opinion  that 
a  genuine  reform  was  only  attainable  by  the  common 
action  of  the  two  Great  Powers.  He  confined  himself 
to  his  old  proposition  of  a  Confederate  court  of  arbi- 
tration, the  defects  of  which  we  have  already  seen. 

So  opinions  and  proposals  were  bandied  about  in 
startling  confusion.  But  finally  it  appeared  that  the 
chief  power  on  which  Herr  von  Beust  had  reckoned 
for  support,  Austria,  was  not  as  yet  inclined  under  all 
circumstances  to  come  into  line  M'ith  the  Lesser  States. 
Against  Prussia's  efforts  for  unity  put  forth  in  liurniony 
with  the  National  Association,  she  wouhl  naturally  fight 
to  the  death.  This  was  tlie  more  certain,  since  the 
Coui't  of  Vienna,  after  its  Italian  losses,  valued  all 
the  more  its  })Osition  in  Germany.  But  wliat  Count 
Rechberg,  in  tlie  midst  of  all  tlie  vexations  of  the  past 
montlis,  truly  wished  in  tlie  bottom  of  his  heart  was,  to 
avoid    any    such    conflict:     he    desired,    not   war    witli 


396        QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

Prussia,  but  an  understanding  with  her,  and,  indeed, 
rather  with  Prussia  than  with  the  Lesser  States.  For  a 
generation  Prince  Metternich  in  the  most  intimate 
conjunction  with  the  Court  of  Berlin  had  controlled 
the  destinies  of  Germany :  was  it  impossible  to  bring 
about  a  renewal  of  this  satisfactory  relation? 

Count  Recliberg  with  this  in  view  would  have  been 
ready  to  listen  to  a  great  many  proposals,  provided 
they  did  not  actually  affect  the  foundations  of  the 
Confederation.  During  the  diplomatic  quarrel  after 
Villafranca,  he  had  in  August  brought  forward  the 
suggestion  that,  just  as  in  the  old  peaceful  times, 
neither  of  the  two  Powers  should  bring  forward  a 
proposal  in  the  Confederate  Diet  without  previously 
consulting  the  other ;  and  this  had  been  favorably 
received  by  Schleinitz.  When  Prussia  began  to  talk 
about  a  reform  of  the  Confederate  Constitution,  Recli- 
berg expressed  to  the  Prussian  Ambassador  his  perfect 
readiness  to  take  steps  in  the  matter,  and  only  asked  for 
a  speedy  communication  of  the  Prussian  proposals.  It 
was,  therefore,  for  the  time,  uncertain  how  far  the 
Lesser  States  could  count  upon  Austria's  co-operation 
in  their  plans. 

Meanwhile,  Herr  von  Beust  had  succeeded  in  in- 
ducing his  friends  to  unite  on  a  motion  to  be  brought 
before  the  Diet.  On  the  17th  of  October  it  was  intro- 
duced, signed  by  the  four  Kingdoms,  by  Darmstadt  and 
by  Nassau.  Its  contents  were  as  meaningless  as 
possible  ;  and  the  spirit  of  opposition  to  Prussia  that 
lay  at  the  bottom  was  thereby  rendered  all  the  more 


MOTION  DIRECTED  AGAINST  PRUSSIA.       397 

unmistakable.  Together  with  laudation  of  the  fruitful 
capacity  of  development  inherent  in  the  Confederation, 
it  was  announced :  that  any  propositions  would  gladly  be 
entertained  by  which  a  repetition  of  the  objections  that 
had  unfortunately  been  made  of  late  against  the  execu- 
tion of  lefjitimate  decisions  of  the  Confederate  Diet 
and  against  its  decrees  could  be  avoided ;  that  it  was 
the  duty  of  all  to  seek  this  object,  and  to  repress 
agitation  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Confederate  Consti- 
tution ;  and  that,  since  of  late  the  Confederate  military 
organization  had  especially  been  found  fault  with,  it 
was  proposed  that  the  Confederate  military  commission 
should  be  charged  to  examine  the  same  carefully  and  to 
report  upon  any  necessary  changes.  The  authors  of 
the  motion  avoided  any  reference  to  wishes  of  their 
own  ;  indeed,  it  was  no  secret,  that  the  sole  aim  of  the 
whole  thing  was  simply  to  get  rid  of  Prussia's  plans  of 
reform,  and  to  secure  the  inviolability  of  their  cherished 
Confederate  army. 

Prussia,  however,  readily  agreed  to  the  motion,  and 
then  laid  before  the  Commission  her  own  plans  of 
reform  also,  which  were"  very  simple :  in  case  the 
Confederation  should  be  involved  in  a  war  in  which 
Austria  and  Prussia  both  took  part  with  all  their  forces, 
the  two  South  German  corps  should  be  under  Austria's 
and  the  two  North  (ierman  under  Prussia's  leadership ; 
in  tliis  way  a  Confederate  general  would  not  have  to  be 
chosen,  guided,  and  watched  over  by  the  Diet.  It  soon 
appeared  that  in  spite  of  all  the  conciliatory  language 
of  Rechberg,  Austria,  who  on  the  7th  of  July  had  pro- 


398        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

posed  at  Frankfort  the  election  of  such  a  general, 
would  not  accept  Prussia's  proposition ;  "  for,"  said 
Rechberg,  "  the  small  North  German  States  could  not, 
in  tlie  end,  avoid  submitting  to  Prussia's  leadership,  but 
in  the  South,  Bavaria  would  raise  insuperable  obstacles 
against  any  subordination  to  Austria."  By  this  the 
fate  of  the  proposition  was  decided ;  though  according 
to  Frankfort  usage  it  did,  indeed,  linger  along  several 
months,  until  the  Commission  in  May,  1860,  decided 
almost  unanimously  to  recommend  to  the  Diet  its 
rejection. 

In  the  mean  time,  another  act  of  Prussia  had  caused 
equal  annoyance  among  the  majority  of  the  German 
Courts,  and  had  produced  a  more  irritated  state  of 
feeling,  if  possible,  than  had  prevailed  hitherto. 

In  the  unfortunate  matter  of  the  Constitution  of 
Hesse-Cassel,  the  Diet  had,  as  we  have  seen,  desired  a 
declaration  of  the  Assembly  of  Estates  in  regard  to 
some  improvements  of  the  Constitution  of  1852,  to 
which  it  was  hoped  the  Government  would  not  refuse 
its  assent.  In  this  affair  the  firmness  and  persistence  of 
the  Hessian  people  were  shown  in  a  brilliant  light. 
The  hopelessness  of  the  situation  did,  indeed,  exclude 
any  attack  as  a  matter  of  principle  upon  the  validity  of 
the  Constitution  that  had  been  granted.  But  when  it 
came  to  a  question  of  the  criticism  of  the  same,  in 
accordance  with  the  decree  of  the  Diet,  Hassenpfiug  was 
able  neither  by  persuasion  and  threats,  nor  b}^  the  offer 
of  a  new  constitution,  to  prevent  the  Chambers  and  the 
electors   from   demanding    more    extended    rights    for 


THE  HESSIAN  CONSTITUTION.  399 

the  Estates.  The  battle  lasted  five  years,  and  had  no 
other  result  than  the  gathering  of  wider  and  wider 
circles  of  the  peoj)le  about  their  valiant  representatives. 
Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  First  Chamber  was  unani- 
mous in  the  Opposition,  and  the  majority  of  the  Second 
was  also,  though  less  determinedly  than  the  First,  per- 
sistent in  clinging  to  its  proposals,  and  at  last  even 
increased  its  demands. 

As  Hassenpflug  prevented  the  two  Chambers  from 
framing  a  joint  resolution  of  the  Assembly  of  Estates, 
the  proposals  of  the  Chambers  finally  reached  the 
Diet  separately,  each  containing  a  statement  that  their 
propositions  of  amendment  taken  together  formed  an 
indivisible  whole.  They  were  accompanied  by  a  series 
of  propositions  of  amendment  coming  from  the  Govern- 
ment, which  were  aimed  at  lendering  even  such  efforts 
of  a  moderate  opposition  for  the  future  impossible. 
These  documents  then  remained  for  nearly  two  j^ears  in 
the  hands  of  the  Diet  committee  on  Hessian  affairs, 
until  finally,  in  1859,  the  efforts  of  the  Court  of  Cassel 
roused  the  chairman.  Baron  Marschall  of  Baden,  out  of 
his  lethargy. 

With  perfect  coolness  the  Diet  continued  its  method, 
which  had  been  in  practice  since  1851,  of  remoulding 
individual  constitutions  at  its  own  omnipotent  pleasure, 
in  utter  disregard  of  the  Vienna  Final  Act.  Times 
had  certainly  changed  somewhat  since  1852,  and  there- 
fore the  committee,  while  doing  everything  possible  to 
be  agreeable  to  the  Elector,  for  the  honor  of  the 
monarchical  principle,  nevertheless   thought  it  best  to 


400        QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

show  some  consideration  for  the  loyal  Estates,  inasmuch 
as  such  lively  sympathy  for  these  prevailed  among  the 
German  people  and  in  almost  all  the  German  Chambers. 
They  therefore  rejected  those  propositions  of  the 
Government  which  tended  to  increased  repression,  and 
then  refused  to  grant  some  of  the  desires  of  the  Estates, 
but  gave  their  assent  to  the  remainder,  and  proposed  to 
hold  out  to  the  Elector,  if  he  acted  according  to  these, 
the  hope  of  the  guaranty  which  he  desired.  In  this 
way,  tlie  committee  thought,  the  dreadful  cancer  which 
for  years  had  been  eating  away  the  German  body  politic, 
would  be  cut  away  with  a  gentle  hand. 

But  this  attractive  prospect  was  unexpectedly  dis- 
turbed. 

After  the  committee  had  made  its  report  to  the  Diet 
on  the  28th  of  August,  and  after  the  Diet  had  deter- 
mined that  the  vote  on  the  subject  should  be  taken  on 
the  20th  of  October,  Herr  von  Usedom  sent  an  urgent 
request  to  the  Prussian  Cabinet,  that  any  decision  in 
this  matter  might  be  delayed  until  the  reception  of  a 
memorial  in  which  he  hoped  to  throw  light  on  Prussia's 
position  in  regard  to  the  Hessian  question.  Usedom 
did  not  always  show  great  insight  as  a  diplomatist ;  but 
this  time,  moved  by  his  feelings  as  well  as  by  his  under- 
standing, he  succeeded  in  hitting  the  nail  on  the  head. 
Casting  a  glance  backward  at  the  past  history  of  the 
affair,  he  pointed  out  the  series  of  illegal  assumptions 
on  which  not  only  the  electoral  Government,  but  also 
the  Diet,  unfortunately  with  Prussia's  co-operation,  had 
based  its  action  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Constitution, 


USEDOM  CRITICISES   THE  DIET'S  ACTION.      401 

thereby  rendering  tlie  results  obtained  utterly  void 
from  a  legal  point  of  view.  He  said  that  the  last 
chance  was  now  at  hand  for  Prussia,  with  the  approval 
of  the  whole  nation,  to  separate  herself  from  such 
illegal  action,  and  to  restrict  the  Diet  once  more  to  the 
limits  of  its  legal  authority.  He  pronounced  it  to  have 
been  a  suicidal  policy  that  led  the  Prussian  Ministry,  in 
1852,  to  recognize  the  Diet  as  competent  to  interfere, 
with  constitutive  power,  in  matters  of  internal  law  and 
privilege  in  the  individual  States,  and  so  perhaps  some- 
time to  abrogate  the  Prussian  Constitution  also. 
According  to  him,  the  sole  legitimate  office  of  the  Diet 
in  this  matter  of  Hesse  would  have  been  to  have  care- 
fully pointed  out  and  expunged  in  the  Constitution  of 
1831  the  articles  that  were  contrary  to  the  principles 
of  the  Confederation,  but  beyond  this,  in  accordance 
with  Article  LVI.  of  tlie  Vienna  Final  Act,  it  was  bound 
to  refrain  from  any  interference  in  constitutional  ques- 
tions in  Hesse-Cassel.  The  Diet,  he  continued,  had 
had  a  consciousness  of  this  duty,  and  had,  therefore,  not 
abolished  the  Constitution,  but  liad  simply  ordered  it  to 
go  "out  of  effect."  This  was  the  vulnerable  point; 
and  as  an  understanding  between  the  Elector  and  the 
Estates  in  regard  to  the  work  of  1852  had  been  shown 
to  be  out  of  the  question,  Usedom  recommended  that  a 
motion  should  be  made  for  putting  an  end  to  the 
suspension  of  the  Constitution  of  1831  and  for  limiting 
the  interference  of  the  Diet  to  the  expunging  of  certain 
articles  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the  Confederation. 
In   tlu!   wholt'   exi)0.siti()n   every   word   was   accurate. 


402        QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

with  the  single  exception  of  the  assertion  that  the 
decree  of  the  Diet  of  1852  had  been  aimed  at  only  a 
temporary  suspension.  The  potentates  who  settled  the 
matter  at  that  time  had  had  by  no  means  such  tender 
consciences,  and  Usedom  did  not  think  so  himself. 
His  distinction  had  no  other  object  than  to  facilitate  for 
the  wrongdoers  their  return  to  a  legal  method  of  pro- 
ceeding. 

When  Herr  Schleinitz  read  this  memorial,  which  flew 
in  the  face  of  all  the  traditions  of  the  Diet,  he  was  a 
little  frightened.  He  sought  from  Herr  von  Gruner 
some  light  on  the  question  as  to  how  far  Prussia  was 
bound  by  the  action  of  Uhden  and  Manteuffel  in  the 
matter.  Schleinitz  himself  admitted  that  the  report  of 
the  committee  could  not  possibly  be  accepted ;  but  he 
thought  that  a  restoration  of  the  Constitution  of  1831 
could  never  be  passed  through  the  Diet.  "  If  we  take 
the  part  of  the  people  decidedly  in  this  affair,"  he  said, 
*'  the  whole  Diet  will  brand  us  as  fostering  a  tendency 
to  Revolution."  It  will  be  readily  understood  that, 
after  these  indications  of  the  Minister's  feeling, 
Gruner's  opinion  was  given  distinctly  against  Usedom. 
And  it  may  here  be  added,  that,  in  the  further  course 
of  things,  the  Prussian  Ambassadors,  Herr  von  Sydow 
in  Cassel,  Herr  von  Savigny  in  Dresden,  and  Herr  von 
Werther  in  Vienna,  took  also  this  same  view,  and 
thereby  made  the  task  of  their  Government  by  no  means 
an  easier  one. 

For  the  purpose  of  further  consultation,  Schleinitz 
took   a    journey   to    Baden-Baden,   where    the    Prince 


PRUSSIA   ACCEPTS   USEDOM'S  MOTION.      403 

Regent  with  Auerswald  was  then  staying,  and  Usedom 
was  immediately  summoned  thither.  The  latter  brought 
further  evidence  for  a  full  consideration  of  the  past 
mistakes,  and  produced  on  the  7th  of  October  an  out- 
line of  the  motion  as  he  would  put  it  to  vote  in  the 
Diet. 

The  Regent  made  a  careful  investigation  of  every- 
thing; Auerswald  immediately  expressed  himself  in 
favor  of  Usedom's  views ;  even  Schleinitz  gradually 
dropped  one  difficulty  after  another  out  of  sight;  and 
the  Regent  finally  gave  his  decision  in  accordance  with 
his  words  of  November  8th :  "  The  world  must  know 
that  Prussia  is  everywhere  ready  to  defend  the  right." 
Usedom's  motion  was  approved  ;  a  detailed  memoiial  of 
the  whole  matter,  drawn  up  entirely  from  Usedom's 
point  of  view,  was  prepared ;  and  after  a  full  Ministe- 
rial Council  had,  on  the  lOtli  of  October,  at  the  Regent's 
command,  considered  the  matter  and  given  a  unanimous 
assent,  the  memorial  was  sent  on  the  same  day  to 
Vienna  with  a  request  for  Austria's  support.  It  was 
added,  at  the  same  time,  that  Prussia  was  firm  in  her 
determination  in  regard  to  the  question  of  what  \vas 
lawful  in  the  matter,  and  would  act  on  that  determina- 
tion, even  if  Austria  refused  to  join  her. 

This  turn  in  the  policy  of  Prussia  was  soon  generally 
known,  and  aroused  on  all  sides  a  violent  agitation, 
highly  characteristic  in  its  different  forms.  In  Hesse- 
Cassel  the  effect  was  like  the  awakening  from  a  troubled 
and  anxious  dream.  Crushed  by  superior  force,  with- 
out hope  of  support,  the  Estates  had  contented  tliem- 


404       QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

selves  with  suggesting  at  least  some  concessions,  without 
which,  as  Usedom  said,  their  existence  would  remain  a 
mockery ;  and  even  against  these  their  oppressor  had 
raised  a  protest.  Then  came  the  news  of  Prussia's 
action,  bearing,  as  they  hoped,  a  true  message  of 
approaching  salvation.  In  a  moment  the  effort  after 
small  concessions  vanished ;  and  once  more  arose  amonof 
the  people  the  demand  for  their  rights,  for  the  ancient 
and  thrice-confirmed  rights  of  their  country.  The 
Second  Chamber  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote  aban- 
doned their  late  propositions  of  amendment,  which  had 
been  rejected  by  the  Elector,  and  adopted  an  address  to 
be  presented  to  him,  as  well  as  a  memorial  to  be  sent 
to  the  Diet,  desiring  the  restoration  of  the  lawful 
Constitution  of  1831.  The  enthusiastic  appeal  went 
abroad  among  the  people  throughout  the  whole  of  that 
small  country ;  officials,  citizens,  and  peasants  were 
indefatigable  in  the  presentation  of  patriotic  resolutions ; 
and  with  impotent  wrath  the  Elector  looked  on  at  the 
irresistible  progress  of  this  agitation,  which  aimed  at 
nothing  but  what  was  just. 

The  excitement  extended  far  beyond  the  Hessian 
boundaries.  In  all  German  lands  the  Liberal  party 
roused  itself  for  the  good  cause ;  in  assemblies,  in  the 
meetings  of  associations,  in  the  newspapers,  the  cry 
was  re-echoed  for  the  recognition  of  those  rights  which 
had  been  so  long  and  so  harshly  trampled  upon ;  with 
fierce  passion  the  treatment  of  Hesse  by  the  Diet  was 
represented  as  a  shame  and  disgrace  to  the  German 
nation ;  and  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  after  this,  the 


OBJECTIONS  IN  SOUTH  GERMANY.  405 

Chambers  of  the  German  States  would,  almost  without 
exception,  raise  their  voice  for  the  acceptance  of 
Prussia's  motion  and  against  the  Majority  in  the  Diet. 

All  this  increased  the  dissatisfaction  which  was 
aroused  among  the  German  Courts  by  Prussia's  action. 
Their  vexation  at  seeing  her  likely  to  acquire  popu- 
larity in  South  Germany  was  intensified  by  the  con- 
sciousness that,  in  the  year  1850,  for  the  sake  of 
opposing  the  Prussian  Union,  they  had  espoused  a 
thoroughly  rotten  cause,  and  had  been  soiling  their 
hands  with  it  more  and  more  every  year.  None  of  the 
Sovereigns  or  Ministers  had  an}-  respect  for  the  Elector 
or  for  Hassenpflug :  they  clinched  their  fists  in  their 
pockets  at  the  thought  that,  for  the  sake  of  such 
friends,  they  Avere  now  obliged  to  choose  between 
joining  Prussia  in  casting  aside  their  own  work  as 
unlawful  and  worthless,  or  drawing  the  wrath  of  the 
whole  German  people  upon  themselves  and  the  Diet 
and  furnishing  the  National  Association  with  priceless 
material  on  which  to  base  its  atrocious  demand  for  a 
German  Parliament.  And  they  were  so  anxious  to 
remain  popular  in  those  bad  times,  when  by  the  Italian 
war  Austria's  power  had  been  shaken,  Prussia's  influ- 
ence increased,  and  tlie  blood  of  the  whole  nation  set 
on  fire  I 

Negotiations  were,  therefore,  begun  with  Prussia. 
Count  Rechberg  expressed  regret  that  Prussia,  in  spite 
of  the  agreement  of  August,  had  irrevocabl}'  adopted 
an  opinion,  witliout  ])r('vious  (.■onmumication  with 
Vienna  ;  and  lie  further  ])ointed  out  that  the  Constitu- 


406        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

tion  of  1852,  now  so  harshly  judged  by  the  Prussian 
Cabinet,  had  been  mainly  the  creation  of  Prussians  ;  in 
any  case,  by  the  decrees  of  the  Diet,  passed  at  that 
time,  a  firm  legal  connection  had  been  established 
between  the  Confederation  and  the  Elector,  which  the 
Diet  ought  not  to  assail.  But  it  was  not  necessary  to 
abandon  entirely  the  course  which  had  been  adopted. 
It  was  only  by  Prussia's  sudden  turn  that  the  people  of 
Hesse-Cassel  had  been  aroused  from  the  calm  into 
which  they  had  subsided.  Nothing  further  would  be 
necessary  than  that  the  Diet  should  charge  the  commit- 
tee to  frame  its  report  somewhat  more  favorably  to  the 
Estates,  and  to  introduce  into  the  new  Constitution  as- 
amendments,  such  articles  of  the  Constitution  of  1831 
as  were  essentially  unobjectionable.  In  the  opinion  of 
the  Count,  it  was  impossible  to  pursue  the  opposite 
course,  and  restore  as  a  whole  the  Constitution  of  1831, 
which  had  been  abolished  by  the  Diet,  and  then  to 
agree  upon  and  expunge  the  unsuitable  articles  one  by 
one. 

In  this  connection,  a  memorial  of  October  26th, 
written  by  Rechberg's  chief  adviser  in  all  German 
matters,  Herr  von  Biegeleben,  rose  to  the  unctuous  tone 
of  the  palmiest  days  of  Metternich.  "  If  it  is  once 
recognized,"  said  this  document,  "  that  the  old  Consti- 
tution was  incompatible  with  the  rights  of  the  Confed- 
eration, no  ivell-disposed  person  will  find  fault,  if  the 
occasion  is  seized  for  a  complete  revision,  in  order  that 
with  the  authority  of  the  Confederation,  with  the  free 
co-operation  of  the  country,  and  with  the  good-\N\\\  of 


SECOND  REPORT  OF  THE   COMMITTEE.     407 

all  concerned,  a  work  may  be  accomplished,  wliicli  will 
be  safe  from  all  attack  in  the  future,  and  will  be  worthy 
of  the  Hessian  Government  and  of  its  subjects :  that  is 
the  true  intention  of  the  Decree  passed  by  the  Diet  in 
1852 ;  for  this  object  we  are  ready  to  agree  that  the 
subject  shall  be  again  given  in  charge  to  the  committee, 
in  order  that  the  work  may  there  be  still  further 
perfected." 

It  was  not  difficult  for  Herr  von  Schleinitz,  in 
refuting  these  specious  phrases,  to  justify  Prussia's 
standpoint.  At  the  same  time  he  agreed  to  a  postpone- 
ment of  the  final  vote  and.  to  a  further  consideration  by 
the  committee,  to  the  great  annoyance  of  Usedom,  who 
revenged  himself  by  publishing  secretly  —  in  disregard 
of  the  strict  prohibition  of  Schleinitz  —  the  memorial 
of  the  10th  of  October,  thus  causing  a  fresh  outburst  of 
public  opinion.  The  complicated  negotiations  between 
the  German  Courts,  which  were  now  carried  on  for 
months,  need  not  be  related  in  detail.  The  renewed 
consideration  of  the  matter  by  the  committee  of  the 
Diet  at  length  produced  its  result  in  the  shape  of  a 
report  of  the  19th  of  January,  1800.  It  was  recom- 
mended in  this  report,  that  on  points  concerning  which 
the  Hessian  Government  and  the  Estates  were  agreed, 
their  decision  should  give  validity  to  the  corresponding 
articles  of  tlie  Constitution  of  1852 ;  that,  where  no 
agreement  had  been  arrived  at,  the  text  of  1852  should 
be  valid,  l)ut  w  itli  the  exception  that  any  provision  of 
1831,  not  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the  Confedera- 
tion and  reconiniendcd  by  the  Estates,  should  be  adopted. 


408        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  changes  proposed  by  the  Hessian 
Government  were  declared  inadmissible. 

This  was  meant  as  a  proposal  of  mediation ;  it 
appeared  to  its  authors  to  be  a  great  concession,  when 
they  granted  that,  in  spite  of  the  Decree  of  1852,  there 
were  in  the  Constitution  of  1831,  which  had  been  con- 
demned at  that  time,  provisions  not  contrary  to  the 
principles  of  the  Confederation.  But  none  the  less  on 
this  account  was  the  recommendation  of  the  committee 
an  act  of  constitutive  power,  such  as  the  Diet  was 
incapable  of  by  the  fundamental  principles  of  its  exist- 
ence. Since  the  last  declaration  on  the  part  of  the 
Hessian  Chambers,  there  had  been  no  longer  any  propo- 
sitions of  the  Estates  at  all  before  the  committee  ;  the 
verdict  of  the  committee  that  this  declaration  had  no 
force  was  utterly  without  legal  justification  ;  hence,  the 
committee  had  altered  an  article  here,  and  approved  one 
there,  solely  according  to  its  own  subjective  opinion,  as 
if  the  whole  world  recognized  it  as  a  function  of  the 
Diet  to  say  what  should  be  lawful  and  what  not  in  any 
country's  internal  affairs. 

Naturally,  Prussia  continued  in  her  opposition.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  King  of  Hanover  was  very  indig- 
nant with  the  committee  which  had  yielded  to  the  Lib- 
eral current  in  sixteen  articles.  The  Elector  was  also 
angry  at  the  rejection  of  his  amendments ;  he  had  had 
great  hopes  of  being  strong  enough,  after  they  were 
carried,  to  secure  the  succession  to  one  of  his  sons. 
But  both  Sovereigns  soon  perceived  that  nothing  better 
than  what  the  committee  recommended  could  be  had. 


DECREE   OF  MARCH  24TH,  1860.  409 

and  reconciled  themselves  to  giving  their  unqualified 
assent. 

On  the  24th  of  March,  1860,  the  Diet  passed  a  decree 
in  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  the  com- 
mittee. With  Prussia  voted  only  the  Saxon  Duchies, 
Oldenburg,  Waldeck,  Reuss  (younger  line),  and  the 
free  Cities.  Prussia  brought  forward  a  protest  against 
the  decree,  on  the  ground  that  tlie  Diet  was  exceeding 
its  proper  functions,  and  proclaimed  it  legally  worthless 
and  not  binding.  Pfordten,  passionate  as  ever,  declared 
that  by  sucli  a  step  Prussia  aimed  a  death-blow  at  the 
dignit}'  of  the  Diet,  and  he  proposed  that  a  special 
committee  should  be  appointed  for  the  censure  of  the 
Prussian  vote.  But  Austria,  Hanover,  and  Baden 
objected  to  this  ;  and  the  matter  ended  in  a  simple 
declaration  on  the  part  of  the  president,  which  an- 
nounced it  to  be  the  constitutional  duty  of  all  the 
Governments  to  recognize  the  decree.  In  private  con- 
versation, the  Ministers  Schrenck  in  Munich  and  Von 
Iliigel  in  Stuttgart,  as  well  as  the  King  of  Saxony, 
admitted  that  in  1852  things  had  been  carried  too  far ; 
but  they  thought  that  the  decree,  having  been  once 
passed,  ought  to  be  j-espected. 

When,  in  Aj))'!],  the  Piussian  Lower  House,  after  an 
exciting  discussion,  called  upon  the  Governments  to 
remain  firm  in  the  defence  of  the  Hessian  national 
rights,  the  Wiirttemherger  Stnatsanzelr/er  replied  with  a 
violent  polemic  against  the  whole  Prussian  policy.  In 
Cassel,  however,  the  Goveniniciit,  in  accordance  \\'\{\\ 
the  decree  of  tlu;  Diet,  made  a  new  concoction,  taking 


410        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

the  Constitution  of  1852  as  a  basis,  accepting  a  number 
of  the  former  proposals  of  the  Chambers,  and  adding  a 
homoeopathic  dose  of  privileges  for  the  Estates.  The 
constitutional  document  so  created  they  made  public  on 
the  30th  of  May,  1860.  The  next  question  was,  what 
effect  they  would  thus  produce  on  the  country. 

While  in  this  way  a  violent  contest  had  arisen  in 
regard  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Confedera- 
tion, a  new  turn  of  general  European  politics  called 
forth  still  another  demonstration  of  German  unanimity 
of  feeling. 

The  Emperor  Napoleon,  placed  in  a  dilemma  between 
the  demands  of  Austria,  the  Pope,  and  the  Clerical 
party  on  one  side,  and  the  efforts  of  the  Italian 
national  party  which  had  been  half  recognized  by  him 
at  Plombieres  on  the  other,  had  first  made  an  agreement 
with  Austria  to  call  a  congress  of  the  five  Great 
Powers  for  the  settlement  of  the  affairs  of  Italy.  But 
then  he  found  that  neither  Austria  nor  the  Pope  made 
any  arrangements  whatever  for  carrying  out  the  internal 
reforms  agreed  upon  at  Villafranca,  and  consequently 
that  he  also  need  be  no  longer  bound  by  that  compact. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  he  again  entered  into  friendly 
relations  with  Sardinia,  he  could  once  more  have  the 
hope  of  acquiring  Savoy  and  Nice  according  to  the 
arrangement  made  at  Plombieres,  to  which  there  had 
naturally  been  no  reference  since  Villafranca. 

Towards  the  end  of  1850  he  had  come  to  a  decision. 
In  the  beginning  of  January,  1860,  appeared  an  unofficial 
treatise,  entitled.  The  Pope  and  the  Congress,  in  which  it 


INCREASED  AGITATION  IN  ITALY.  411 

was  argued,  that  the  temporal  sovereignty  of  the  Pope  in 
the  Papal  States  was  ifeither  needful  nor  advantageous 
to  his  spiritual  authoritj,  but  on  the  contrary  injurious. 
A  significant  change  of  Ministers  followed :  in  the  place 
of  the  Conservative  Walewski,  Thouvenel,  whose  Italian 
sympathies  were  well  known,  was  appointed. 

In  Turin,  also,  Cavour  seized  again  the  reins  of 
government,  and  the  popular  agitation  for  the  unity  of 
Italy  swelled  in  a  stronger  tide  in  all  parts  of  the 
country.  In  Florence  and  Bologna,  the  Sardinian 
Constitution  and  the  Sardinian  mode  of  election  were 
introduced;  from  Rome  and  from  the  Marches  many 
petitions  were  sent  to  Paris  for  liberation  from  the 
intolerable  government  of  the  Pope ;  in  Naples  the 
popular  excitement  rose  to  such  a  pitch  that  the  English 
Ambassador  declared  there  was  no  other  course  possible 
than  a  change  of  the  system  of  government  or  a  change 
of  dynasty. 

Napoleon  then  announced  to  King  Victor  Emmanuel, 
by  a  despatch  of  February  24th,  that  if  he  would 
content  himself  with  the  annexation  of  Parma  and 
Modena,  and  would,  at  the  same  time,  govern  the 
lvf)inagna  as  Papal  Vicar,  France  ^^•ould  aid  him  against 
any  foreign  attack ;  l)ut  if  he  was  inclined  to  go 
further,  lie  must  do  it  at  his  own  risk,  and  France  would 
then  renew  her  claim  upon  Savoy  and  Nice.  Victor 
Emmanuel  chose  the  latter  alternative ;  and  in  March 
took  place,  on  tlie  l)iisis  of  ;i  formal  vote  of  the  people, 
the  annexation  of  Tuscany  and  of  tlic  I^inilia  (as  the 
united  territory  of  Modena,  Parma,  and   the    Koinagna 


412       QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

was  now  called)  to  the  Sardinian  Crown,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  incorporation  of  S^voy  and  Nice  into  the 
French  Empire. 

There  was  no  longer  any  talk  about  the  great  con- 
gress. Napoleon  had,  however,  on  his  part,  after 
separating  himself  from  Vienna  and  Rome,  sought 
connections  elsewhere,  and  had  partially  succeeded  in 
finding  them.  The  Whig  Ministry  in  England  took 
a  warm  interest  in  the  struggles  of  Italy,  and  rejoiced 
heartily  at  the  overthrow  of  the  scheme  devised  at 
Villafranca.  More  than  this,  Napoleon  had  for  some 
time  had  in  mind  for  France  a  change  from  the  system 
of  the  exclusion  of  imports  and  of  protective  tariffs 
hitherto  in  vogue  to  principles  of  moderate  free-trade  ; 
and  he  found  England  very  ready  to  make  advances  in 
this  direction.  He  therefore,  on  the  20th  of  January, 
1860,  brought  about  the  signing  of  a  commercial  treaty, 
the  consequences  of  which,  as  we  shall  soon  see, 
acquired  great  importance  for  the  development  of  the 
affairs  of  our  own  Germany.  Thus  far  the  under- 
standing between  England  and  France  was  perfect. 

In  Russia,  also,  although  the  sympathy  with  France 
was  not  so  warm  as  in  the  spring  of  1859,  the  Emperor 
Alexander  and  Prince  Gortschakoff  were  still  of  the 
opinion  that  a  triple  alliance  between  Russia,  Prussia, 
and  France  would  be  a  real  league  of  peace  for  Europe, 
then  so  unsettled,  and  would  at  the  same  time,  such 
was  the  Russian  idea,  be  also  an  excellent  suj)port  for 
Russia's  position  in  the  East,  where  she  was  opposed  to 
Austria  and  England.     Napoleon    took    good  care  not 


POLICY  OF  NAPOLEON.  413 

to  discourage  any  suggestions  of  this  kind;  on  the 
contrary,  he  made  repeated  attempts,  in  the  direction  of 
Russia's  wishes,  to  cultivate  similar  tendencies  in  the 
mind  of  the  Prussian  Regent.  He  sent  to  Berlin 
friendly  hints,  that  France  would  greet  with  joy  the 
elevation  of  Prussia  to  a  fitting  position  in  the  German 
Confederation,  and  that,  if  Prussia  would  then  agree  to 
a  little  adjustment  of  frontiers  on  the  Rhine,  France 
would  insure  her  a  rich  compensation,  perhaps  the 
acquisition  of  Schleswig-Holstein. 

The  Prince  Regent  allowed  all  these  advances  to  fall 
flat  to  the  ground ;  and  when,  at  the  end  of  March,  tlie 
annexation  of  Savoy  and  Nice  ensued,  with  an  official 
declaration,  that  France  had  in  this  region  recovered 
her  natural  boundaries,  a  sharp  rent  was  made  through 
the  whole  web  of  diplomacy.  Before  the  war.  Napoleon 
had  proclaimed  the  lofty  unselfishness  of  France :  and 
now  came  the  acquisition  of  a  noble  province,  while  at 
the  same  time  a  very  evident  desire  was  shown  for  the 
further  restoration  of  the  so-called  natural  boundaries, — 
that  is  to  say,  for  the  conquest  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine. 

Switzerland  and  Germany  saw  themselves  alike 
threatened ;  and  the  general  excitement  manifested 
itself  more  and  more,  when  even  in  England  the  Gov- 
ernment and  the  newspapers  expressed  their  mistrust  of 
the  dangerous  policy  and  the  vagaries  of  the  French 
Emperor.  Napoleon  in  vain  proclaimed  in  tlie  most 
solemn  iiianiicr  his  love  of  peace  ;  all  that  he  could 
obtain  was  a  statement  on  Lord  Palinerston's  part  that 


414       QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

England  would  not  indeed  declare  war  on  account  of 
the  annexation  of  Savoy,  but  that  she  should  persist  in 
her  disapproval  of  that  action.  The  Prussian  Regent, 
who  at  this  time  made  a  journey  through  the  region 
about  the  Saar,  took  occasion,  at  a  festival  of  welcome 
there  given  him,  to  announce,  to  Napoleon's  great 
vexation,  that  never,  with  his  consent,  should  the 
Fatherland  lose  a  clod  of  German  soil. 

After  this,  when,  in  the  very  beginning  of  May, 
Garibaldi,  with  a  company  of  a  thousand  volunteers, 
put  to  sea  from  the  port  of  Genoa,  and  it  was  known 
in  a  few  days  that  he  had  landed  in  Sicily,  in  order  to 
bring  that  island  also  under  the  rule  of  Victor  Emman- 
uel, the  whole  world  was  convinced  that  he  would 
never  have  ventured  on  such  an  undertaking  without 
the  co-operation  of  Cavour,  and  that  Cavour  never 
would  have  given  his  co-operation  without  the  approval 
of  Napoleon.  The  Russian  Cabinet,  especially,  which 
had  always  had  a  fancy  for  posing  as  the  peculiar 
protector  of  Naples,  expressed  its  great  dissatisfaction 
in  Turin  as  well  as  in  Paris.  Napoleon  protested  that 
he  was  not  in  the  least  responsible  for  this  bad  business  ; 
but  he  found  little  belief  for  his  assertion,  although  this 
time  he  spoke  the  truth,  and  had  himself  been  thor- 
oughly taken  in  by  Cavour.^  The  latter  had  helped  on 
Garibaldi's  undertaking  in  every  way,  had  secretly 
gained   over  a  number  of  Neapolitan    generals    to  the 

1  Cavour  gave  orders  by  word  of  mouth  to  the  commander  of  the 
squadron  to  protect  the  expedition,  if  it  should  be  necessary.  The  officer 
said  :  "  After  it  has  happened,  you  will  imprison  me."  Cavour 
answered  :  "  To  be  sure,  my  friend.     I  see  you  understand  me." 


NAPOLEON'S  ADVANCES   TO  PRUSSIA.         415 

Italian  cause,  and  finally  had  despatched  a  Sardinian 
squadron  to  protect  the  expedition  on  its  voyage.  But 
at  the  same  time  he  had  constantly  given  the  French 
Ambassador  the  most  explicit  assurances,  that  he  had 
no  suspicion  of  Garibaldi's  plans  and  actions,  so  that 
the  landing  in  Sicily  was  as  much  of  a  surprise  to 
Napoleon  as  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 

But  what  difference  did  it  make  ?  He  had  become 
the  object  of  universal  suspicion  :  judging  by  the  varia- 
tions of  his  policy,  which  with  all  its  variations  was 
alwaj^s  aggressive,  every  one  credited  him,  and  not 
without  reason,  with  plans  of  disturbance  in  all  corners 
of  Europe  ;  at  this  time  no  one  was  inclined  to  have 
anything  to  do  with  him. 

Under  these  circumstances  he  once  more  turned  his 
glance  toward  Prussia.  The  calm,  open,  and  fu-m 
attitude  of  the  Prince  Regent  during  the  preceding 
years  had  inspired  the  Emperor,  not  with  hatred,  but 
with  respect :  he  sent  to  Berlin  a  proposal  for  a  personal 
interview.  The  Regent  had  a  feeling  that  Napoleon 
was  anxious  to  set  him  at  odds  with  Germany  and  to 
l)riiig  the  exchange  of  the  Rhine  Province  for  Schles- 
vvic:  -  Holstein  again  under  discussion ;  he  therefore 
twice  refused  the  proposal,  and  finally  accepted  it  only 
on  the  express  understanding  that  the  basis  of  all  dis- 
cussion should  be  the  inviolability  of  German  territory. 
King  Max  of  Bavaria  luul  already  expressed  his 
intention  of  visiting  the  Prince  at  Baden-Baden  while 
the  latter  was  making  liis  summer  residence  there  as 
usual;  the  King  of  Wiirtcmberg  also  wished  to  come ; 


416       QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

and  thither  the  Regent  invited  the  French  Emperor,  at 
the  same  time  sending  a  circular-letter  to  the  German 
Courts  to  make  them  acquainted  with  the  proposed 
interview. 

This  caused  a  nervous  anxiety  everywhere ;  but  the 
most  disturbed  of  all  was  the  King  of  Hanover,  who 
had  been  already  troubled  and  annoyed  by  the  prospect 
of  King  Max's  visit  to  Baden.  King  George  had  long 
been  suspicious  of  the  Prince  Regent  with  his  Liberal 
Ministers  and  his  plans  of  reform  in  the  Confederation ; 
and  he  regarded  the  Napoleonic  Empire  as  simply  Satan 
himself  made  flesh.  From  a  union  of  these  two  noth- 
ing but  mischief,  annexation,  and  the  abolition  of  all 
sovereignty,  could  possibly  proceed.  After  long  delib- 
eration, he  decided  to  take  the  bull  by  the  horns,  trav- 
elled all  night  to  Berlin,  and  saw  the  Regent  early  in 
the  morning  of  June  13th.  "  You  must  not  go  at  all," 
he  cried,  "  or  you  must  invite  all  the  German  Princes, 
and  the  Emperor  of  Austria  as  well,  to  the  interview." 
The  Regent,  somewhat  astonished  at  his  zeal,  let  the 
mention  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria  rest  where  it  was, 
but  at  once  invited  the  royal  visitor  himself,  and  then 
wrote  also,  with  the  same  object,  to  King  John  of 
Saxony.  "  I  could  not  invite  any  one,  or  exclude  any 
one,"  he  said  afterwards,  "  but  I  did  not  wish  it  to  seem 
as  if  I  were  doing  something  behind  the  back  of 
Germany." 

We  must  give  a  somewhat  detailed  account  of  this 
interview,  not  because  the  results  there  obtained  were 
very  important,  but  because  the  whole  course  of  affairs 


ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  IN  BADEN.  417 

was  so  characteristic  of  the  Prince  Regent,  who  had  no 
thought  of  using  the  friendl}^  disposition  of  France  as 
a  means  of  exerting  diplomatic  pressure  upon  the 
German  opponents  of  his  plans  for  national  unity,  but 
with  perfect  openness  took  the  position  of  representa- 
tive of  all  the  German  States  in  his  dealings  with 
Napoleon. 

On  the  14th  of  June  the  Regent  arrived  in  Baden, 
where  King  Max  had  already  been  for  some  days ;  the 
three  other  Kings,  and  a  number  of  lesser  Princes, 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden  as  host,  the  Grand  Dukes  of 
Darmstadt  and  Weimar,  and  the  Dukes  of  Nassau  and 
Coburg,  were  likewise  there.  The  Regent  declared  to 
them  his  determination  to  consent  to  no  rearrangement 
of  boundaries  at  the  expense  of  Germany  or  of  German 
States.  The  four  Kings  agreed  among  themselves  to 
show  the  Prince  royal  honors  and  to  grant  him  pre- 
cedence. 

On  the  15th  of  June,  therefore,  at  seven  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  he  received  the  imperial  guest  at  the  head 
of  a  troop  of  royalties.  After  eight  lie  made  his  visit 
to  the  Emperor ;  their  conversation,  the  only  one  that 
they  had  ah)ne,  lasted  aljout  an  hour,  \mt  hardly  con- 
sisted of  anything  more  than  Napoleon's  complaints  of 
tlie  groundless  excitement  against  him  that  prevailed 
in  Germany  and  of  the  hostile  attitude  of  almost  the 
entire  German  Press.  It  was  true,  he  said,  that  tliere 
was  a  party  in  France  desirous  of  acquiring  (Tcrmaii 
territory.  Hut  liis  own  view  was  <piite  different,  lie 
desired  that  tlic  two  peo[)les  which  stood  at  the  head  of 


418        QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

civilization  might  keep  up  a  friendly  intercourse  and 
join  their  interests  together.  He  had  come  for  the  pur- 
pose of  announcing  these  sentiments. 

The  Regent  thereupon  expressed  his  satisfaction  and 
approval :  he  said  that  he  had  agreed  to  the  meeting 
the  more  willingly,  as  he  felt  that  it  would  be  a  pledge 
of  peace.  At  the  same  time  he  observed  that  the 
excitement  in  Germany  was  the  consequence  of  the 
incorporation  of  Savoy,  after  the  solemn  proclamation 
of  French  disinterestedness.  "  That  was  an  exceptional 
case,"  cried  Napoleon,  "the  fulfilment  of  a  compact 
made  some  time  before,  according  to  which,  if  Sardinia 
obtained  certain  advantages,  France  was  to  receive 
compensation  for  assistance  rendered.  In  the  case  of 
Germany  the  state  of  things  is  very  different."  "  I  did 
not  myself  have  any  knowledge  of  that  compact," 
answered  the  Prince ;  "  and  the  impression  produced 
by  the  annexation  was  the  greater,  since  your  Majesty 
proved  yourself  in  the  war  a  successful  general." 
"  Now,"  said  Napoleon,  "  what  is  to  be  done  to  allay  all 
this  excitement?"  "Tell  the  German  Princes  what 
you  have  told  me,"  replied  the  Prince. 

The  next  morning  the  Emperor  took  advantage  of  the 
visits  to  and  from  the  Princes  to  act  on  this  advice. 
"  Have  what  you  say  published  in  all  the  French  news- 
papers," said  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg  to  him.  The 
Emperor  called  on  the  King  of  Hanover  also,  but  was 
informed  that  the  King  was  not  at  home ;  he  was, 
indeed,  not  in  the  house,  but  he  was  in  the  garden 
behind   it.      To    the    King   of    Saxony,    the    Emperor 


NAPOLEON    IN   BADEN.  419 

expressed  a  wish  for  a  commercial  treaty,  on  which 
subject  the  King  referred  him  to  Prussia.  After  this, 
there  were  church-goings,  drives,  and  a  banquet,  as 
usual  on  such  occasions;  in  the  evening  there  was  a 
great  assembly ;  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  Count 
Trautmannsdorff,  who  was  present,  reported  that  the 
Emperor's  manner  during  the  whole  evening  was  very 
quiet  and  self-contained,  that  he  was  almost  silent ;  he 
carried  on  long  conversations  with  no  one,  and  most  of 
the  German  Princes  showed  an  embarrassed  reserve 
with  regard  to  him.  The  people  also  treated  him  with 
great  coolness ;  they  cried  out  to  a  company  of  French 
who  were  shouting  "Vive  I'Empereur  "  to  be  silent,  and 
then  themselves  shouted  for  the  Prince  Regent. 

On  the  17th,  the  Emperor  had  another  conversation 
with  the  Prince  Regent  and  King  Max  in  regard  to 
Naples ;  the  King  afterwards  reported  that  Napoleon's 
statements  were  not  calculated  to  produce  confidence  ; 
the  latter  said  that  in  the  affairs  of  Italy  he  was  obliged 
to  keep  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  with  England  con- 
stantly before  his  eyes ;  nor  would  it  do  for  him  to 
oppose  the  King  of  Sardinia,  who  was  urged  on  by  the 
popular  party  and  had  not  the  power  to  resist. 

One  extraordinary  conquest  the  Emperor  did  make 
before  his  departure.  He  entered  unannounced  the 
reception-room  of  the  King  of  Hanover,  and  waited 
there  very  quietly  till  the  appearance  of  the  blind 
monarch,  who  was  at  first  disturbed  at  the  intrusion  of 
a  stranger;  afterwards,  however,  he  received  the  Order 
of  the  Legion  of  Honor  with  gracious  thanks,  and  was 


420       QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

so  fascinated  by  the  well-calculated  speeches  of  Napo- 
leon, that  from  that  time  he  sang  the  Emperor's  praises 
in  every  key.  At  nine  o'clock  Napoleon  departed,  with 
his  eyes  unpleasantly  opened  by  the  events  of  his  expe- 
dition and  by  its  empty  results. 

But  an  after-piece  to  conclude  the  great  Assembly  of 
Princes  was  further  intended  for  the  Prince  Regent. 
He  had,  although  at  the  risk  of  Napoleon's  hostility, 
stood  forth  so  emphatically  as  the  representative  of 
harmony  in  Germany,  that  a  sharp  lesson  on  the  nature 
of  that  harmony  could  not  have  been  unexpected  by 
him. 

On  the  afternoon  of  June  17th  (at  the  instigation, 
if  I  am  not  mistaken,  of  the  King  of  Hanover)  a  con- 
ference of  the  Princes  who  favored  an  entire  Germany 
met  at  the  residence  of  King  Max  of  Bavaria.  The 
Grand  Duke  of  Baden  was  no  longer  included  among 
these  Princes  ;  the  Assembly  therefore  consisted  of  the 
four  Kings,  of  the  Grand  Duke  of  Darmstadt,  and  of 
the  Duke  of  Nassau  ;  and  its  object  was  to  consider  the 
questions  at  issue  between  these  Princes  and  Prussia. 
The  first  subject  of  discussion  was  the  unpleasant 
business  of  Hesse-Cassel :  Saxony  and  Hanover  desired 
that  the  matter  should  be  settled  at  once  and  finally  by 
the  Confederation's  authorizing  the  new  Constitution 
of  May  30th.  But  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  advised 
prudence ;  Wiirtemberg  hesitated  in  regard  to  the 
constitutionality  of  such  a  course,  and  Bavaria  was 
opposed  to  it  out  of  consideration  for  public  opinion. 
Therefore,  no  decision  was,  adopted ;  and  the  attention 


DISAGREEMENT  AMONG   THE  PRINCES.     421 

of  the  Princes  was  turned  to  a  still  more  important 
question,  the  reform  of  the  Confederate  Constitution 
desired  by  Prussia. 

All  were  unanimous  that,  after  the  opinion  of  the 
committee  as  expressed  by  Pfordten,  the  Prussian 
proposition  was  to  be  rejected.  But  when  they  came 
to  consider  the  matter,  they  found  that,  even  on 
this  subject,  their  views  were  very  different.  King 
John  of  Saxony  proposed  that  they  should  expressly 
recognize  the  essential  point  of  the  committee's  report, 
which  was  that  special  agreements  should  be  reserved 
for  the  case  of  Prussia's  or  Austria's  taking  j)art  with 
their  whole  army  in  a  war  undertaken  by  the  Confed- 
eration, and  that  they  should  then  entreat  the  Prince 
Regent  either  to  withdraw  his  proposition,  or  at  any 
rate  not  to  enter  a  fresh  protest  against  the  Diet's 
decree.  But  King  George  of  Hanover  opposed  this 
energetically.  He  said  that  that  would  practically  be 
realizing  Prussia's  plan ;  if  it  was  not  possible  to  induce 
the  t\^'o  Great  Powers  to  provide  each  three  corps  to 
serve  under  the  chosen  Confederate  general,  according 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  then  the  best 
plan,  in  his  opinion,  would  be  to  form  three  armies, 
those  of  the  two  Powders,  together  with  another  which 
sliould  include  the  remaining  Confederate  forces,  and 
the  commander  of  which  should  be  chosen  by  the 
Governments  concerned,  and  guided  and  controlled 
according  to  the  principles  laid  down  by  the  Confeder- 
ate Constitution.  On  this  subject  also  a  unanimous 
agreement  proved  to  be  out  of  the  question  :  and  the 


422       QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

Assembly  was  finally  obliged  to  be  satisfied  with 
deputing  King  Max  of  Bavaria  to  deal  as  decidedly  as 
possible  with  the  Prince  Regent  in  the  name  of  the 
German  Princes,  both  on  this  subject  and  in  regard  to 
the  suppression  of  the  National  Association. 

But  Kino-  Georg-e  could  not  rest  satisfied.  Immedi- 
ately  after  the  discussion,  he  dictated  for  his  friends  a 
memorial  in  regard  to  the  military  organization,  to  the 
effect  that,  according  to  the  distinct  statement  of 
the  Prince  Regent,  in  case  of  a  war,  the  Confederate 
military  organization  in  its  existing  form  would  be 
exploded ;  that,  however,  would  be  an  event  fraught 
with  the  greatest  consequences  politically,  for  the 
dualism  thereby  introduced  would  tear  in  pieces  the 
unity  of  Germany,  and  would,  moreover,  lay  the  axe  at 
the  root  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  individual  Princes. 
One  of  the  first  elements  of  that  sovereignty  was 
military  supremacy ;  and  the  loss  of  this  would  be  the 
beginning  of  the  end,  and  would  render  the  Princes 
vassals  of  the  Great  Powers.  Such  an  anomalous 
situation  could  not  endure  permanently :  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  Princes  must  either  prevail  in  its  integrity 
and  traditional  sacredness,  or  it  must  in  a  short  time 
entirely  disappear. 

The  proud  Guelph  who  fought  with  such  zeal  for  the 
inviolability  of  his  historical  right  did  not  know  that 
his  noble  forefathers  a  century  before  had  never  j)os- 
sessed  more  than  a  limited  and  derived  sovereignty,  or, 
more  exactly,  tliat  the  idea  of  underived  sovereignty  in 
general  is  a  creation  of  only  very  recent  times. 


THE  KING   OF  BAVARIA   AND   THE  REGENT.     423 

Meanwhile,  after  the  departure  of  the  other  Prmces  — 
at  which  time  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg  took  occasion 
to  address  the  Prince  Regent  once  more  with  a  great 
deal  of  bluster  in  regard  to  the  Tariff-Union  —  the  good 
King  Max,  on  the  19th  of  June,  tried  his  fortune  witli 
the  Prussian  ruler.  He  first  made  an  effort  to  recom- 
mend the  compromise  of  tlie  triple  division  of  the  army : 
the  Prussian  plan,  he  said,  could  not  be  accepted  by  the 
German  Princes,  since  it  deprived  them  of  the  control 
of  their  own  troops ;  Prussia  had  better,  therefore, 
withdraw  her  plan.  But  the  Prince  answered  very 
decidedly  that  this  could  not  be  ;  both  plans  must  come 
before  the  Confederation  for  its  decision.  Unity  was 
certainly  preferable  in  itself ;  but  considering  the  size 
of  the  army  and  the  extent  of  the  territory  to  be 
defended,  a  twofold  arrangement  was  the  natural  one  to 
be  adopted.  A  triple  division  would  simply  mean  the 
proclamation  of  anarchy ;  the  interference  of  the  vari- 
ous commissioners  who  would  be  present  at  head- 
quarters would  hamper  all  the  movements  of  the 
Confederate  army.  "  The  twofold  arrangement,"  said 
the  King,  "  would  mean  dividing  Germany  along  the 
line  of  the  Main."  "  It  would  be  only  a  temporary 
measure  adopted  during  the  continuance  of  war,"  replied 
the  Prince. 

An  equally  meagre  result  attended  the  King's  attempt 
to  bring  about  energetic  action  against  the  National 
Association.  'J'he  Prince,  for  what  regarded  his  own 
position  in  (ierman  affairs,  referred  to  his  answer  to  the 
address  of  the  citizens  of  Stettin  ;  but  he    refused  to 


424       QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

take  any  steps  against  the  Association,  so  long  as  its 
proceedings  were  not  subject  to  legal  prosecution; 
everything  of  the  sort  that  had  been  done  in  Saxony, 
Hanover,  and  elsewhere,  had  called  forth  universal  dis- 
approval.    This  the  King  could  not  deny. 

He  then  turned  with  all  the  more  feeling  to  a  personal 
desire,  the  one  which  had  in  the  beginning  brought  him 
to  Baden,  the  desire  to  bring  about  more  intimate  rela- 
tions with  Austria,  The  Prince  expressed  his  entire 
readiness  for  this,  with  the  simple  condition  that 
Austria  should  at  length  cease  to  regard  Prussia  as  an 
upstart  and  recognize  her  fairly  as  an  equal  Great 
Power.  The  very  way  in  which  modern  Prussia  had, 
in  1815,  been  formed  out  of  two  isolated  portions  of 
territory,  had  been  the  result  of  an  effort  made  even 
then  to  keep  her  as  weak  as  possible  :  when  Prussia,  in 
spite  of  this,  succeeded  in  raising  herself,  the  insinua- 
tion had  been  spread  abroad  from  Vienna,  that  Prussia 
was  seeking  to  incorporate  into  her  own  Kingdom  the 
two  states  which  lay  between  her  provinces,  and  an 
experience  of  forty  years  had  not  been  able  to  extin- 
guish the  suspicion  thus  caused.  "I  must  wait  and 
see,"  said  the  Prince,  "  whether  my  latest  utterances 
have  altered  this  disposition  on  the  part  of  Austria,  but 
no  one  can  blame  me  if  I  feel  myself  injured :  Austria 
has  the  settlement  of  the  question  in  her  own  hands  ;  so 
soon  as  she  ceases  to  wish  to  injure  Prussia,  an  arrange- 
ment can  easily  be  brought  about."  King  Max,  on  this, 
expressed  the  opinion  that  Prussia's  attitude  during  the 
last  war  had  injured  her  much ;  every  one  had  thought 


THE  KING   OF  BAVARIA   AND   THE  REGENT.      425 

that  she  held  back  purposely,  in  order  that  Austria 
might  be  overcome.  "  When  was  your  army  ready  to 
march  on  that  occasion  ? "  asked  the  Prince.  "  In 
July,"  the  King  answered,  "  just  when  your  summons 
came."  "  Prince  Frederick  of  Wiirtemberg  told  me 
exactly  the  same  thing,"  continued  the  Regent :  "  then 
what  would  have  happened,  if  I  had  wished  to  march 
as  early  as  April?  No,  we  delayed  in  order  that  we 
might  not  draw  the  French  main  army  upon  German 
soil  in  the  beginning  of  the  contest ;  but  Austria  gave 
up  a  province  at  Villafranca  rather  than  let  us  have  the 
glory  of  a  triumph  over  France." 

In  spite  of  the  irritated  feeling  shown  in  these  words, 
the  King  proposed  that  the  Prince  should  have  a  per- 
sonal interview  with  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  for 
which  he  himself  would  gladly  make  the  necessary 
arrangements.  No  objection  was  made  to  this.  The 
Prince  only  required  that,  after  the  manifesto  of  the 
preceding  year,  which  had  put  such  a  slight  upon 
Prussia,  the  first  advances  should  come  from  Vienna. 
He  added,  that,  true  to  his  principle,  he  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  premature  guaranties  or  alliances, 
but  that  he  would  discuss  certain  possibilities,  which,  in 
case  of  war,  might  render  it  necessary  for  Austria  and 
Prussia  to  act  together  and  in  common  with  Germany. 

King  j\Iax,  tlierefore,  Avent  to  work  eagerly  to  urge 
the  Court  of  Vienna  in  the  direction  of  reconciliation, 
and  found  all  the  more  favorable  a  reception,  since 
Austria  had  a  little  while  before  tested  the  feeling  in 
St.  Peterslnirg  with  regard  to  a  renewal  of  the  Holy 


426        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

Alliance,  and  had  been  referred  to  Prussia  on  the 
subject  by  Prince  Gortschakoff.  The  Prince  Regent 
also  did  what  he  could  by  writing  a  letter  to  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  in  which  he  described  the 
proceedings  in  Baden-Baden,  and  deduced  from  them 
the  advantage  of  an  understanding  between  Austria  and 
Prussia  in  matters  of  general  European  policy. 

On  the  10th  of  July  the  Emperor  replied,  and 
proposed  an  interview  in  Dresden.  Meanwhile  it  had 
become  known  that  the  Kings  of  the  Lesser  States 
were  very  anxious  to  be  present  in  Dresden,  as  they 
had  been  in  Baden,  at  the  meeting  of  the  two  great 
Sovereigns  ;  but  the  Prince  Regent  thought  that  this 
would  not  improve  matters,  and  proposed  to  the 
Emperor  that  they  two  should  have  a  conference  alone 
at  Teplitz.  This  proposition  was  immediately  accepted. 
Rechberg  and  Schleinitz  were  to  accompany  their 
sovereigns. 

On  the  20th  of  July,  at  Mayence,  the  Prince  consid- 
ered the  line  to  be  taken  in  the  discussion.  It  was 
clearly  recognized,  that,  after  what  had  happened  in 
Baden,  a  Franco-Prussian  alliance  would  be  out  of  the 
question  for  a  long  time  to  come ;  and  that  the  result 
of  this  was,  that  the  circle  of  diplomatic  means  useful 
in  obtaining  concessions  from  Austria  had  been  consid- 
erably narrowed.  Yet  Prussia,  if  she  supported  Austria 
in  Italy,  must  certainly  claim  proportionate  advantages 
in  return :  the  removal  of  what  was  unsuitable  in  the 
Confederation,  an  alternating  presidency  of  the  Diet, 
and  a  settlement  of  the  Holstein  matter  in  accordance 


THE  PRINCE  AND  FRANCIS  JOSEPH.        427 

with  Prussia's  wishes.  On  other  conditions  the  Parha- 
ment  would  never  grant  money  for  a  war  on  behalf  of 
Austria.  Besides  this,  the  Prince  Regent  had  long  had 
a  feeling,  that  an  alliance  with  Austria  could  have  little 
value,  unless  that  country  were  strengthened  internally, 
and  that  such  a  strengthening  presupposed  liberal 
reforms  and  religious  tolerance. 

On  this  basis  he  made  his  propositions  to  the 
Emperor  on  the  26th  of  July,  They  were  to  the  effect 
that  Prussia  would  be  ready  to  take  part  in  the  com- 
mon defence  against  a  common  danger ;  that  is,  in  the 
defence  against  a  French  attack  upon  the  possessions  of 
either  state,  unless  Austria  should  have  provoked  the 
war.  Francis  Joseph,  on  this,  declared  that  he  had  no 
wish  ever  to  provoke  a  war,  and  that  in  case  he  were  at 
any  time  forced  to  become  the  aggressor,  he  would  do  it 
only  after  an  understanding  with  Prussia.  The  Prince 
further  proposed  common  resistance  to  any  manifes- 
tation of  French  greed  for  annexation,  whether  in 
Switzerland,  Belgium,  or  Holland.  Germany  would 
regard  any  act  of  aggression  on  the  part  of  Sardinia  as 
a  casus  helli^  if  German  territory  should  be  violated  by 
such  act. 

Thus  far  everything  went  harmoniously'.  But  when 
the  Prince  introduced  the  subject  of  what  Austria  was 
to  concede  in  .return,  the  harmony  was  considerably 
disturbed.  The  Emperor  rejected  the  alternating  presi- 
dency of  tlic  Diet;  lie  could  not  permit  an  ancient  and 
honorable  privilege  of  his  House  to  be  infringed. 
Progressive   movement  in  parliamentary  legislation,  as 


428        QUESTIONS   OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

%Yell  as  equal  recognition  of  different  creeds,  he 
regarded  as  affairs  of  domestic  concern,  concerning 
which  he  could  enter  into  no  written  compact,  though 
he  expressed  by  word  of  mouth  his  purpose  of  advan- 
cing in  the  path  suggested.  The  Prince  then  brought 
up  the  subject  of  the  discussion  of  the  Confederate 
military  organization  which  was  pending  at  Frankfort, 
but  only  obtained  the  Emperor's  consent  that  a  confer- 
ence of  generals  from  either  side  should  consider  the 
question  of  the  twofold  or  threefold  division  of  the 
army.  Finally,  in  regard  to  Schleswig-Holstein  no 
decision  whatever  was  reached.  After  all  this,  there 
could  be  no  question  of  the  signing  of  any  compact. 

None  the  less  did  the  Emperor  return  well  satisfied 
from  Teplitz.  Although  he  had  received  no  binding 
promise  of  Prussian  assistance  in  case  of  a  French 
attack,  yet  he  had  now  no  doubt  that  the  Prussian 
Regent,  following  his  own  disposition,  would  not  look 
idl}^  on  in  such  an  event.  "  I  am  sure,"  he  said  to  the 
King  of  Saxony  immediately  afterwards,  "  that  I  shall 
not  be  left  in  the  lurch  a  second  time." 

In  the  mean  time,  in  the  field  of  European  politics 
the  clouds  had  been  growing  steadily  darker  and  more 
ominous.  Wherever  Garibaldi  appeared,  the  Neapolitan 
forces  scattered  almost  without  fighting :  they  either 
fled  or  deserted  to  the  enemy.  On  the  7th  of  Septem- 
ber he  entered  Naples,  the  capital,  in  triumph,  amid 
the  joyful  shouts  of  the  people ;  and  he  now  proclaimed 
his  intention  of  first  freeing  Rome  and  afterAvards 
Yenetia,  and  only  then  of  bringing  united  Italy  to  do 


UNITY  OF  ITALY.  429 

homage  to  Victor  Emmanuel.  This  would  have  meant 
an  attack  on  the  French  garrison  in  Rome,  and  if  such 
an  attack  contrary  to  all  expectation  succeeded,  a  war 
of  revolutionary  Italy  against  Austria. 

Cavour  could  never  permit  such  madness.  There 
was  only  one  way :  Sardinia  must  herself  advance  in 
the  name  of  Italy,  must  occupy  the  eastern  portion  of 
the  Papal  territory  between  the  Emilia  and  Naples, 
must  push  on  from  there  to  Naples,  and,  gently  putting 
Garibaldi  aside,  proclaim  on  the  spot  Victor  Emmanuel 
as  ruler  over  both  Sicilies.  That  was  the  only  way  to 
secure  the  unity  of  Italy  and  at  the  same  time  to  close 
for  her  the  era  of  revolution.  This  course  was  adopted, 
and  in  a  short  time  the  work  was  finished.  With  the 
exception  of  Rome  and  Venetia,  the  peninsula  belonged 
to  the  King  of  Italy ;  and  Cavour  announced  on  every 
occasion,  that  the  Government  kept  the  fate  of  Venice 
carefully  in  view,  but  could  not  for  the  time,  in  consid- 
eration of  the  feeling  of  Europe,  think  of  making  war 
upon  Austria. 

This  assurance  was  everywhere  received  with  real  or 
pretended  suspicion.  The  English  Government,  indeed, 
declared  itself  wholly  pleased  with  Cavour's  successes ; 
but  the  continental  Cabinets  joined  with  one  voice  in 
declaiming  against  triumphs  so  revolutionary,  and  acts 
of  aggression  so  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations ;  and  a 
hundred  times  it  was  asserted  in  the  leading  diplomatic 
circles,  that  it  would  Ije  impossible  for  Cavour  to 
restrain  his  followers  from  an  attack  on  Venetia.  In 
case  such  an  attack  should  take  pla'ce,  who  could  fore- 


430        QUESTIONS  OF  REFORM  IN  GERMANY. 

see  the  consequences  ?  Napoleon,  who  was  a  good  deal 
disturbed  by  the  outcry  of  the  Clerical  party  over  the 
new  losses  of  the  Pope,  once  more  recurred  to  the  idea 
of  a  congress  of  the  Great  Powers,  the  decisions  of 
which  would  remove  from  his  shoulders  all  responsi- 
bility for  the  fate  of  Italy.  Russia  was  ready  to  please 
him  on  this  point,  in  the  hope  of  receiving  in  return 
some  assistance  in  the  affairs  of  the  East. 

Besides  this,  the  Czar  Alexander  had  been  greatly 
incensed  at  Garibaldi's  action,  and  was  very  anxious  to 
confer  personally  with  the  Prince  Regent  in  regard  to 
the  state  of  things ;  it  was,  therefore,  decided  that  in 
October  the  two  Sovereigns  should  pass  some  days 
together  in  Warsaw.  The  same  thought  occasioned  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  likewise  to  ask  of  his  own 
accord  whether  a  visit  from  him  would  be  agreeable  to 
the  Czar. 

The  meeting  of  the  three  Sovereigns,  which  took 
place  on  the  days  from  the  22d  to  the  26th  of  October, 
had  a  good  result,  in  that  the  personal  bitterness  exist- 
ing between  the  two  Emperors  was  for  the  time 
lessened,  but  positive  decisions  were  not  arrived  at  here 
any  more  than  between  the  Prince  Regent  and  Francis 
Joseph.  The  proposition  of  Napoleon  in  regard  to  a 
congress  for  the  settlement  of  Italian  affairs,  which 
was  brought  forward  by  the  Emperor  Alexander,  was 
regarded  by  Prussia  as  not  definite  enough  for  practical 
action,  and  was  simply  rejected  by  Austria  without 
comment.  Besides  this,  the  Emperor  Alexander,  who, 
after  Cavour's  proceedings,  had  withdrawn  his  embassy 


THE  SOVEREIGNS  AT   WARSAW.  431 

from  a  Court  so  eager  for  revolution  as  that  of  Turin, 
did  not  conceal  his  vexation  that  Prussia  did  not  follow 
his  example,  but  contented  herself  with  sending  to 
Turin  a  severe  criticism  of  the  unlawful  policy  there 
pursued.  Things  remained,  therefore,  in  a  state  of 
uncertainty,  and  no  common  plan  of  action  was 
adopted. 

For  the  Prince  Regent  there  also  began  at  this  time  a 
serious  crisis  in  his  own  country. 


432  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

CONTEST   OVER    THE    MILITARY  REFORMS    EST   PRUSSIA. 

The  enthusiastic  joy  and  exaggerated  expectations 
with  which  the  majority  of  the  Prussian  people  had 
received  the  new  Government  made  the  sober  reality 
seem  all  the  colder  and  harder  when  it  was  seen  that 
the  grossest  abuses  of  the  former  system,  the  arbitrary 
action  of  the  police,  the  false  interpretation  of  the 
laws,  the  harsh  management  in  ecclesiastical  matters, 
did,  indeed,  disappear,  but  that  in  other  respects  every- 
thing went  on  in  the  old  rut,  and  a  paradisiacal  condition 
of  unheard-of  freedom  and  happiness  did  not  by  any 
means  begin. 

Definite  desires  for  particular  objects  also  arose  in  a 
short  time,  the  non-fulfilment  of  which  caused  bitter 
complaints.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  vexation  because 
the  new  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Count  Schwerin, 
declared  that  it  was  more  in  accordance  with  liberal 
ideas  to  leave  heads-of-departments  of  "feudal"  ten- 
dencies in  their  places,  so  long  as  they  did  nothing 
illegal,  than  to  fill  all  influential  positions  with  partisans 
of  his  own,  as  Herr  von  Westphalen  had  done. 

When  the  Upper  House  decidedly  rejected  two  liberal 
laws,  concerning  the  establishment  of  civil  marriage  and 
the    adjustment  of  taxes    upon    land,  laws    which    had 


DISSATISFACTION  IN  PRUSSIA.  433 

been  proposed  by  the  Government  and  accepted  with 
enthusiasm  by  the  Lower  House,  the  public  grew  very 
angry  because  the  Government  did  not  proceed  imme- 
diately to  a  reform  of  the  Upper  House,  to  a  thorough 
clearing  out  of  that  nest  of  the  feudalists.  People  did 
not  wish  to  doubt  the  Liberal  disposition  of  the  Minis- 
ters, but  it  had  been  hoped  that  the  champions  of  the 
former  Liberal  Opposition  would  now,  in  an  official 
position,  lay  the  axe  at  the  root  of  the  Reaction  with  a 
firmer  hand. 

Then  came  the  Italian  war.  The  people,  as  we  have 
seen,  had  not  the  slightest  desire  to  take  up  arms  for 
Austria  ;  at  the  same  time,  here  also,  there  was  no  con- 
fidence in  the  restless  son  of  the  Napoleons ;  and  the 
Parliament,  that  the  country  might  be  prepared  for  war, 
agreed  without  opposition  to  a  loan  of  forty  million 
thalers,  and  to  an  increase  of  twenty-five  per  cent  in  the 
most  important  taxes.  When,  however,  the  great  mobi- 
lization followed,  only  to  end  in  a  general  disbandment 
after  Villafranca,  when  Austria  and  France  rivalled 
each  other  in  throwing  all  the  responsibility  of  the 
misfortunes  that  had  happened  upon  Prussia,  the  people 
came  decidedl}^  to  the  conclusion,  that  things  were 
going  not  very  differently  from  the  way  they  went  in 
1850,  that  Herr  von  Bonin  did  not  seem  to  have  much 
more  martial  ardor  than  Herr  von  Stockliausen,  nor 
Herr  von  Schleinitz  mucli  more  energy  than  Herr  von 
Manteuffel.  And  wlicn  the  National  Association  had 
called  the  question  of  CJerman  Unity  once  more  into 
life,    the     pul/lic     dissatisfaction    was    completed     by 


434  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

Schwerin's  answer  to  the  address  of  the  citizens  of 
Stettin,  an  answer  which,  it  was  thought,  contained 
nothing  but  involved  and  self-contradictory  statements. 
"  The  Ministers  are  excellent  men,"  it  was  everywhere 
said,  "  but  they  are  not  equal  to  the  management  of 
great  questions  ;  they  lack  strength  and  determination, 
if  they  have  not  indeed  actually  abandoned  their  old 
opinions.     The  people  must  keep  their  eyes  open." 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  when  the  Prince  Regent 
undertook  the  work,  which  he  had  long  recognized  as 
the  indispensable  condition  of  any  progress  in  German 
affairs,  the  remodelling  of  the  Prussian  army.  It  was 
very  clear  to  him,  that  any  serious  attempt  to  support 
the  demands  that  had  been  sacrificed  at  Olmiitz  —  Con- 
federate reform  and  the  assurance  of  constitutional 
rights  in  Hesse-Cassel  and  in  Holstein  —  would  be 
attended  for  Prussia  with  great  danger  of  war,  and  that 
the  existing  army  was  insufficient  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  great  object. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  Prussian  military  organiza- 
tion was  grounded  at  that  time  upon  the  laws  of  1814 
and  1815,  which,  on  the  basis  of  a  universal  obligation 
to  serve,  assigned  all  the  male  population  for  three 
years  to  the  regiments  of  the  line,  and  for  two  years 
more  to  the  war-reserve  of  these  regiments,  and  then 
for  seven  years  to  the  first,  and  for  seven  years  more  to 
the  second,  levy  of  the  militia.  In  time  of  war  the 
regiments  of  the  line  and  the  first  levy  of  the  militia 
would  constitute  the  active  army  in  the  field,  while  the 
second   levy  would   garrison   the    fortresses.     Now,  in 


REASONS  FOR  MILITARY  REFORM.  435 

1815,  the  population  was  something  over  ten  millions, 
and  the  number  of  those  yearly  drafted  40,000  ;  the 
number  and  the  strength  of  the  regiments  of  the  line 
were  therefore  established  upon  the  basis  of  three  such 
yearly  drafts.  In  forty  years,  however,  the  population 
had  increased  to  nearly  eighteen  millions,  and  thus  the 
number  of  those  under  obligation  to  serve  had  increased 
to  65,000,  while  the  regiments  could  still,  as  before,  only 
receive,  train,  and  pass  over  to  the  militia  the  original 
40,000,  in  consequence  of  which  25,000  j^oung  men 
every  year  escaped  service  entirel}'.  Evidently  there 
was  no  truth  in  talking  about  a  universal  obligation  to 
serve  under  such  conditions  ;  on  the  contrary,  injustice 
and  unfairness  abounded  in  every  quarter.  As  has  been 
mentioned  before,  the  first  le^y  of  the  militia,  consisting 
of  men  of  from  twenty-five  to  thirty-two  years  of  age, 
who  had  already  served,  belonged  to  the  active  army 
destined  for  the  field;  now,  in  the  mobilizations  of 
1849,  1850,  and  1859,  it  had  been  shown  that  half  of 
these  men  were  married  and  fathers  of  families,  so  that 
their  death  would  ruin  whole  households,  and  yet  they 
were  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  while  many 
thousands  of  unmarried  youths  were  sitting  quietly  by 
their  own  hearths. 

But  this  was  not  all.  Between  the  officers  of  the 
line  and  those  of  the  militia  called  out  only  for  war 
there  was  a  very  great  difference.  The  former  were 
soldiers  by  profession,  who  had  grown  up  in  the  service, 
and  were  constantly  with  their  troops;  the  latter  had 
for    the    most    part    had   their  training  in  a  one-year's 


436  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

term  of  service,  and  under  ordinary  circumstances  fol- 
lowed their  calling  as  citizens,  not  becoming  acquainted 
with  their  men  before  the  mobilization.  Moreover,  they 
themselves,  as  well  as  their  men,  were  unaccustomed,  at 
least  at  first,  to  strict  discipline  and  accuracy  of  tactics; 
in  spite  of  energy  and  courage,  the  harmony  and  quick- 
ness of  action  in  their  battalions  was  not  equal  to  that 
in  those  of  the  line.  It  was  not  enough  to  place  50,000 
fathers  of  families  in  the  first  rank  of  battle ;  they  were 
placed  there  and  made  to  face  the  enemy  with  an  organ- 
ization inferior  to  that  of  the  younger  men. 

In  the  Baden  campaign  of  1849  the  Prince  Regent 
had  himself  had  ocular  evidence  of  the  inferior  skill  in 
manoeuvres  and  of  the  proportionately  greater  losses 
among  the  militia ;  and  even  at  that  time  he  had  deter- 
mined that  a  fundamental  change  must  be  made  in  this 
direction. 

After  long  consideration  of  many  systems,  the  Prince 
had  at  last  fixed  on  a  plan  which  by  its  very  simplicity 
proved  its  general  applicability.  The  "  universal 
obligation  to  serve,"  which  had  shrunk  into  a  mere 
figment,  was  to  be  made  once  more  almost  a  reality,  and 
the  yearly  draft  to  be  increased  from  40,000  to  63,000 
men.  In  order  that  it  might  absorb  these  accessions, 
the  line  required  an  increase  of  thirty-nine  infantry  and 
ten  cavalry  regiments.  On  the  other  hand,  the  first 
levy  of  the  militia  was  divided ;  the  men  of  from  twenty- 
five  to  twenty-seven  years,  the  majority  of  whom  were 
still  unmarried,  were  added  to  the  war-reserve  of  the 
line-regiments,  while  the  remainder  were  removed  from 


PLAN  OF  THE  PRINCE  REGENT.  437 

the  active  army  and  assigned  with  the  second  levy  to 
the  garrisoning  of  the  fortresses.  By  these  arrange- 
ments all  the  difficulties  were  got  rid  of,  the  fathers  of 
families  were  protected,  the  young  men  uniformly 
brought  to  the  front,  and  the  active  army  everywhere 
provided  with  reliable  officers. 

The  Regent  seized  the  occasion  of  the  mobilization  of 
1859.for  applying  this  system.  When  the  demobiliza- 
tion came,  he  kept  all  the  divisions  of  the  militia  under 
arms,  each  being  represented  only  by  a  part  of  its  men : 
from  these  the  new  regiments  of  the  line  were  to  be 
formed.  The  Minister  of  War,  General  von  Bonin, 
took  hold  of  the  plan  with  great  zeal,  and  prepared  the 
necessary  outlines  of  laws  and  schedules  of  expenses  for 
the  next  Parliament.  The  new  regiments  of  the  line 
could  naturally  not  be  kept  up  without  money ;  the 
additional  cost  of  the  proposed  active  army,  though  not 
much  larger  than  the  former  one,  was  estimated  at  nine 
and  a  half  million  thalers  yearly. 

To-day  there  is  heard  but  one  general  sentiment  of 
gratitude  for  the  work  of  King  William,  witliout  which 
the  founding  of  the  German  Empire  would  have  been 
a  sliadowy  dream.  But  at  that  time  it  was  otherwise. 
Public  opinion  was  embittered  by  the  humiliation  which 
the  Government  of  Frederick  William  IV.  had  suffered 
in  foreign  affairs,  and  by  the  harsh  pressure  of  the 
system  of  the  feudal  party;  the  people  had  likewise 
become  dissatisfied  with  tlic  new  ^Ministry,  from  wliose 
weakness  they  could  not  expect  great  actions  eitlier  at 
home  or  abroad.     What  was  the  use  of  creating  forty- 


438  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

nine  new  regiments  for  such  a  Government,  when  they 
would  be  used  only  for  brilliant  parades  and  to  provide 
pay  for  young  nobles  as  their  lieutenants,  whose  prin- 
cipal business  it  would  be  to  annoy  good  citizens  by 
their  hausfhtiness  and  insolence  ?  And  to  this  end  it 
was  proposed  to  abolish  the  militia,  the  grand  result  of 
the  War  of  Liberation,  the  peculiar  representative  of  the 
people  in  the  army  !  And  for  such  objects  as  these,  in 
addition  to  the  already  crushing  burden  of  the  taxes, 
nine  millions  were  demanded  for  the  army  of  the  line, 
the  expense  of  which,  as  it  was,  had  made  it  impossible 
for  the  Government  to  support,  as  it  should,  the  produc- 
tive branches  of  industry. 

This  was  the  cry  from  all  parts  of  the  country  :  it 
was  certain  that  warm  debates  would  arise  in  the  next 
session  of  the  Parliament.  General  von  Bonin  did  not 
feel  himself  adapted  to  a  parliamentary  contest,  and 
exchanged  his  ministerial  chair  for  the  command  of  the 
army  on  the  Rhine. 

He  was  succeeded  by  General  Albrecht  von  Roon,  a 
man  of  conspicuous  talent,  of  thorough  education,  of 
passionate  energy,  and  of  soaring  ambition.  Although 
he  had  shortly  before  proposed  a  plan  of  reform  of  his 
own,  widely  different  from  the  official  one,  he  now 
placed  himself  unreservedly  at  the  orders  of  his  highest 
military  superior,  and  declared  himself  ready  to  carry 
out  the  reform  in  the  army  according  to  the  Regent's 
commands,  and  to  defend  it  in  the  Parliament.  Among 
the  Liberals,  however,  this  change  of  ministers  awoke 
mistrust  of  the   Government.      Bonin  was    considered 


THE  REGENT'S  SPEECH.  439 

liberal,  while  Roon  was  regarded  as  an  absolutist.  It 
was  thought  that  the  time  for  showing  consideration 
was  over,  and  that  it  would  be  doing  the  liberal 
elements  of  the  Ministry  a  service,  to  prove  to  them 
that  they  had  a  strong  support  in  the  popular  will. 

Under  such  conditions  the  Parliament  was  opened  on 
the  12th  of  January.  The  Regent's  speech  from  the 
throne  mentioned  Prussia's  efforts  for  Confederate 
reform,  and  in  behalf  of  Hesse-Cassel  and  Holstein,  and 
then  went  on  to  announce  the  reform  of  the  army. 
"  The  experience  of  the  last  ten  or  twenty  years,"  said 
the  Regent,  "  has  shown  the  readiness  of  the  peo^jle  to 
make  sacrifices  and  their  capacity  for  fighting,  but  it 
has  also  sliown  that  a  bad  condition  of  things  has  taken 
a  deep  hold  in  the  army ;  and  to  get  rid  of  this  is  my 
duty  and  my  right.  It  is  not  intended  to  break  with 
the  traditions  of  a  great  time ;  the  Prussian  army  will 
remain  for  the  future  also  the  Prussian  people  in  arms. 
But  I  ask  that  you  will  give  an  unprejudiced  examina- 
tion and  your  approval  to  a  plan  which  has  been  most 
carefully  matured,  and  wliich  consults  alike  the  common 
interests  of  the  citizen  and  of  the  soldier.  This  will, 
in  all  quarters,  give  proof  of  the  confidence  of  the 
country  in  the  honesty  of  my  intentions.  No  measure 
of  such  importance  for  the  defence  and  protection,  for 
the  greatness  and  power,  of  the  Fatlierland  has  yet  been 
brouglit  before  the  representative  assembly." 

These  were  simple  and  on  that  account  doubly 
impressive  words.  Tliey  could  leave  no  doubt  that  the 
Regent  saw  in  this  the  burning  question  of  his  policy. 


440  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

that  he  made  every  other  consideration  dependent  on 
this,  and  that  he  would  regard  every  one  as  friend  or 
foe  according  as  they  supported  or  opposed  this  meas- 
ure. "  If  the  Liberals  are  wise  now,"  said  the  former 
Prime  Minister,  Von  Manteuffel,  "  they  are  sure  of  the 
possession  of  power  for  many  years."  It  was,  however, 
destined  that  this  wisdom  should  belong,  not  to  the 
Liberals,  but  to  their  opponents. 

On  the  10th  of  February,  1860,  the  Government 
brought  up  in  the  Lower  House  drafts  of  two  laws,  —  one 
in  regard  to  the  arrangement  of  the  obligation  to  serve, 
and  the  other  in  regard  to  the  appropriation  of  nine 
millions  and  a  half  of  thalers.  The  committee  to  whom 
these  were  referred,  chose  Georg  von  Vincke  as  their 
president,  and  the  retired  major-general  Stavenhagen  to 
present  their  report. 

Stavenhagen  had  at  that  time  a  great  reputation 
among  the  Liberals  in  military  matters ;  he  was  an 
upright  and  honorable  man,  free  from  the  bitterness  of 
feeling  so  common  among  officers  who  have  been 
retired.  But  even  he  did  not  escape  the  prevailing 
current.  He  did,  indeed,  entirely  approve  of  the 
increase  of  the  draft  to  63,000  men,  and  he  had  no 
objection  to  augmenting  the  number  of  regiments  of  the 
line.  But  he  declared  that  the  removal  of  the  militia 
from  the  active  army  was  a  slight  to  the  former,  and  an 
abandoning  of  the  most  sacred  traditions  of  the  Prussian 
people.  More  than  this,  he  felt  that  a  period  of  two 
years'  service  for  the  training  of  the  infautr}-  was  quite 
sufficient  for  purposes  of  war ;  if  such  an  arrangement 


OPPOSITION  IN  THE  PARLIAMENT.  441 

were  introduced,  then,  as  compared  with  the  results  of 
the  three-years'  system,  either  one-third  of  the  expense 
would  be  saved,  or  the  number  of  disciplined  soldiers 
would  be  increased  by  one-third. 

In  vain  did  the  Ministers  protest  against  both  these 
proposals.  They  showed  that,  with  a  two-years'  term 
of  service,  half  of  every  battalion  would  consist  of  raw 
recruits,  and  the  other  half  would  not  be  strong  enough, 
when  the  reserves  were  called  out,  to  form  a  firm 
framework  for  the  whole.  It  was  argued,  moreover, 
that  only  a  prolonged  continuance  in  the  service  could 
give  a  body  of  troops  the  internal  stability  which  was 
essential  for  solid  and  consistent  action  in  the  field. 

The  experience,  which  in  the  wars  soon  after  was  to 
give  a  striking  confirmation  of  these  statements,  had 
not  yet  been  acquired ;  and  in  reply  to  them,  it  was 
asked  whetlier  the  recruits  and  militia  of  1813  had 
required  a  three-years'  term  of  service  to  win  their 
glorious  victories.  The  two  proposals  of  Stavenhagen, 
that  the  militia  should  be  retained  in  the  active  army, 
and  that  a  two-years'  term  should  be  adopted  for  the 
infantry,  were  agreed  to  by  the  committee  ;  there  was 
no  doubt  that  they  would  be  accepted  in  the  House 
also,  and  the-  plan  of  the  Ministry  consequently 
rejected. 

These  proceedings  occasioned  the  Government  to 
take  a  serious  step,  the  first  step  on  a  path  that  led 
from  a  contest  over  the  army  to  a  contest  over  the 
Constitution. 

It  was  decided,  that,  if  some  subordinate  advantages 


442  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

were  renounced,  a  new  law  in  regard  to  the  obligation 
to  serve  was  not  necessary.  The  law  of  1814  imposed 
the  universal  liability  to  be  called  on  for  defence,  and 
the  obligation  to  serve  for  three  years.  It  was  further 
specified  in  that  law  that  the  strength  of  the  army 
(which  necessarily  meant  the  yearly  number  of  recruits) 
should  be  determined  in  accordance  with  the  conditions 
then  existing  in  the  country :  that  in  1814  the  power 
of  determining  this  was  the  prerogative  of  the  King 
alone,  went  without  saying;  and  hitherto  no  one  had 
ever  suggested  that  the  Constitution  of  1850  affected 
this  prerogative.  A  natural  deduction  from  this  was  a 
like  power  on  the  King's  part  to  arrange  the  divisions 
in  which  the  recruits,  when  levied,  should  receive  their 
military  training ;  and  on  this  point  also  there  had 
hitherto  been  no  difference  of  opinion.  To  be  sure,  the 
Government's  plan  of  assigning  the  three  youngest 
yearly  accessions  of  the  militia  to  the  war-reserve  of  the 
line  hardly  seemed  in  harmony  with  the  law  of  1814. 
But  even  in  that  law  the  sharp  distinction  between  the 
line  and  the  militia  was  of  importance  only  in  time  of 
peace :  in  war,  the  needs  of  the  time  alone  were  to 
decide  about  the  arrangement  of  the  troops ;  now,  the 
war-reserve  took  up  arms  only  in  case  of  war,  and  in 
case  of  war  it  was  allowable,  even  by  the  old  law,  to 
assign  to  that  reserve  the  soldiers  of  the  militia. 

On  the  whole,  then,  the  Government  felt  itself 
authorized,  on  the  ground  of  the  old  law,  to  carry  out 
its  reforms  without  regard  to  the  opposition  of  the 
Parliament.     It   therefore    withdrew   its    draft,    which 


Pa  TOW'S  ''PROVISIONAL"  ARRANGEMENT.     443 

had  been  so  severely  assailed.  Meantime,  however,  it 
needed  money  to  carry  out  its  new  arrangements,  and 
for  that  purpose  it  required  a  decree  of  the  Parliament. 
Herr  von  Patow  therefore  brought  forward  in  tlie 
House  a  motion  to  grant  the  Government  nine  millions 
for  the  next  fourteen  months,  for  the  object  of  "  carry- 
ing on  and  completing  the  measures  which  are  neces- 
sary to  make  the  army  more  prepared  for  war,  and  to 
increase  its  effectiveness,  and  which  are  practicable  on 
the  basis  of  laws  already  in  force." 

This  led  to  a  discussion  attended  with  unpleasant 
results.  Patow  assured  the  committee  that  the  definite 
settlement  of  all  questions  was  not  at  all  prejudiced  by 
his  proposition ;  the  only  object  was  a  provisional 
arrangement;  if  the  House  should  later  refuse  the 
necessary  funds,  everything  could  be  reduced  again. 
Afterwards,  during  the  discussion  in  the  House  itself, 
he  limited  the  meaning  of  his  woixls,  saj'ing  he  had. 
designated  the  existing  state  of  things  as  provisional 
only  in  so  far  as  a  definite  arrangement  could  not  be 
arrived  at  until  after  a  further  consideration  by  the 
Parliament,  that  is,  on  the  occasion  of  the  settlement  of 
the  expenses  in  the  budget. 

But  tlie  majority  in  the  House  and,  as  was  soon  seen, 
in  the  country,  preferred  to  stand  by  the  first  statement 
to  the  committee,  that  the  measures  intended  were  only 
temporaiy,  and,  if  objected  to  by  the  Parliament,  would 
be  withdrawn  and  the  old  state  of  tilings  restored. 
After  Vincke,  llien,  had  once  more  witli  great  zeal 
dwelt  upon  the  two  years'  term  and  the  maiiiteiiance  of 


444  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

the  militia  as  indispensable,  the  nine  millions  for  the 
current  year  were  almost  unanimously  granted.  The 
Upper  House  followed  this  example ;  but,  in  marked 
contrast  to  the  other  Chamber,  it  added^  a  unanimous 
resolution,  urging  the  Government  to  hold  fast  to  the 
original  plan  of  reform,  and  to  carry  out  all  the  meas- 
ures appertaining  to  it. 

The  Prince  Regent,  when  he  closed  the  session  on 
May  23d,  1860,  complained  of  the  opposition  to  the  bill 
concerning  the  army ;  the  delay  produced  by  that  oppo- 
sition, he  said,  might  have  been  very  serious,  if  the 
Parliament  had  not  granted  the  supplies  for  the  neces- 
sary increase  in  the  means  of  defending  the  Fatherland ; 
in  this  action  he  saw  a  pledge  that  the  necessity  of  the 
military  reforms  would  in  the  end  be  rightly  appre- 
ciated, and  the  question  that  had  been  postponed,  in  a 
short  time  satisfactorily  settled. 

These  words  admit  no  other  interpretation  than  that 
the  Regent  saw  in  the  granting  of  supplies  a  virtual 
assent  to  the  military  reforms,  and  expected  from  the 
next  session  a  definitive  approval  of  the  expenses.  He 
therefore  followed  the  letter  of  the  proposition,  which 
had  been  accepted,  in  which  the  Government  had 
demanded  the  money,  not  only  in  order  to  put  the  army 
in  a  temporary  state  of  preparation  for  war,  but  in 
order  to  increase  its  effectiveness,  that  is,  to  adojDt  the 
new  organization.  The  Opposition,  however,  clung  un- 
compromisingly to  Patow's  first  statement,  according  to 
which  every  part  of  the  new  and  provisional  organization 
might  be  made  of  none  effect  by  their  opposition  in  the 


THE  REFORM  CARRIED   OUT.  445 

following  year.  This  difference  between  the  two 
I^oints  of  view,  or,  if  any  one  prefers,  this  ambiguity  in 
the  term  "  provisional  arrangement,"  was  the  source  of 
all  the  ensuing  trouble.  For  the  more  convinced  each 
side  was  of  the  justness  of  its  own  opinion,  the  more 
inclined  it  was  to  doubt  the  good  faith  of  the  other  and 
to  presuppose  in  it  a  systematic  plan  of  deception. 
Such  a  feeling  was  sufficient  to  destroy  all  chance  of 
a  harmonious  agreement. 

In  July,  1860,  after  the  new  formations  were  com- 
pleted, the  Prince  Regent  ordered  the  division  of  the 
same  into  groups  of  regiments,  and  the  final  appoint- 
ment of  the  commissioned  and  non-commissioned 
officers.  In  October,  their  colors  and  standards  were 
delivered  to  the  regiments,  and  in  January,  1861,  the 
solemn  consecration  of  these  military  insignia  took  place. 
From  this  time  on  every  one  could  say  to  himself  that 
these  were  no  longer  provisional,  but  permanent  forma- 
tions, which  the  Regent  would  never  decide  to  disband 
of  his  own  accord.  The  newly  formed  army  was  then 
an  accomplished  fact. 

When  the  country  found  itself  undeceived,  the  feel 
ing  of  bitterness  was  very  deep.  Patow  had  said  that 
everything  was  to  be  provisional,  that  ever3'^thing  could 
be  retracted  if  the  Parliament  refused  its  sanction. 
Now  came  the  question,  w'hether  the  thousands  of 
officers  had  provisional  commissions,  whether  the  one 
hundred  and  seventeen  battalions  would  vanish  on  the 
simple  rejection  of  one  item  in  the  budget.  "  The 
Government,"    said   the    moderate    Liberals,    "  should 


446  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

have  declared  its  purpose  plainly  before  the  money  was 
granted."  "  That  is  a  simple  remark  !  "  cried  the  more 
violent.  "Will  you  never  see  that  everything  was 
craftily  arranged  that  you  might  be  deceived  ?  " 

So  the  irritation  and  anger  sank  deeper  and  deeper ; 
and  although  just  at  that  time  the  Liberal  Bernuth 
became  Minister  of  Justice  in  place  of  the  more  con- 
servative Simons,  the  general  dissatisfaction  with  the 
Ministry  increased  to  such  a  degree  that  at  two  by- 
elections  in  the  autumn  the  very  electors  who  in  1858 
had  rejected  every  Democrat  of  1848,  now  sent  to  the 
Lower  House  two  chiefs  of  that  party,  Waldeck  and 
Schultz-Delitzsch. 

While  the  outlook  in  domestic  policy  was  so  dark, 
a  change  of  sovereigns  took  place  in  Prussia.  On  the 
2d  of  January,  1861,  death  ended  the  melancholy  exist- 
ence of  Frederick  William  IV.,  and  King  William  I. 
began  to  govern  in  his  own  name,  an  event  which, 
under  other  circumstances,  would  undoubtedly  have 
increased  the  disposition  to  gratify  the  royal  wishes, 
but  which,  in  the  midst  of  the  general  irritation,  pro- 
duced this  effect  in  only  a  very  slight  degree.  In  his 
speech  from  the  throne  at  the  opening  of  the  Parlia- 
ment, on  the  14th  of  January,  the  King  alluded  to  the 
reform  of  the  army  as  something  already  accomplished  ; 
he  trusted  that  the  Parliament  would  not  shun  the  task 
of  supporting  and  furthering  the  arrangements  which 
had  been  made.  At  the  same  time  the  Upper  House 
was  urged  to  give  its  assent  to  the  reform  in  the 
marriage  laws  and  to  the  adjustment  of  the  land-tax, 


THE   UPPER   HOUSE  AND   THE   THRONE.      447 

without  A^hicli  the  military  reforms  could  not  be 
financially  assured.  This  hint,  that  an  unfavorable 
vote  about  the  land-tax  would  endanger  the  reform  of 
the  army,  had  an  immediate  effect ;  the  two  laws  which 
had  hitherto  been  rejected  by  the  Upper  House  were 
now  passed  by  a  large  majority,  and  a  harmonious 
relation  between  that  body  and  the  Throne  was  once 
more  established. 

Unfortunately  no  such  satisfactory  result  appeared  in 
the  Lower  House. 

Even  in  the  discussions  over  the  reply  to  the  Address 
from  the  Throne,  decided  differences  of  opinion  between 
the  Ministry  and  the  former  ]\Iinisterial  party  had  come 
to  light  in  regard  to  foreign  and  to  German  policy.  In 
spite  of  the  energetic  opposition  of  Herr  von  Schleinitz, 
the  House  accepted  a  motion  of  Vincke's,  to  the  effect 
that  Prussia  had  no  interest  in  opposing  the  consolida- 
tion of  Italy,  as  well  as  a  motion  of  its  committee, 
expressing  thanks  to  the  King  for  his  efforts  for  a 
reform  in  the  Confederate  military  organization,  but  at 
the  same  time  submitting  its  opinion  that  this  was  not 
sufficient  for  the  national  needs,  which  required  a  total 
reform  of  the  Confederate  Constitution  with  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  position  which  properly  belonged  to  Prussia. 

Schleinitz,  well  knowing  that  the  King  would  not 
decide  upon  any  such  step  as  this,  until  the  reform  of 
the  army  was  placed  on  a  solid  basis,  declared  that  this 
motion  went  far  beyond  the  actual  standpoint  of  the 
Government ;  but  he  gained  nothing  except  an  increased 
opposition    in    the     House    to    the    military    reforms. 


448  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

"For,"  said  the  Liberals,  "there  is  no  reason  for 
granting  over  100,000  soldiers  and  an  addition  to 
the  budget  of  many  millions  to  a  Ministry  that  has 
neither  courage  nor  energy  to  take  a  decisive  step  in 
the  great  national  cause.  Let  Herr  von  Schleinitz 
continue  writing  despatches ;  he  will  never  go  any 
further,  and  there  is  no  need  of  money  or  soldiers  for 
that." 

As  for  what  concerned  the  military  reforms  them- 
selves, the  Government,  faithful  to  its  original  position, 
had  brought  forward  no  bill  in  regard  to  the  obligation 
to  serve,  but  had  referred  to  the  remodelling  of  the 
army  only  in  connection  with  the  statement  of  the  bud- 
get, increased  now  not  by  nine  and  a  half,  but  only  by 
eight  millions.  Herren  von  Patow  and  von  Roon  did 
all  in  their  power  to  justify  the  carrying  out  of  the 
reforms  on  the  basis  of  existing  laws.  But  the  suspi- 
cion of  deliberate  deception  could  not  be  eradicated. 
Patow  had  said  that  everything  was  provisional,  every- 
thing revocable  :  now  it  was  announced  that  everything 
was  definitively  settled  and  could  not  be  changed. 

A  group  of  some  fifty  members,  led  by  Waldeck,  was 
disposed  to  strike  out  the  entire  cost  of  the  new 
establishment,  and  then  to  wait  and  see  what  the  Gov- 
ernment would  propose.  But  the  majority  were  not 
inclined  to  go  so  far.  They  had  no  objections  to  make 
against  keeping  up  the  new  regiments,  but  they  wished 
to  force  the  Ministry  to  propose  a  law  in  regard  to  the 
obligation  to  serve,  and  they  wished  to  see  the  militia 
retained  in  the  active  army. 


THE   OPPOSITION  BECOMES  MORE  BITTER.     449 

In  order  to  secure  this,  it  was  necessary  to  prove  that 
the  old  law  was  violated  by  the  new  arrangement,  for 
the  legalization  of  which  a  new  law  would  be  necessar}^  ; 
and  it  must  be  confessed,  it  was  no  very  striking 
argument  that  was  brought  into  the  field  in  support  of 
this  view.  It  was  alleged  that  the  assignment  to  the 
war-reserve  of  the  line  of  several  of  the  yearly  acces- 
sions to  the  militia,  which  by  the  new  system  became  a 
permanent  arrangement,  was  by  the  old  law  only  allow- 
able for  the  time  after  the  actual  outbreak  of  a  war,  but 
not  for  the  mobilization  before  the  war.  To  make  it 
apply  to  this  latter,  therefore,  a  new  law  was  required. 

In  accordance  with  this  theory,  the  framers  of  the 
old  law  had  intended  first  to  bring  the  battalions  before 
the  enemy  on  a  peace  footing,  and  then  to  send  the 
reserves  after  them  when  the  war  had  fairly  begun. 
As  such  a  position  was  too  absurd  to  be  maintained, 
refuge  was  taken  in  the  distinction,  that,  beside  the 
mobilization  for  actual  war,  there  was  a  mobilization  for 
diplomatic  purposes,  such  as  had  taken  place  in  1850 
and  in  IHoO;  to  include  the  militia  in  this  was  declared 
to  be  l)y  the  old  law  wholly  inadmissible.  But  this 
explanation  was  no  better  founded  than  the  original 
argument.  In  ])oth  of  the  instances  adduced,  there  had 
actually  been  a  question  of  serious  danger  of  war;  and 
in  any  case,  eveiy  in()l)ili/.atioii,  even  if  there  is  perhaps 
hope  tliat  the  enemy  will  give  way  without  a  battle,  is 
a  tlireat  of  war,  the  consequences  of  which  no  one  can 
determine  beforehand. 

ilowuvcr,  ill  sucli  a  stale  of  passion  as  prevailed,  this 


450  MILITARY  REFORMS  IN  PRUSSIA. 

interpretation  of  the  law  seemed  to  the  majority  quite 
sufficient  to  support  the  assertion  that  the  definitive 
recognition  of  the  military  reforms  was  impossible, 
unless  a  new  law  were  brought  forward  in  regard  to 
the  obligation  to  serve.  The  estimates  of  the  new 
establishment,  therefore,  after  being  reduced  by  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  thalers,  were  once  more 
approved  for  the  current  year;  but  the  sum  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  ordinary  to  the  extraordinary  expenses ; 
that  is,  into  the  class  of  payments  occurring  once  and 
not  regularly  fixed ;  and  a  resolution  of  Vincke's  was 
appended  to  the  accepted  budget,  in  which,  after  the 
above-mentioned  arguments  had  been  adduced,  the 
proposition  of  an  army  law,  that  should  alter  the 
provisions  of  the  law  of  1814,  was  mentioned  as  an 
indispensable  condition  of  the  permanent  support  of 
the  new  military  arrangements. 

Yet  once  more  had  an  open  breach  been,  not  exactly 
avoided,  but  postponed.  The  parliamentary  term  was 
coming  to  an  end  ;  a  general  election  was  at  hand ;  it 
was  left  to  the  Prussian  people  themselves  to  express 
their  opinion  of  the  work  of  the  King. 


CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS.  451 


CHAPTER  V. 

CONFLICTS   IN  ALL    DIRECTIONS. 

The  Government  did  not  yet  abandon  the  hope  of  a 
favorable  issue  in  the  ensuing  session.  Step  by  step,  in 
the  preceding  year,  had  they  drawn  nearer  to  the 
accomplishment  of  their  object ;  they  felt  that,  after 
the  first  surprise  had  worn  off,  the  country  and  the 
parliament  would  not  longer  fail  to  recognize  the 
advantages  of  the  military  reforms.  They  clung  all 
the  more  strongly  to  this  view,  as  the  firm  establish- 
ment of  the  new  army  was  rendered  more  desirable  by 
the  daily  increasing  confusion  in  German  affairs,  where, 
in  many  directions,  the  possibility  of  an  appeal  to  arms 
came  daily  nearer. 

Two  different  and  wholly  contrary  signs  of  the  times 
were  now  showing  themselves  side  by  side,  in  a  thor- 
oughly German  fashion  :  an  eager  desire  on  the  part  of 
both  Princes  and  people  for  Confederate  reform  in 
general,  and  an  utter  unlikelihood  that  any  understand- 
ing would  be  arrived  at  in  regard  to  the  particular  j^lans 
of  reform  under  consideration.  In  opposition  to  Prus- 
sia's proposal  concerning  the  Confederate  military 
organization,  the  four  Kingdoms,  with  Darmstadt  and 
Nassau,  had,  in  August,  18G0,  at  a  conference  in  Wiirz- 
burg,  brought  forward  a  proposition,  tliat  the  unity  of 


452  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

the  Confederate  army  should  be  maintained,  but  that, 
in  case  Austria  and  Prussia  placed  their  whole  force  at 
the  orders  of  the  Confederation,  the  appointment  of  the 
general  should  be  left  to  the  two  Great  Powers.  At 
their  conference  at  Teplitz  the  two  Monarchs  decided, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  leave  the  question  to  a  council  of 
generals  from  both  sides,  who  should  meet  at  Berlin. 

The  sessions  of  this  council  lasted  till  April,  1861 : 
whatever  concerned  technical  military  details  was 
readily  settled  ;  but  when  political  considerations  came 
under  discussion,  everything  ended  without  the  real 
object  having  been  attained.  It  came  out  clearly,  that 
Austria  was  far  from  disposed  to  recognize  the  funda- 
mental position  of  the  Prussian  projDOsal,  the  placing 
of  Prussia  on  an  equal  basis  with  herself ;  on  the 
contrary,  she  had  it  in  mind,  after  she  had  once  re- 
established her  own  internal  affairs  on  a  firm  basis  by 
means  of  a  strongly  centralized  government,  to  allow 
in  Germany  only  a  federation  in  which  she  should  be 
the  leading  Power :  with  this  end  in  view,  she  would 
be  well  satisfied  with  a  German  triad,  since,  under  such 
an  arrangement,  the  Lesser  States  would  be  ready  to 
keep  Prussia's  ambition  within  narrow  limits. 

In  regard  to  another  not  less  important  question,  the 
defence  of  the  northern  and  eastern  coasts,  opinions 
were  quite  as  sharply  divided.  Prussia  desired  for  this 
purpose  a  single  organization,  as  well  for  the  protection 
of  the  coasts  as  for  a  flotilla  of  gunboats  under  her 
command ;  Hanover,  on  the  other  hand,  advocated  for 
the  non-Prussian  portion  of  the  coast  a  separate  organ- 


DEFENCE  OF  THE   COASTS.  453 

ization  under  the  command  of  Hanover.  The  part  of 
Prussia  was  taken  by  those  most  nearly  concerned,  to 
whom  the  protection  of  the  coast  was  a  serious  matter, 
that  is,  by  Oldenburg  and  by  the  Hanse  Towns  ;  but 
Austria  and  the  Lesser  States  favored  Hanover,  for 
they  cared  much  less  about  the  defence  of  the  coasts  of 
the  North  Sea  than  they  did  about  preventing  any 
increase  in  the  power  of  Prussia.  The  result  of  end- 
less negotiation  was,  that  no  decision  was  arrived  at,  and 
the  coast  of  the  North  Sea  was  left  as  defenceless  as  the 
Upper  Rhine. 

On  the  other  hand,  Prussia's  protest  was  entered 
against  every  decree  of  the  Diet  tending  to  extend  its 
authority  over  matters  that  had  been  left  by  the  Act  of 
Confederation  (such  as  affairs  of  general  utility)  to 
voluntary  agreement  among  the  states  ;  and  in  regard 
to  which,  therefore,  the  Diet  could  only  take  action 
with  the  unanimous  consent  of  all  its  members.  The 
Lesser  States  had  now  united,  with  the  purj)ose  of 
increasing  the  popularity  of  the  Diet  by  pursuing  just 
this  course ;  and  they  brought  forward  one  proposal 
after  another,  all  directed  toward  tlie  most  laudable 
objects  :  a  bill  to  establish  a  Confederate  commission  to 
arrange  uniform  weights  and  measures  for  all  Germany, 
a  bill  aimed  against  piratical  reprints,  another  to  bring 
about  the  development  of  a  German  process  of  law  for 
civil  and  for  criminal  i)rosecutions.  All  these  Prussia 
opposed  for  the  well-known  reasons,  and  by  her  ojiposi- 
tion  rendered  it  impossible  to  pass  them. 

Little  trace  of  these  discussions,   however,  came  to 


454  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

light  at  the  time.  But  the  feelings  of  the  German 
people  were  quite  enough  irritated  by  the  continuance 
of  the  trouble  caused  by  the  two  great  burning  ques- 
tions, that  of  Holstein  and  that  of  Hesse-Cassel. 

Neither  the  Confederate  decree,  nor  the  Constitution 
of  1860  that  had  been  founded  upon  it,  had  sufficed  to 
settle  the  difficulties  in  Hesse-Cassel.  The  leader  of 
the  Hessian  Opposition,  the  barrister  Friedrich  Other, 
a  man  of  unyielding  character  and  of  courage  equal  to 
his  tenacity,  of  thorough  knowledge  in  legal  matters, 
and  at  the  same  time  possessing  as  a  party-leader  a 
j)rudence  never  to  be  led  astray,  gradually  gathered 
together  all  sections  of  the  country  and  all  classes  of 
the  people  about  the  banner  of  the  one  legal  Constitu- 
tion, that  of  1831.  When  the  Estates  were  to  be 
chosen  according  to  the  Constitution  of  1860,  all  the 
electors  voted  and  all  the  candidates  accepted,  with 
reservations  in  favor  of  the  ancient  right.  Hassenpflug 
had  done  away  with  the  oath  taken  by  the  representa- 
tives to  support  the  Constitution  ;  this  exactly  suited 
the  champions  of  the  ancient  right :  the  Second 
Chamber  unanimously  constituted  itself  and  then  voted 
that,  since  it  had  not  been  summoned  in  accordance 
with  the  laws  of  1831  and  1849,  it  was  incapable  of 
performing  the  functions  of  the  Estates  of  the  land. 
It  was  immediately  dissolved. 

A  new  election,  some  months  later,  produced  the 
same  result,  while  a  motion  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Baden  was  introduced  in  the  Diet,  to  the  effect 
that,  in  view  of  the  evident  impossibility   of  carrying 


HESSE-  CA  SSEL.  455 

out  the  decree  of  the  Diet,  the  Elector  should  be 
empowered  to  return  to  the  old  Constitution.  The 
Elector  was  irritated  to  the  highest  degree,  dissolved 
the  Parliament  once  more  after  a  three  days'  session, 
and  presented  to  the  Diet  a  memorial,  savage  beyond  all 
measure,  protesting  against  the  proposition  of  Baden. 
At  the  same  time,  his  enthusiastic  and  muddled  Min- 
ister, Abee,  kept  proclaiming  that  the  Elector  was  the 
sole  embodiment  of  legitimacy  in  those  wretched  times, 
and  prophesying,  a  seer  in  spite  of  himself,  that  with 
the  fall  of  the  Elector  the  whole  Confederate  Constitu- 
tion in  Germany  would  go  to  pieces. 

Of  Schleswig-Holstein  we  shall  speak  later.  On  the 
7th  of  February  the  Diet  threatened  once  more  to 
chastise  the  Duchies,  upon  which  England  and  Russia 
both  made  urgent  representations  in  Vienna,  Berlin,  and 
Frankfort,  entreating  that  such  a  measure  might  be 
abandoned,  as  likely  to  endanger  seriously  the  peace  of 
Europe. 

These  were  the  things  that  increased  the  popular 
excitement  in  all  corners  of  Germany.  Thundering 
appeals  of  the  National  Association,  energetic  resolu- 
tions of  the  Chambers  in  Dresden,  Carlsruhe,  Bruns- 
wick, tumultuous  assemblies  of  citizens  in  Suabia  and 
Franconia  —  all  re-echoed  the  cry,  that  their  rights 
should  be  restored  to  Hesse  and  to  Holstein ;  and  all 
came  to  the  decision,  that,  for  the  growtli  and  prosperity 
of  German  rights  and  German  power,  the  creation  of  a 
German  Central  Authority  and  of  a  German  Parliament 
was     required.      Zealous    patriots,    like    the    Duke    of 


456  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

Cobui'g,  bestirred  themselves  in  all  directions  to  extend 
the  idea  of  unity  from  the  educated  classes  to  the  mass 
of  the  people  :  at  a  festival  of  the  Gotha  Shooting 
Guild  a  German  Shooting  Association  was  founded  at 
the  instigation  of  the  Duke ;  soon  there  were  German 
athletic  associations  and  German  singers'  associations, 
and  at  every  German  shooting-match  and  singing- 
festival  the  greatness  of  the  united  Fatherland  was 
glorified.  Then  followed  German  conventions  of  depu- 
ties, of  cities,  of  merchants,  and  of  lawyers ;  and  through 
all  the  gatherings  of  the  different  industries  there  was 
woven  like  a  red  thread  the  cry  for  German  Unity, 
which  was  always  responded  to  by  the  applause  of 
throngs  of  spectators. 

The  same  fashion  prevailed  everywhere,  the  same 
enthusiasm,  the  same  unanimity.  Only,  if  this  was  not 
to  be  disturbed,  one  point  must  not  be  touched  upon, 
and  that  the  decisive  one  —  if  any  thought  was  enter- 
tained of  transferring  all  these  dreams  from  the  realm 
of  ideas  into  that  of  reality, —  the  question,  Avho  was  to 
be  the  future  holder  of  the  German  central  authority  ? 
On  this  there  was  a  division,  as  there  had  been  ten 
years  before,  between  the  wishes  of  the  advocates  of  an 
entire  and  tliose  of  a  restricted  Germany,  of  the  Cleri- 
cals and  of  the  Liberals,  of  the  South  Germans  and  of 
the  North  Germans.  For  this  reason  there  was  a  tacit 
agreement  at  the  great  meetings  and  festivals  to  avoid 
so  far  as  possible  the  delicate  question,  and,  instead  of 
touching  upon  that,  to  stir  the  feelings  of  the  assembled 
throngs  by  brilliant  portrayals  of  the  splendor  of  the 


KING    WILLIAM  AT  OSTEND.  457 

German  State  and  of  the  happiness  that  would  attend 
the  accomplishment  of  German  unity.  Those  who 
spoke  thus  had  no  suspicion  into  whose  hands  they 
were  playing.  The  aspirations  thus  aroused  could  not 
be  satisfied  by  any  programme  founded  on  reality, 
whether  it  aimed  at  an  entire  or  a  restricted  Germany  ; 
the  warmer  this  enthusiasm  was,  the  more  difficult  did 
it  render  any  practical  effort  for  reform,  and  thus,  as 
was  soon  seen,  it  was  only  doing  service  in  the  cause  of 
individualism. 

The  result  of  all  this,  so  far  as  the  King  of  Prussia 
was  concerned,  was  the  impression  in  his  mind  that  the 
attitude  of  reserve  hitherto  adopted  by  him  on  tlie 
great  question  could  no  longer  be  maintained,  and  that 
he  should  be  obliged  to  take  a  definite  stand  in  the 
matter.  After  the  close  of  the  session  of  the  Parlia- 
ment he  went,  as  usual,  to  Baden,  where  the  attempt  at 
assassination,  made  on  the  14th  of  July  by  a  half-crazy 
student,  had  no  other  effect  than  to  increase  his  calm 
confidence  in  God.  He  had,  at  that  time,  a  long  inter- 
view Avith  Plerr  von  Bismarck,  who  was  at  Baden 
resting  for  a  time  from  his  labors,  and  whose  first  and 
last  word  to  the  Kiuef  was  the  urfjent  recommendation 
of  a  hold  policy.  From  Baden  King  William  went  to 
the  sea-l)aths  at  Ostend,  accompanied  by  Minister  von 
Schleinitz  and  tlie  Ambassador  at  London,  Count 
Bernstorff.  Tliitlier  came  also  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Baden,  w  itli  liis  new  Minister,  Baron  von  Roggenbach, 
a  young  man  of  a  fertile  mind,  of  attractive  manners, 
and  of  vigorous  activity,  who,  following  tlie  preponder- 


458  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

ating  opinion  in  his  own  country,  openly  declared  his 
adhesion  to  the  plan  of  a  strong  central  authority, 
that  should  have  the  King  of  Prussia  at  its  head  and 
be  responsible  through  its  ministers  to  a  parliament 
chosen  by  popular  election.  In  other  words,  he  favored 
a  constitution  similar,  in  the  main,  to  the  outline  of  the 
League  of  the  Three  Kingdoms  of  May  26th,  1849,  and 
similar  to  that  in  this  point  also,  that  the  entrance  into 
the  more  restricted  union  that  was  to  be  formed  inde- 
pendent of  Austria  was  left  optional  to  each  individual 
Government.  Roggenbach  declared  himself  ready  to 
bring  forward  this  plan,  either  in  the  form  of  a  circular 
to  the  Courts  or  of  a  motion  in  the  Diet,  if  he  were 
assured  of  the  approval  of  Prussia. 

Herr  von  Schleinitz  had  many  misgivings.  Above  all 
things,  it  was  clear  to  him  that  there  must  be  no  men- 
tion of  Prussia's  taking  the  lead  in  such  a  matter. 
Then  it  was  difficult  to  see  how  such  a  twofold  apparatus 
of  Government — Ministers  of  the  Empire  responsible 
to  the  general  Parliament,  and  Prussian  Ministers 
responsible  to  the  Prussian  Parliament  —  could  work 
without  disagreement  and  friction  ;  and  Prussia  could 
not  possibly  subordinate  herself  unconditionally  with- 
out some  guaranty  of  her  independence,  to  the  control 
of  a  German  Parliament.  Before  any  definite  opinion 
was  expressed  about  the  plan,  all  these  points  must  be 
thoroughly  examined. 

Count  Bernstorff  agreed  with  the  above  criticism  in 
many  particulars,  but  showed  himself  tnore  favorably 
disposed  to  the   main  idea  than  Schleinitz    had  been. 


WILLIAM  I.   CROWNED  AT  KONIGSBERG.     459 

The  King  himself  spoke  even  more  approvingly,  and  it 
was  finally  agreed  that  Roggenbach  should  shortly  bring 
to  Berlin  a  more  detailed  development  of  his  system  for 
a  final  decision. 

Meanwhile  the  King,  having  returned  to  Berlin, 
busied  liimseli  with  the  preparations  for  his  solemn 
coronation,  which  was  to  take  the  place  of  the  usual 
paying  of  homage,  and  was  to  be  performed  at  Konigs- 
berg  on  the  18th  of  October.  He  intended  to  express 
the  great  importance  which  he  attached  to  Prussia's 
entrance  upon  her  constitutional  existence,  by  this 
renewal  of  a  ceremony  which  had  been  used  at  the 
time  when  the  electoral  hat  was  changed  into  the  Prus- 
sian kingly  crown,  and  which  had  not  been  repeated 
since.  With  this  solemnity  before  him,  he  became 
confirmed  in  his  resolution  to  give  his  foreign  policy  a 
more  decided  tone  than  it  had  had  hitherto. 

After  lie  had  returned  Napoleon's  visit  at  Compiegne 
in  the  begfinningf  of  October,  and  had  once  more  ex- 
changed  assurances  of  peace  and  friendship  with  the 
Emperor,  he  appointed  Count  Bernstorff  jSlinister  in 
place  of  Schleinitz,  and  then  set  out  on  his  journey  to 
Konigsberg,  in  order,  with  all  the  pomp  of  the  Church, 
to  place  the  regal  crown  upon  his  head.  He  went 
through  this  solemn  act  in  profound  agitation  of  spirit, 
regarding  it  as  a  promise  of  the  faithful  fulfilment  of 
duty  made  in  tlie  sight  of  God  the  Lord.  Mindful 
of  this,  he  said  at  that  time  to  the  members  of  the 
Parliament  and  the  Estates  present  at  the  ceremony  : 
"  Since    the    crown    comes    from    God    only,    I    have 


460  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

announced,  by  my  coronation  in  tlie  holy  place,  that  I 
have  received  it  in  humility  from  his  hands."  This 
consecration  made  the  prerogatives  of  that  crown  seem 
to  him  all  the  more  sacred,  though  to  his  serious  and 
upright  mind  they  transformed  themselves  immediately 
into  stern  obligations.  To  fulfil  the  obligations  and  to 
guard  the  prerogatives  was  his  determination  devoutly 
and  piously  formed.  In  the  pursuit  of  that  end  he 
cared  not  on  what  side  strife  and  opposition  awaited 
him. 

Complications  in  all  directions  were  not  wanting. 

With  Austria,  indeed,  at  that  moment  a  better  rela- 
tion seemed  about  to  be  formed  on  the  basis  of  common 
action.  The  negotiations  in  regard  to  the  Elbe  Duchies 
had  hitherto  been  carried  on  only  in  the  Diet,  and  had 
consequently  been  confined  to  Holstein.  In  August, 
1861,  Denmark  attempted  to  make  an  arrangement 
directly  with  the  two  German  Great  Powers,  upon 
which  both  the  Powers,  in  complete  accord,  on  the  basis 
of  the  Compacts  of  1852,  brought  up  also  the  com- 
plaints of  Schleswig.  Denmark  then  refused  to  allow 
that  the  two  Courts  had  any  right  to  interfere  in  such  a 
way  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Danish  State ;  so  that 
the  chance  of  war  and  perhaps  even  of  conflicts  with 
foreign  Powers  came  daily  nearer.  In  this  connection, 
evidently  the  most  important  thing  was  to  induce 
Austria  to  consent  to  common  action  as  long  as  pos- 
sible. 

For  this  reason  the  satisfaction  in  Berlin  was  all  the 
greater,  when,  in  the  autumn  of  1861,  Count  Rechberg 


BEUST'S  PROPOSITION  FOR  REFORM.       461 

besran  to  incline  to  the  Prussian  view  in  the  affairs  of 
Hesse-Cassel  also.  In  1850,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had 
been  for  a  time  Confederate  Commissioner  in  that 
country,  and  had  there  become  thoroughly  familiar  with 
the  Elector  and  his  counsels.  He  now  saw  Prussia's 
position  exalted  by  recent  events  far  and  wide  through- 
out Germany;  he  had  the  general  sympathy  for  the 
maltreated  Hessian  people  before  his  eyes ;  Austria 
herself  had  been,  since  the  26th  of  February,  1861,  a 
constitutional  state,  and  Rechberg  had  had  to  endure 
harsh  language  in  the  Imperial  Council  on  account 
of  his  former  behavior  in  Hesse.  In  short,  he  be- 
came convinced  that  in  this  matter  the  Diet  held 
an  untenable  position,  and  he  announced  to  the 
Prussian  ambassador  his  readiness  to  yield.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  say  how  gladly  this  news  was  received 
in .  Berlin. 

Unfortunately  this  was  but  a  momentary  gleam  of 
sunlight,  which  was  soon  obscured  by  clouds  darker 
than  ever  and  doubly  pregnant  with  storm.  In  the 
Saxon  Chamber  a  proposition  had  been  brought  forward 
for  a  German  central  authority  and  popular  representa- 
tion. Herr  von  Beust,  convinced,  as  we  know,  of  the 
necessity  of  the  Governments'  doing  something  for 
reform,  resolved  not  to  hesitate  longer,  and  drew  up  a 
plan  for  a  German  Constitution,  which  he  hoped  would 
be  received  with  approbation  by  all  parties  because  he 
had  allotted  a  morsel  of  reform  to  cacli.  It  was  liis  old 
idea :  the  Diet  was  to  be  replaced  by  conferences  of 
Ministers  of  all  the  German  states,  to  be  convened  for 


462  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

four  weeks  twice  in  every  year  for  a  speedy  settlement 
of  business,  once  in  the  south  at  Ratisbon  under  Aus- 
tria's presidency,  and  once  in  the  north  under  Prussia's. 
Besides  this,  he  recommended  an  assembly  of  delegates 
from  the  Parliaments  of  the  different  states,  to  be  sum- 
moned, so  soon  as  the  Diet  should  deem  it  necessary,  for 
the  consideration  of  whatever  bills  should  be  presented 
to  it ;  and  finally,  a  Confederate  Court  of  Appeal  to 
decide  disputes  that  might  arise  in  connection  with  the 
Constitution. 

In  September  he  made  a  journey  to  Vienna  to  have  a 
confidential  interview  with  Rechberg.  The  latter,  who, 
since  his  failures  in  1859,  had  been  impressed  with  the 
necessity  of  winning  popular  sj^mpathy  everywhere, 
received  him  in  a  friendly  way.  It  is  true  he  was,  for 
the  moment,  deprived  of  the  advice  of  his  firm  and 
well-informed  counsellor  in  German  matters,  Herr  von 
Biegeleben,  who  was  seriously  ill;  but  nevertheless  he 
readily  entered  u^Don  the  consideration  of  Beust's  plan, 
stifled  some  doubts  about  the  delegations,  and  induced 
Herr  von  Beust  to  introduce,  for  the  interim  between 
the  two  yearly  conferences,  a  Confederate  executive 
body,  and  even  a  Directory  of  three,  Austria,  Prussia, 
and  another  member  to  be  elected.  Beust's  proposed 
alternation  in  the  presidency  seemed  to  him,  however, 
very  hard.  "  What  will  posterity  say  of  me,"  he  sighed, 
"  if,  after  Villaf ranca  and  Zurich,  I  make  this  concession 
also  ?  "  But  even  on  this  point  he  overcame  his  feelings, 
and  induced  the  Emperor  to  give  a  conditional  assent, 
and  to  agree  that  he  would  pay  the  price,  if  that  would 


THE  PROPOSITION  REJECTED.  463 

insure  tlie  success  of  the  whole  work,  and  if  it  was 
not  to  be  accomplished  in  any  other  way.^ 

Thus  encouraged,  Herr  von  Beust,  on  the  15th  of 
October,  laid  his  creation  before  all  the  German  Courts. 
But  he  was  forced  to  suffer  a  failure  as  complete  as  can 
possibly  be  conceived.  The  rejection  of  the  plan  by 
the  party  that  favored  a  restricted  Germany  as  well  as 
by  the  Liberals  was  perfectly  natural.  "  Tliis,"  cried 
Herr  von  Roggenbach,  "  is  offering  the  German  people 
a  stone  instead  of  bread."  But  the  friends  and  sympa- 
thizers, who  favored  an  entire  Germany,  also  refused  to 
accept  this  offering. 

"The  thing,"  said  the  King  of  WUrtemberg,  "is  as 
unpractical  as  it  is  dangerous."  In  Munich  there  was 
much  annoyance  that  the  third  place  in  the  Directory 
was  not  assigned  once  for  all  to  Bavaria.  Herr  von 
Dalwigk,  who  was  always  thoroughly  loyal  to  the  cause, 
would  have  amended  the  outline  by  leaving  out  the 
main  idea  as  incapable  of  being  carried  out.  Hanover 
and  Hesse-Cassel  remained  firm  in  their  principle,  that 
the  Act  of  Confederation  of  1815  was  unalterable, 
unimprovable,  and  not  to  be  questioned.  And  now  let 
us  look  at  the  answers  of  the  two  Great  Powers,  the 
one  as  surprising  to  the  author  of  the  plan  as  the  other 
was  almost  disastrous. 

While  Beust  had  been  visiting  the  other  Courts,  at 
Vienna  Herr  von  Biegcleben  had  recovered,  and  by 
taking  a  very  decided  stand  he  had  led  both  Rechberg, 

1  Report  of  the  Piussiaii  Aniliassador,  Savigny,  of  the  2d  of  January, 
1862 ;  founded  on  a  di'tailed  account  given  by  Beust. 


464  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

who  was  hesitating,  and  the  Emperor,  who  had  all 
along  been  doubtful,  to  reject  the  project.  In  the  case 
of  Biegeleben,  this  was  caused  by  a  strong  confidence 
in  himself  in  common  with  Catholic  zeal  and  the  tradi- 
tional pride  of  jthe  Chancellorship  at  the  Vienna  Court. 
The  official  answer  of  Austria,  given  on  the  5th  of 
November,  came  unmistakably  from  his  pen,  which  we 
shall  often  see  in  action  after  this. 

In  this  answer  the  Austrian  Government,  using 
almost  condescending  language,  declined  to  go  into  the 
undoubted  merits  and  the  great  weaknesses  of  Beust's 
creation.  But  it  dwelt  mainly  upon  the  proposed 
alternation  in  the  presidency  of  the  Diet.  It  went  far 
beyond  Schwarzenberg's  counter-arguments  in  1851,  in 
the  assertion  that  the  national  unity  of  Germany  had 
its  sole  personification  in  Austria's  fixed  presidency ;  if 
this  were  to  yield  to  the  shifting  accidents  of  the  alter- 
nate arrangement,  the  result  would  be  the  dismember- 
ment of  Germany.  This  could  only  be  thought  of,  if,  in 
compensation  for  the  overthrow  of  the  acknowledged 
headship,  a  correspondingly  broader  and  firmer  basis 
were  given  to  national  unity  by  embracing  the  non- 
German  possessions  of  Austria  under  the  protection  of 
the  Confederation.  Such  talk  as  this  meant  favoring 
an  entire  Germany  in  the  very  loftiest  style. 

The  deliberations  at  Berlin  resulted  in  a  decision  of 
an  opposite  tendency.  Even  while  returning  from 
Konigsberg  Herr  von  Patow  had  communicated  to  his 
colleasfues  the  outline  of  a  national  constitution  on  the 
basis  of  "  a  restricted  union,"  but,  in  accordance  with 


ROGGEXBACH'S   OUTLINE.  465 

the  disposition  of  those  colleagues,  he  had  received  no 
answer  in  regard  to  the  troublesome  document.  Imme- 
diately after,  there  came  from  Roggenbach  the  outline 
of  a  circular  to  the  German  Courts,  which  had  been 
promised  at  Ostend ;  the  King  and  the  Ministry  con- 
sulted upon  it,  and  although  Count  Schwerin  warmly 
declared  that  such  a  subordination  of  Prussia  to  a 
German  Parliament  would  be  the  ruin  of  the  country, 
the  King  decided  to  approve  the  circular  in  general,  and 
only  to  make  a  reservation  for  the  securing  of  Prussia's 
position  as  a  European  Power.  Then  the  text  of 
Austria's  answer  to  Bcust  of  the  5th  of  November  was 
received,  and  not  a  little  annoyance  was  felt  at  the 
significance  therein  attached  to  the  presidency  of  the 
Diet :  that  which  in  1816  had  been  treated  without 
contradiction  as  a  merely  formal  guidance  in  matters  of 
))usiness,  was  now  to  be  elevated  to  a  sort  of  supreme 
headship  in  all  Germany. 

Meanwhile  Roggenbach,  on  the  appearance  of  Beust's 
[)lan,  had  for  tlie  time  laid  his  own  aside,  but  had, 
nevertheless,  on  the  strength  of  their  old  Frankfort 
acquaintance,  communicated  it  to  Herr  von  Biegeleben 
in  Vienna.  lie  received  an  answer,  dated  November 
27th.  It  began  in  a  tone  of  ill-concealed  excitement ; 
but  to  the  question  whether  Austria  was  now  more 
ready  than  under  Prince  Schwarzenberg  to  admit  the 
system  of  a  restricted  union  and  of  a  more  comprehen- 
sive alliance,  a  passionate  answer  was  given  in  the 
negative.  "  Austria,"  wrote  Biegeleben,  "  can  never 
resign  her  position  as  the  first  Power  in  rjennany  ;  by 


466  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

the  side  of  a  great  national  state  she  would  have  no 
future  before  her ;  such  a  state  would  speedily  draw 
the  Austrian  Germans  into  its  circle.  Austria  now 
stands  at  the  head  of  Germany,  and  yet  her  monarchy 
rests  on  its  own  basis,  and  is  not  forced  to  depend  upon  a 
German  Confederation  for  keeping  her  territories 
together:  this  alone  is  the  fitting  position  for  the 
Government  which  is  centred  at  Vienna.  Unfortu- 
nately we  see  that  very  soon  again  attempts  at  a 
Prusso-German  union  may  be  made :  in  that  case  a 
decided  opposition  will  not  be  lacking." 

It  was  a  variation  on  the  old  theme :  Austria  inde- 
pendent of  Germany  and  yet  the  first  Power  in 
Germany.  It  was  the  same  theory  that  had  been 
uttered  in  almost  the  same  words  in  the  Congress  in 
regard  to  the  Confederate  army.  There  was  no  choice 
left :  either  blind  submission,  or  an  open  proclamation 
of  the  standpoint  that  was  repudiated  in  Vienna. 

With  this  in  view,  the  King  ordered  an  answer  to 
Bemst's  plan  to  be  prepared.  In  this  it  was  declared 
that  the  German  Confederation  was  an  international 
league  of  states  indepsndent  and  very  different  from 
one  another ;  Prussia  keenly  desired  the  continuance  of 
this  league,  and  for  that  very  reason  was  anxious  that 
its  powers  should  be  kept  within  the  narrowest  limits 
possible  ;  whoever  wished  for  anything  better  than  this 
on  German  soil,  could  obtain  it  only  by  the  voluntary 
association  of  similar  states  in  a  restricted  union  within 
the  more  comprehensive  alliance ;  that  is,  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  federation  within  the  confederacy. 


AUSTRIA'S  POSITION.  467 

On  the  20th  of  December,  1861,  this  communication 
was  sent  to  Dresden,  and  it  was  made  public  immedi- 
ately after.  It  was  no  proposition,  no  appeal,  no  outline 
of  a  constitution  :  it  was  nothing  more  than  an  expres- 
sion of  opinion  about  the  way  to  a  really  valuable 
Confederate  reform.  But  coming  from  the  source  it 
did,  it  was  sufficient  to  produce  a  general  explosion  of 
passion  on  the  opposite  side. 

Like  an  ant-hill  disturbed  by  the  gardener's  stick  was 
the  rushing  and  hurrying  of  despatches  and  messages 
among  the  Courts  of  the  Lesser  States.  "  How  ? " 
cried  they.  "  Prussia  desires  a  more  restricted  union  ? 
She  returns  to  the  abominable  ideas  of  the  Union  and 
of  the  Assembly  in  the  Cathedral  of  St.  Paul?  It  is 
true  the  communication  says  nothing  of  Prussia's  being 
at  the  head  of  the  Empire,  of  the  mediatization  of  the 
Lesser  States,  of  the  exclusion  of  Austria,  of  a  Demo- 
cratic parliament ;  but  in  the  word  Union,  as  in  the  box 
of  Pandora,  all  evil  is  contained.  In  a  case  like  this, 
the  thing  to  do  is,  to  make  a  stand  at  the  very  begin- 
ning, to  hold  the  position  firmly,  and  to  act  togetlier." 

Some  relief  was  felt,  however,  when,  in  January, 
1862,  it  was  learned  tliat  Austria  thought  the  occasion 
serious  enough  to  require  that  she  herself  should 
undertake  the  leadersliip  in  the  contest.  About  the 
middle  of  the  month,  Count  Rechberg  came  back  from 
a  journey  to  Venice.  lie  told  the  Prussian  ambassador 
that  he  would  enter  into  no  discussion  of  the  comniuiii- 
cation  of  December  20th,  because  by  so  doing  he  might 
endanger  the  good  understanding  in  regard  to  Hesse- 


^ii6  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

Cassel ;  but  at  the  same  time  he  took  measures  to  bring 
about  a  demonstration,  as  imposing  as  possible,  against 
the  Prussian  heresy.  For  his  easily-excited  feelings 
were  this  time  thoroughly  aroused. 

"  That  communication,"  he  declared  to  the  ambassa- 
dor from  Baden,  "is  an  unexampled  challenge  on  the 
part  of  Prussia,  an  undissembled  summons  to  revolu- 
tion. After  such  a  proceeding,  the  next  thing  for 
Austria  to  do,  would  be  to  take  up  the  gauntlet,  and  by 
an  open  and  decided  programme  of  opposition  to  gather 
the  majority  of  the  German  Nation  about  herself.  We 
still  hesitate  about  doing  this,  because  in  that  case  the 
breach  with  Prussia  would  be  unavoidable,  and  a  civil 
war  would  be  proclaimed.  But  Austria  can  no  longer 
look  on,  while  Prussia  seeks  to  oust,  by  perfidious 
intrigues,  the  Imperial  State  from  Germany. 

The  angry  speeches  of  Rechberg  were  echoed  by 
Herr  von  Schmerling,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
whose  newspaper  (^Der  Botschafter')  had  already  opened 
with  savage  articles  the  campaign  against  Prussia.  "  I 
will  not  justify  all  this  violence,"  he  said ;  "  but  it  is 
the  natural  consequence  of  the  Prussian  challenge." 

The  Austrian  ambassadors  at  the  Lesser  Courts  were 
summoned  to  Vienna;  a  rising  Austrian  diplomatist, 
Count  Blome,  then  visited  those  Courts ;  the  result  of 
his  consultations  there,  was  a  note,  dated  the  2d  of 
February,  which  was  addressed  on  the  same  day  and  in 
the  same  terms  by  seven  Governments  —  Austria,  the 
four  Kingdoms,  Darmstadt,  and  Nassau  —  to  the  Cab- 
inet at  Berlin.     In   this   note   the   wickedness  of   his 


INDIGNATION  AGAINST  PRUSSIA.         469 

ideas  was  held  up  before  the  Prussian  sinner ;  he  was 
emphatically  reminded  of  the  failure  that  had  formerly 
attended  such  attempts ;  an  energetic  protest  was 
entered  against  any  limitation  of  the  sovereignty  of 
German  Princes ;  and  conferences  were  demanded  in 
regard  to  the  establishment  of  a  Confederate  directory 
and  of  an  assembly  of  delegates.  Count  Bernstorff 
answered  this  on  the  14th  of  February  very  coolly, 
denying  in  a  few  words  the  accusations  that  had  been 
brought,  and  declining  to  take  any  part  in  conferences 
carried  on  on  a  hopeless  basis. 

In  connection  with  this  correspondence,  the  Han- 
overian Minister,  Count  Platen,  observed  to  the  Prussian 
ambassador  that  King  George,  who  had  been  hitherto 
opposed  to  any  change  in  the  Confederate  Constitution, 
had  been  forced  only  by  Prussia's  action  to  adopt  the 
standpoint  of  the  note  of  the  2d  of  February.  Platen 
said  that  he  himself  had  hitherto  always  defended 
Prussia's  interests,  but  was  now  obliged  to  declare 
that  Hanover  was  firmly  allied  with  the  Confederates  of 
Wiirzburg,  and  must  be  counted  among  the  opponents 
of  Prussia. 

Thus  the  conflict  between  the  party  favoring  an 
entire  and  that  favoring  a  restricted  Germany  now 
showed  itself  among  the  Governments  as  it  liad  hitherto 
done  among  the  people ;  and  on  tlie  side  of  those  who 
favored  an  entire  Germany,  at  least,  warnings  had  not 
been  lacking,  that  any  farther  step  of  Prussia  along  the 
path  she  had  entered  would  occasion  a  declaration  of 
war.     In  order  to  make  the    situation   as    dillicnlt  as 


470  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

possible  for  the  Prussian  ruler,  at  the  same  with  this 
defection  of  the '  German  Princes,  the  internal  conflict 
in  regard  to  the  military  reforms  increased  in  violence, 
in  a  way  excluding  every  prospect  of  an  amicable 
settlement. 

Immediately  after  the  close  of  the  session  of  the 
Parliament,  the  extreme  Left  of  the  Lower  House  had 
constituted  itself  a  "  German  Progressist "  party,  and 
had  circulated  its  programme  in  all  parts  of  the  country. 
This  consisted  of  complaints  of  the  half-heartedness 
and  weakness  of  the  Ministry,  and  of  an  appeal  for  the 
election  of  men  that  would  stand  forth  with  energy  and 
determination  for  the  just  demands  of  the  people.  This 
was  explained  to  mean  open  war  against  the  Upper 
House,  without  a  remodelling  of  which  no  law  of  a 
liberal  tendency  could  be  passed  ;  a  refusal  of  any  con- 
sent to  the  new  arrangement  of  the  army,  till  a  law  had 
settled  the  continued  existence  of  the  militia,  a  two 
years'  term  of  service,  and  by  this  means  a  diminution 
of  the  taxes ;  and  finally,  a  desire  that  the  Government 
should  without  delay  take  vigorous  steps  for  the  calling 
of  a  German  Parliament  and  the  creation  of  a  Prusso- 
German  central  authority. 

This  last  stipulation  at  once  calls  forth  the  question, 
how  it  was  possible  to  urge  the  Government  to  a  policy 
in  German  affairs  that  implied  a  great  war  at  the  very 
outset,  and  at  the  same  time  to  deny  them  the  most 
necessary  means  for  such  a  war,  an  effective  army? 
The  answer  to  this  is,  that  the  party  had  no  belief  in 
any  war  on  account  of  the  German  question.     Consid- 


THE  PARTY  OF  PROGRESS  IN  PRUSSIA.      471 

ering  the  results  obtained  by  the  National  Association, 
the  sentiments  of  many  of  the  German  Chambers,  and 
the  agitation  everywhere  carried  on  for  German  Unity, 
they  thought  that  if  Prussia  could  only  gain  the  favor 
of  the  German  people,  the  masses  and  the  Chambers 
would  soon  compel  the  reluctant  Governments  to  yield 
and  follow  her  plans  ;  but  the  first  condition  of  this  was, 
that  Prussia  should  show  herself  thoroughly  liberal  in 
internal  affairs,  should  establish  a  constitution  in  a 
liberal  spirit,  and,  above  all,  should  turn  her  back  upon 
a  measure  so  highly  unpopular  and  reactionary  as  the 
strengthening  of  the  standing  army.  Certainly,  any 
one  who  remembered  the  attitude  of  Austria  in  1850, 
the  hatred  of  Prussia  manifested  by  the  people  of 
Suabia  and  Bavaria  in  1859,  the  hostility  universally 
displayed  by  the  Clerical  party  to  all  efforts  in  the 
direction  of  a  restricted  Germany,  could  not  listen  to 
these  speeches  of  a  vague  enthusiasm  without  anxiety. 
Nevertheless,  the  majority  of  what  had  formerly  been 
the  Ministerial  party  kept  drawing  nearer  and  nearer  to 
the  party  of  Progress.  The  appeal,  which  the  former 
issued  to  the  electors,  differed  from  that  issued  by  the 
latter,  not  in  the  matter  of  its  demands,  but  in  hardly 
anything  more  than  the  indication  of  somewhat  more 
prudence  in  the  methods  to  be  pursued,  of  a  reluctance 
to  proceed  at  once  to  violent  measures.  The  mass  of 
the  people  thronghout  the  country  showed  no  great 
enthusiasm  for  the  retention  of  the  militia  in  the 
regular  army,  nor  for  the  inspiring  thought  of  German 
Unity  ;  but    the  alluring  watchwords  of  a  two  years' 


472  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

term  of  service  and  diminished  taxes  found  an  echo 
everywhere.  The  result  of  the  elections  on  the  6th  of 
December  was  a  complete  overthrow  of  the  Conserva- 
tives, whose  strength  was  reduced  to  twenty-four  votes, 
and  a  great  triumph  of  the  Pi'ogressist  party  and  their 
friends,  the  moderate  Liberals,  who  had  every  prospect 
of  controlling  a  majority  in  the  new  House. 

The  Government,  filled  with  a  desire  to  arrive  at  an 
amicable  arrangement,  immediately  after  the  opening  of 
the  session,  which  took  place  on  the  14th  of  January, 
1862,  brought  in  the  draft  of  a  law  in  regard  to  the 
obligation  to  serve,  as  had  been  requested  by  the  former 
House,  and  announced  further  economies  in  the  ex- 
penses of  the  army.  Drafts  of  laws  were  also  produced 
in  regard  to  the  abolition  of  the  proprietary  police  and 
the  introduction  of  a  liberal  arrangement  of  districts  ; 
another  draft,  in  regard  to  the  Chamber  of  Accounts, 
was  intended  to  establish  as  a  permanent  law  the 
method  which  had  been  generally  adopted  there  in 
dealing  with  the  budget ;  and  finally,  a  fourth  draft  was 
brought  forward,  which,  by  a  change  in  the  provision  of 
the  Constitution  that  gave  the  right  of  impeaching  a 
Minister  to  either  House  of  Parliament,  made  that 
right  dependent  upon  a  common  resolution  of  both 
Houses. 

The  general  impression  of  these  propositions  upon 
the  deputies  was  not  very  favorable.  It  was  said  that 
the  two  liberal  laws  would  certainly  be  thrown  out  by 
the  Upper  House ;  so  far  from  there  being  any  mention 
of  a  remodelling  of  that  House,  its  consent  was  now  to 


THE   OPPOSITION  IN  THE  LOWER  HOUSE.      473 

be  made  necessary  before  a  Minister  could  be  impeached. 
The  bakmce  of  the  proposed  drafts  of  laws,  they  said, 
inclined,  therefore,  to  the  side  of  the  reactionary  party ; 
and  for  such  a  return  as  this  the  country  was  asked  to 
take  upon  itself  the  three  years'  term  of  service  and 
the  expense  of  the  new  regiments  ! 

Kor  was  the  Majority  better  satisfied  with  the 
management  of  foreign  affairs  and  its  results,  in  spite 
of  the  assurances  held  out  in  the  speech  from  the 
thi'one  that  the  path  hitherto  chosen  in  German  matters 
would  be  persisted  in.  In  the  very  first  sessions 
motions  were  brought  forward  for  explicit  statements 
concerning  Hesse-Cassel,  as  well  as  concerning  Confed- 
erate reform,  which  were  referred  to  special  committees. 
In  regard  to  Hesse-Cassel  two  forms  of  a  motion  were 
considered  by  the  committee,  both  decidedly  hostile  to 
the  Elector,  but  one  couched  in  comparatively  moderate 
terms,  the  other  much  more  violent. 

Count  Bernstorff,  who  had  with  joy  found  Austria 
ready  for  common  action  in  this  matter,  in  spite  of  all 
previous  disputes,  for  that  reason  besought  the  commit- 
tee to  adopt  the  milder  form,  but  only  succeeded  with 
difficulty  in  bringing  about  a  combination  of  the  two 
propositions  to  the  following  effect :  "  It  is  urgently 
requested  that  the  Government  will  use  all  possible 
means  for  tlie  complete  restoration  of  constitutional 
rights  in  Hesse-Cassel."  This  was  accepted  in  the 
House  by  an  overwhelming  majority.  As  for  Count 
Bernstorff,  the  deputies  did  not  sjieak  of  him  with 
great    respect.      He    had,    they   said,    about   as   much 


474  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

courage  and  energy  as  his  predecessor,  Schleinitz  ;  he 
employed  no  means  but  diplomatic  trickery,  and  was 
frightened  at  every  open  and  energetic  expression  of 
the  popular  will. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  14th  of  February,  the  notes  of  the 
seven  Governments,  mentioned  above,  had  been  received 
by  Prussia  and  answered  in  the  negative.  The  Majority 
in  the  House  did  not  indeed  find  fault  because  the 
Government  had  not  answered  the  notes  with  cannon, 
but  they  were  now  all  the  more  urgent  that  that  course 
should  be  pursued,  which,  according  to  their  ojDinions, 
could  alone  lead  to  safety,  —  the  peaceful  gaining  over  of 
the  German  people  by  an  open  declaration  of  the  entire 
plan  of  a  restricted  Germany. 

The  committee  to  which  this  matter  had  been  referred 
adopted  a  resolution  on  the  25th  of  February,  which 
emphasized  in  sufBciently  plain  terms  the  claim  of  the 
German  nation  to  the  Imperial  Constitution  of  1849, 
briefly  and  roundly  denied  the  legal  existence  of  the 
Diet,  which  had  been  abolished  in  1848,  and  could  not 
be  restored  without  the  consent  of  the  popular  repre- 
sentatives in  the  different  countries,  and  thus  arrived  at 
the  followinef  motion :  "  That  the  Plouse  considers  it 
necessary  to  form  a  more  comprehensive  alliance  with 
Austria  and  a  restricted  union  with  the  other  States, 
which  latter  shall  have  Prussia  at  its  head  and  shall 
have  a  German  parliament;  the  Government  should 
make  this  openly  the  object  of  their  policy,  and  should 
at  once  seek  to  realize  it  by  mutual  understandings  with 
the  other  German  states." 


THE  DIFFICULTIES  INCREASE.  475 

The  Ministry  saw  in  these  declarations  a  serious 
danger  to  its  German  policy.  The  majority  even  of  its 
Liberal  members  had  only  with  reluctance  agreed  to  the 
communication  of  December  20th,  which,  by  its  sug- 
gestions of  German  Unity,  had  so  sorely  disturbed 
German  unanimity.  And  now  were  they  to  be  called 
on  to  protest  against  the  legality  of  the  Diet,  which 
Prussia,  like  all  the  other  German  Governments,  had 
recognized  in  1851,  and  the  contributions  to  which  had 
since  that  time  been  granted  yearly  by  the  Prussian 
Parliament  and  by  all  the  German  Chambers?  The 
committee  was  therefore  informed  that  the  whole 
motion  was  calculated  to  defeat  its  own  object;  it 
would  call  forth  and  strengthen  opposition  everywhere, 
and  would  render  useless  the  efforts  of  the  Government 
for  a  Confederate  reform  that  Avas  really  attainable. 
The  answer  of  the  committee  was  an  unconditional 
persistence  in  their  determination  and  tlie  bringing  of 
their  proposals  before  the  whole  House. 

This  action  caused  intense  irritation  on  both  sides. 
The  Government  felt  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  get 
along  for  any  length  of  time  with  an  assembly  so 
violent  in  its  demands,  and  at  the  same  time  so  inconsid- 
erate ;  what  term  could  be  applied  to  their  action  in 
bitterly  opposing  the  strengthening  of  the  arm}^  and  at 
the  same  time  making  requirements  which,  if  yielded 
to,  would  at  once  be  tlie  signal  for  an  attack  by  the 
Confederation  and  a  war  with  Austria  and  South 
Germany  ? 

On  tlie  other  hand,  the  conviction  had  become  estab- 


476  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

lislied  in  the  minds  of  the  deputies,  that  the  existing 
INIinistiy,  whether  of  Bernstorff  or  Schleinitz,  was 
hovering  without  vigor  or  energy  around  the  great 
problems  of  Prussian  power  and  honor,  and  drew  back 
in  fear  before  every  lofty  aim  and  every  bold  decision. 
If,  at  the  time  of  the  election  agitation  in  the  autumn, 
there  had  still  remained  a  hope  of  a  decided  policy  that 
should  aim  at  acquiring  for  Prussia  an  honorable  posi- 
tion in  Europe,  there  was  now  an  end  of  that  illusion ; 
but  equally  surely  was  there  an  end  of  any  thought  of 
consenting  to  the  new  regiments  of  the  line,  which 
would  be  employed  only  in  an  idle  service  of  parade. 

At  this  time  every  hope  of  an  understanding  in  the 
committee  on  military  matters  also  vanished.  What- 
ever else  may  have  been  satisfactory  about  the  Govern- 
ment's proposition,  the  committee  remained  firm  in  the 
position  that  everything  was  unessential,  so  long  as  a 
concession  was  not  made  in  regard  to  the  two  years' 
term.  At  length,  on  the  5th  of  JVIarch,  Herr  von  Roon 
made  a  final  statement,  that  the  Government  could  not 
accede  to  this  innovation,  but  must  adhere  to  the  legal 
condition  of  things,  a  three  years'  term.  Upon  this  the 
Majority  persisted  in  their  resolution  to  strike  out  from 
the  budget  the  cost  of  the  new  formations  in  the  army. 
"  You  talk  about  the  Law  of  1814,"  they  said.  "  Very 
well,  we  will  use  our  rights  in  regard  to  the  budget. 
You  call  out  soldiers  and  form  battalions,  tliat  is  your 
privilege.  We  refuse  you  the  money  necessary  for 
their  support,  that  is  ours." 

Just  at  this  time  an  occasion  offered  itself  for  insur- 


THE  HOHENZOLLERN  MINISTRY  RESIGN.     477 

ingf  the  effect  in  detail  of  such  a  determination.  On 
the  6th  of  March  came  the  report  of  the  committee  that 
had  been  appointed  to  consider  the  draft  of  the  Law 
concerning  the  Chamber  of  Accounts.  The  most 
important  point  of  this  report  was  the  legal  confirma- 
tion of  the  habitual  practice,  according  to  which,  the 
statement  of  the  budget  contained  only  the  sums  total 
under  the  different  main  headings  and  the  Government 
was  not  bound  by  any  designated  allotment  of  the 
appropriations  carried  into  details.  In  opposition  to 
this  the  deputy  Hagen  moved  to  specialize  the  state- 
ment even  for  the  current  year ;  that  is,  to  make 
detailed  allotments  by  which  the  Government  should 
be  bound.  The  motion  was  directed,  as  was  shortly 
after  openly  declared,  against  the  military  plans  of  the 
administration.  It  was  desired  to  prevent  the  Govern- 
ment from  saving  enough  out  of  the  large  appropria- 
tions under  the  various  main  headings  to  keep  the  new 
formations  in  the  arm}-  on  foot.  Although  the  Minister 
of  Finance  declared  it  impossible  to  apply  such  an 
arrangement  to  the  statement  of  1862  then  under  con- 
sideration, promised  to  carry  out  the  specialization 
himself  for  1863,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  his  si3eech 
clearly  implied  that  the  continuance  in  office  of  the 
Cal)inet  depended  upon  the  vote,  the  House  adopted 
Hagen's  motion,  one  hundred  and  seventy -seven  against 
one  Imndi'ed  and  forty-three. 

This  was  an  open  declaration  of  war,  on  the  part  of 
the  House,  against  the  entire  plan  of  the  military 
reforms,  and  it  was  received  with  api)roval  and  delight 


478  CONFLICTS  IN  ALL  DIRECTIONS. 

in  all  parts  of  the  country.  It  was  the  signal  for  the 
close  of  the  new  era. 

The  Liberal  Ministers  had  now  in  the  Lower  House 
only  a  small  minority  on  tlieir  side,  and  in  the  Ui^per 
House  they  were  detested  as  much  as  ever.  Prince  von 
Hohenzollern  had  already  practically  withdrawn,  and 
Herr  von  Auerswald  had  been  long  an  invalid.  On 
the  8th  of  March  the  whole  Cabinet  offered  its  resigna- 
tion to  the  King.  The  King,  however,  did  not  accept 
it,  but  expressed  his  confidence  in  his  Ministers,  and 
asked  them  to  advise  him  as  to  the  measures  that 
should  be  taken  under  the  circumstances.  They  were 
all  agreed  as  to  the  first:  the  Lower  House  must  be 
dissolved;  and  this  appeared  all  the  more  desirable, 
since  on  the  11th  of  March  the  debate  on  the  German 
question  was  to  come  on,  which  the  Government 
desired  above  all  things  to  avoid.  On  that  very  day, 
the  11th,  the  dissolution  took  place. 

But  as  to  what  was  to  be  done  next,  the  different 
elements  of  the  Cabinet  disagreed.  In  order  to  pro- 
claim to  public  opinion,  now  so  excited,  the  favorable 
disposition  of  the  Government,  Count  Schwerin  pro- 
posed that  the  draft  of  the  law  concerning  the  arrange- 
ment of  districts  should  be  further  adapted  to  the 
wishes  of  the  Liberal  Majority.  Herren  von  der 
Heydt  and  von  Roon,  however,  pointed  out  that  this 
would  carry  with  it  the  risk  of  a  loss  of  the  friendship 
of  the  Upper  House,  so  important  for  the  military 
reforms.  And  on  general  principles  they  held  that, 
after   recent   occurrences,    no  good   results    could    be 


THE  HOHENZOLLERN  MINISTRY  RESIGN.     479 

obtained  from  the  Lower  House  by  yielding,  but  only 
by  firmness.  The  King  thought  that,  step  by  step,  too 
much  advance  had  been  made  toward  the  Left ;  he  was 
afraid  of  finalh^  abandoning  a  conservative  basis 
entirely,  and  therefore  rejected  Schwerin's  proposal. 
The  immediate  result  was  the  definitive  resignation  of 
the  Liberal  Ministers,  Auerswald,  Schwerin,  Patow, 
Bernuth,  and  Count  Piickler, 

Roon,  Von  der  Heydt,  who  now  became  Minister  of 
Finance,  and  Count  Bernstorff,  remained.  The  presi- 
dency of  the  INIinistry  was  assumed  by  the  President  of 
the  Upper  House,  Prince  Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen  ;  and 
in  the  place  of  those  who  had  resigned,  Herren  von 
Jagow,  von  Miihler,  von  Holzbrink,  and  the  Counts 
zur  Lippe  and  von  Itzenplitz  were  appointed.  A 
thoroughly  conservative  Cabinet  was  thus  opposed  to 
the  radical  tendencies  of  the  future  Lower  House. 


BOOK   VIIL 


BEaiNNINa    OF  THE  MINISTRY  OF 
BISMARCK. 


CHAPTER  I. 

STRUGGLE   OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

The  Prussian  Ministry  of  March  18th,  1862,  of  which 
the  virtual  leader  was  the  Minister  of  Finance,  Von 
der  Heydt,  in  the  beginning  of  its  existence  had  some 
weighty  events  to  record  in  German  politics. 

In  spite  of  the  tension  of  relation  which  existed 
between  the  two  German  Great  Powers,  and  which  had 
been  made  manifest  in  the  notes  of  the  seven  Govern- 
ments communicated  on  the  2d  of  February,  Count 
Rechberg  had  been  unwilling  to  leave  to  the  Prussian 
Government  alone  anything  so  popular  as  the  defence 
of  Schleswiof-Holstein  and  of  the  constitutional  rigfhts 
of  Hesse-Cassel.  He  therefore  continued  without 
interruption  to  take  part  energetically  in  common  with 
the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  in  the  war  of  despatches  against 
Denmark. 

As  regards  Hesse-Cassel,  the  Elector  made  a  third 
attempt  in  18G2  to  get  together  on  the  basis  of  a  new 
constitution  a  parliament  that  would  be  amenable ;  but 
this  failed  as  completely  as  the  two  former.  Rechberg 
then  linally  listened  to  Prussia's  propcisitioii.  tliat  with- 
out any  criticism  of  fonner  decrees  of  the  Diet,  and 
solely  on  the  ground  of  the  impossibility  of  any  other 
course,  the   Elector   should   be  forced  to  yield  to  the 

483 


484        STRUGGLE   OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

wishes  of  liis  people.  Both  Powers,  therefore,  moved, 
on  the  8th  of  March,  in  the  Diet,  that  that  body  should 
call  upon  the  Elector  to  bring  into  effect  once  more  the 
Constitution  of  1831,  such  provisions  of  that  Constitu- 
tion as  were  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the  Confed- 
eration having  been  first  expunged. 

As  a  number  of  the  smaller  Courts  found  it  hard  to 
reconcile  themselves  to  such  a  repeal  of  the  steps  that 
had  formerly  been  taken  in  that  wretched  business,  the 
decision  in  regard  to  the  motion,  according  to  the  usual 
Frankfort  practice,  was  long  delayed.  It  occurred  to 
King  William,  therefore,  that  it  might  be  a  good  thing 
if  he  himself  should  appeal  directly  and  personally  to 
the  Elector.  He  could  send  him,  by  one  of  his  adju- 
tants, an  autograph  letter,  calling  his  attention  to  the 
certainty  that  the  Diet  would  agree  to  the  motion 
before  it,  and  representing  to  him  how  admirable  it 
would  be,  if,  before  that  happened,  he  should  grant  of 
his  own  accord  what  was  desired,  and  should  at  the 
same  time  call  into  his  Ministry  men  who  had  the 
public  confidence.  The  letter  was  to  make  it  clear 
that  Prussia  could  no  longer  tolerate  a  hotbed  of 
increasing  agitation  between  her  provinces,  and  would 
therefore  be  driven,  in  her  own  interest,  in  case  of 
further  obstinacy  on  the  Elector's  part,  to  take  decided 
steps. 

The  King  first  of  all  invited  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna 
to  take  part  in  this  measure,  and  at  the  same  time  laid 
before  it  a  list  of  those  who  might  become  INIinisters  in 
Hesse.     But  Count  Rechberg  at  once  replied  that  this 


AFFAIRS  IN  HESSE-CASSEL.  485 

would  be  interferinfj  too  far  in  the  Elector's  sovereisfii 
rights,  and  that  Austria  could  the  less  take  part  in  such 
an  act,  since  at  the  head  of  the  list  of  Ministers 
presented  stood  the  name  of  a  former  "  March  "  Min- 
ister, of  acknowledged  leanings  towards  a  restricted 
Germany^  Herr  von  Wintzingerode :  Austria  might 
yield  to  such  an  appointment  so  far  as  it  affected  Hesse, 
but  never  as  it  affected  Germany. 

The  Elector,  encouraged  by  so  much  hesitation,  broke 
in  upon  these  deliberations,  on  the  26th  of  April,  with 
a  brutal  order,  by  which  the  participation  of  every 
citizen  in  the  elections  for  the  Parliament  was  made 
dependent  upon  a  previous  express  recognition  of  the 
Constitution  of  1860 :  without  such  recognition  no 
elector  was  to  be  permitted  to  cast  his  vote,  and  it  was 
expected  that  by  this  means  the  small  company  of  the 
Elector's  faithful  followers  Avould  be  chosen  by  a 
minority  of  the  voters  and  would  form  a  popular 
representation  that  would  be  well  affected.  The  indig- 
nation of  the  country  flamed  high  ;  all  the  electors  of 
Cassel  sent  a  complaint  to  the  Confederate  Diet,  a 
committee  of  which  had  now  for  two  months  been 
deliberating  without  result  upon  the  proposition  of  the 
Great  Powers.  The  Elector  laughed;  and  counting  on 
his  secret  supporters  at  Frankfort,  he  sent  out,  on  the 
3d  of  May,  the  writs  for  the  parliamentar}'-  elections,  in 
accordance  with  the  order  mentioned  above. 

But  patience  was  now  exhausted  at  Berlin.  On  the 
6th  of  May,  Count  Bernstorff  sent  word  to  Vienna 
that    the    Elector   had    pushed    things    to   extremities. 


48G        STRUGGLE   OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

Prussia,  he  said,  could  no  longer  make  her  action 
dependent  upon  the  delays  at  Frankfort,  and  she 
believed  that  Austria's  feeling  was  the  same.  He 
therefore  repeated,  with  a  request  for  strict  secrecy,  the 
proposition  that  the  two  Cabinets,  acting  in  common, 
should  send  two  generals  to  Cassel,  to  demand  first  a 
postponement  of  the  elections,  and,  in  case  of  a  refusal, 
to  declare  diplomatic  relations  broken  off. 

At  that  time  in  Vienna,  in  consequence  of  the  affair 
of  the  Tariff-Union,  which  we  shall  mention  later,  the 
feeling  toward  Prussia  had  grown  decidedly  less 
friendly,  while  there  was  a  strong  desire  to  keep  the 
leading  role  in  the  work  of  popular  salvation,  and 
hence  to  retain  that  work  in  the  hands  of  the  Diet. 
The  sending  of  the  generals  was,  therefore,  declined; 
but  it  was  proposed  to  move  that  the  Diet  should 
prohibit  the  carrying  on  of  the  elections,  which  motion, 
if  passed,  would  render  any  independent  action  on  the 
part  of  the  Governments  superfluous.  "  Very  well, 
then,"  telegraphed  Bernstorff  in  reply.  "  The  King 
will  make  this  last  attempt ;  but  if  the  prohibition  is 
not  agreed  to  in  the  next  sitting  of  the  Diet,  General 
von  Willisen  will  march  to  Cassel,  and  Prussia  will 
look  to  her  own  interests  on  her  own  account." 

The  telegraph  was  busy  in  all  directions;  and  almost 
all  the  German  Courts,  with  the  exception  of  Hanover 
and  INIecklenburg-Schwerin,  had  instructed  their  repre- 
sentatives to  vote  for  the  prohibition  at  the  sitting  on 
the  10th  of  May.  On  the  other  side,  the  Hessian 
representative   demanded  a  postponement  till   the  fol- 


GENERAL   WILLI  SEN  IN  CASSEL.  487 

lowing  sitting,  a  demand  which,  according  to  the 
regular  order  of  business,  had  to  be  granted.  As  Herr 
von  Usedom  reported  that  there  was  every  possibility 
of  a  similar  demand  at  the  next  session,  and  as  Herr 
von  Sydow  sent  word  from  Cassel  that  the  Elector  was 
intoxicated  with  his  victory  in  obtaining  the  postpone- 
ment, and  was  determined  to  refuse  obedience  even  to 
the  prohibition,  King  William,  on  the  11th  of  May, 
ordered  General  Willisen  to  set  out  for  Cassel,  and 
made  it  known  in  Vienna  that  a  refusal  on  the  Elector's 
part  would  involve  serious  consequences. 

The  first  thing  Willisen  learned,  when  he  saw 
Adjutant  von  Lossberg  at  Wilhelmshohe,  was  that  the 
secret  of  his  coming  had  been  badly  kept.  Lossberg 
informed  him  that  orders  had  been  given  that  no  one 
should  present  him  to  the  Elector  but  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Goddaus.  Soon  after  came  a  letter 
from  Lossberg  announcing  that  the  Elector  was  ill  in 
bed.  Willisen  returned  to  Cassel,  and  was  not  received 
by  Goddaus,  who,  however,  had  a  short  conversation 
with  him  afterwards  at  Sydow's,  but  would  say  nothing 
definite  about  the  further  treatment  of  the  General. 
During  this  time,  however,  news  had  been  brought  to 
the  Elector  of  movements  of  Prussian  troops  toward 
the  Hessian  boundaries,  and  this  put  him  into  such  a 
state  of  wrath  that  he  determined  to  have  done  with 
his  troublesome  visitor  at  once. 

At  eight  in  the  evening  Willisen  Avas  informed  that 
the  Elector,  though  ill,  had  come  to  town  and  would 
receive   him  then.     In   the  ante-chamber   tlie    General 


488        STRUGGLE  OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

found  the  two  Ministers,  Abee  and  Goddaus,  who 
followed  him  when  he  entered,  so  that  he  could  have 
no  further  doubt  as  to  the  result.  The  Elector  held 
the  King's  letter,  which  had  been  given  to  him,  in  his 
hand.  Willisen  asked  whether  His  Electoral  High- 
ness would  not  open  it  (as  is  generally  the  custom). 
The  Elector  said :  "  That  is  not  etiquette,"  and  tossed 
the  letter  upon  a  table  standing  before  the  mirror. 
Willisen  was  then  obliged  to  speak,  and  said  that  it 
was  his  duty  only  to  repeat,  as  well-meant  and  strongly- 
urged  advice,  what  had  been  frequently  said.  The 
Elector  interrupted  him :  "  Every  new  Minister  in 
Prussia  wants  to  play  a  new  game  in  Hesse ;  all  mis- 
fortune in  Hesse  comes  from  Prussia;  everything 
would  be  peaceable  here,  if  some  one  from  there  were 
not  always  meddling."  "  Only  one  point  is  at  issue 
just  now,"  observed  Willisen,  "  in  regard  to  which 
there  is  but  one  opinion  in  all  Germany :  that  is,  the 
stopping  of  the  proceedings  in  regard  to  the  elections." 
The  Elector  cried :  "  A  constitution  involves  elections ; 
no  one  can  release  ministers  from  a  constitutional 
duty."  To  this  Willisen  agreed,  but  emphasized  the 
fact  that  the  main  thing  that  was  proposed  was  the 
withdrawal  of  the  order  of  the  26th  of  April,  which 
was  by  no  means  prescribed  by  the  Constitution.  The 
Elector,  extremely  angry,  burst  out :  "  Very  extraordi- 
nary, that  the  King  of  Prussia  criticises  such  steps  in 
another  country,  yet  will  soon  be  obliged  to  do  much 
worse  things  in  his  own ! "  At  these  words  Ab^e 
hastily  interposed,  and  made  a  long  argument  in  justifi- 


PRUSSIA'S   THREATENING  ATTITUDE.        489 

cation  of  the  order.  This  Willisen  briefly  disposed  of» 
and  then  turned  again  to  the  Elector :  he  besought  him 
not  to  give  a  final  answer  in  the  negative ;  in  the 
morning  all  his  fellow-members  of  the  Diet  would 
address  the  same  recommendation  to  him  that  was  now 
made  by  Prussia.  The  Elector  shook  his  head.  Willi- 
sen continued :  "  Then  I  must  announce  the  intention 
of  His  Majesty  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations." 
The  Elector  closed  the  interview :  "  I  cannot  prevent 
the  King  from  doing  so,"  he  said ;  "  but  it  is  a  singular 
proceeding  to  withdraw  ambassadors,  because  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  a  neighboring  country  everything 
does  not  go  on  exactly  as  one  prescribes." 

After  this,  there  was  naturally  no  mention  of  a 
change  of  JNIinistry. 

On  the  13th  of  May  the  Diet  agreed  to  the  prohibi- 
tion ;  but  as  this  made  no  change  in  the  attitude  of  the 
Elector,  King  William  ordered  the  Westphalian  and 
Magdeburg  army-corps  to  be  ready  to  march  on  the 
23d ;  and  on  the  18th,  Sydow,  with  the  threat  of  a 
declaration  of  war,  demanded,  as  satisfaction  for  the 
insulting  treatment  of  General  von  Willisen  and  the 
formal  disregard  of  the  King's  letter,  the  immediate 
dismissal  of  the  Hessian  Ministry.  It  is  not  to  be 
denied  that  this  action  might  have  brought  Prussia  into 
a  difficult  position,  if  the  Elector  had  persisted  in  an 
obstinate  and  passive  resistance  ;  since  Austria,  as  well 
as  the  Diet,  would  very  soon  have  objected  energetically 
to  any  continued  occupation  of  Hesse-Cassel.  The 
very  threat  of  such  a  tiling  caused  great  excitement  in 
Vienna. 


490        STRUGGLE   OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

Clearly,  the  steps  taken  by  Prussia  could  have  no  real 
meaning  nor  significance,  unless  a  determination  had 
been  formed  at  Berlin  to  make  the  Hessian  question,  as 
Prince  Schwarzenberg  had  made  it  in  1850,  the  critical 
point  of  a  question  that  affected  all  Germany,  this 
being  done  at  the  risk  of  a  great  war  with  Austria  and 
the  Lesser  States.  Whether  King  William  personally 
had  this  idea,  I  do  not  know ;  but  it  is  certain  that  it 
was  not  entertained  by  his  Cabinet. 

At  that  time  Herr  von  Bismarck,  who  had  just  been 
recalled  from  St.  Petersburg  and  ordered  to  go  to 
Paris,  was  in  Berlin.  Count  Bernstorff  asked  him  his 
opinion.  Bismarck  answered :  "  The  circumstance  of 
the  Elector's  throwing  a  royal  letter  upon  a  table  is  not 
a  very  sound  casus  belli ;  but  if  you  want  war,  make  me 
your  under-secretary  of  state,  and  I  will  furnish  you 
within  four  weeks  a  German  civil  war  of  the  finest 
quality."     But  Count  Bernstorff  drew  back  in  dismay. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  seen  what  an  emphatic  word 
from  Prussia  was  worth  in  Germany.  The  fine  co- 
operation of  Bernstorff  and  Rechberg  in  Hessian  affairs 
had  not  been  able  in  two  months  to  bring  about  a  decis- 
ion of  the  committee  of  the  Diet ;  now,  when  Prussia 
announced  an  ultimatum  with  her  hand  on  her  sword, 
the  Austro-Prussian  motion  of  March  8th  for  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  Constitution  of  1831  became  in  a 
few  days  a  Confederate  decree,  upon  which  the  Hessian 
Ministry,  glad  of  a  good  excuse,  offered  their  resigna- 
tion without  delay. 

A  few  weeks  passed,  after  this,  before  the  formation 


QUESTIONS  OF  TARIFF.  491 

of  a  new  Cabinet.  The  wish  of  Prussia,  to  see  a  pro- 
fessed supporter  of  the  old  Constitution  at  its  head, 
was  not,  indeed,  fulfilled ;  but  one  of  the  former 
Ministers,  a  certain  Herr  von  Dehn-Rotfelser,  who  was 
raised  to  that  position,  to  the  agreeable  surprise  of  the 
rest  of  the  world,  and  to  the  great  vexation  of  the 
Elector,  took  his  stand  conscientiously  and  honestly  on 
the  basis  of  the  ancient  rights,  proclaimed  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  the  Constitution  of  1831,  and  immediately 
sent  out  writs  for  the  elections,  in  accordance  with  the 
electoral  law  of  1849. 

But  whatever  happened,  Prussia's  victory  over  the 
Elector,  the  Diet,  and  the  system  consecrated  at 
Olmiitz,  could  no  longer  be  questioned.  What  the 
last  House  of  Deputies  had  so  eagerly  demanded  of  the 
Prussian  Government  had  been  accomplished  to  its 
fullest  extent. 

Still  more  in  harmony  were  the  Government  and  the 
representatives  of  the  people  in  regard  to  a  commercial 
and  political  question,  which  quickly  acquired  such  an 
importance  that  it  threatened  to  kindle  a  conflagration 
that  would  destroy  the  whole  German  Confederate 
Constitution. 

For  some  time  past  the  conviction  had  been  present 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  had  studied  the  Tariff- 
Union,  that  the  existing  system  of  tariff,  arranged 
thirty  years  before,  and  in  the  course  of  time  altered  in 
particular  points  to  adapt  it  to  temporary  needs  or  to 
inadequate  compromises,  no  longer  formed  in  itself  a 
systematic  whole,  and  did  not  any  longer  correspond  to 


492         STRUGGLE  OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

the  growth  of  German  industries,  that  had  taken  place 
since  its  introduction.  Now,  in  1860,  the  great  Anglo- 
French  commercial  treaty  had  been  agreed  upon,  on  the 
English  side  with  an  almost  complete  adoption  of 
free-trade,  and  on  the  French  with  a  very  important 
lightening  of  the  burdens  on  international  commerce, 
and  immediately  afterwards  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
approached  the  Prussian  Government  on  the  subject  of 
a  treaty  of  like  tendency  between  France  and  the 
Tariff-Union.  Prussia  was  very  ready  to  enter  into 
this,  and  in  June,  1860,  called  upon  the  other  members 
to  give  her  full  powers  for  such  a  negotiation  in  the 
name  of  the  Union,  reserving  to  them,  of  course,  a  free 
criticism  of  the  result. 

In  January,  1861,  a  French  commissioner  appeared 
in  Berlin,  who  at  once  brought  forward  some  general 
principles  for  the  projected  treaty :  reciprocal  freedom 
from  duty  for  goods  passing  through  the  country ; 
reciprocal  freedom  from  duty  on  exports ;  finally,  for 
imports,  a  mutual  agreement  on  the  basis  of  considering 
which  nation  was  to  gain  the  most,  and  a  suitable 
adjustment  of  the  tariff  on  both  sides.  The  first  two 
of  these  three  propositions  could  be  acceded  to  at  once. 
As  to  the  third,  Prussia  gladly  seized  the  occasion  thus 
offered  for  a  general  revision  of  the  tariff,  such  as  had 
long  been  desired,  and  in  April  she  laid  her  plans  on 
the  subject  before  the  other  members  of  the  Tariff- 
Union. 

Answers  were  received  in  May  and  June,  1861, 
which  suggested  a  number  of  amendments  in  regard  to 


QUESTIONS  OF  TARIFF.  493 

the  duties  upon  particular  articles,  but  which  announced 
satisfaction  in  the  main  with  the  course  the  nesfotia- 
tion  had  liitherto  taken.  It  was  clearly  shown  that 
the  strongly-protectionist  party  had  everywhere  lost 
ground,  and  that  on  the  German  side  there  was  the 
prospect  of  an  approval  of  an  essential  lightening  of 
the  burdens  upon  commerce. 

But  when  the  discussion  began  in  Berlin  with  the 
French  commissioner  about  the  tariff  in  detail,  the 
latter  began  to  bargain,  offered  little  and  demanded 
much,  so  that  in  September  Prussia  announced  to  her 
fellow-members  a  complete  standstill  in  the  negotia- 
tions, and  at  the  same  time  proposed  to  give  up  the 
treat}^  unless  France  changed  her  tone,  to  establish 
the  new  tariff  by  internal  legislation  with  the  reduc- 
tion of  a  long  series  of  import  duties,  and  with  or 
without  a  commercial  treaty,  to  allow  tliose  nations, 
which  treated  German  products  as  favorably  as  those 
of  any  other  country,  to  share  the  benefits  of  such 
an  arrangement.  Almost  all  the  Governments  in 
the  Tariff-Union  agreed  to  these  susrsrestions  of 
Prussia. 

Up  to  this  time  the  question  liad  been  treated  solely 
from  tlie  point  of  view  of  national  economy,  with 
regard  for  the  material  prosperity  of  the  German 
people.  But  now  politics  of  a  more  general  character 
suddenly  interfered  in  tlie  discussion,  at  first  with  a 
gentle  toucli,  and  then  willi  a  rough  liaiul. 

As  we  remember,  the  crisis  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Tariff-Union  in  18">3  had  ended  in  a  commercial  treaty 


494        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

■with  Austria,  in  the  preamble  of  which  there  was  held 
up  as  the  great  aim  of  the  future  an  Austro-German 
tariff-union,  the  practicability  of  which  was  to  be  dis- 
cussed six  years  later;  further  than  this,  the  two  con- 
tracting parties  had  arranged  a  number  of  reductions  of 
duties,  very  advantageous  for  their  mutual  commerce, 
but  in  which  importations  from  other  countries  were  to 
have  no  share ;  finally,  they  had  mutually  agreed,  that, 
if  one  of  them  should  concede  to  a  third  Power  a 
reduction  of  dut}^  on  any  of  the  articles  the  traffic  in 
which  was  so  favored,  the  other  contracting  party 
should  receive  notice  of  such  concession  three  months 
before  it  was  made.  If  the  projDosed  tariff-union  should 
amount  to  nothing  at  the  end  of  six  years,  further 
facilitation  of  commerce  at  least  could  be  arranged. 

In  the  year  1853,  therefore,  both  sides  had  expressed 
the  wish  for  a  great  Austro-German  tariff-union, 
although  this  was  unfortunately  not  practicable  at  that 
time.  But  they  had  bound  themselves  to  nothing 
except  to  consider  the  matter  further  after  six  years 
had  elapsed,  a  pactum  de  contrahendo  which  left  both 
parties  entirely  free  so  far  as  the  outcome  of  the 
negotiations  was  concerned.  In  the  year  1860,  Austria 
made  proposals  in  Berlin  for  the  beginning  of  such 
negotiations ;  but  Prussia  declared  that  there  was  no 
need  of  taking  that  trouble,  for  any  general  tariff-union 
was  as  impracticable  as  before.  This  was  the  case 
even  more  certainly  than  in  1853,  since,  independent  of 
the  difficulty  of  uniting  in  one  system  of  tariff  such 
various    consumers   as  Rhinelanders  and  Croats,  Han- 


AUSTRIA  INTERFERES.  495 

overians  and  Hannaks,  an  ardent  protectionist  party 
was  at  that  time  dominant  in  Austria,  while  in  the 
Tariff-Union  a  majority  of  the  Governments  and  of  the 
people  were  urgent  for  a  reduction  of  import  duties  and 
free  competition  in  the  general  market  of  the  world. 

In  spite  of  all  this,  Count  Rechberg  felt  himself 
obliged,  on  the  news  of  the  Franco-Prussian  negotia- 
tions, to  send  a  communication  to  Prussia  in  September, 
1861,  in  which  he  pointed  out  the  incompatibility  of  such 
a  general  tariff-union  as  had  been  contemplated  in  1853 
with  a  treaty  which  would  give  the  French  a  claim  to 
every  consideration  in  tariff  matters  that  had  hitherto 
been  shown  to  Austria.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  ask 
whether  Prussia  meditated  a  complete  tariff-union  with 
France  as  well  as  with  Austria. 

There  was  as  yet  no  talk  of  any  right,  or  of  any  pro- 
test on  Austria's  part ;  but  an  approaching  battle  against 
the  French  treaty  and  the  liberal  revision  of  the  tariff 
was  clearly  indicated.  What  would  follow,  it  Avas  easy 
to  predict :  an  agitation  in  South  Germany  among  the 
protectionists  still  numerous  there,  and  an  exertion  of 
influence  upon  the  Lesser  States,  wlio  were  in  other 
questions  Austria's  constant  allies.  It  was  the  old 
opposition  of  interests,  showing  itself  now  in  a  com- 
mercial field,  as  it  had  hitherto  done  in  a  political  one : 
the  point  of  struggle  was  the  demand  that  Germany 
should  refrain  from  a  salutary  improvement  of  its 
material  conditions  just  so  long  as  Austria  thought  she 
was  not  in  a  condition  to  take  part  in  it. 

Prussia    determined   to    take   a    stand    quickly   and 


496        STRUGGLE   OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

decidedly.  Bernstorff  resumed  the  interrupted  nego- 
tiations with  France;  it  immediately  became  evident 
in  this  conjuncture  that  the  Cabinet  of  Paris  had  not 
meant  an3'thing  very  bad  by  its  haggling,  after  all ; 
both  sides  strove  for  an  understanding  by  mutual  con- 
cessions, and  on  the  29th  of  March,  1862,  the  treaty 
was  prepared  and  drawn  up  at  Berlin.  It  was  then, 
four  days  after,  communicated  to  the  other  members  of 
the  Union  and  to  the  Court  of  Vienna. 

The  excitement  aroused  in  all  Germany  by  this 
sudden  event  was  immense.  Austria  did  not  delay 
opening  the  diplomatic  attack  in  full  force.  In  a 
memorial  of  May  7th,  Count  Rechberg  declared  that 
the  object  of  the  agreement  of  1853  had  been  to  prepare 
the  way  for  a  great  Austro-German  tariff-union  through 
the  favoring  of  mutual  commerce  by  lower  import  duties 
than  were  imposed  on  the  merchandise  of  other  nations  ; 
the  new  treaty  with  France  destroyed  the  effect  of  all 
advantages  accorded  to  Austria,  by  the  concession  to 
France  of  all  the  rights  of  a  most  favored  nation,  and 
by  setting  the  German  rates  of  duties  in  general  so  low 
that  Austria  could  not  adopt  them  for  herself  without 
exposing  her  own  industries  to  destruction  by  the 
influx  of  a  tide  of  foreign  products.  Austria,  there- 
fore, could  not  but  see  in  the  treaty  an  infringement 
and  a  setting  aside  of  the  compact  of  1853. 

The  answer  was  not  long  delayed.  It  came,  to  the 
fresh  surprise  of  the  German  public,  from  two  quarters, 
not  only  from  Prussia,  but  also  from  Prussia's  bitterest 
political    opponent,  the   Kingdom  of  Saxony,  AA'liere,  as 


COMMERCIAL   TREATY   WITH  FRANCE.       497 

in  1852,  regard  for  the  welfare  of  the  country  and  for 
the  encouragement  of  its  higlily  developed  industries 
outweighed  every  other  consideration.  A  note  of  the 
27th  from  the  Saxon  Government,  and  one  of  the  28th 
from  the  Prussian,  maintained,  that,  in  the  compact  of 
1853,  neither  of  the  contracting  parties  had  renounced 
the  liberty  of  making  changes  in  its  tariff ;  on  the 
contrary,  that  compact  contained  provisions  for  what  was 
to  be  done  in  such  a  contingency  ;  the  inutility  for  the 
future  of  the  existing  system  of  tariff  was  now  mani- 
fest ;  a  remodelling  of  the  same  in  a  liberal  spirit  had 
become  a  vital  question  for  German  industries,  and  if 
Austria  complained  that  such  a  measure  would  injure 
her  industries,  the  fact  itself  was  a  proof  that  the 
general  tariff-union  alluded  to  in  1853  would  be  out  of 
the  question  for  an  indefinite  time  to  come  ;  at  any  rate, 
Germany  could  not  possibly  be  expected  to  fetter  her 
industries  till  Austria  should  overtake  her. 

After  this,  in  June,  both  the  Saxon  Chambers  unani- 
mously approved  the  treaty  with  France,  and  Herr  von 
Beust  immediately  communicated  Saxony's  assent  to 
the  Prussian  Cabinet.  Baden,  Oldenburg,  and  the 
Thuringian  States,  one  after  another,  quickly  followed 
this  example. 

Meanwhile,  Austria  had  continued  her  campaign, 
and,  indeed,  on  a  twofold  scene  of  operations.  In  the 
notes  of  the  seven  Governments,  of  the  2d  of  February, 
the  states  taking  part  therein  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
announced  further  conferences  in  regard  to  Confederate 
reform,  and  had  invited  Prussia  to  join  in  them,  but  the 


498        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

latter  had  refused  to  particijmte  in  so  hopeless  a  work. 
The  Court  of  Vienna  now  sent  out  invitations  once 
more,  and  in  this  matter  Saxony  did  not  hold  aloof. 

The  four  Kingdoms,  both  Hesses,  and  Nassau,  sent 
their  representatives;  and  on  the  7th  of  July,  Count 
Rechberg  opened  the  first  conference  in  Vienna  with 
the  proposal  to  make  an  attempt,  with  the  co-operation 
of  an  assembly  of  delegates  from  the  German  Cham- 
bers, to  consider  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  Grerman 
civil  and  criminal  law.  This  meant  the  carrying  out 
of  a  part,  though,  to  be  sure,  only  a  small  part,  of  the 
great  plan  of  reform  of  Herr  von  Beust,  which  had  been 
hitherto  so  generally  rejected ;  and  it  can  be  easily 
understood  that  to  him  this  bait  was  irresistible,  in 
spite  of  all  commercial  treaties.  Saxony's  cry,  after 
this,  was :  "  Prussia  in  matters  of  the  Tariff-Union, 
Austria  in  all  that  concerns  the  Confederation  !  " 

There  was  then  sent,  on  the  10th  of  July,  to  all 
the  Governments  in  the  Tariff-Union,  a  proposal  of 
Count  Rechberg,  that,  on  the  basis  of  a  continuation 
of  the  tariff  now  prevailing,  entire  Austria  should  be 
received  into  the  Union,  and  that,  when  this  had  taken 
place,  Austria  and  Prussia  should  in  common  be  em- 
powered to  treat  with  France  and  England. 

Prussia's  attitude  in  regard  to  these  proceedings  of 
the  Austrian  Government  was  understood  beforehand. 
In  all  that  had  to  do  with  Confederate  reform  she  simply 
persisted  in  her  refusal  to  take  any  part  in  the  confer- 
ence and  in  her  protest  against  every  extension  of  the 
authority-  of  the    Confederate    Diet   that   did   not  rest 


PRUSSIA   RECOGNIZES  ITALY.  499 

upon  a  unanimous  determination  of  all  the  German 
Governments.  She  refused  her  consent  to  Austria's 
admission  into  the  Tariff-Union,  in  the  first  place 
because  she  considered  herself  already  bound  to  France, 
but  above  all  because  the  preliminary  of  such  admission 
proposed  by  Austria  herself,  namely,  the  continuation  of 
the  existing  system  of  tariff,  was  wholly  incompatible 
with  the  vital  interests  of  German  industries. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  Government  at  Berlin 
considered  itself  free  from  any  considerations  of  friend- 
ship for  Austria ;  and  as  in  the  beginning  of  July  the 
Russian  Government,  then  engaged  in  a  bitter  quarrel 
with  the  Pope,  had  declared  its  recognition  of  the  young 
kingdom  of  Italy,  Prussia  did  not  hesitate  to  publish 
a  similar  acknowledgment.  It  was  done  the  more 
readily,  since  in  the  preceding  year  the  representatives 
of  the  people  had  expressed  themselves  very  decidedly 
to  the  same  effect.  Austria  did  not  restrain  her  anger 
at  this.  The  Prussian  Government,  in  announcing  their 
action,  had  observed  that  that  action  was  taken  only  in 
consideration  of  a  solemn  assurance  that  Italy  would 
not  attack  Venetia.  Rechberg  retorted  that  such  a 
promise  was  not  worth  the  paper  it  was  written  on. 

After  the  Prussian  Parliament,  with  a  minority  of 
twelve  in  the  Lower  House  and  in  the  Upper  House 
unanimously,  had  given  its  approval  to  the  treaty  with 
France,  the  Government,  on  the  2d  of  August,  gave  its 
final  signature  thereto.  It  then  notified  the  members  of 
the  Tariff-Union ;  and  to  smooth  the  way  for  the  South 
German  States,  it  expressed  its  willingness  to  do  what 


500        STRUGGLE   OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

had  been  often  asked  for  by  them,  to  give  up  the  duty 
on  the  transport  of  wines.  Austria's  interference  had, 
however,  already  had  such  an  effect,  that  this  concession 
on  Prussia's  part  received  little  attention.  The  Lesser 
States,  with  the  exception  of  Saxony,  and  also  the  two 
Hesses  and  Nassau,  categorically  refused  to  agree  to 
the  treaty  with  France,  partly  on  the  ground  of  pro- 
tective views,  partly  from  consideration  for  the  tariff- 
union  with  Austria  and  the  compact  of  1853. 

At  the  same  time,  Prussia  received  word,  on  the  7th 
of  August,  that  the  Vienna  conference  had  accepted 
the  Austrian  proposition  for  the  convening  of  an 
assembly  of  delegates,  and  on  the  14th,  that  this  had 
been  brought  forward  as  a  motion  in  the  Diet  by  the 
eight  states  taking  part  in  the  conference.  Count 
Bernstorff  thereupon  renewed  his  protest  against  any 
majority-decision  in  that  matter,  and  declared  that  the 
popular  assemblies  of  Germany  would  also  object  to 
this  project  of  delegates  ;  the  nation  desired,  he  said,  an 
executive  authority  with  greater  powers  and  a  true 
national  representation;  neither  of  these  was  to  be 
obtained  by  the  course  suggested. 

On  the  26th  of  August,  Prussia's  answer  was  sent  to 
Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg,  to  the  effect  that  a  definitive 
rejection  of  the  commercial  treaty  must  be  taken  as  the 
expression  of  an  intention  not  to  continue  the  Tariff- 
Union  with  Prussia.  The  Prussian  Lower  House 
expressed  its  approval  of  this  declaration  on  the  5th  of 
September  by  a  vote  of  233  to  26. 

Thus  the  two  parties  were  confronting  each  other  in 


PRUSSIA'S  ATTITUDE.  501 

distinct  positions,  in  spite  of  the  active  efforts  of  Baden 
on  one  side  and  Saxony  on  the  other  for  a  reconcilia- 
tion. The  commercial  question  was  not  absolutely- 
dangerous,  although  it  touched  very  many  irritable 
feelings  ;  for  the  existing  compacts  of  the  Tariff-Union 
did  not  expire  till  the  end  of  1865,  and  before  that  time 
the  passions  excited  might  be  allayed  by  numerous 
discussions  and  communications,  as  did  in  fact  in  a 
great  measure  take  place.  Very  different  was  it  with 
the  question  of  Confederate  reform,  which  by  reason  of 
the  latest  proposition  of  the  party  favoring  an  entire 
Germany  had  brought  an  armed  collision  dangerously 
near.  If  this  proposition  should  be  accepted  by  a 
majority  in  Frankfort,  there  would  only  remain  to 
Prussia  the  choice  between  humble  submission  and  a 
declaration  of  withdrawal  from  the  Confederation,  the 
nature  of  which  had  been  falsified  by  the  majority. 
The  latter  course  would  certainly  and  speedily  bring  on 
war. 

King  William  earnestly  desired  to  be  spared  such  an 
unfortunate  alternative,  and  would  gladly,  like  Count 
Rechberg,  have  put  aside  any  thought  of  unity,  if  an 
honorable  co-operation  of  the  two  Powers  in  the  leader- 
ship of  Germany  could  have  been  brought  about.  Yet 
if  this  could  not  be,  he  was  determined  not  to  yield  a 
hair's-breadth  to  any  decree  contrary  to  the  Constitu- 
tion, but  to  put  fortli  Prussia's  whole  might  for  Prus- 
sia's good  right  —  and  then  vor/ue  la  gale  re. 

In  European  affairs  in  genei-al  no  syin})tom  appeared, 
of   a   nature    to    induce    Prussia    to    give    way   before 


502        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

anything  unfitting.  Her  relations  with  Russia  were 
excellent :  the  Emperor  Alexander  continually  assured 
the  King  of  his  warm  friendship,  and  while  Prince 
Gortschakoff  held  firmly  to  his  wish  for  a  Franco-Russian 
alliance,  nothing  would  have  pleased  him  better  than 
the  entrance  of  Prussia  into  so  mighty  a  league.  He 
repeatedly  declared  to  the  Prussian  ambassador  that  the 
strengthening  of  Prussia's  position  in  the  German 
Confederation  would  be  of  general  advantage,  and  that 
Austria's  opposition  to  this  lacked  all  reasonable  ground. 
Moreover,  Gortschakoff  was  not  by  any  means  certain 
of  bringing  about  a  French  alliance,  as  the  Emperor 
Alexander  displayed  a  constantly-increasing  mistrust  of 
Napoleon's  revolutionary  tendencies.  On  the  other 
hand,  Russia's  harmonious  relations  with  Austria  had 
been  much  sliaken  by  the  Russian  recognition  of  Italy, 
and  the  complications  existing  in  Servia  were  not 
adapted  to  increase  the  friendly  feeling  on  either  side. 
All  this  was  as  advantageous  as  possible  for  Prussia. 

More  than  this,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  spoke  very 
decidedly  to  Herr  von  Bismarck  about  affairs  in  Ger- 
many. He  alluded  with  great  respect  to  the  admirable 
personal  character  of  King  William ;  he  expressed 
sympathy  in  regard  to  the  difficulties  which  the  King 
had  to  encounter  on  internal  questions  in  the  Prussian 
Parliament ;  in  his  view  everything  depended  upon  the 
general  aim  of  the  policy  of  the  Government:  if  the 
people  agreed  with  this,  disputes  about  particular  points 
would  be  attended  with  little  danger ;  it  appeared  to 
him  that  Prussia  was  led  by  tlie  nature  of  things  in 


PRUSSIA'S  POSITION  IN  EUROPE.  503 

the  direction  of  a  reformation  of  the  German  Confedera- 
tion, and  if  she  made  this  the  object  of  her  efforts,  all 
other  difficulties  would  quickly  disappear.  France,  he 
said,  could  welcome  any  transformation  of  Germany, 
with  the  exception  of  the  so-called  "  empire  of  seventy 
millions,"  that  is,  the  admission  of  entire  Austria  into 
the  Confederation.  That  she  would  object  to,  because 
it  would  completely  disturb  the  European  balance  of 
power.  All  this  sounded  sufficiently  favorable  to 
Prussia ;  how  far  such  a  view  would  be  persisted  in,  in 
the  event  of  things  actually  taking  such  a  course,  was 
indeed  worth  considering.  But  it  was  evident  that,  for 
the  time,  Prussia  need  not  fear  Napoleon's  taking  part 
with  Austria. 

Finally,  all  former  misunderstandings  with  Italy  were 
disposed  of  by  the  accomplishment  of  Prussia's  recog- 
nition of  that  kingdom.  There  was,  as  yet,  no  talk  of 
any  closer  relation  between  the  two  Courts ;  but  the 
whole  world  was  convinced  that  the  instant  there  was 
a  breach  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  the  Italian  army 
would  fall  upon  Venetia. 

The  Prussian  Cabinet,  therefore,  saw  itself  surrounded 
all  over  the  continent  with  the  good-will  and  the  sym- 
pathy of  the  non-German  Powers.  Its  sole  opponents 
were  to  be  found  on  German,  and  unhappily,  as  we 
shall  now  see,  on  Prussian,  soil. 

It  lias  aheady  been  explained  from  liow  many  sources 
the  gradually  increasing  dislike  to  King  William's 
military  reforms  had  grown  up  among  the  great 
majority  of    the    Prussian   people.      First,  there   were 


504        STRUGGLE  OVER   THE  CONSTITUTION. 

the  desire  for  relief  from  the  burden  of  the  army  and 
the  taxes,  romantic  memories  of  the  glory  of  the  militia 
of  1813,  and  resentment  against  the  preference  shown 
to  the  nobility  in  many  corps  of  officers.  There  was 
the  general  conviction,  founded  on  the  attitude  of  the 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  that  the  existing 
Government,  like  that  of  Frederick  William  IV., 
would  never  venture  on  a  bold  war-policy,  and  would, 
therefore,  never  have  use  for  so  oppressive  an  arma- 
ment. And  lastly,  there  was  an  uncertainty  in  the 
parliamentary  management  of  the  reforms,  a  dragging 
along  of  ambiguous  provisional  arrangements  from  one 
session  to  another,  which  at  length  spread  far  and  wide 
among  the  people  the  unfortunate  delusion  that  a 
systematic  deception  of  the  Parliament  was  being 
attempted  by  the  Ministers. 

In  such  a  state  of  things  the  Democratic  party  of 
1848,  which  had  gained  renewed  strength,  found  no 
difficulty  in  securing  everywhere  a  ready  hearing  in 
their  appeal  for  taking  the  offensive  energetically 
against  so  unconstitutional  a  system ;  and  when  the 
Liberal  Ministers  had  finally  resigned  and  a  Conserva- 
tive Cabinet  undertook  the  government,  no  doubt 
seemed  possible  any  longer,  and  the  one  duty  of  the 
people  appeared  to  be  determined  opposition  to  the 
threatened  return  to  feudal  absolutism. 

The  new  Cabinet  did  its  best,  by  a  rough  attempt  at 
influencing  the  election  agitation,  to  increase  this  tide 
of  feeling  and  to  drive  a  number  of  otherwise  moderate 
men   into   the   arms  of  the    Radical    Opposition.     The 


OPPOSITION  TO   THE  MILITARY  REFORMS.     505 

election  of  May  6th  resulted  in  a  total  defeat  of  the 
Ministry.  Not  one  of  its  adherents  obtained  a  seat; 
the  feudal  and  tlie  Catholic  interests,  as  well  as  the 
party  of  the  former  Ministry,  now  called  the  old-Liberal 
party,  were  reduced  to  small  groups ;  the  Progressists 
and  the  almost  equally  strong  Left  Centre,  who  differed 
from  each  other  decidedly  in  their  plans  for  the  future, 
but  were  for  the  most  part  agreed  in  regard  to  the  main 
question  then  pending,  formed  together  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority  in  the  House. 

Disagreements  did,  indeed,  arise  at  once  concerning 
the  manner  and  method  of  treating  the  matter  in  hand, 
as  well  as  in  regard  to  what  concessions  were  to  be 
made  to  the  Government.  Li  each  of  the  two  great 
parties,  voices  were  raised  in  behalf  of  the  former  policy 
of  the  House ;  that  is,  in  favor  of  granting  the  means 
of  support  for  the  new  regiments,  if  the  Government, 
by  the  proposal  of  a  new  law  concerning  the  obligation 
to  serve,  would  agree  to  the  two  years'  term  of  service 
for  the  infantry  of  the  line. 

Many  weeks  passed  before  an  understanding  in  this 
matter  could  be  brought  about  among  the  members  of 
the  parties,  and  meanwhile  the  question  was  not  touched 
upon  either  in  the  House  or  in  the  committee  on  the 
budget.  Iiut  the  decision  finally  reached  was  wholly 
in  the  spirit  of  the  Radicals.  And  it  then  appeared, 
that,  in  both  parties,  only  one  member  persisted  in  the 
conciliatory  view,  all  the  others  being  resolved  upon  a 
complete  refusal  of  the  costs  of  the  army-reforms. 
The   announcement    l)y    the    Ministry,    that   they   had 


506        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

saved  two  millions  more  in  the  military  budget  and 
could  now  give  up  the  additional  taxes  of  1859,  made 
no  longer  any  impression. 

In  the  beginning  of  August,  the  budget-committee 
began  the  consideration  of  the  cost  of  the  army;  in 
their  very  first  sitting  tliey  ordered  the  transference  of 
the  cost  of  the  military  reforms  into  the  category 
of  extraordinary  expenses,  again  repeated  the  more 
than  doubtful  assertion,  that  the  reforms  were  contrary 
to  the  law  of  September  3d,  1814  (and  consequently 
could  not  be  recognized  as  legal),  and  finally,  on 
August  22d,  decided  upon  a  proposition  to  strike  out 
all  additional  expenses  for  the  reforms,  and  to  leave  it 
to  the  Government  to  take  what  course  thej^  pleased 
for  placing  the  condition  of  the  army  once  more  on  a 
legitimate  foundation. 

Quite  as  thorough-going  was  the  proposition  made  on 
the  29th  of  August  by  the  committee  on  marine 
matters,  that  the  plan  brought  forward  by  the  Govern- 
ment for  the  creation  of  a  fleet  should  be  totally 
rejected,  because  the  necessary  means  for  such  a  pur- 
pose were  lacking.  Finally,  the  budget-committee,  a 
few  days  later,  came  to  a  decision  in  regard  to  the 
military  expenses  for  1863,  exactly  the  same  as  that 
they  had  adopted  for  the  current  year. 

Upon  this,  on  the  11th  of  September,  the  House 
entered  into  a  seven  days'  discussion,  such  as  the 
Parliament  had  not  seen  since  its  creation.  All  the 
oratorical  powers  of  the  Government  and  of  the  differ- 
ent parties  were  called  into   play ;  on  either  side  every 


DEBATES  IN  THE  PARLIAMENT.  507 

man's  pulse  throbbed  with  the  feeling  that  a  crisis  of 
far-reaching  importance  to  Prussia's  future  was  at  hand. 
On  one  side  was  the  belief  that  constitutional  life  in 
Prussia  was  being  destroyed,  and  that  the  times  of 
feudal  degradation  would  return,  if  in  this  matter  the 
will  of  the  people's  representatives  did  not  have  its  free 
course.  On  the  other  was  the  conviction,  that,  with  the 
victory  of  the  Majority,  constitutional  monarchy  would 
be  changed  into  a  parliamentary  government,  and  the 
independence  of  the  Crown  would  be  lost.  One  side 
constantly  urged  energetic  action  in  the  affairs  of  Hesse 
and  of  Holstein  as  well  as  in  the  questions  of  the  com- 
mercial treaty  and  of  Confederate  reform,  and  with  the 
adoption  of  a  liberal  policy  a  reliance  on  the  enthusi- 
astic approval  of  the  German  nation  as  an  effective 
weapon  for  controlling  the  self-importance  of  individual 
Princes.  The  other  side  could  not  restrain  its  anger  at 
such  a  childish  blindness,  wliich  believed  that  Den- 
mark, Austria,  and  South  Germany  would  not  offer 
armed  resistance  to  these  plans,  and  which  conse- 
quently sought  to  make  Prussia  defenceless  by  land  and 
by  sea. 

We  need  not  go  into  a  further  consideration  of  the 
great  parliamentary  battle,  since  no  new  arguments 
were  brought  forward  in  regard  to  the  subject  which 
had  been  for  three  years  under  discussion.  A  motion  of 
Keichensperger,  of  the  Catholic  party,  that  the  Govern- 
ment should  bo  rc(|uiied  to  bring  in  a  jx'titiou  for 
indemnity  for  tliuii-  action  liitherto,  did  not  receive  a 
single  vote.     A  mediatory  proposal   made  by  tlie  depu- 


608        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

ties  Stavenhagen,  Twesten,  and  Von  Sybel  (the  author 
of  this  book),  that  the  new  regiments  should  be  main- 
tained and  the  two  j^ears'  term  of  service  introduced, 
was  for  an  instant  regarded  by  Herr  von  Roon  as 
possibly  practicable,  but  was  rejected  on  the  following 
da}^,  after  more  careful  technical  examination,  as  being 
too  dangerous  to  the  organic  consistency  of  the  bodies 
of  troops.  The  proposal  had  no  better  success  in  the 
House ;  it  was  rejected  by  a  majority  of  three  to  one. 
The  result  of  the  whole  thing  was  the  refusal  of  sup- 
plies for  the  reforms,  to  the  amount  of  nearly  six 
million  thalers.  That  is  to  say,  it  was  an  imperious 
summons  to  the  Government  to  disband  the  one  hun- 
dred and  seventeen  new  battalions,  and  in  one  form  or 
another  to  ask  pardon  for  having  supported  those 
battalions  for  nine  months  of  the  current  year,  before 
their  budget  for  that  year  had  been  sanctioned. 

Thus  the  struggle  was  proclaimed  in  all  its  bitterness, 
a  struggle  not  only  about  certain  special  demands,  but 
about  rights. 

For  hitherto  the  right  of  the  Crown  to  determine  the 
figures  of  the  yearly  draft,  and,  accordingly,  to  arrange 
the  number  and  strength  of  the  regiments  supported  by 
that  draft,  had  been  undisputed  ;  but  equally  undisputed 
had  been  the  right  of  the  Lower  House  to  refuse  such 
new  supplies  as  were  not  prescribed  by  law.  The  King 
said,  with  good  reason,  that  an  exaggerated  application 
of  this  right  of  controlling  the  budget  would  make  his 
position  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  an  empty 
name.     But   the   answer  was  quite  as  clear,  that   the 


THE  PRINCIPLES  INVOLVED.  509 

expenditure  of  a  sum  not  granted  by  the  House  involved 
an  infringement  of  the  Constitution. 

There  were  few  men  in  Prussia  at  that  time,  who 
were  not  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  truth  of  this  latter 
assertion ;  old-Liberals  and  Left  Centre,  Catholics  and 
Progressists,  whether  they  praised  or  blamed  the  recent 
vote,  all  agreed  in  recognizing  the  principle  no  supplies 
without  the  approval  of  the  Lower  House,  as  the  founda- 
tion and  corner-stone  of  a  constitutional  state.  This 
had  been  the  lesson  learned  from  the  examj^le  of  Eng- 
land, ever  since  efforts  had  been  made  in  Germany  for 
constitutional  rights.  Often  enough  had  there  been 
complaints  of  its  being  a  serious  fault  in  the  Prussian 
Constitution  that  it  had  not  placed  the  consent  to 
methods  of  raising  revenue  as  completely  in  the  hands 
of  the  Deputies  ;  but  the  answer  had  always  been,  that 
the  control  over  the  spending  of  that  revenue  was  quite 
sufficient  to  insure  a  deciding  influence  in  the  affairs  of 
the  State.  And  this  influence  was  secured  to  the  Lower 
House  alone,  to  the  representatives  of  the  people 
chosen  by  the  tax-payers.  As  in  England,  so  in  Prus- 
sia, the  co-operation  of  the  Upper  House  had  been 
limited  l)y  the  proliiljition  of  alterations  in  details  to 
the  power  of  accepting  or  refusing  the  estimates  as  a 
whole  in  the  form  approved  by  the  Deputies ;  that  is  to 
say,  as  in  England,  its  part  in  the  matter  was  merely 
honorary.  For  rejection  would  mean  throwing  the 
State  wliolly  out  of  joint,  and  the  conservative  Upper 
House  would  certainly  not  place  itself  on  a  line  with 
the  revolutionaries  that  wished  to  refuse  supplies. 


510       STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

Public  opinion  was  unanimous  in  this  matter.  Even 
the  Minister  of  Finance,  Von  der  Heydt,  had  no  other 
view :  he  had  cried  out  to  the  deputies  that  an  im- 
proper application  of  their  right  might  bring  about 
things  which  were  by  no  means  written  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, —  which,  in  other  words,  might  lead  to  a  coup 
d'etat ;  but  he  had  for  weeks  kept  declaring  to  the  King, 
that,  if  the  House  came  to  the  decision  that  seemed 
probable,  he  should  no  longer  be  able  to  co-operate  in 
the  support  of  the  new  organization  of  the  army. 

The  King  himself  was,  if  I  am  rightly  informed,  in 
a  state  of  great  uncertainty,  between  his  oath  to  the 
Constitution  and  his  convictions  in  regard  to  military 
matters.  After  Von  der  Heydt's  declarations,  he  turned 
to  the  man  whom  he  had  long  known  as  the  most  skil- 
ful and  the  boldest  of  his  statesmen,  to  whom  in  1858, 
and  again  in  the  preceding  May,  he  had  wished  to 
intrust  a  ministerial  portfolio  :  he  desired  Bismarck, 
who  was  then  at  Biarritz  enjoying  a  short  season  of 
repose,  to  come  to  Berlin.  Bismarck  yielded  unwill- 
ingly ;  for  never  certainly  did  a  born  master  of  state- 
craft have  so  little  ambition  to  attain  to  the  highest 
place. 

But  his  sense  of  duty  forbade  him  to  refuse  the 
King.  On  the  19th  of  September,  1862,  he  came  to 
Berlin ;  four  days  later  followed  the  momentous 
decision  of  the  House.  On  the  24th,  Prince  Hohenlohe 
and  Herr  von  der  Heydt  resigned,  and  Bismarck,  for 
the  time  without  any  portfolio,  was  made  president  of 
the  Ministry. 


BISMARCK  APPOINTED  PRIME  MINISTER.      511 

No  one  suspected  then  that  with  that  day  a  new  era 
did  in  truth  begin  for  Prussia  and  Germany,  and  so  for 
Europe.  For  how  many  men  knew  anything  of  Bis- 
marck's inward  development  since  1851  ?  Every  one 
saw  in  him  the  boldest  champion  of  the  feudal  party, 
the  most  insolent  opponent  of  every  liberal  effort,  the 
orator  who  had  wished  to  blot  out  all  great  cities  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  who  had  met  the  Liberals  with  the 
threatening  cry :  "  The  proud  steed  of  Borussia  shall 
lay  the  parliamentary  carpet-knights  low  in  the  dust." 

The  very  name  of  the  new  Minister  pushed  the 
general  excitement  beyond  all  bounds.  Now,  it  was 
felt,  the  last  veil  was  torn  away ;  this  haughty  young 
noble,  who  had  formerly  opposed  the  first  steps  towards 
the  Constitution,  who  had  raised  his  voice  in  Erfurt 
against  German  Unity,  who  had  defended  the  shameful 
policy  of  Olmlitz,  and  had  then  found  in  the  Confederate 
Diet  a  retreat  wholly  suited  to  encourage  his  natural 
tendencies,  —  this  absolutist  and  aristocrat  had  now 
taken  lessons  in  the  art  of  couj}  cVetats  from  Napoleon, 
and  hoped  with  volleys  of  grape  to  scatter  the  shreds  of 
the  Constitution  to  the  winds.  The  only  thing  to  be 
done,  therefore,  was  to  take  a  firm  stand  on  the  ground 
of  the  law,  to  cast  away  every  unworthy  weakness,  and 
at  no  point  to  sacrifice  with  cowardly  submission  the 
smallest  atom  of  constitutional  rif^ht. 

In  spite  of  this  dechn-ation  of  war  made  by  a  thou- 
sand voices,  Bismarck's  first  steps  were  an  attempt  at 
some  arrangement.  He  invited  the  leaders  of  the  old- 
Liberals  to  come  to  him,  explained  to  them  his  inten- 


512        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

tions,  and  offered  them  some  of  the  places  in  his 
Cabinet.  They  were  astonished  to  find  him  so  entirely- 
different  from  what  the  Liberal  world  loved  to  represent 
him.  But  the  unfortunate  demand  of  a  two  years' 
term  of  service,  on  which  they  laid  so  much  stress,  came 
between  him  and  them.  "  Should  we  become  Ministers 
without  this  concession,"  said  Simson,  "  we  should  be 
officers  without  any  soldiers." 

Bismarck,  thereupon,  withdrew  the  estimates  for 
1863,  which  had  already  been  curtailed  by  the  budget- 
committee,  in  order  that  he  might  not  increase  the 
number  of  burning  questions  in  dispute,  and  at  the 
same  time  he  promised  a  statement  as  soon  as  possible 
after  the  beginning  of  the  new  session  in  January,  1863, 
together  with  the  new  law  so  often  asked  for  in  regard 
to  the  obligation  to  serve.  The  answer  was  a  resolution 
of  the  House,  that  the  Government  was  bound  to  pro- 
duce the  budget  for  1863  before  the  beginning  of  the 
year,  and  that  all  expenditure  before  the  approval  of  the 
same  was  unconstitutional.  Bismarck  did  not  hesitate 
an  instant ;  he  was  perfectly  clear  in  his  mind  as  to  the 
course  to  be  pursued  in  the  contest  that  was  now  un- 
avoidable. 

On  the  10th  of  October  the  Upper  House  considered 
the  estimates  as  sent  to  them  by  the  Lower.  The 
committee  of  the  former  had  proposed  conferences 
with  the  other  House,  for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  an 
understanding  in  regard  to  the  military  estimates ;  on 
the  other  hand.  Count  Arnim-Boytzenburg  desired  a 
rejection  of  the  budget  as    determined   in  the  Lower 


THE   UPPER  HOUSE  REJECTS   THE  BUDGET.      513 

House,  and  an  acceptance  of  the  original  proposition  of 
the  Government.  The  latter  part  of  this  suggestion 
was  unfortunate,  because  it  was  formally  contrary  to 
the  established  order  of  things  ;  according  to  that  order 
such  an  acceptance  could  merely  be  made  in  the  form 
of  a  resolution  of  the  House.  In  any  case,  the  only 
part  of  the  proposal  of  any  importance  was  the  negative 
one,  the  rejection  of  the  estimates  as  agreed  to  in  the 
other  House.  Bismarck  interposed  in  the  discussion 
with  the  statement  that  nothing  was  to  be  expected 
from  conferences  with  the  Lower  House,  and  that 
therefore  he  could  recommend  only  the  proposition  of 
Arnim.  After  a  long  debate  the  rejection  of  the 
budget  as  settled  by  the  other  House  followed  on  the 
11th  of  October,  with  a  vote  of  150  against  17,  and 
the  proposal  of  the  Government  was  approved  by  114 
against  44. 

Thus  it  stood.  In  Prussia,  a  Government  without  a 
budget  had  become  for  the  time  unavoidable.  On  the 
12th  of  October,  the  Lower  House  declared  the  action 
of  the  Upper  House,  so  far  as  it  concerned  the  accept- 
ance of  the  proposition  of  the  Government,  as  uncon- 
stitutional and  null.  Immediately  afterwards  the 
President  of  the  Ministry  announced  the  close  of  the 
session,  and  in  the  afternoon  he  read  the  Address  from 
the  Throne,  in  which  the  Government  dechired  it  to 
be  its  duty  to  maintain  the  new  arrangements  in  the 
army,  wliidi  had  been  created  on  the  basis  of  former 
grants  of  the  Parliament ;  after  the  action  of  the 
Upper   House,   it   felt   itself   obliged   to  carry  on    the 


514       STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

administration  without  the  grant  prescribed  by  the 
Constitution ;  it  was  conscious  of  the  responsibility 
it  assumed  by  so  doing,  but  it  was  also  mindful  of 
its  duty  to  the  country,  which  forced  it  to  make  the 
outlay  necessary  for  the  general  good,  until  the  esti- 
mates were  legally  settled,  with  the  expectation  that 
this  outlay  would  afterwards  receive  the  approval  of 
the  Parliament. 

Did  Bismarck  at  that  time  suspect  that  he  was  with 
these  words  opening  a  four  years'  bitter  struggle  in 
Prussia  between  the  highest  powers  of  the  State  ?  It  is 
certain,  at  any  rate,  that  he  was  determined  to  carry  it 
through  to  the  end  at  every  risk.  At  the  same  time, 
he  had  succeeded  in  convincing  the  King  of  the  con- 
stitutionality of  his  action.  The  views  which,  during 
the  years  of  contest,  he  was  forced  to  defend  in  various 
applications,  can  be  summed  up  in  the  following 
positions : 

In  England,  indeed,  as  a  result  of  a  long  historical 

development,  the  Lower  House  alone  has  the  power  of 
deciding  whether  a  certain  revenue  shall  be  collected, 
or  a  certain  expenditure  allowed.  From  this,  a  wide- 
spread doctrine  has  been  formed,  that  this  right  in 
regard  to  the  budget  is  a  necessary  element  of  all 
constitutional  Government. 

We,  however,  do  not  live  in  England,  but  in  Prussia ; 
and  we  have  to  arrange  our  methods  in  State  affairs, 
not  according  to  general  theories,  but  according  to 
positive  Prussian  laws. 

Now,  since  the  proclamation  of  the  Prussian  Consti- 


BISMARCK'S   VIEW  OF  THE  STRUGGLE.      515 

tution,  all  receipts  and  expenses  have  been  brought 
together  in  the  estimates,  and  these  estimates  have 
been  made  the  subject  of  an  Act  passed  every  year. 
The  Act  for  this  purpose,  like  every  other  Act,  becomes 
valid  by  the  common  consent  of  the  Crown  and  the 
two  Houses.  Before  the  consent  of  all  three  has  been 
obtained,  the  decision  of  one  House  has  only  the  value 
of  an  expression  of  opinion,  not  any  binding  force. 
Although  the  Upper  House  has  less  influence  in  the 
settlement  of  the  estimates  than  the  two  other  factors, 
yet  its  final  vote  upon  the  estimates  as  a  whole  is  of 
equal  importance  with  that  of  the  Lower  House.  For, 
according  to  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution, 
the  members  of  either  House  have  alike  the  character 
of  representatives  of  the  entire  people. 

If  this  Act  concerning  the  estimates  is  not  passed, 
then,  strictly  speaking,  the  continuance  of  the  Act  of 
the  preceding  year  cannot  be  assumed,  for  this  ceases 
to  be  valid  with  tlie  last  day  of  the  year  to  which  it 
applies.  And  strictly  speaking,  neither  the  raising  nor 
the  spending  of  money  in  the  new  year  is  in  this  case 
allowable,  whether  special  items  in  the  estimates  have 
been  accepted  in  the  Lower  House  or  refused. 

But  as  the  State  cannot  exist  a  day  without  expendi- 
tures, while  on  the  other  hand  it  must  exist,  an 
imperative  necessity  requires  that  some  one  must  pro- 
vide for  the  necessary  expenses ;  and  it  again  results 
from  the  necessity  of  the  circumstances,  that  this  some 
one  can  be  no  one  else  than  the  royal  Government,  even 
leaving  out  of  account  that  article  of  the  Constitution 


^ 


616        STRUGGLE  OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

which  gives  the  Government,  in  case  of  urgent  neces- 
sity, a  provisional  right  of  taking  its  own  measures. 

Doubtless,  all  the  different  parts  of  the  organization, 
and  hence  the  Government  also,  are  bound  to  do  their 
utmost  to  end  this  state  of  things,  and  to  bring  about 
as  soon  as  possible  an  agreement  of  the  three  different 
authorities  with  regard  to  the  estimates.  With  this 
object  in  view,  the  Government  will,  therefore,  during 
the  interim  unprovided  for,  respect  as  much  as  possible 
the  former  decisions  of  one  House  as  well  as  of  the 
other,  without,  however,  allowing  them  a  binding  force 
which  they  do  not  have,  nor  in  any  particular  case 
giving  more  consideration  to  them  than  to  the  needs  of 
the  country. 

If  these  arguments  are  examined  and  compared  with 
the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  it 
will  be  impossible  to  assert  that  false  interpretation  of 
those  provisions  was  intended,  after  the  fashion  of 
Herr  von  Westphalen  under  Frederick  William  IV. 
On  the  contrary,  the  actual  letter  of  the  law  is  fol- 
lowed, though  in  contradiction  to  what  we  all,  at  that 
time,  considered  the  spirit.  Evident  it  certainly  is, 
that  under  such  a  system  the  power  of  the  Lower 
House  in  financial  matters,  and  hence  in  the  Govern- 
ment as  a  whole,  is  much  more  limited  than  in  Eng- 
land. A  mischievous  Government  can  make  the  right 
of  the  Lower  House  in  regard  to  the  budget  an  empty 
name.  This  is  quite  as  true  as  the  converse  proposi- 
tion, that  the  English  Lower  House,  by  means  of  its 
right,  can  make  the  Crown  and  the  Upper  House  yield 


CHANGES  IN  THE  MINISTRY.  517 

to  any  of  its  demands.  The  guaranty  against  such 
extremes  lies  in  a  clear  consciousness  on  either  side, 
that  reasonable  co-operation  is  more  profitable  for  every 
one  than  an  obstinate  effort  for  mastery. 

It  was  the  good  fortune  of  Prussia  and  of  Germany, 
that  neither  in  the  fiercest  moments  of  the  conflict,  nor 
in  the  triumph  of  the  most  brilliant  victories,  was  the 
consciousness  of  this  principle  wanting  in  the  minds  of 
the  King  and  his  great  Ministers.  Both  were  immov- 
able in  their  determination  to  uphold  at  once  the 
military  reforms  and  the  Constitution. 

After  the  close  of  the  session,  Bismarck  next  gave 
his  attention  to  the  arrangement  of  the  Cabinet.  He 
himself  undertook  the  direction  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
while  Count  Bernstorff  once  more  returned  to  London. 
For  want  of  a  better,  he  appointed  to  the  Department  of 
Finance  the  former  Minister  in  the  Manteuffel  Cabinet, 
Carl  von  Bodelschwingh.  The  place  of  Herr  von 
Jagow  in  the  Department  of  the  Interior  was  taken  by 
Count  Frederick  Eulenburg,  a  man  of  solid  ability, 
very  fond  of  enjoying  life,  and  perhaps  less  so  of  work,  a 
statesman  of  keen  insight,  a  fearless  and  ready  debater, 
firmly  grounded  in  monarchical  principles,  and  as  free 
from  party  fanaticism  as  Bismarck  himself. 

The  German  questions  were  the  ones  that  first  of  all 
required  the  attention  of  the  Cabinet.  Bismarck  took 
them  in  hand  without  hesitation.  lie  announced  liis 
intention  to  persist  in  the  renewal  of  the  Tariff-Union 
only  witli  tliose  states  that  entered  into  the  commercial 
treaty  with  France.     In  this,  in  spite  of  the  abhorrence 


518        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

felt  by  the  Liberals  for  tlie  Minister  personally,  the 
public  opinion  of  Germany,  determined  by  the  impor- 
tance of  material  interests,  was  entirely  on  the  Prussian 
side.  On  the  18th  of  October,  the  German  commercial 
convention  in  Munich,  by  a  majority  of  104  non- 
Austrian  votes  against  96  Austrian  and  4  South  Ger- 
man, expressed  a  desire  that  the  French  treaty  should 
continue  in  force. 

In  Hesse-Cassel  the  Parliament  was  summoned  for 
the  30th  of  October.  It  expressed  its  thanks  to  the 
Elector  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  Constitution,  but 
learned  that  its  sole  work  was  to  be  the  acceptance  of  a 
new  electoral  law,  as  the  Elector  did  not  consider  the 
Act  of  1849  to  be  valid.  The  legal  competence  of  the 
Parliament  was  thus  brought  in  question,  this  time  by 
the  Elector.  The  Parliament  protested,  and  asked  that 
the  budget  should  be  presented  to  them  as  was  proper 
at  that  time.  When  a  negative  answer  was  returned, 
they  requested  that  at  least  the  Government  would 
move  the  granting  of  an  extraordinary  credit. 

Otker,  who  on  the  15th  of  October  had  consulted 
Bismarck  with  the  profoundest  secrecy,  and  who,  con- 
trary to  Liberal  prejudices,  had  recognized  in  him  the 
eminent  statesman,  turned  in  these  new  difficulties  once 
more  to  Berlin ;  and  when  in  November  the  Elector 
suddenly  dismissed  his  Ministers  and  prorogued  the 
assembly  of  Estates  for  an  indefinite  time,  Bismarck's 
decisive  counter-move  followed  at  once.  Diplomatic 
relations  between  the  two  Courts  had  not  been  renewed 
since  they  had  been  broken  off  after  Willisen's  inter- 


BISMARCK'S  ACTION  IN  GERMAN  MATTERS.     519 

view  with  the  Elector.  Bismarck,  therefore,  sent  a 
despatch  by  a  sharp-shooter  directly  to  Herr  von  Dehn, 
expressing  regret  for  the  Elector's  action,  declaring  it 
impossible  for  Prussia  again  to  allow  political  diffi- 
culties of  such  a  dangerous  nature  to  arise  in  a  country 
placed  between  her  provinces,  and  announcing  the 
intention,  if  the  Elector  continued  in  his  perverse 
courses,  of  beginning  to  take  the  necessary  steps  in 
conjunction  with  the  agnates. 

This  hit  the  mark  more  sharply  than  Bernstorff's 
military  equipments,  six  months  before.  The  Elector 
hated  nothing  more  than  his  agnates,  and  the  feeling 
was  cordially  returned  by  them.  It  was  also  certain 
that  Austria  would  make  no  objection,  if  a  family- 
council  should  declare  a  Prince  wliose  character  was 
incapable  of  improvement,  incapable  of  ruling.  The 
Elector,  therefore,  yielded  in  impotent  anger,  summoned 
the  Ministers  and  the  Estates  to  new  activity,  and  for  a 
time  Ilesse-Cassel  was  restored  to  the  number  of  nor- 
mally-administered and  constitutionally-governed  states. 

In  a  fur  more  comprehensive  fashion  did  the  proposal 
from  Vienna  for  the  summoning  of  an  assembly  of 
delegates  in  connection  with  the  Confederate  Diet 
afford  the  Prussian  Minister  an  occasion  for  indicating 
his  position  on  the  German  question. 

It  is  hardly  likely  that  Bismarck  had  at  tliat  time 
formed  any  ddinite  conclusion  in  regard  to  tlie  nature 
and  foim  of  the  (Jernian  Constitution  that  was  to  be 
aimed  at  in  the  future.  lie  was  quite  clear  as  to  tlie 
fact  that  Prussia's  actual  position  in  the  Confederation 


620       STRUGGLE  OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

was  unendurable,  and  that  it  must  be  clianged,  if  neces- 
sary, as  he  had  once  written  to  Schleinitz,  ferro  et  igni. 
And  not  less  certain  was  he  that  the  decision  of  the 
question  depended  wholly  upon  the  two  important 
powers  in  Germany,  upon  the  relation  between  Austria 
and  Prussia. 

A  peaceful  transformation  of  these  relations  Bismarck 
regarded  as  wholly  improbable :  "  Any  other  war,"  he 
well  said,  "  that  Prussia  might  undertake  before  this 
Austrian  one,  would  be  a  mere  throwing  away  of  pow- 
der." He  was  ready  to  enter  into  the  conflict,  but  did 
not  ignore  its  dangers,  and  would  gladly  have  welcomed 
the  chance  of  an  understanding,  if  such  a  work  of  peace 
had  appeared  possible. 

The  various  systems  available  in  war  or  in  peace  lay 
all  in  perfect  clearness  before  his  incomparably  keen 
and  far-seeing  eye  :  a  control  over  Germany  exercised 
by  the  two  Great  Powers  in  common ;  or  a  division  of 
Germany  between  the  two  Powers  along  the  line  of  the 
Main ;  or  a  complete  exclusion  of  Austria  from  Ger- 
many, and  in  this  case  either  a  more  federative  or  a 
more  unified  constitution  of  the  new  Confederation,  a 
more  limited  or  a  more  extended  competence  of  the 
central  authority  under  Prussia's  headship,  and  of  the 
national  popular  representation.  With  none  of  the  pre- 
judices of  a  doctrinaire  in  favor  of  any  one  of  these 
systems,  he  weighed  all  their  aspects  and  advantages, 
as  well  as  their  costs  and  dangers,  and  above  all  their 
practicability  in  view  of  the  mutual  jealousy  of  the  two 
Powers,  always  ready  to  change  his  means  or  his  end  as 


BISMARCK'S  ACTION  IN  GERMAN  MATTERS.     521 

circumstances  might  dictate  :  only  keeping  this  one 
rule  fixed,  that  Prussia  should  always  advance,  should 
never  yield,  never  lose  the  ground  that  had  been  gained, 
nor  her  own  courage.  Without  doubt,  the  point  of 
departure  of  all  his  action  was  not  a  Germany  existing 
only  in  the  fancy,  but  Prussia  growing  in  tangible 
reality ;  yet  it  is  not  less  certain  that  tliis  man,  who 
dealt  only  with  facts,  for  that  very  reason  found  the 
true  way  to  realize  Germany's  ideal. 

As  early  as  the  30th  of  September  Bismarck  had 
announced,  at  a  sitting  of  the  budget-committee,  that 
the  German  problem  could  hardly  be  solved  by  parlia- 
mentary decrees,  but  only  by  blood  and  iron,  and  he 
had  thus  caused  a  great  boiling  over  of  public  o2:)inion 
and  moral  indignation  on  the  part  of  peace-loving 
citizens.  As  has  been  said,  he  was  very  ready,  so  far 
as  in  him  lay,  to  save  them  from  the  need  of  these 
violent  means ;  and  when,  on  the  4th  of  December,  the 
report  of  the  committee  on  the  proposal  from  Vienna 
came  up  for  consideration  in  the  Diet,  and  Prussia  was 
preparing  to  cast  a  protecting  vote  in  the  negative, 
Bismarck  invited  the  Austrian  Deputy,  Count  Karolyi, 
to  a  consultation  in  regard  to  the  state  of  things  on 
both  sides  and  the  probable  outcome.  This  was  the 
first  of  those  interviews  in  which  Bismarck  henceforth 
so  often  astonished  the  diplomatic  world  by  his  unre- 
served frankness  in  the  exposition  of  his  views  and 
purposes. 

With  the  tone  of  indifference  of  an  historian  narratingf 
events  of  tlie  past,  Bismarck  gave  the  Count  a  sketch 


522        STRUGGLE   OVER    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

of  the  future  of  Germany.  "  Our  relations  with  Aus- 
tria," he  said,  "  must  become  better  or  worse ;  we 
sincerely  desire  the  former  of  these  alternatives,  but 
Austria's  behavior  cannot  but  prepare  us  for  the  latter." 
He  mentioned  Austria's  hostile  efforts  among  the  states 
neighboring  to  Prussia,  which  could  not  but  destroy  all 
sympathy  for  Austria  in  Berlin. ^ 

Karolyi  thought  that  in  the  case  of  a  French  attack 
upon  Austria,  the  two  German  Powers  would  remain 
in  firm  alliance.  But  Bismarck  entreated  him  to  oppose 
in  Vienna  with  all  his  power  such  a  dangerous  mistake ; 
the  renewal  of  the  intimate  relations  of  the  past,  he 
said,  would  depend  solely  upon  Austria's  German 
policy;  and  if  such  a  renewal  were  not  brought  about, 
an  alliance  of  Prussia  with  one  of  Austria's  opponents 
was  as  little  out  of  the  question,  as  in  the  contrary 
event  a  firm  and  loyal  union  of  both  Powers  against 
their  common  enemies.  It  lay  in  Austria's  choice, 
either  to  continue  her  present  anti-Prussian  policy  with 
the  support  of  a  coalition  of  the  Lesser  States,  or  to 
seek  an  honorable  alliance  with  Prussia.  Prussia's 
most  earnest  wish  was  to  bring  about  the  latter ;  but 
this  could  only  be  accomplished  b}'  Austria's  abandon- 
ing her  unfriendly  machinations  at  the  German  Courts. 

Karolyi  said  that  Austria  could  not  j)ossibly  resign 
her  traditional   influence  at  the  German  Courts  ;  that 

1  It  is  well  known  that  Bismarck,  after  a  report  of  this  interview  had 
been  published,  by  an  indiscretion  on  the  Austrian  side,  in  the  Niirnher- 
ger  Correspondent,  produced  on  his  side  an  account  of  the  matter  by  a 
circular  to  the  German  embassies.  The  differences  between  the  two 
statements  on  important  points  are  without  consequence. 


BISMARCK  AND   COUNT  KAROLYI.  623 

would  mean  her  being  thrust  out  from  Germany.. 
"■  Well,  then,"  cried  Bismarck,  "  move  your  centre  of 
gravity  towards  Buda-Pesth."  ^ 

Bismarck  then  laid  stress  on  the  want  of  considera- 
tion shown  by  the  friends  of  Austria  in  the  Diet  in 
adopting  a  hostile  attitude  towards  Prussia,  and  in 
treating  the  Prussian  protest  against  Austria's  proposal 
as  an  incident  not  worth  noticing.  In  a  second  inter- 
view on  the  loth,  he  further  declared  to  the  Count,  that 
Prussia  would  be  forced  to  regard  any  exceeding  of  the 
proper  powers  of  the  Confederation  by  the  vote  of  a 
mere  majority  as  a  breach  of  the  Act  of  Confederation, 
and  to  withdraw  her  representative  from  the  Diet  with- 
out appointing  any  one  in  his  place.  The  practical 
results  of  this  would  soon  make  themselves  felt. 

On  the  19th  of  December,  after  Pfordten,  as  spokes- 
man of  the  committee,  had  recommended  to  the  Diet 
tlie  acceptance  of  the  proposal,  it  was  agreed  without 
further  discussion  to  take  the  vote  on  the  subject  on 
the  22d  of  January,  1863. 

Meanwhile  the  report  of  Bismarck's  conversation 
with  Karolyi  was  causing  great  excitement  in  Vienna. 
Count  Rechberg  assured  the  Prussian  ambassador. 
Baron  Werther,  that  he  desired,  as  ardently  as  Bis- 
marck, a  close  understanding  between  the  two  Powers, 
and  tliat  he  wished  for  an  active  alliance  between 
them  against  revolutionary  tendencies.  Werther  re- 
minded liini  of  his  efforts  in  opposition  to  the  proposals 
of  Prussia  in  the  matters  of  the  Confederate   military 

1  Austriuu  Circular,  28lli  of  January,  18C3. 


52-4       STRUGGLE   OVER   THE   CONSTITUTION. 

organization  and  the  defence  of  the  coast,  also  of  the 
ever-increasing  disturbance  that  had  been  aroused  in 
the  Tariff-Union,  and  of  the  stirring-up  of  trouble  in 
Hanover  and  Cassel.  But  Rechberg  explained  that  the 
military  organization  of  the  Confederation  had  great 
practical  difficulties ;  that  Austria's  isolation  in  affairs 
of  trade  had  long  ago  been  seen  by  Metternich  to  be 
insupportable,  nay,  it  might  even  be  looked  upon  as 
one  great  cause  of  the  March  Revolution  in  Vienna. 
The  dislike  of  Hanover  and  Hesse-Cassel  for  Prussia, 
he  said,  had  its  foundation,  not  in  Austria's  influence, 
but  in  the  fear  that  both  States  had  of  a  Prussian 
hegemony.  If  Austria  should  refuse  to  protect  them 
any  longer,  they  would  not  look  to  Prussia,  but  would 
make  advances  to  France. 

In  accordance  with  these  views.  Count  Rechberg  on 
another  occasion  declared  that  the  withdrawal  of  the 
project  in  regard  to  the  delegates,  in  the  actual 
advanced  stage  of  the  proceedings,  was  quite  out  of 
the  question.  At  the  same  time  he  disputed  the  right 
of  the  Prussian  Government  to  secede  from  the  Con- 
federation, and  hoped  that  between  then  and  the  22d  of 
January  that  Government  would  yet  become  convinced 
that  by  such  a  step  it  would  draw  down  upon  itself  the 
greatest  evils. 

With  no  small  anxiety,  therefore,  did  the  whole  of 
Germany  look  forward  to  the  22d.  But  for  this  time, 
at  any  rate,  the  crisis  was  avoided.  The  proposal  was 
unsatisfactory,  not  only  to  those  States  that  had  in 
mind  a  genuine  parliament  in  a  more  restricted  union. 


AUSTRIA'S  PROPOSAL  REJECTED.  525 

but  also  to  the  extreme  opponents  of  such  a  union,  the 
Governments  that  were  disgusted  at  the  idea  of  any 
popular  representation  at  all  in  the  Confederation.  It 
was  therefore  rejected  by  nine  votes  against  seven,  while 
one  member  refrained  from  voting.  Prussia,  in  giving 
her  vote,  had  dwelt  not  only  upon  the  question  of  the 
powers  of  the  Confederation,  but  also  upon  the  practi- 
cal impossibility  of  carrying  out  the  plan  of  an  assembly 
of  delegates,  and  had  at  the  same  time  referred  to  the 
national  demand  for  a  parliament  based  upon  the  suf- 
frages of  the  people. 

By  the  German  public  this  attitude  was  everywhere 
treated  with  scorn.  What  was  to  be  said  of  the  brazen 
forehead  of  a  man  that  tyrannized  over  the  parliament 
in  his  own  country  and  then  wished  to  assemble  repre- 
sentatives from  all  Germany  to  make  them  undergo 
similar  treatment  ?  No  one  would  put  any  faith  in  the 
threat  of  Prussia's  withdrawal  from  the  Confederation  : 
such  a  bold  and  dangerous  course  seemed  out  of  the 
question  in  a  state  so  distracted  by  internal  dissensions 
as  was  Prussia  at  that  time. 

But  meanwhile  other  events  had  occurred  that  turned 
the  attention  of  all  Europe  in  feverish  anxiety  toward 
the  East.  The  cry  spread  through  every  country  :  The 
Revolution  is  in  Poland. 


526  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 


CHAPTER  II. 

COMPLICATIONS   IN   POLAND. 

Among  the  world-embracing  schemes  of  improvement 
of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III.,  the  liberation  of  Poland, 
as  we  have  seen,  occupied  a  conspicuous  place  beside 
the  reconstruction  of  Italy.  When  the  Crimean  War 
began,  all  parties  among  the  Polish  fugitives  bestirred 
themselves  energetically  in  both  Paris  and  London. 
General  Mieroslawski,  in  mournful  remembrance  of 
1849,  hoped  for  a  democratic  republic  with  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  Occidental  conventions  of  civilization. 
More  moderate  spirits  gathered  about  Prince  Adam 
Czartoryski,  the  patriarch  of  the  emigration,  and  candi- 
date for  the  throne  of  the  future  Polish  national  king- 
dom. The  country  of  Poland  itself,  however,  remained 
in  silent  lethargy,  completely  fettered  by  the  military 
dictatorship  that  had  administered  the  government  since 
1831  and  repressed  the  least  movement  of  any  kind. 

Attention  was  at  once  aroused  by  a  statement  of 
Napoleon's  that  had  made  its  way  into  the  newspapers, 
to  the  effect  that  it  would  perhaps  be  for  the  interest  of 
Germany  to  revive  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw.  But 
when  the  Prussian  ambassador  made  inquiries  as  to  the 
meaning  of  these  words,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  drew  back : 
it  was  evident,  he  said,  that  much  might  be  adduced  in 


NAPOLEON  III.  AND  POLAND.  527 

favor  of  such  a  view ;  but,  nevertheless,  it  was  the 
affair  of  the  German  Powers,  and  the  Emperor  would 
not  bring  it  forward.  He  added  further,  that  if  Prussia 
and  Austria  feared  that  the  creation  of  such  a  Polish 
state  would  imply  the  loss  of  their  Polish  provinces,  the 
possibility  of  a  rich  compensation  on  German  soil  lay 
near  at  hand.  Prussia,  on  this,  said  no  more ;  but 
Count  Buol,  the  Austrian  Minister,  sent  word  to  Paris 
that  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  held  firmly  to  the  principle 
proclaimed  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  that  the 
protection  of  Turkey  was  aimed  at,  but  no  change  in 
the  possessions  of  any  European  Power.  Thus  the 
Poles  gained  nothing. 

Immediately  after  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations 
for  peace  in  1856,  Napoleon  said  to  Prince  Czartoryski : 
"  For  the  first  time  I  press  your  hand  with  a  painful 
feeling ;  but  there  was  nothing  else  to  be  done." 
Napoleon's  wish,  to  demand  political  rights  for  Poland 
at  the  Peace-Congress  in  Paris,  was  decidedly  rejected 
by  Austria  ;  and  even  England,  though  approving  of 
the  object,  thought  the  proposal  "  inopportune  "  in  the 
liighest  degree  :  the  Congress,  therefore,  contented  itself 
with  a  declaration  on  the  part  of  Prince  Orloff,  that 
the  Emperor  Alexander  II.  Avould  do  what  was  possible 
to  better  the  condition  of  Poland.  Afterwards,  when 
the  Poles  pressed  Napoleon  for  support,  he  well  said  to 
them  :  "What  would  you  have?  You  missed  the  favor- 
able opportunity  of  the  Crimean  War ;  now  liave 
patience  ;  trust  in  my  sympathy,  and  look  with  hope  to 
the  future." 


528  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

In  fact,  the  existing  state  of  things  was  not  favorable 
to  the  Poles.  As  Napoleon,  immediately  after  the  Paris 
Congress,  turned  his  thoughts  to  the  expulsion  of  Aus- 
tria from  Italy,  and  for  this  object  sought  to  establish 
closer  relations  with  Russia,  any  talk  of  Poland's  being 
assisted  by  French  arms,  that  is,  of  the  re-establishment 
of  an  independent  Poland,  was  for  him  out  of  the  ques- 
tion. At  the  same  time  he  never  entirely  gave  u]3  his 
concern  for  that  unfortunate  people,  and  strove,  if  not 
with  the  sword  for  their  freedom,  yet  with  diplomatic 
means  for  an  improvement  of  their  condition. 

When  in  1857  he  met  Alexander  II.  in  Stuttgardt, 
he  said  to  the  Russian  Emperor  that  there  was  no  other 
matter  that  involved  any  danger  to  the  accord  between 
them ;  the  sole  question  that  could  occasion  any  dis- 
turbance of  the  good-feeling  of  the  French  people  was 
the  Polish  one  ;  if  the  Emperor  Alexander  desired  to 
confirm  harmonious  relations,  he  must  go  as  far  in  his 
concessions  to  Poland  as  was  compatible  with  the 
interests  of  Russia.  Alexander,  who  was  the  mildest 
and  most  humane  ruler  that  ever  occupied  the  Russian 
throne,  replied,  that  it  had  long  been  his  most  heartfelt 
wish  to  take  such  measures  ;  and  thus  the  two  Sover- 
eigns parted  with  an  excellent  understanding  between 
them. 

Still  more  than  the  Czar,  was  the  guiding  spirit  in 
foreign  affairs,  the  Vice-Chancellor,  Prince  Gortschakoff, 
filled  with  a  desire  for  close  friendship  with  France. 
Even  when  a  young  man,  as  Russian  chargS  d'affaires 
in  Stuttgardt,  the  quick,  ambitious,  and  easily-excited 


STATE   OF  THINGS  IN  POLAND.  529 

mind  of  the  diplomat  had  seized  the  idea  that  Russia, 
if  supported  by  a  f'rench  alliance,  would  acquire  the 
first  place  in  Europe.  And  now,  after  the  Crimean 
War,  his  soul  lived  and  moved  in  the  desire  of  making- 
good  as  soon  as  possible  the  losses  then  suffered,  of 
restoring  Russia's  influence  in  the  Orient,  and  above  all 
of  blotting  out  the  shameful  clause  in  the  Peace  of 
Paris  that  forbade  the  presence  of  Russian  ships  in  the 
Black  Sea.  If  France  should  be  well  disposed  to  these 
ideas  of  his,  as  then  appeared  probable,  and  if  the 
relaxation  of  the  oppressive  sabre-domination  in  Poland 
was  to  be  the  price  of  a  French  alliance,  Gortschakoff 
was  ready  and  eager  to  pay  the  same  in  its  full  extent. 

The  new  Governor  of  Poland,  Prince  Michael  Gort- 
schakoff, readily  came  into  accord  with  the  wishes  of  the 
Minister.  No  restoration  of  the  Constitution  was  as 
yet  ventured  upon ;  but  in  the  administration,  a  wholly 
new  tone  of  liberal  confidence  replaced  the  jealous 
severity  of  Paskiewitsch.  Especially  did  the  Govern- 
ment turn  its  attention  to  what  was  at  that  time  the 
worst  side  of  affairs  in  Poland,  to  the  condition  of  the 
peasant  population ;  and  on  this  point  the  evil  was  very 
serious,  and  any  improvement  exceedingly  difficult  to 
carry  out. 

It  is  well  known  that  in  the  old  da3's  of  Poland,  the 
peasant  serf  was  bound  to  the  soil,  and  unlimited  sway 
was  given  to  the  arl)itrary  will  of  the  lord.  Wlieii,  in 
the  year  1807,  Napoleon  founded  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Warsaw,  serfage  was  at  once  abolished,  personal  free- 
dom was  proclaimed  for  tlie  peasants,  and  the  power  of 


530  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

changing  their  abode  at  will,  and  with  the  introduction 
of  the  code  Napoleon  the  relation  between  proprietor 
and  peasant  was  characterized  as  a  free  compact  subject 
to  withdrawal  on  either  side  at  any  time.  For  a  more 
detailed  settlement  of  the  matter  neither  Napoleon  nor 
the  Saxon-Polish  Government  found  time. 

Under  the  constitutional  rule  of  Alexander  I.,  the 
influence  of  the  nobles  controlled  the  Chambers,  and 
the  nobles  did  not  find  themselves  at  leisure  to  call  into 
existence  organic  laws  in  regard  to  peasant-rights,  at 
the  expense  of  their  own  purses.  Meanwhile,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  freedom  of  the  peasants  had  taken 
the  following  shape.  So  long  as  the  peasant  had 
remained  bound  to  the  estate  to  which  he  belonged,  the 
lord  had,  indeed,  been  able  to  maltreat  him,  but  not  to 
rob  him  of  his  wretched  possessions  :  now,  when  mutual 
withdrawal  from  the  compact  was  the  right  of  either 
side,  the  proprietor,  in  innumerable  cases,  found  it  to 
his  advantage  to  get  rid  of  the  peasant,  and  either  to 
incorporate  the  latter's  farm  into  his  own  estate  proper, 
or  to  rent  it  to  some  foreign  and  prosperous  peasant, 
very  often  a  German,  for  a  profitable  return. 

This  treatment  of  the  peasantry  went  so  far,  that  by 
the  middle  of  the  century  half  the  rural  population  had 
lost  all  their  property,  and  were  floating  aimlessly  with 
their  wives  and  childen  about  the  country,  seeking  their 
daily  bread  in  every  sort  of  service.  In  the  case  of  the 
other  half,  the  power  of  dismissal  which  belonged  to 
the  proprietors  was  used  for  the  purpose  of  imposing 
upon  their  vassals,  in  addition  to  the  rent,  the  continu- 


STATE   OF  THINGS  IN  POLAND.  531 

ance  of  a  great  number  of  feudal  services :  ordinary 
and  extraordinary  labor  upon  the  lord's  fields,  contribu- 
tions to  the  kitchen  of  the  manor-house,  service  as 
watchman,  house-service,  socage-service,  etc.  An  offi- 
cial account  of  the  various  kinds  of  service  rendered 
by  the  peasantry  throughout  the  kingdom  numbered 
them  at  one  hundred  and  twenty-one. 

But  this  was  not  enough.  Beside  these  pecuniary 
privileges,  there  was  a  widely-extended  power  of  super- 
intending control.  A  proprietor  that  possessed  ten  or 
more  peasant  farms  was  by  hereditary  right  the  superin- 
tendent of  such  a  group,  or  could  himself  appoint  a 
bailiff  with  the  power  of  dismissing  him  at  his  pleasure. 
The  bailiff  represented  the  police  of  his  district ;  he 
could  impose  petty  punishments,  either  pecuniary  or 
corporal,  at  his  discretion ;  he  administered  justice,  and 
was  the  sole  organ  of  the  central  government  within 
that  district.  These  districts,  which  occupied  the 
greater  part  of  the  arable  land  in  the  kingdom,  were 
reckoned  at  something  over  five  thousand,  with  about 
sixteen  thousand  officials  connected  with  them.  These 
hitter  were  all  taken  from  the  petty  nobles,  the  schlachta; 
they  were,  for  the  most  part,  penniless  and  ignorant, 
harsli  and  prejudiced  against  the  peasantry,  and  blindly 
suljservient  to  tlie  proprietors,  at  the  same  time  ardent 
patriots  and  filled  with  hatred  for  Russians,  Germans, 
and  Jews.  These  feelings  were  shared  with  them  to 
their  full  extent  by  the  only  other  influential  class  in 
the  country,  the  Catliolic  clergy,  wlio,  indeed,  under 
the  Russian  Government  still  retained  their  great  reve- 


532  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

nues,  but  ou  whose  peculiar  privileges  and  thirst  for 
power  strict  limits  had  been  imposed. 

This  wretched  state  of  things  had  long  attracted 
attention  in  St.  Petersburg,  and  even  in  the  time  of  the 
Emperor  Nicholas  various  steps  had  been  taken  towards 
improving  the  condition  of  things  ;  but  that  ruler  had 
not  ventured  upon  thorough  measures,  because  he  had 
scruples  about  freeing  the  Russian  peasants,  and  yet 
could  not  refuse  to  them  what  he  conceded  to  the 
peasants  in  Poland.  But  when  his  successor  decided 
on  the  abolition  of  serfage  in  Russia,  he  thought  at  once 
of  his  unhappy  Polish  subjects  also.  One  of  his  first 
measures  was  the  granting  of  permission  to  form  a  great 
agricultural  association  for  the  sake  of  materially  ad- 
vancinof  the  cultivation  of  the  soil.  This  association 
was  to  have  a  chosen  central  committee  in  Warsaw,  and 
branch  associations  in  all  the  provinces  of  the  kingdom, 
—  an  organization  that  would  have  been  simply  impos- 
sible and  inconceivable  under  Paskiewitsch.  After  this, 
in  the  year  1856,  a  ukase  declared  it  to  be  the  Emper- 
or's will,  that  the  feudal  labors  and  services  should  be 
converted  into  a  fixed  money-payment  to  be  settled  in 
the  beginning  by  the  free  agreement  of  the  parties  con- 
cerned, but  afterwards  by  standards  soon  to  be  legally 
fixed  for  such  agreements,  for  the  consideration  and 
preparation  of  which  special  authorities  were  appointed. 

All  this  was  well  and  good,  and  held  out  to  the 
country  the  prospect  of  material  improvement.  Never- 
theless, it  was  quite  comprehensible,  that  all  hearts  did 
not  at  once  warm  to  the  new  system  with  submissive 


POLISH  PARTIES.  533 

gratitude.  The  burden  had  pressed  too  heavily,  the 
hatred  had'  eaten  in  too  far.  Among  the  cultivated 
classes  national  ideas  on  the  one  side  and  the  stream  of 
democratic  tendencies  on  the  other  had  sufficed  to  keep 
alive  hatred  of  Russia  and  of  the  Czar's  omnipotence. 
It  was  an  old  saying,  that  under  a  mild  ruler  Poland 
could  rise,  and  under  a  harsh  one  she  must.  In  every 
benefit  emanating  from  St.  Petersburg  there  seemed  to 
be  nothing  but  a  small  instalment  toward  the  payment 
of  past  debts,  in  every  privilege  of  freedom  granted  by 
the  Czar  but  a  weapon  for  continuing  the  struggle 
against  the  accursed  foreign  yoke. 

In  regard  to  the  means  to  be  emploj'ed  for  this  pur- 
pose, opinions  did,  indeed,  differ ;  and  from  the  first  day 
a  moderate  and  a  radical  party,  afterwai'ds  called  the 
Whites  and  the  Reds,  appeared  in  opposition  to  one 
another.  The  nucleus  of  the  former  party  consisted  of 
the  great  landed  proprietors,  who  now  possessed,  in  the 
Agricultural  Association,  wliich  was  under  their  guid- 
ance, an  organization  embracing  the  whole  kingdom. 
Tlieir  view  of  the  matter  was,  that  the  Emperor's  good- 
will should  be  used  for  ol)taining  once  more  for  the 
kingdom  an  autoiiomons  adniinistration  independent  of 
Russia,  that  then  the  restoration  of  the  Lil)oral  Consti- 
tution of  1815  and  of  a  Polish  army  should  be  bi-ought 
about,  and  so  the  means  of  arriving  at  complete  inde- 
pendence prepared.  They  looked  upon  the  questions 
concerning  the  peasants,  wliich  had  been  raised  by  the 
Emperor,  with  very  divided  feelings.  They  saw  in 
them,   first  of  all,   the    desire    of    tlie    Government   to 


634  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

secure  the  dependence  of  the  peasants  upon  itself, 
and  hence  the  probability  of  serious  losses  of  property 
for  the  nobles ;  they  therefore  determined  to  take  the 
thing  into  their  own  hands,  to  make  a  bargain  as 
cheaply  as  possible,  and  to  gain  for  themselves  the 
gratitude  of  the  peasants  for  the  benefits  they  were  to 
receive. 

The  Red  party  bestowed  on  this  slow  and  complicated 
method  of  procedure  nothing  but  silent  contempt.  In 
their  view,  the  holy  cause  of  democratic  Revolution 
disowned  all  half-measures  ;  the  sole  object  to  be  pur- 
sued was  to  strike  down  every  enemy  as  quickly  as 
possible,  and  the  Polish  nobility  themselves  would  have 
to  choose  whether  they  would  be  enemies  or  friends. 
To  these  enthusiasts,  therefore,  it  was  not  a  question  of 
constitutional  experiments,  but  of  war  and  arms.  This 
concise  programme  was  accepted  by  the  great  body  of 
the  petty  nobles,  so  far  as  they  had  not  entered  the 
service  of  the  great  lords,  by  the  majority  of  the  mer- 
chants and  artisans  in  the  towns,  by  a  great  part  of  the 
parish  clergy  and  of  those  in  monastic  institutions,  and 
by  almost  all  the  younger  men  of  the  educated  classes. 
For  a  time,  however,  both  these  parties  took  pains  to 
avoid  an  open  breach ;  for  the  Whites  were  anxious  to 
remain  popular  in  the  towns,  and  the  Reds  needed  for 
their  preparations  the  influence  and  the  wealth  of  the 
landed  proprietors. 

A  consideration  of  great  importance  in  the  pursuit 
of  all  these  different  interests  was  the  internal  condition 
of  the  Russian  Empire  itself  at  that  time.     Even  there 


STATE   OF  THINGS  IN  RUSSIA.  535 

the  democratic  tendencies  of  the  age  had  found  entrance 
and  adherents,  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  absolutist 
system  in  the  Crimean  War.  Many  of  the  nobles 
thought  that  they  ought  to  receive  compensation  for 
what  they  had  lost  by  the  abolition  of  serfage  and  by 
the  concession  of  constitutional  and  parliamentary  priv- 
ileges ;  and  the  Vice-Chancellor,  who  credited  himself 
with  brilliant  oratorical  powers,  was  not  indisposed  to 
give  his  support  to  such  demands.  Still  more  adher- 
ents, however,  both  in  the  country  and  in  the  army, 
joined  the  social-democratic  party,  which  received  its 
impetus  from  tlie  well-known  exiles,  Herzen  and  Baku- 
nin,  and  whicli  was  in  intimate  connection  with  those 
of  like  disposition  in  Warsaw.  Bakunin  at  this  time 
declared  publicly  that  three  hundred  Russian  officers  in 
the  standing  army  of  the  Empire  had  been  gained  over 
to  the  cause  of  revolt. 

Now  in  1859,  as  we  know,  it  happened  that  the 
Emperor  Alexander,  on  account  of  the  revolutionary 
tempest  in  Italy,  became  decidedly  cooler  in  his  feelings 
toward  France ;  and  also  in  October,  1860,  at  the  inter- 
view in  Warsaw,  a  moderately  amicable  relation  with 
tlie  Emperor  of  Austria  was  once  more  established. 
Napoleon,  irritated  by  this  and  by  the  failure  of  his 
plans  for  a  congress,  then  decided  to  show  the  grim 
side  of  his  disposition  to  his  faithless  friend ;  and  he 
announced,  in  violent  newspaper  articles  written  by  his 
cousin  Jerome,  tliat  Fiance  would  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  Russia,  just  so  far  as  the  latter  agreed  to 
look  favorably  upon  Poland's  efforts  towards  progress. 


536  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

In  Poland  this  action  of  the  French  Government  had 
all  the  more  effect,  since  at  the  same  time  rumors  were 
abroad  of  Italian  preparations  against  Venetia.  If  this 
be  the  case,  thought  the  Poles,  then  Hungary  and 
Galicia  will  rise  in  full  revolt,  and  the  hour  of  libera- 
tion for  the  Polish  people,  and  for  the  Russian  people 
also,  is  near  at  hand.  The  first  nucleus  of  a  revolu- 
tionary organization  was  therefore  formed  at  Warsaw : 
twelve  young  men,  hitherto  wholly  insignificant  and 
unknown  in  the  country,  organized  themselves  as  a 
secret  committee,  which,  according  to  revolutionary 
custom,  gave  itself,  in  the  name  of  the  Polish  people, 
full  powers  for  guiding  the  national  movement.  Its 
orders  appeared  without  signature,  accredited  only  by 
the  seal  of  the  Committee  ;  but  in  the  excited  state  of 
public  feeling  its  action  awoke  a  ready  echo,  and  it 
found  numerous  adherents  in  all  parts  of  the  country. 

One  of  the  chiefs  of  the  insurrection  of  1831, 
Mochnacki,  had  once  closed  an  historical  account  of  that 
rebellion  with  the  words  :  "  Poland  will  become  free 
when  her  patriotism  can  rise  into  discipline  and  obedi- 
ence." The  leaders  in  1860  had  profited  by  this  saying, 
and  unconditional  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  Com- 
mittee became  the  first  and  last  command  for  every  mem- 
ber of  the  league.  Quite  as  definite  was  the  declaration 
of  the  aim  of  the  conspiracy  :  the  restoration  of  Poland, 
at  least  to  the  boundaries  of  1815,  and,  if  it  might  in  any 
way  be  possible,  to  those  of  the  glorious  times  of  the 
Jagiellos,  that  is,  from  the  Oder  to  the  Carpathians  and 
the  Dnieper.     For  an  actual  contest  in  arms,  those  who 


THE  MARQUIS   WIELOPOLSKI.  537 

espoused  these  plans  were  not  yet  prepared  ;  but  tliey 
determined  to  begin  at  once,  by  a  series  of  unarmed 
demonstrations,  to  arouse  tlie  minds  of  the  people,  to 
provoke  the  oppressor  to  more  hateful  deeds  of  vio- 
lence, and  to  show  the  world  that  Poland  was  still 
alive. 

In  February,  1861,  the  general  assembly  of  the  Agri- 
cultural Association  held  its  meeting  in  Warsaw  and 
discussed  the  great  question  of  the  condition  of  the 
peasants.  It  was  generally  agreed  that  something  must 
be  done  to  assert  the  Association's  leadership  in  the 
matter;  but  as  to  M^iat  that  something  should  be, 
opinions  dispersed  to  all  points  of  the  compass.  A 
turbulent  minority,  which  wished  to  force  the  nobility 
at  once  into  the  path  of  revolution,  demanded  the 
transference  of  the  ownership  of  the  small  farms  to 
the  peasants  in  consideration  of  a  moderate  payment ; 
in  general  these  more  violent  spirits  urged  an  active 
interference  of  the  Association  in  the  political  agitation, 
and  although  the  Managing  Committee  decidedly  re- 
jected this  course,  it  met  with  more  and  more  sympathy 
in  the  assembly. 

At  this  juncture,  there  appeared  in  Warsaw,  for  the 
j)urpose  of  giving  weight  to  an  exactly  opposite  ten- 
dency, the  only  member  of  the  great  land-holding  class 
that  had  hitherto  held  aloof  from  the  Association,  the 
Mar([uis  Wiclopolski.  He  was  a  dignified  ])ersonage, 
of  strong  features  and  concise  speech,  with  (lie  nmniu'r 
of  one  accustomed  to  comma i id.  an  admirable  mana- 
ger of    his   vast   estates,  a  proutl   aristocrat  of  strong 


538  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

passions  and  of  an  iron  will.  Up  to  this  time,  he  had 
liv^ed  for  fifty  years  in  the  cultivation  of  these  charac- 
teristics. In  1846,  at  the  time  of  the  Galician  butch- 
eries, he  had  attracted  great  attention  by  an  energetic 
despatch  to  Metternich ;  then  he  had  sunk  back  once 
more  into  his  solitary  existence  in  the  country  and  into 
his  scholarly  pursuits  of  every  sort. 

His  was  an  imperious  nature,  imperious  towards 
others  and  towards  itself,  thirsting  insatiably  after 
thorough  knowledge,  inflexible  in  its  logical  reasoning, 
pitiless  against  every  illusion  however  fair ;  in  all  these 
respects  it  contrasted  with  the  excitable  temperament 
of  the  greater  part  of  his  countrymen,  sensitive  as  it 
was  to  every  emotion,  and  hence  he  was  a  stranger 
among  his  fellows,  misunderstood  and  not  beloved.  In 
politics,  he  was  a  man  of  order,  of  system,  of  reform 
based  upon  experience ;  the  noisy  harangues  of  enthu- 
siastic half-knowledge  disgusted  him  ;  and  he  was  the 
born  opponent  of  all  lawless  insurrection.  He  had  as 
high  a  conception  of  the  rights  of  the  government 
as  of  its  duties ;  it  should  rule  with  a  strong  hand,  but 
at  the  same  time  surrender  itself  with  complete  devotion 
to  labor  for  the  common  good. 

With  such  sentiments,  he  had  studied  the  condition 
of  his  country,  and  step  by  step  had  turned  his  back 
upon  the  patriotic  dreams  of  his  countrymen.  "  Our 
past,"  he  said,  "  lies  in  ashes  ;  we  must  build  with  the 
materials  of  the  present."  With  him,  tliis  meant  a 
renunciation  of  national  independence,  which  with  good 
reason  he  regarded  as  for  the  time  unattainable,  a  frank 


WIELOPOLSKrS  PROPOSITION.  539 

acknowledgment  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Russian 
Imperial  House,  and  on  this  basis  the  hope  for  a  return 
to  the  liberal  state  of  things  of  1815,  and  so,  for  a 
reconciliation  between  the  two  nations  hitherto  enemies 
to  the  death. 

The  ultimate  object  of  this  Slavonic  brotherly  league 
was,  however,  suggested  to  him  by  his  bitter  and  inex- 
tinguishable hatred  of  the  Germans.  Even  in  the 
preceding  3'ear  of  1860  he  had  put  himself  in  commu- 
nication with  the  Vice-Chancellor,  and  in  a  long  memo- 
rial had  demonstrated  to  him  the  necessity  of  the 
liberation  of  Poland  as  a  bulwark  for  Russia,  since  only 
in  this  way  could  the  mortal  enemy  of  the  Slavic 
name,  the  German,  be  hindered  in  his  constant  en- 
croachment upon  Slavic  territory  and  be  once  more 
deprived  of  his  unlawful  possessions  on  Slavic  soil. 
Gortschakoff  had  made  no  objections  to  this  line  of 
argument. 

The  Marquis  now  laid  before  the  Managing  Com- 
mittee an  address  to  the  Emperor  drawn  up  in  accord- 
ance with  his  own  principles,  containing,  that  is,  an 
open  declaration  of  firm  loyalty,  and  on  the  strength  of 
this,  first  of  all  a  request  for  tlie  restoration  of  the 
Constitution,  and  secondly,  a  proposal  for  the  settle- 
ment of  the  questions  concerning  the  peasants,  for  the 
reform  of  the  higher  education,  especially  in  the  re- 
opening of  tlie  University  of  Warsaw,  and  for  the 
bestowal  of  equal  rights  as  citizens  upon  the  Jews,  a 
step  which  the  INIarquis  regfirded  as  being  the  most 
important  one,  in  the  existing  state  of  things,  towards 


540  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

the  strengthening  of  the  citizen  class  in  Poland,  which 
had  been  hitherto  lamentably  insignificant. 

The  members  of  the  Committee  hesitated.  The  sub- 
stance of  what  Wielopolski  proposed  agreed  exactly 
with  their  own  wishes.  But  it  went  against  the  grain 
to  swear  fealty  and  obedience  to  the  alien  Czar,  to  beg 
from  his  favor  what  they  held  to  be  their  own  right,  to 
disown  the  revolution  of  1831,  in  one  word,  to  sign  a 
petition  that  involved  the  recognition  of  the  existing 
state  of  things.  The  Committee  took  counsel  with 
their  friends ;  and  the  state  of  feeling  became  more  and 
more  unfavorable  to  the  position  held  by  the  Marquis. 

But  the  Radicals  had  little  confidence  in  this  mere 
feeling ;  they  decided  to  stifle  the  attempt  to  conciliate 
in  blood.  On  the  25th  of  February,  1831,  the  Poles 
had  once  fought  the  Russians,  near  Grochow ;  they  had 
been  defeated,  but  they  had  struggled  bravely.  The 
Secret  Committee  now  ordered  a  great  religious  cele- 
bration of  the  anniversary  of  that  day.  It  began 
with  a  solemn  service  in  all  the  churches,  to  which  was 
added  a  colossal  procession  with  all  i^riestly  pomp,  with 
Polish  colors,  with  standards  and  with  torches.  An 
immense  concourse  of  people  followed.  Soon  there 
was  a  block  in  the  streets,  interruption  of  traffic, 
collision  with  the  police.  Finally,  armed  authority  was 
able  to  disband  the  people  by  the  slow  advance  of 
horsemen. 

On  the  27th  the  gathering  was  renewed  ;  and  when  the 
Cossacks  behaved  with  brutality,  and  maltreated  even 
the  priests  who  were  present,  the  crowd  turned  threat- 


SPREAD   OF  INSUBORDINATION.  541 

eningly  toward  the  castle  of  the  Governor.  The  old 
general,  hesitating  and  uncertain,  assailed  by  many 
different  counsels,  finally  gave  the  order  to  use  arms. 
Five  men  were  shot  dead  on  the  spot ;  the  people  then 
dispersed  with  a  fierce  clamor. 

Thus  blood  had  been  shed,  and  a  state  of  war  was 
once  more  proclaimed  between  Poles  and  Russians. 
The  Secret  National  Committee  had  stood  the  first  trial 
of  its  power.  "•  Only  a  few  bold  men  took  an  active 
part,''  said  one  of  the  Committee's  newspapers,  "but 
the  peojjle  of  Warsaw  rallied  about  them  and  screened 
them  from  the  sight  of  the  police."  The  Committee 
now  issued  orders  almost  daily,  printed  handbills,  which 
were  sometimes  pasted  on  the  walls  and  sometimes 
carried  by  boys  to  the  different  houses.  A  general 
mourning  throughout  the  country  was  ordered,  black 
garments  for  the  women  and  a  new  national  dress  for 
the  men.  On  certain  days,  at  the  command  of  the 
unknown  chiefs,  all  the  promenades,  theatres,  and  cafes 
were  left  empt}'.  Above  all,  by  the  enthusiastic  parti- 
cipation of  the  clergy,  the  church  was  drawn  into  the 
patriotic  agitation.  Not  a  week  passed  without  a 
solemn  liigh-mass  in  one  of  the  Warsaw  churches  cele- 
brated in  memory  of  some  anniversary  honorable  to 
Poland,  and  these  were  always  concluded  by  the  sing- 
ing of  a  i)atriotic  hymn.  This  fashion  was  set  first 
in  Warsaw,  and  soon  spread  through  all  parts  of  the 
country. 

The  i\gricultural  Association  was  swept  more  and 
more  into  tlie  stream.     Since  the  shots  of  the  27th  of 


642  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

February,  nothing  more  had  been  heard  of  Wielopolski's 
petition.  In  its  stead,  an  address  was  sent  to  the 
Emperor  demanding  in  pathetic  language  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  national  and  liistorical  rights  of  Poland. 
The  general  assembly  of  the  Association  closed  its 
deliberations  with  a  series  of  resolutions,  in  which  it 
was  declared  the  duty  of  the  landed  proprietors  to  con- 
vert the  domestic  service  and  the  socage  service  of  the 
peasants  into  a  money-equivalent,  and  then  to  give 
them  the  title  to  their  property  after  sixteen  such  pay- 
ments. 

After  this  the  Managing  Committee  of  the  Associa- 
tion remained  passive ;  but  the  majority  of  the  branch 
associations,  and  therefore  of  the  landed  proprietors, 
obeyed  the  directions  of  the  Secret  National  Committee. 
Since,  as  we  have  seen,  the  officials  appointed  by  the 
proprietors  were  the  sole  organs  of  the  Government 
throughout  the  country,  the  civil  administration  in  the 
provinces  was,  by  these  proceedings,  practically  broken 
up  or  put  in  the  hands  of  the  revolutionary  leaders. 
In  Warsaw,  upon  receiving  a  notice  from  the  National 
Committee,  a  large  number  of  the  Polish  officials 
resigned  their  offices  in  a  body.  The  remainder  were 
affected  by  the  contagion  that  was  spreading  through 
both  upper  and  lower  classes.  Before  long,  the  Gov- 
ernment could  not  escape  the  conviction  that  in  all  its 
different  offices,  in  the  postal  service  and  in  that  of  the 
railroads,  above  all  in  the  ranks  of  the  police,  the 
patriotic  conspiracy  had  its  sympathizers  and  its 
asrents. 


METHODS  OF  THE  NATIONAL   COMMITTEE.     543 

While,  therefore,  the  effectiveness  of  the  Government 
service  was  diminished  in  all  directions,  the  secret 
administration  soon  found  itself  in  a  position  to  con- 
strain the  lukewarm  or  the  disaffected  among  their 
countrymen  to  obey  their  commands.  Every  Polish 
woman  that  showed  herself  in  a  bright-colored  garment 
was  publicly  insulted  in  the  streets,  the  shops  of  recal- 
citrant merchants  were  plundered,  and  Poles  of  distinctly 
Russian  sympathies  were  most  brutally  maltreated  in 
broad  daylight.  In  these  cases,  the  police  regularly  ap- 
peared on  the  scene  only  after  the  act  had  been  completed 
and  the  actors  had  escaped. 

So  within  a  few  weeks  the  entire  authority  of  the 
legal  administration  of  the  State  passed  into  the  hands 
of  twelve  unknown  young  men,  whose  efforts  were 
supported  by  the  enthusiasm  of  the  youth,  the  women, 
and  the  clergy,  and  the  neglect  of  whose  commands 
was  more  dangerous  than  refusal  to  obey  the  orders  of 
the  Emperor  of  Russia.  In  the  beginning,  every 
appearance  of  an  armed  insurrection  was  avoided.  On 
the  contrary,  it  was  proclaimed  to  all  Europe :  "  We 
beg  and  implore  ;  and  the  Russians  murder  us."  But 
the  object  in  view  was  very  clearly  expressed  by  General 
Mieroslawski  on  the  3d  of  March,  1861,  in  a  message  to 
the  Secret  Committee. 

First  of  all,  he  said,  the  resolution  of  the  Agricul- 
tural Association  in  regard  to  the  establishment  of  the 
peasantry  upon  an  indei)endcnt  footing  must  be  pro- 
mulgated and  carried  into  effect,  both  in  the  kingdom 
itself    and   among   the    Lithuanians    and    Ruthenians ; 


544  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

while,  in  the  mean  time,  the  whole  population  is  to  be 
prepared  for  the  struggle  and  to  receive  a  military 
organization.  Then  the  peasants,  gained  over  by  the 
gift  of  their  independence,  will  place  themselves  under 
the  leadership  of  the  nobility,  and  at  a  given  moment 
fall  upon  whatever  Russian  garrison  is  the  nearest. 
Above  all  things,  the  people  must  not  allow  the  Russian 
Government  to  make  any  conscription  for  the  army. 
At  the  same  time  the  Committee  at  Warsaw  must 
arouse  the  attention  and  the  interest  of  Europe  by 
newspaper  articles  in  all  languages,  and  must  by  vigor- 
ous, and,  if  necessary,  fictitious  reports,  portray  the 
strength  of  the  revolt  and  the  internal  disintegration  of 
Russia.  The  Governments  of  France  and  England  are 
to  be  overwhelmed  and  wearied  with  complaints  which 
must  ostensibly  have  been  presented  at  St.  Petersburg 
and  invariably  put  aside  with  contemptuous  neglect. 
Some  time  will  be  required  for  all  this  to  take  effect ; 
but  it  will  finally  bring  about  a  quarrel  between  the 
Western  Powers  and  Russia.  An  insurrection  in 
Poland  would  be  a  signal  to  the  Italians  and  the 
Hungarians  to  rise :  on  this  point,  it  was  said,  there 
was  a  complete  understanding  between  Mieroslawski, 
Garibaldi,  and  Klapka. 

We  shall  see  with  what  exactness  and  completeness 
this  programme  was  carried  out  by  the  Warsaw  National 
Committee. 

While  these  mines  were  being  laid  in  Poland,  what 
was  the  state  of  things  on  the  Russian  side? 

The   scenes   of  the    27th   of    February  had  put  the 


ACTION  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  GOVERNMENT.     545 

aged  Governor,  General  Gortschakoff,  quite  beside  him- 
self. In  the  first  moment  of  excitement,  he  proposed 
to  the  Government  the  proclamation  of  a  state  of  siege  ; 
but  on  such  insufficient  grounds  the  Vice-Chancellor 
would  not  hear  of  such  a  thing.  Upon  this,  the  old 
man  went  quite  to  the  other  extreme,  and  favored  the 
proposition  of  a  volunteer  committee  of  citizens  who 
should  become  responsible  for  order,  if  the  police  and 
the  military  were  withdrawn.  The  Secretary  of  the 
State  Council,  Enoch,  then  represented  strongly  to  the 
Governor,  that  if  he  wished  to  manage  the  uprising  by 
a  policy  of  conciliation,  he  must  enter  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble upon  organic  reforms ;  and  when  the  Governor 
eagerly  declared  his  readiness  to  do  this,  Enoch  pro- 
posed, as  the  best  representative  of  such  a  policy,  the 
Marquis  Wielopolski.  The  Governor  agreed ;  he  re- 
jected, indeed,  the  Marquis's  first  proposition,  the  resto- 
ration of  the  Constitution  of  1815,  but  forwarded  to  St. 
Petersburg,  with  an  urgent  recommendation  for  their 
acceptance,  the  further  proposals  of  Wielopolski :  that 
is  to  say,  those  for  the  establishment  of  elective  district- 
councils  and  local  authorities,  as  well  as  of  a  council  of 
state  re-enforced  by  notables  to  pronounce  an  opinion 
upon  legislative  propositions,  for  the  extension  of  equal 
rights  to  the  Jews,  for  the  abolition  of  socage  service, 
the  reform  of  the  system  of  education,  and  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  the  University  of  Warsaw. 

In  St.  Petersburg  also,  these  proposals  were  well 
received.  Tlie  Emperor,  in  the  consciousness  of  his 
own  humane  inclinations,  would   not   yet   believe  the 


546  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

Poles  irreconcilable.  The  Vice-Chancellor  saw  in  the 
approval  of  the  proposals  a  great  step  towards  the 
realization  of  his  own  pet  idea,  the  renewal  of  an  inti- 
mate connection  with  France.  When  the  Prussian 
Ambassador,  Herr  von  Bismarck,  exjiressed  to  him 
some  doubts — not  as  to  the  extent  of  the  concessions, 
but  as  to  the  opportuneness  of  the  time,  since  it  might 
seem  as  if  they  had  been  produced  by  fright  at  the  out- 
break of  the  27tli  of  February  —  Gortschakoff  declared 
with  some  vexation  that  Russia  could  not  take  advice 
in  these  internal  questions  even  from  her  best  friends ; 
it  was  the  duty  of  every  Government  to  get  rid  of  such 
abuses  as  had  hitherto  existed  in  the  administration  of 
Poland ;  Russia  was  tired  of  being  always  looked  upon 
in  Europe  as  the  wild  man,  the  barbaric  despot,  whenever 
her  government  was  compared  with  that  exercised  by 
Prussia  and  Austria  in  their  Polish  territories. 

In  short,  Wielopolski's  proposals  went  through  some 
further  sifting ;  but  in  a  ukase  of  the  •SGth  of  March, 
the  Governor  received  by  telegraph  the  imperial  ap- 
proval of  the  establishment  of  a  council  of  state,  of  the 
formation  of  elective  councils  in  the  various  local 
divisions  of  the  country,  and  of  the  creation  of  a  com- 
mission^ to  preside  over  the  concerns  of  the  church 
and  of  education.  On  the  27th  the  Marquis  entered 
upon  his  new  office.  He  was  determined  to  restore 
order  and  obedience,  and  by  that  very  course  to  lay  the 
firm  foundation  for  a  systematic  and  liberal  self-govern- 

1  At  that  time  the  various  departments  of  government  in  the  king- 
dom bore  the  modest  title  of   "  commissions." 


WIELOPOLSKI  AND   THE  RADICALS.  547 

merit  in  Poland  under  the  supremacy  of  the  Emperor, 
but  independent  of  Russian  officials. 

He  was  destined  to  a  bitter  experience  in  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  task  he  had  set  before  himself. 

The  Marquis  found  the  Agricultural  Association  and 
the  country  priests  engaged  so  actively  in  a  national 
agitation  that,  though  himself  a  Roman  Catholic,  he  at 
once,  on  the  2d  of  April,  forbade  the  clergy  to  interfere 
in  political  matters,  and  on  the  5th  dissolved  the  Asso- 
ciation on  the  ground  of  its  having  gone  beyond  its 
powers.  While  this  was  sufficient  to  exasperate  the 
bishops  and  the  great  nobles,  the  Reds  had,  from  the 
very  beginning,  regarded  Wielopolski  as  the  most  dan- 
gerous enemy  of  their  cause.  To  prepare  the  way  for 
their  revolution  they  required  an  increasing  feeling  of 
indignation  among  the  people,  and  for  this  purpose  in 
the  ruling  circles,  not  intelligent  reform,  but  a  harsher 
misgovernment.  They  therefore  resolved  to  meet  the 
ukase  of  March  26th  with  an  emphatic  repetition  of  the 
tumult  of  the  27th  of  February,  in  order  that  the  new 
authorities  at  their  very  entrance  into  office  might 
receive  in  the  sight  of  the  people  the  character  of 
bloodthirsty  oppressors.  The  course  that  things  took 
on  the  8tli  of  April  was  exactly  the  same  as  in  Feb- 
ruary :  a  religious  solemnity,  patriotic  songs,  a  threat- 
ening crowd  gathered  before  the  palace  of  the  Gov- 
ernor. A  repeated  command  to  disperse  was  followed 
by  the  throwing  of  stones  at  the  troops,  till  finally  a 
sharp  volley  was  fired  and  ten  men  were  killed  on  the 
spot. 


548  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

By  this  the  ukase  of  March  26th  and  Wielopolski's 
system  received  their  interpretation  in  the  public 
opinion  of  Poland.  Once  more  the  old  state  of  things  — 
"  we  entreat,  they  murder  "  —  was  renewed,  and  Wielo- 
polski  was  regarded  as  the  betrayer  of  his  country,  who 
wished  to  tame  her  with  caressing  words  to  the  yoke  of 
the  Russian  tyrant.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  this,  the  Minis- 
ter worked  unceasingly  at  his  reforms,  and  was  sup- 
ported, so  far  as  possible,  by  the  Governor,  whose 
entire  confidence  he  had  gained.  But  it  was  the  ill- 
fortune  of  the  Marquis  that,  at  the  end  of  May,  Prince 
Michael  suddenly  fell  sick,  and  died  on  the  30th  after 
a  few  days  of  suffering.  Wielopolski's  whole  position 
was  thus  endangered. 

There  was  great  difficulty  in  St.  Petersburg  about 
finding  a  suitable  successor  to  the  Prince,  and  it  cannot 
be  denied  that  the  various  choices  that  were  made  one 
after  another  resulted  very  unfortunately.  The  first  of 
them,  the  former  Minister  of  War,  General  Suchosanett, 
was  a  soldier  of  seventy  years,  who  had  no  other  con- 
ception of  government  than  with  his  fifty  thousand  Rus- 
sian soldiers  to  keep  those  incorrigible  Polacks  at  any 
rate  in  order,  to  lock  up  or  transport  every  suspicious 
character,  and  to  regard  the  civil  authorities  as  simply 
non-existent. 

In  August  he  was  succeeded  by  Count  Lambert,  a 
half-disabled  general  of  French  descent  and  education, 
wholly  uninformed  as  to  Polish  affairs.  He  had  been 
charged  to  proclaim  a  state  of  siege,  if  necessary  for 
the  preservation  of  peace  and  order;  but,  for  his  own 


THE  NATIONAL   COMMITTEE.  549 

part,  he  was  filled  with  the  idea  of  becoming  popular 
not  only  in  Poland,  but  also  in  France,  and  strove,  as  a 
good  Catholic,  to  win  the  approval  of  the  clergy  ;  so 
that  very  soon  a  weak  and  purposeless  anarchy  took  the 
place  of  the  rule  of  the  sword. 

The  seed  sown  by  the  National  Committee  was  now 
growing  more  and  more  vigorously  with  the  increasing 
irritation  of  the  people  and  the  miserable  inefficiency 
of  the  Government.  In  the  postal  service  and  on  the 
railroads  nearly  half  of  the  officials  were  agents  of 
the  Committee,  and  the  case  was  not  very  different  in 
the  ranks  of  the  police  and  of  the  gendarmes.  The 
contributions  levied  by  the  Committee  were  exactly 
paid,  implicit  obedience  was  yielded  to  its  orders,  and 
the  recalcitrant  or  negligent  were  reached  by  the  dag- 
gers of  the  mighty  secret  tribunal..  The  Committee 
extended  its  activity  to  Lithuania  and  Volhynia ;  in 
Kovno  and  Wilna  there  were  tumults  as  bloody  as  those 
in  Warsaw. 

On  the  10th  of  October,  the  Committee  arranged  a 
great  popular  assembly  at  Horodlo  on  the  Bug,  in  com- 
memoration of  the  union  of  the  Poles  and  Ruthenians 
there  effected  in  the  year  1413,  and  also  as  a  protest  in 
the  sight  of  Europe  against  the  division  of  Poland.  In 
the  appeal,  therefore,  an  invitation  was  extended  to 
deputations  from  all  the  countries  formerly  belonging 
to  Poland  —  from  Posen,  West-Prussia,  and  Pome- 
rania,  from  Cracow,  from  Galicia,  and  from  Kiev  —  to 
be  present  at  Horodlo.  The  Russian  General  in  com- 
mand at  Horodlo  looked  on  with  his  troops  in  iiuliffer- 


550  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

ence,  while  the  religious  service  forbidden  by  Lambert 
was  celebrated  with  all  ecclesiastical  pomp  in  the  open 
fields,  by  the  Bishop  of  Lublin  with  a  hundred  priests, 
and  before  four  thousand  spectators. 

When  this  was  reported  in  St.  Petersburg,  it  filled 
the  cup  of  imperial  wrath  to  overflowing,  and  on  the 
14th  of  October  there  appeared  in  Warsaw  an  order 
from  the  supreme  authority  containing  the  proclamation 
of  a  state  of  siege.  The  Committee,  in  response  to 
this,  ordered  a  national  celebration  in  honor  of  Kosci- 
usko to  be  held  in  all  the  churches  on  the  evening  of 
the  15th.  The  celebration  took  place  before  an  immense 
throng  of  people.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  service 
revolutionary  songs  were  sung  in  two  of  the  churches ; 
whereupon  the  doors  were  occupied  by  the  military,  and 
when  the  crowd  refused  to  leave  the  building,  a  detach- 
ment of  soldiers  was  sent  in  about  midnight,  who  with 
a  violent  tumult  drove  out  the  women  and  children,  but 
carried  off  the  men,  seventeen  hundred  in  number,  to 
prison. 

On  the  16th,  at  a  hint  from  the  Committee,  a  majority 
of  the  chapter  of  the  Cathedral  obliged  the  Archbishop, 
Bialobrzeski,  to  order  the  closing,  not  only  of  the  two 
churches  desecrated  by  the  brawl,  but  of  all  the 
churches  of  Warsaw,  in  order  to  save  them,  as  he  said, 
from  possible  desecration  in  the  future.  This  was  an 
act  that  went  beyond  all  canonical  rules,  in  its  open 
hostility  to  the  Government;  and  the  latter  answered  it 
by  the  deposition  and  arrest  of  the  holder  of  the  see,  a 
proceeding  that  gave  the  patriots  clear  proof  that  the 


WIELOPOLSKI  IN  ST.  PETERSBURG.  551 

Government  was  involved  in  a  like  damnation  with 
Nero  and  Diocletian.  The  hand  of  God  vindicated  its 
own  power :  Count  Lambert  was  made  incapable  of 
managing  affairs  by  a  hemorrhage,  and  once  more  the 
rough  and  harsh  Suchosanett  was  called  provisionally 
to  undertake  the  government  of  Poland. 

In  these  hours  of  violence,  Wielopolski  had  seen  his 
most  cherished  schemes  fade  away  without  effect.  He 
was  openly  on  bad  terms  with  both  Suchosanett  and 
Lambert;  and  when  the  former  was  reinstated,  the 
Marquis  besought  the  Emperor  to  allow  him  to  resign. 
Alexander,  who  prized  the  ability  and  information  of  the 
Marquis,  had  been  by  various  circumstances  somewhat 
shaken  in  his  confidence  in  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
man  ;  he  therefore  sent  for  him  to  St.  Petersburg,  in 
order  to  judge  for  himself. 

There  the  Marquis  succeeded  in  winning  greater 
consideration  and  stronger  influence  every  day;  and 
especially  Prince  Gortschakoff  continued  to  show  him- 
self the  zealous  supporter  of  a  conciliatory  policy,  such 
as  was  recommended  by  Wielopolski.  The  Marquis 
was  soon  able  to  unfold  to  the  Emperor  his  great  plan 
in  all  its  details  :  it  consisted  of  a  separation  of  the 
military  and  civil  powers,  the  former  to  remain  in 
tlie  hands  of  a  Russian  General  with  Russian  troops, 
the  latter  to  be  confided  to  a  Minister,  who  should  be 
independent  of  Russian  authorities,  sliould  have  at  his 
side  a  council  of  state  for  the  i)romulgation  of  laws,  and 
should  liave  under  liim  Polisli  ofiicials,  as  well  as  local 
authorities  chosen  by  the  people  ;  with  the  organization 


552  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

of  this  system  the  state  of  siege  would  come  to  an  end, 
and  also  the  Catholic  Church  would  receive  important 
concessions  ;  finally,  at  the  head  of  the  whole  should  be 
placed  a  member  of  the  imperial  family,  as  representa- 
tive of  the  Crown. 

In  connection  with  this  Gortschakoff  said :  "  The 
present  state  of  things  cannot  continue ;  you  can  lean 
on  bayonets,  but  you  cannot  sit  on  them ;  something 
must  be  done."  The  oldest  of  the  Emperor's  brothers, 
the  Grand  Duke  Constantino,  expressed  his  emphatic 
approval  of  Wielopolski's  scheme.  The  Emperor  hesi- 
tated for  a  long  time,  in  doubt  whether  the  step,  taken 
at  that  late  hour,  would  have  the  desired  conciliatory 
effect  upon  the  Poles  ;  but  finally  he  decided  not  to 
deny  himself  the  satisfaction  of  making  one  more 
attempt.  In  the  last  days  of  May,  1862,  therefore,  the 
world,  which  had  hitherto  heard  of  nothing  but  Russian 
acts  of  violence  in  Poland,  was  astonished  by  the  proc- 
lamation of  the  new  system.  The  Grand  Duke  Con- 
stantino was  appointed  Governor,  and  Wielopolski  chief 
of  the  civil  administration ;  the  command  of  the  army 
was  retained  by  General  Liiders,  who  had  already  held 
it  for  some  months. 

Wielopolski  had  reckoned  this  time  upon  receiving 
for  once  some  thanks  from  his  countrymen.  Instead  of 
the  Russian  military  dictatorshij),  he  brought  them  a 
civil  administration  carried  on  by  their  own  people  and 
independent  of  Russia,  together  with  reforms  in  every 
sphere  of  social  life.  But  the  Emperor  had  judged  the 
Polish  parties  only  too  correctly.     The  nobility  of  the 


ATTEMPTS  AT  ASSASSINATION.  553 

White  faction  refused  every  office  under  Wielopolski, 
because  his  power  did  not  extend  to  the  entire  Poland 
of  1771.  The  Reds,  on  the  other  hand,  to  whom  noth- 
inor  seemed  more  dreadful  and  more  full  of  danger  than 
a  reconciliation  between  the  Czar  and  the  Poles,  and 
who,  as  we  have  seen,  had,  on  the  8th  of  April,  responded 
to  the  first  step  of  the  Marquis  in  that  direction  with 
bloodshed,  decided  that  very  different  blood  should 
smoke  before  him  now,  when  he  was  returning  as  the 
guiding  spirit  of  the  government.  On  the  27th  of  June 
a  pistol-shot  was  fired  at  short  range  at  General  Liiders 
in  the  Saxon  Garden,  by  which  his  jaws  were  broken. 
Those  who  had  done  the  deed  could  not  be  dis- 
covered. 

Soon  after  this,  the  news  spread  through  the  country 
that  a  negotiation  between  Russia  and  the  Vatican,  set 
on  foot  to  induce  the  Pope  to  address  peaceful  admoni- 
tions to  the  Polish  clergy,  had  grown  to  an  open  breach. 
The  Pope  called  upon  the  Polish  bishops  to  take  under 
their  protection  the  priests  who  had  been  arrested  for 
unlawful  behavior.  Upon  this,  Gortschakoff  said  :  "  If 
the  Pope  fosters  revolution  in  Poland,  he  cannot  expect 
Russia  to  support  him  against  revolution  in  Italy,"  and 
he  acknowledged  openly  the  Italian  sovereignty  of 
Victor  Emmanuel. 

By  these  proceedings,  the  fanaticism  of  the  Poles  was 
increased  to  the  highest  |)oiiit,  and  it  sliowed  itself  in 
an  unexampled  series  of  deeds  of  violence.  A  pistol 
was  fired  at  the  Grand  Duke  two  days  after  his  arrival; 
the  ball  reached  its  mark,  but  was  arrested  in  the  thick 


554  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

epaulets  of  the  generars  uniform.  In  the  month  of 
August  four  attempts  at  assassination  were  made  one 
after  another  against  Wielopolski,  with  firearms,  with 
steel,  with  poisoned  letters,  and  with  poisoned  food.  It 
is  a  wonder  that  they  all  failed.  At  the  same  time 
thirty  Russian  officers  of  the  garrison  of  Warsaw  were 
convicted  of  participation  in  the  conspiracy ;  all  the 
pulpits  once  more  resounded  with  an  appeal  for  the 
sacrifice  of  property  and  life  for  the  good  of  the  Father- 
land ;  and  the  arms  necessary  to  supplement  this  appeal 
were  hidden  in  the  cellars  of  the  monasteries.  On  the 
1st  of  September  the  National  Committee  issued  a 
proclamation,  in  which  it  constituted  itself  the  National 
Government,  announced,  as  the  aim  of  the  revolt,  the 
liberation  of  all  Poland  as  far  as  the  boundaries  of  1771, 
promised  to  the  peasants  the  ownership  of  their  farms, 
and  summoned  all  the  Slavonic  peoples  to  take  part  in 
the  struggle  for  freedom. 

The  feelings  aroused  in  the  Grand  Duke  and  the 
Minister  by  such  proceedings  can  easily  be  imagined. 
They  had  come,  in  their  own  view,  to  overwhelm  the 
Polish  nation  with  benefits,  and  they  found  themselves 
confronted  with  a  storm  of  popular  hatred  that  was 
guided  by  fanatics  who  recognized  no  restraint,  who 
hesitated  at  no  crime,  who  declared  themselves  and 
their  followers  as  free  as  air,  and  who  hurled  the  threat 
of  armed  revolution  in  the  faces  of  their  would-be  ben- 
efactors. Wielopolski,  keeping  his  ideal  unswervingly 
before  him,  was  not  even  in  this  state  of  affairs  unfaith- 
ful to  his  convictions.     In  spite  of  all  the  machinations 


PLAN  OF  RECRUITING  AT   WILL.  555 

and  the  audacity  of  the  rebels,  he  was  determined  that 
the  autonomous  administration,  and  the  benefits  of  the 
reforms  in  education,  and  of  the  laws  releasing  the 
peasants  from  their  obligations,  should  not  be  spoiled 
for  his  countrymen.  He  therefore  dismissed  all  Russian 
officials,  and  gave  their  places  for  the  remainder  of  the 
year  to  natives  of  the  country  :  he  would  not  believe 
that  by  doing  this  he  brought  many  thousand  agents  of 
the  approaching  revolution  into  influential  positions. 
The  instigation  to  disturbance  which  was  kept  up  more 
and  more  by  the  clergy  in  all  the  provinces  he  at  first 
left  unnoticed  :  but  he  was  resolved  to  seize  the  Hydra 
of  Revolution  in  its  deepest  lurking-place  with  what  he 
thought  would  be  a  crushing  grasp.  Against  the  assas- 
sins who  with  poison  and  dagger  disgraced  the  Polish 
name,  any  means  seemed  to  him  permissible,  if  they 
were  only  effective. 

Since  the  end  of  the  Crimean  war  no  recruiting  had 
been  undertaken  for  the  Russian  army,  so  that  the 
different  divisions  hardly  contained  half  the  normal 
number  of  troops  for  a  peace-footing.  Beside  the 
guard  (30,000  men)  and  tlie  Orenburg  and  Caucasian 
troops  (150,000),  the  European  garrisojis  had  somewhat 
more  than  180,000  men  under  the  flag,  of  whom  G0,000 
were  kept  in  Poland,  in  view  of  the  threatening  condi- 
tion of  that  country,  and  as  many  in  the  western 
provinces  of  Russia,  which  had  formerly  ])een  Polish. 
Nothing  was  more  natural  than  tliat  the  Government 
should  think  of  once  more  filling  up  the  vacancies  with 
young  men;  and  already  in  June,  the  new  Minister  of 


656  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

War,  Miliretin,  had  announced  to  the  Marquis  Wielo- 
polski  the  necessity  of  such  a  measure. 

Now  in  the  year  1859  a  ukase  had  been  issued  which 
instituted  the  conscription  by  lot  among  all  classes  of 
the  population  liable  to  military  service,  but  this  had 
never  as  yet  gone  into  effect.  Wielopolski,  brought  to 
the  highest  degree  of  irritation  by  the  succession  of 
attempts  at  assassination  and  by  the  proclamation  of  the 
1st  of  September,  now  adopted  the  idea  of  carrying  on 
the  recruiting  in  Poland  according  to  the  old  principle, 
which  left  the  authorities  free  choice  among  those  liable 
to  serve,  and  of  removing  from  the  country  by  this  means 
at  one  stroke,  if  not  the  whole  band  of  rebels,  at  least 
the  greater  part  of  them.  He  laid  before  the  Grand 
Duke  the  arguments  on  which  such  action  could  be 
based :  as  regarded  the  substance  of  the  matter,  there 
could  be  no  doubt  of  the  Government's  right  to  use 
every  means  against  the  bandits,  who  of  their  own  accord 
had  put  themselves  beyond  any  consideration  of  law ; 
nor  was  the  Emperor's  formal  right  less  clear,  as  the 
sole  and  unrestricted  source  of  all  law,  to  suspend  any 
existing  law  for  a  particular  place  and  time. 

The  Grand  Duke  objected;  he  had  been  sent,  he 
said,  to  further  peace  and  reconciliation,  and  this  mis- 
sion could  not  be  broup'ht  into  accord  with  a  measure 
that  in  spite  of  the  arguments  of  the  Marquis  would  be 
regarded  as  a  coiq?  cVetat.  But  the  strong  will  and 
keen  logic  of  the  Marquis  overcame  these  scruples,  and 
Wielopolski's  proposal  received  the  royal  approval  on 
the  18th  of  September. 


DETAILS   OF  THE  PLAN.  557 

Accordingly,  on  the  6tli  of  October,  the  ofhcial  jour- 
nal of  the  Government  published  an  announcement  to 
the  following  effect :  at  the  same  time  with  the  general 
recruiting  throughout  the  Empire,  a  partial  draft  was  to 
take  place  in  Poland,  which,  as  an  exception  to  the 
usual  custom,  would  not  affect  the  rural  population  — 
in  order  not  to  interfere  with  the  action  of  the  laws 
affecting  the  obligations  of  the  i:)easants  —  but  only 
that  of  the  towns,  and  this,  too,  with  the  exclusion  of 
choice  by  lot,  although  all  legal  grounds  of  exemption 
would  still  continue  fully  in  force.  In  all  districts 
conscription-commissions  were  then  instituted,  and  the 
officials  v/ere  charged  with  an  examination  of  the 
physical  fitness  of  those  liable  to  serve.  A  secret 
instruction  was  addressed  to  the  commissions,  charo-incr 
them  to  select  above  all  those  of  bad  rejHitation,  those 
who  liad  no  definite  place  of  abode  and  no  vocation,  and 
those  who  were  under  the  suspicion  of  exciting  revolu- 
tionary agitation,  since  it  was  desired  to  use  the  con- 
scription as  a  means  of  getting  rid  of  these  dangerous 
elements.  A  few  days  after  its  communication  this 
order  became  known  to  the  National  Committee  and 
also  to  the  foreign  newspapers.  As  the  Grand  Duke 
had  foreseen,  a  sliout  of  indignation  went  through 
Poland  and  through  Europe. 

We  remember  tliat  so  long  before  as  IMarch,  18G1, 
Mieroslawski  had  admonished  liis  friends  in  Warsaw  to 
submit  under  no  circumstances  to  a  conscription,  but  if 
such  a  thing  should  be  announced,  to  oppose  it  at  every 
risk.     This  entirely  suited  the  wishes  of  the  National 


558  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

Committee ;  the  question  was  only,  how  far  the  neces- 
sary preparations  could  be  carried  before  the  as  yet 
unknown  day  of  the  outbreak,  in  order  that  the  insur- 
gents might  fall  with  effect  in  one  night  upon  the 
Russian  garrisons  scattered  through  the  country. 

At  any  rate  the  Committee  went  on  with  the  work 
with  redoubled  zeal.  Already  they  had  repeatedly 
collected  sums  of  money  among  the  patriots,  and  made 
here  and  there  purchases  of  arms ;  now  they  issued  an 
order,  on  the  8th  of  October,  imposing  upon  all  real- 
estate  and  mortgages  a  capital-tax  of  one-half  of  one 
per  cent,  and  upon  all  revenues  of  any  other  sort  an 
income  tax  of  five  per  cent. 

The  enthusiasm  for  this  patriotic  sacrifice  was  not 
shared  by  all  the  patriots,  but  the  committee  had  more 
effective  means  of  executing  its  wishes  than  is  usually 
the  case  with  other  governments:  if  any  landholder 
refused  to  pay,  his  house  and  farm-buildings  were 
burned  within  a  week  after  the  expiration  of  the  term 
set  for  payment ;  and  in  the  towns,  recalcitrant  citizens 
were  murdered  in  the  streets  in  open  day.  Great  sums 
were,  therefore,  quickly  collected,  without  the  Govern- 
ment officers  being  able  to  lay  hands  on  a  single  one 
of  the  receivers  of  the  money,  of  the  assassins,  or  of 
the  incendiaries.  And  soon  large  orders  had  been  de- 
spatched to  England,  France,  and  Belgium,  for  a  speedy 
delivery  of  muskets  and  sabres,  of  munitions  and  uni- 
forms, and  also  of  daggers,  strychnine,  and  curare. 

The  refugees  in  Paris  and  the  European  Revolu- 
tionary Committee  in  London  helped  on  these  prepa- 


REVOLUTIONARY  PREPARATIONS.  559 

rations  according  to  their  ability,  though  with  the 
difference  that  Ladislas  Czartoryski  gave  warnings 
against  premature  action,  in  view  of  the  unfavorable 
conjuncture  in  European  affairs ;  while  the  Committee 
in  London,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  hope  that  the  fire 
blazing  up  in  Poland  would  quickly  spread  to  the  coun- 
tries round  about,  urged  that  the  rising  should  take 
place  as  soon  as  possible.^ 

jNIeanwhile  the  Warsaw  Committee  made  its  arrano-e- 
ments  for  establishing  the  revolutionary  organization  in 
Lithuania,  Posen,  and  Galicia.  In  harmony  with  the 
tone  of  the  manifesto  of  September  1st,  its  newspapers, 
at  the  close  of  the  year,  raised  the  cry  for  the  liberation 
of  the  whole  great  Fatherland  from  the  yoke  of  the 
Germans  and  the  Russians.  To  be  sure,  it  was  not 
intended  to  allow  the  revolt  immediately  to  break  out 
also  on  Prussian  and  Austrian  territory,  and  so  to  draw 
forth  at  once  the  military  force  of  all  three  of  the 
Powers  that  took  part  in  the  partition  ;  on  tlie  contrar}^ 
the  struggle  was  first  to  be  begun  against  Russia,  where 
it  was  hoped  that  the  demoralization  of  tlie  armj^  and 
perhaps  revolutionary  agitations  in  sympathy  with  those 
in  Poland,  would  be  of  assistance,  while  the  Courts  of 
Berlin  and  Vienna  would  be  restrained  by  the  public 
opinion  of  Europe  from  interfering  in  a  quarrel  that 
apparently  did  not  concern  them.  But  none  the  less 
on  this  account  were  Posen  and  Galicia  to  be  diawn  in 
as  a  support   in    the    attack    upon    Russia,  since    they 

'  Communicatiou  of  Nov.  23d,  1862,  in  Knorr  :  Polish  Insurrections 
since  1830. 


560  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

AYOuld  furnish  aid  by  transmitting  across  the  frontier 
the  supply  of  arms  arriving  from  Liege,  by  sharing  in 
the  payment  of  the  national  contributions,  and  by  levy- 
ing and  sending  over  companies  of  volunteers.  In 
Posen  the  association  of  the  Polish  deputies  of  the 
Provincial  Parliament  had  been  for  two  years  doing 
preparatory  work,  and  had  also  extended  its  connections 
among  the  Slavonic  population  of  Upper  Silesia :  in  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1863,  the  Warsaw  Committee 
appointed  the  deputy,  Alexander  Guttry,  chief  of  the 
entire  national  government  which  was  to  be  established 
in  the  duchy,  on  the  model  of  that  in  Warsaw. 

While  all  this  was  going  on,  the  National  Committee 
received  the  news  that  the  recruiting  was  to  take  place 
about  the  middle  of  January.  After  long  and  stormy 
debates,  the  majority  of  the  Committee  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  at  that  moment  insurrection  was  out  of 
the  question;  all  that  could  be  done  was  to  withdraw 
individuals  who  were  threatened  from  the  grasp  of  the 
Russian  military  authorities.  There  was  no  great  diffi- 
culty about  this,  considering  the  disposition  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  civil  officials  ;  it  was  only  necessary 
to  send  the  young  men  away  from  their  actual  place  of 
abode  into  another  district,  so  that  the  officers  who  had 
charge  of  the  conscription  had  no  means  whatever  of 
tracing  them. 

Immediately  many  hundreds  of  young  men  began  to 
disappear  every  night,  especially  from  Warsaw.  When, 
on  the  night  of  the  14th  of  January,  1863,  the  con- 
scription was  begun   in    the   capital,  the  officials  found 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  REVOLT.  561 

only  1,400  men  out  of  4,500,  and  those  under  suspicion 
in  political  matters  were  the  very  ones  who  were  miss- 
ing. Wielopolski  was  bitterly  undeceived,  and  had  the 
failure  of  his  plan  before  his  eyes. 

But  the  National  Committee  also  found  it  impossible 
to  adhere  to  its  decision.  First  among  the  youth  who 
had  escaped  from  the  conscription,  and  soon  also  among 
the  greater  number  of  the  revolutionary  agents  in  the 
provinces,  the  cup  of  passions  that  had  been  inflamed 
for  years  was  filled  to  overflowing.  The  young  men 
did  not  wish  to  hide,  but  to  fight.  Those  from  Warsaw 
gathered  together  in  a  wood  a  few  miles  from  the 
town.  Similar  bands  were  assembled  at  Plock,  Lublin, 
and  Petrikau. 

The  Connnittee  saw  that  they  would  entirely  lose  the 
control  of  things,  if  they  attempted  to  resist  the  cur- 
rent any  longer.  With  heavy  heart  and  bold  words 
they  gave  the  signal  to  all  the  agents  in  the  provinces 
for  the  armed  rising :  exactly  in  accordance  with  what 
Mieroslawski  had  proposed  in  March,  1861,  the  Russian 
garrisons,  on  the  night  of  the  23d  of  January,  were  to 
be  attacked  and  overwhelmed. 

On  the  22d  appeared  three  proclamations  of  the 
Committee,  or  rather,  according  to  the  title  now  adopted 
by  it,  the  National  Government:  in  these,  the  Polish 
nation,  up  to  that  day  a  martyr  and  a  suppliant,  was 
called  upon  to  become  on  the  morrow  a  hero  and  a 
giant ;  all  men  capable  of  bearing  arms  were  to  liasten 
to  the  banner  of  tlie  Fatlierland ;  all  peasant-fai-mers 
were  once  more  promised  the  ownership  of  their  farms 


562  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

—  with  the  reservation  of  compensation  to  be  made 
later  to  the  former  proprietors ;  —  all  farm-servants, 
cottagers,  and  day-laborers  were  promised  a  share  of 
three  acres  apiece  in  the  public  land.  For  the  Com- 
mittee did  not  fail  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  everything 
depended  upon  gaining  over  the  peasant  population  to 
the  standard  of  the  revolt.  Bold  as  was  the  youth  of 
the  cities,  eager  as  the  petty  nobles  were  for  battle,  it 
was  not  possible  to  form  from  them  such  masses  as 
were  necessary  to  encounter  the  columns  of  the  Rus- 
sians. 

On  the  night  of  the  23d  of  January,  then,  a  number 
of  Russian  garrisons  in  the  smaller  towns  were  attacked. 
The  secret  had  been  remarkably  well  kept ;  everywhere 
the  Russian  soldiers  lay  quietly  asleep  in  their  quarters ; 
some  hundreds  were  struck  down  at  the  first  attack,  or 
destroyed  in  the  houses  that  were  set  on  fire,  and  over 
three  hundred  were  wounded.  But  no  decisive  result 
was  obtained  by  the  insurgents.  Everywhere  the  first 
surprise  was  followed  by  an  alarm  quickly  given,  an 
assembling  of  the  troops,  and  a  repulse  of  the  Polish 
bands.  The  latter  threw  themselves  once  more  into  the 
woods,  made  a  new  gathering,  and  received  accessions 
from  all  sides,  mainly  petty  nobles,  artisans,  and  stu- 
dents, a  very  few  peasants,  and  soon  also  volunteers 
from  Posen  and  Galicia.  At  one  stroke  the  country 
was  filled  with  the  tumult  of  war,  the  civil  administra- 
tion of  the  Government  was  scattered  like  chaff  before 
the  wind ;  and  the  hopes  of  the  patriots  soared  high 
over  all  difficulties  and  all  bounds. 


PLANS   OF  THE   GRAND  DUKE.  568 

But  quite  as  patriotic  feelings  were  aroused  in  Russia 
by  the  news  of  the  outbreak.  There  the  entire  people 
looked  upon  the  attack  made  uj)on  sleeping  soldiers  as 
a  treacherous  assassination  on  a  large  scale,  and  thou- 
sands of  voices  called  upon  the  Government  to  take 
bloody  revenge.  Gortschakoff,  however,  said  :  "  It  is  a 
good  thing  that  the  ulcer  has  at  last  broken  ;  now  we 
will  cut  it  out,  and  then  continue  to  carry  on  a  mild  and 
conciliatory  government." 

He  and  every  one  else  in  St.  Petersburg  believed  that 
the  rebellion  would  be  quickly  put  down.  "  In  that 
case,"  wrote  the  Prussian  consul-general  in  Warsaw, 
"  Wielopolski  would  be  omnipotent,  and  would  manage 
Poland  as  he  liked."  Another  Prussian  observer  de- 
scribes the  far-reaching,  ambitious  plans  that  were 
entertained  by  those  who  surrounded  the  Grand  Duke 
Constantine  :  if  the  Reds  were  once  controlled,  it  was 
thought  that  Poland  miglit,  as  the  inheritance  of  the 
second  son  of  the  Russian  Imperial  House,  become  an 
independent  kingdom  under  Russian  protection,  strong 
enouorh  to  draw  to  itself  Posen  and  Galicia,  Croatia 
and  Servia,  and  perhaps  all  the  Austrian  Slavs,  so 
opening  to  the  White  Czar  the  broadest  path  to  Con- 
stantinople. 

However  this  might  turn  out,  great  anxiety  was  felt 
in  \'ienna,  in  Berlin,  and  in  I^oudon,  with  regard  to  the 
course  things  might  take.  In  tlie  most  recent  negotia- 
tions in  regard  to  the  complications  in  tlie  Turkish 
countries  on  tlie  Danube,  Russia  had  assumed  a  position 
in  close  understanding  with  France,  and  in  sharp  oi)po- 


564  COMPLICATIONS  IN  POLAND. 

sition  to  Austria  and  England.  It  was  now  learned 
with  surprise  that  Napoleon,  in  spite  of  all  the  sym- 
pathy that  was  everywhere  manifested  throughout 
France,  strongly  condemned  the  Polish  outbreak,  which, 
he  said,  had  been  made  in  conjunction  with  Mazzini,  at 
a  time  when  the  Emperor  Alexander  was  overwhelm- 
ing Poland  with  benefits.  The  conclusion  was  easily 
reached,  that  Gortschakoff  and  Wielopolski  were  carry- 
ing out  their  plans  on  a  perfect  understanding  with 
Napoleon,  and  that  a  kingdom  of  Poland  closely  allied 
with  Russia  was  to  form  a  basis  of  attack  against 
Vienna  and  Constantinople,  while  Napoleon  at  the  same 
time  would  bring  the  affairs  of  Italy  to  the  desired 
settlement  and  then  become  master  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean. 

In  this  connection  the  Polish  revolt,  which  for  the 
moment  interfered  with  GortschakofE's  combinations, 
seemed  in  London  extremely  opportune,  and  even  in 
Vienna  to  have  its  good  side,  in  spite  of  all  fears  for 
Galicia.  In  England,  appeals  were  made  to  the  public 
opinion  of  Europe  in  favor  of  the  insurgents ;  in 
Austria  the  further  course  of  events  was  awaited,  no 
objection  was  entertained  to  seeing  Russia  fall  into  a 
position  of  embarrassment,  and  Polish  arms  and  volun- 
teers were  allowed  to  pass  the  Galician  frontier  unre- 
garded. 

The  Prussian  Government  also  had  in  mind  to  use 
the  Polish  revolt  for  the  overthrow  of  the  dangerous 
system  devised  by  France  and  Russia.  But  it  had  not 
an  instant's  doubt  that  the  proper  means  to  this  end  was 


VIEW   TAKEN  BY  PRUSSIA.  565 

the  reverse  of  the  tendencies  ruling  in  Vienna  and 
London.  In  order  to  nip  the  proposed  Polish-Russian 
Union  and  the  French  alliance  connected  with  it  in  the 
bud,  it  was  necessary,  not  to  look  favoringly  upon  tlie 
Poles,  but  to  keep  Russia  firm  in  her  ancient  friendship 
with  Prussia. 


566  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 


CHAPTER   HI. 

PRUSSIA  AND   RUSSIA. 

During  the  last  lialf-year  Prussia's  position  in 
Europe  had  in  more  than  one  connection  been  giving 
cause  for  serious  consideration.  On  the  22d  of  Jan- 
uary, 1863,  immediately  after  the  rejection  of  the 
proposition  concerning  the  delegations,  Austria  had 
expressly  asserted  for  herself  in  the  Confederate  Diet 
the  right  of  introducing  such  plans  of  reform  and  of 
carrying  them  out,  if  not  in  the  whole  of  Germany,  at 
least  in  such  States  as  agreed  to  them ;  and  Count 
Rechberg  now  declared  his  approval  of  Beust's  view, 
that  the  Governments  must  take  the  reform  into  their 
own  hands,  if  they  did  not  wish  to  be  surprised  by 
revolution.  With  such  principles  as  these,  the  crisis 
that  had  just  been  avoided  might  at  any  time  reappear, 
and  the  breach  of  the  compact  of  confederation  might 
bring  with  it  an  appeal  to  arms.  If  this  were  to  haj)pen, 
what  would  be  the  relation  of  the  contending  parties  to 
the  foreign  Great  Powers? 

With  England  Austria  had  long  gone  hand  in  hand 
in  the  numerous  questions  that  had  arisen  in  the  East; 
and  far  as  the  English  Cabinet  was  from  thinking  of 
interfering  in  the  German  trouble,  its  sympathies,  nev- 
ertheless,   were    with    the    Court   of   Vienna,    and   its 


POLICY  OF  FRANCE.  567 

appeals  to  the  Court  of  Berlin  to  be  reconciled  with 
Austria  were  unceasing.  The  only  answer  that  could 
be  made  to  these  was  that  Austria's  attitude  made  such 
a  reconciliation  impossible,  and  that  England  must 
direct  her  admonitions  to  Vienna :  this  was,  indeed, 
not  calculated  to  increase  in  London  the  friendly  feeling 
towards  Prussia. 

More  important  and  more  serious,  however,  was  a 
change  in  the  policy  of  France,  which  took  place  in  the 
autumn  of  1862.  Faithful  to  the  principle  formerly 
established  by  Cavour,  that  Rome  must  be  the  capital 
of  Italy,  but  that  this  object  was  only  to  be  attained  by 
peaceful  means,  the  Cabinet  of  Turin  had  crushed  at 
Aspromonte  an  audacious  troop  of  Garibaldi's  volun- 
teers on  their  march  against  Rome,  but  had  at  the  same 
time  declared  that  no  Italian  Government  could  re- 
nounce the  thought  of  solving  the  difficulty  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Italian  national  idea.  The  Emperor  Napo- 
leon, who  would  neither  withdraw  the  French  garrison 
from  Rome,  nor  give  up  the  hope  of  forcing  the  Pope 
and  Italy  to  recognize  the  existing  state  of  things, 
decided,  upon  this,  to  make  his  imperial  disapproval 
distinctly  manifest  to  the  Turin  Cabinet ;  he  appointed 
for  Rome  and  for  Turin  ambassadors  of  a  clerical  ten- 
dency, and  replaced  Thouvenel  in  the  management  of 
foreign  affairs  by  tlic  old  supporter  of  the  Pope  and 
Austria,  jVI.  Drouyii  de  Lhuys.  From  this  time  on,  there 
could  be  no  more  talk  in  Berlin  of  reliance  upon  the 
friendship  of  France. 

So  much  the  more   important  was   it  for  Prussia  to 


568  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

keep  up  a  thorough  good  understanding  with  Russia, 
and  so  much  the  more  perilous  would  it  be  to  allow  the 
same  to  be  disturbed  by  the  troubles  in  Poland. 

It  might  have  been  difficult  to  decide  which  danger 
would  be  the  more  serious  for  Prussia,  the  certainlj'-  not 
very  probable  victory  of  the  Red  insurrection,  as  it  was 
carried  on  by  Mieroslawski,  Mazzini,  and  Garibaldi,  or 
the  creation  of  an  autonomous  Poland  under  Russian 
and  French  protection,  according  to  the  plans  of  Wielo- 
polski,  Gortschakoff,  and  Constantine.  The  Red  party 
had  already  at  Horodlo,  and  again  at  the  moment  of  the 
outbreak,  announced  their  claims  to  West  Prussia, 
Posen,  and  Pomerania  as  far  as  the  Oder ;  they  were 
already  levying  contributions  and  recruits  among  their 
fellow  Slavs  in  those  countries,  and  were  establishinof 
in  Posen  a  well-organized  administration  of  the  country. 

Such  extreme  steps  as  these  would  hardly  be  taken 
by  Wielopolski's  autonomous  Poland,  but  the  Minister 
would  be  unceasingly  urged  in  the  same  direction,  as 
well  by  the  Polish  patriots,  as  by  the  efforts  of  the 
Panslavists  and  by  his  own  hatred  for  the  Germans ; 
and  Prince  Gortschakoff  would  be  the  last  to  check 
him  in  such  a  course.  Neither  for  Posen  and  West 
Prussia,  nor  for  the  entire  monarchy,  would  there  be  a 
quiet  hour  under  such  conditions. 

At  the  first  news,  then,  of  the  Polish  insurrection, 
the  determination  was  formed  in  Berlin  of  appealing 
directly  to  the  j)ersonal  feelings  of  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander. ^       General   Gustav  von    Alvensleben     received 

1  Tlie  King  liad  at  first  thought  only  of  sending  a  military  envoy  to 
Warsaw,  but  tliree  days  after  he  extended  his  plan. 


PRUSSIA   AND   THE  POLISH   TROUBLES.        569 

instructions  to  go  to  St.  Petersburg  and  from  there  to 
Warsaw.  In  St.  Petersburg  he  was  to  deliver  an  auto- 
graph letter  from  the  King  to  the  Emperor,  and  then 
to  obtain  as  complete  information  as  possible  in  regard 
to  what  had  happened  hitherto,  but  above  all  to  seek  to 
arrange  an  understanding  with  the  Emperor  with  refer- 
ence to  common  measures  for  the  suppression  of  the 
revolt.  "  The  King,"  so  the  instructions  ran,  "  is  firmly 
convinced  that  the  interests  of  both  Governments  are 
alike  imperilled  by  the  Polish  rising,  and  that  any 
emancipation  of  the  Polish  element  from  the  authority 
of  the  Emperor  will  not  be  limited  in  its  effects  to  the 
boundaries  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland,  but  will  disturb 
the  peace  as  well  of  the  neighboring  portions  of  Prussia 
as  of  the  western  provinces  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
In  our  view,  the  position  of  the  two  Courts  with  regard 
to  the  Polish  revolution  is  substantially  that  of  two 
allies  threatened  by  a  common  enemy."  It  was  there- 
fore to  be  arranged  that  the  generals  of  the  two  nations 
on  both  frontiers  should  be  instructed  to  render  one 
another  every  assistance  necessary  for  the  restoration  of 
order  and  the  putting  down  of  the  revolt. 

Any  one  who  at  that  time  had  cast  a  glance  about 
him  in  Europe,  would  have  been  justified  in  thinking 
such  a  step  an  audacious  venture.  For  the  Press  of  all 
the  most  civilized  countries  was  rejoicing  at  the  insur- 
rection in  Poland  ;  a  judgment  of  condenniation  was 
unanimously  passed  upon  tlie  Russian  tyranny,  which 
had  now  b}^  an  unlawful  system  of  recruiting  forced  a 
long-suffering  people  into  the  struggle  of  despair.     The 


670  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

liberal,  clerical,  and  national  tendencies,  which  gener- 
ally neutralized  each  other,  now  worked  together,  and 
had  on  their  side  the  sympathy  of  public  opinion 
and  energetic  champions  in  the  most  powerful  govern- 
ments. It  required  a  consummate  firmness  of  purpose 
to  oppose  this  tide  of  feeling  and  to  take  a  stand  by 
the  side  of  Russia,  shunned  and  isolated  as  she  was. 

This  very  state  of  things,  however,  insured  the 
Prussian  general  a  doubly  favorable  reception  at  the 
hands  of  the  Emperor  Alexander.  The  more  keenly 
the  sensitive  mind  of  that  Sovereign  was  affected  by 
the  tempest  let  loose  against  him,  the  more  refreshing 
to  him  was  this  message  of  loyal  friendliness.  From 
the  bottom  of  his  heart  he  met  the  advances  of  his 
ally:  and  during  his  lifetime  the  Panslavic  league  of 
brotherhood  between  Poles  and  Russians  was  no  longer 
to  be  feared. 

Alvensleben  found  that  Wielopolski  was  still  in  favor 
with  the  Emperor:  Alexander  spoke  with  sympathy 
and  indignation  of  two  fresh  attempts  which  had  been 
made  to  jDoison  the  courageous  Minister.  "  Independ- 
ent of  the  Emperor,"  wrote  Alvensleben,  "the  Marquis 
has  also  a  strong  party  here  ;  among  the  Russian  people 
the  sentiment  is  divided,  on  one  side  there  is  a  violent 
hatred  of  the  Polish  assassins,  on  the  other,  a  feeling 
that  Russia  has  not  the  slightest  interest  in  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  House  of  Gottorp  in  Poland."  The  Emj)eror, 
however,  remained  firm  in  his  determination  to  suppress 
the  rebellion  as  speedily  as  he  might,  and  then  to  govern 
the  country  as  mildly  as  possible.     At  his  order,  Gort- 


ALVENSLEBEN  AT  ST.  PETERSBURG.         571 

schakoff  proposed  to  the  Prussian  general  to  settle  what 
measures  it  was  necessary  to  adopt  by  a  written  conven- 
tion or  agreement. 

Alvensleben  had  certainly  neither  commission  nor 
powers  to  do  this,  but,  considering  the  simplicity  of  the 
matter,  he  saw  no  reason  for  not  listening  to  the  wish 
of  the  Vice-Chancellor ;  and  he  sent  to  Berlin,  on  the 
6th  of  February,  the  outline  of  such  an  agreement. 
The  substance  of  the  matter  was,  that  at  the  request  of 
the  Russian  or  of  the  Prussian  commander-in-chief,  or 
of  the  frontier  authorities  on  both  sides,  the  generals  of 
both  nations  should  have  full  power  to  render  one 
another  mutual  assistance,  and,  in  case  of  need,  even 
to  cross  the  frontier  for  the  pursuit  of  the  rebels  who 
should  pass  from  one  country  to  the  other.  Officers 
from  both  sides,  appointed  for  the  purpose,  would  be 
present  at  tlie  headquarters  of  the  generals  in  command 
and  of  the  leaders  of  the  different  corps,  and  would  be 
informed  of  all  movements.  There  was  another  article 
which  Gortschakoff  begged  should  be  kept  secret :  the 
Prussian  commander  was  to  be  kept  informed  of  all 
news  received  of  political  machinations  affecting  Posen. 

King  William  was  satisfied  with  the  outline  as  a 
whole,  and  only  desired  that  reciprocity  should  be 
observed  in  regard  to  the  secret  article.  Gortschakoff 
then  added  at  the  end  of  the  outline  the  words  (which 
substantially  invalidated  the  wliole  thing):  "This  ar- 
rangement sliall  liave  force  so  long  as  the  state  of 
things  retjuires  it,  and  botli  Conrts  regard  it  as  desir- 
able."    A  compact  from  Avliich   either  party  can   with- 


572  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

draw,  is,  strictly  speaking,  hardly  to  be  called  a  compact 
at  all. 

On  the  8th  of  February  the  compact  was  signed  by 
Alvensleben  and  Gortschakoff.  No  ratification  by  the 
two  Sovereigns  took  place.  Afterwards,  Gortschakoff, 
to  whom  the  sending  of  Alvensleben  to  St.  Petersburg 
had  been  in  every  way  disagreeable,  determined  to  find 
compensation  in  another  quarter  for  the  annoyance 
Prussia  had  caused  him:  on  the  very  day  after  the 
signing  of  the  compact  he  hastened  to  show  the  text  of 
the  agreement  to  the  French  ambassador,  the  Duke  of 
Montebello.i 

Bismarck,  however,  on  his  side,  had  not  intended  to 
hide  from  the  world  the  substance  of  the  convention. 
Almost  half  the  Prussian  army,  four  of  the  nine  army- 
corps,  was  put  in  readiness  for  war  and  posted  in 
divisions  on  the  long  Polish  frontier  from  Insterburg 
to  Oppeln :  with  such  a  display  of  force,  whatever 
might  happen  on  the  other  side  of  the  frontier,  order 
was  assured  for  Prussia,  and  the  Government  was 
prepared  for  any  further  steps  that  might  be  decided 
upon. 

Alvensleben  had  stopped  at  Warsaw  on  his  return, 
and  had  found  the  Government  there  confident  of  vic- 
tory, and  hence  much  annoyed  at  the  agreement  with 
Prussia,  in  which  they  appeared  as  if  in  need  of  assist- 
ance. In  their  instructions  to  the  Russian  generals 
they  urged  them  to  take  pains  to  confine  the  number 
and  extent  of  their  incursions  across  the  frontiers  within 

1  So  Moiitebello  himself  told  tlie  Prussian  Ambassador,  Von  Redern. 


STATE  OF  THINGS  IN  POLAND.  573 

the  narrowest  possible  limits  ;  and  this  naturally  led  to 
corresponding  orders  to  the  Prussian  commanders.  In 
regard  to  the  actual  state  of  things  in  Poland,  however, 
Alvensleben  and  the  officers  who  accompanied  him  had 
no  very  encouraging  news  to  give.  There  was  no  firm 
control  and  no  distinct  plan  in  the  management  of  the 
army ;  every  leader  of  a  corps  acted  on  his  own 
account ;  they  were  at  one  only  in  their  dislike  to 
Wielopolski,  whom  they  regarded  simply  as  guilty  of 
high  treason.  The  country  now  swarmed  in  all  the 
provinces  with  armed  bands,  for  the  most  part  small  in 
number,  since  the  peasants  obstinately  refused  their 
adhesion  to  the  revolution ;  only  in  the  south-west  were 
larger  bodies  of  troops  to  be  found,  in  consequence  of 
the  accessions  Avhich  arrived  there  from  Silesia  and 
Galicia.  Everywhere  the  leaders  proclaimed  that 
foreign  aid  was  at  hand,  and  so  kept  up  the  courage 
of  their  people. 

In  this  general  uncertainty  concerning  the  state  of 
things  in  Poland,  Bismarck  thought  it  desirable  not 
to  leave  the  Great  Powers  at  all  in  doubt  in  regard 
to  Prussia's  attitude.  On  the  11th  of  February  he 
had  a  conversation  with  the  English  ambassador.  Sir 
Andrew  Buchanan.  He  informed  him  in  confidence  of 
the  conclusion  of  a  compact  with  Russia  for  common 
action  in  the  suppression  of  the  revolt.  Sir  Andrew 
asked  whether  by  this  compact  the  troops  of  both  sides 
were  permitted  to  pass  the  frontier.  Bismarck  answered 
in  the  affirmative,  with  a  distinct  declaration  that  Prus- 
sia could  never  tolerate  an  independent  Poland  on  her 


574  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

borders.  "  But  how  will  it  be,"  said  Sir  Andrew,  "  if, 
as  is  certainly  possible,  the  Russiaud  are  driven  out  of 
Poland?  What  will  you  do  then?"  "Then,"  an- 
swered Bismarck,  "  we  must  try  to  occupy  the  kingdom 
ourselves,  in  order  to  prevent  this  growth  of  a  power 
hostile  to  us."  "  Europe  Avill  never  suffer  that,"  said 
Sir  Andrew,  and  repeated  it  several  times.  Bismarck 
asked  shortly :  "  Who  is  Europe  ?  "  "  The  various 
great  nations,"  said  the  ambassador.  "Are  they 
already  agreed  about  the  matter?"  asked  Bismarck. 
Sir  Andrew  avoided  giving  a  positive  answer,  but 
declared  France  found  herself  unable  to  allow  another 
suppression  of  Poland.  "  For  us,"  said  Bismarck,  "the 
suppression  of  the  revolt  is  a  matter  of  life  and  death;" 
but  he  closed  the  conversation  with  the  remark  that  it 
was  useless  to  discuss  possibilities. 

He  afterwards  adopted  a  similar  tone  in  talking  with 
the  French  ambassador,  M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  con- 
fined himself  to  the  statement  that  he  did  not  know 
the  views  of  his  Government  with  regard  to  Poland. 
Bismarck  spoke  the  more  freely,  since  he  himself, 
when  ambassador  at  Paris,  upon  the  Emperor's  saying 
that  something  must  be  done  for  Poland,  had  explained 
his  own  view  with  emphasis  without  receiving  any  con- 
tradiction from  Napoleon,  and  since  as  lately  as  the  4th 
of  February  the  French  Government,  in  the  legisla- 
tive assembly,  had  opposed  a  motion  of  Jules  Favre 
friendly  to  the  Poles,  and  had  advised  Poland  to  rely 
upon  the  magnanimity  and  humanity  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander.  -         -        ro  ^ 

cjgf!-,         ! 


wb 


THE  ATTITUDE   OF  FRANCE.  575 

But  on  this  point  the  Minister  was  destined  to  be 
soon  undeceived. 

Napoleon  was  certainly  an  opponent  of  the  Red 
party,  as  well  in  Poland  as  in  the  rest  of  Europe.  But 
he  would  gladly  have  agreed  to  the  plans  of  Gorts- 
chakoff  and  Wielopolski,  and  this  fact  alone  would 
have  made  the  Prussian  compact  disagreeable  to  him. 
But  in  addition  to  this  there  was  the  violent  storm  of 
public  0])inion  in  France,  where  the  entire  body  of  the 
clergy  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  Liberals  in  favoring 
Poland,  and  where  just  at  this  time  a  general  election 
was  close  at  hand,  in  which  the  support  of  the  clergy 
was  very  important  to  the  Government.  Thus  placed 
in  a  dilemma  between  the  sympathy  of  the  country  for 
Poland  on  the  one  hand,  and  its  own  sympathy  for 
Russia  on  the  other,  the  Government  began  to  consider 
whether  "  something  could  not  be  done  for  Poland,"  if 
the  agitation  were  directed,  not  against  Russia,  the 
origo  niali,  but  against  her  companion  in  guilt,  Prussia. 
No  one  could  be  more  eager  and  ready  for  such  a  course 
than  Drouyn  de  Lhuys. 

On  the  loth  of  February  he  said  to  the  Prussian 
ambassador.  Count  Goltz :  "  We  understand  that  each 
of  the  three  Powers  that  took  part  in  the  partition  is 
anxious  to  keep  its  Polish  provinces.  But  we  sup- 
posed that  you  were  strong  enough  to  defend  Posen  on 
your  own  account,  and  would  have  left  Russia  to 
manage  her  affairs  alone.  Then  only  a  third  of  the 
Polish  difficulty  would  have  been  touched  upon,  and 
we  could  have  looked  on  calmly.     The  state  of  things 


576  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

is  altered  when  it  becomes  a  question  of  the  whole  of 
Poland.  This  question,  I  fear,  you  yourselves  liave 
brought  up  prematurely.  Are  you  not  anxious  lest,  with 
the  existing  state  of  mind  among  the  English  and  the 
French  people,  your  making  common  cause  with  Russia 
should  provoke  others  to  form  alliances  also  ?  " 

His  tone  was  indeed  most  friendly :  he  said  that  he 
only  expressed  fears,  none  of  which  would,  he  hoped, 
be  realized.  But  on  the  next  day  but  one,  the  17th,  he 
sent  a  despatch  to  Talleyrand,  to  the  same  effect  as  the 
above  speech :  up  to  the  present  time  the  Polish  diffi- 
culty had  been  local ;  now,  by  Prussia's  compact,  it 
had  grown  into  a  question  of  importance  for  all 
Europe.  On  the  18th  he  sent  a  despatch  to  Monte- 
bello  at  St.  Petersburg,  in  which,  referring  to  the  Act 
of  the  Vienna  Congress  of  1815,  the  provisions  of 
which,  he  said,  were  not  being  fulfilled  by  Russia,  he 
expressed  anxiety  lest  the  relations  between  the  two 
Courts  might  become  strained.  That  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys  was  the  moving  spirit  in  the  matter  is  shown  in 
this  case  by  the  appeal  to  the  compacts  of  1815,  which 
the  Emperor,  like  every  Napoleon,  detested  from  the 
bottom  of  his  heart.  The  Minister  assumed  every  day  a 
higher  tone  with  Goltz,  until  he  finall}^  declared  openly 
that  only  the  dismissal  of  Bismarck  could  restore 
amicable  relations.  In  a  much  less  hostile  tone, 
though  substantially  to  the  same  effect,  the  Emperor 
spoke  with  Goltz  on  the  20th  :  "  You  know  how  I  have 
always  desired  intimate  relations  with  Prussia:  had 
Austria  committed  such  an  error  as  Prussia  has  done  in 


THE  FRENCH  PROPOSAL.  577 

agreeing  to  this  convention,  it  would  have  been  a 
matter  of  indifference  to  me ;  but  now  that  Prussia  has 
done  it,  the  event  causes  me  genuine  sorrow." 

However,  sorrow  or  no  sorrow,  the  course  had  been 
entered  upon ;  and  on  the  21st  there  was  sent  to 
London  and  Vienna,  the  outline  of  a  common  note, 
in  which  the  three  Powers,  although  in  the  most  cour- 
teous language,  were  to  express  to  the  Prussian  Cabinet 
their  regret  at  the  conclusion  of  the  convention,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  hope,  that  Prussia  would  soon  find  it 
for  her  interest  to  withdraw  from  the  same. 

Drouyn  de  Lhuys  had  no  doubt  of  obtaining  the  con- 
sent of  the  two  Courts.  He  knew  that  in  Vienna 
indignation  against  Prussia  on  account  of  Confederate 
reform  and  of  the  commercial  treaty  was  blazing  high, 
that  the  most  influential  advisers  of  Rechberg,  Herren 
von  Biegeleben  and  von  Meysenbug,  were,  if  from 
nothing  more  than  Catholic  sympathies,  zealous  friends 
of  Poland,  and  that  in  Galicia  the  Poles  were  allowed 
without  hinderance  to  send  money  and  volunteers  across 
the  frontier.  In  London  public  opinion  was  enthusi- 
astic in  favor  of  Poland ;  and  on  the  20th,  the  very  day 
before  the  outline  was  sent,  the  Mhiister,  Lord  John 
Russell,  had  declared  in  Parliament  that  the  conscrip- 
tion in  Warsaw  was  the  most  unwise  and  the  most 
unjust  step  that  Russia  could  have  taken,  and  that 
Prussia,  by  entering  into  the  convention,  had,  as  an 
accessary  after  the  deed,  become  a  sharer  in  responsi- 
bility for  the  hateful  measure.  What  ground,  tlien, 
could  the  two  Powers  liave  for  refusing  to  sign  together 
a  note  couclicd  in  sucli  mild  terms? 


578  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

But  in  spite  of  all  this,  tlie  calculation  was  a  mistaken 
one. 

Lord  John,  as  an  orthodox  Whig,  was  certainly  full 
of  sympathy  for  the  Poles,  as  for  all  oppressed  nations, 
but  recognized  the  danger  to  Prussia  involved  in  the 
insurrection,  and,  as  a  practical  statesman,  he  had  for 
many  reasons  no  desire  whatever  to  injure  Prussia  or  to 
see  her  injured.  He  therefore  answered  the  French 
communication  by  saying  that,  in  spite  of  any  courtesy 
of  expression,  a  common  note,  as  such,  was  the  most 
serious  and  most  threatening  way  of  making  a  remon- 
strance. Much  as  he  disapproved  of  the  convention, 
its  practical  importance  was  not  sufficient  to  justify 
such  a  step.  And,  at  any  rate,  if  a  desire  was  felt  to 
interfere,  why  should  such  interference  be  directed  at 
the  aider  and  abettor,  rather  than  at  the  originator  of 
the  trouble?  England,  therefore,  refused  to  take  part 
in  the  note  addressed  to  Prussia,  and  instead  of  this, 
called  upon  the  signers  of  the  Act  of  the  Vienna 
Congress,  to  take  steps  in  common  against  Russia. 

Austria,  who  was  at  that  time  constantly  strengthen- 
ing her  connection  with  England,  refused  from  mis- 
trust of  Napoleon  to  sign  the  proposed  note,  in  spite  of 
any  differences  of  her  own  with  Prussia.  The  action 
of  the  French  Minister  ended,  therefore,  in  a  diplomatic 
fiasco.  But  it  was,  nevertheless,  of  great  importance. 
By  it  the  French  Government  had  confessed  its  obliga- 
tion to  support  the  cause  of  Poland.  In  the  effort  to 
do  this  it  had  suffered  a  defeat,  which  Napoleon  was 
much  less  able  to  bear  in  the  sight  of  his  people  than  a 


MISUNDERSTANDING   WITH  RUSSIA.         579 

legitimate  sovereign  would  have  been.  When,  there- 
fore, England  now  proposed  fresh  steps  against  Russia, 
the  Emperor  found  it  doubly  difficult  to  refuse,  though 
none  of  the  consequences  of  such  a  step  could  be  fore- 
seen. 

Bismarck  had  watched  the  development  of  the 
French  policy  during  that  time  not  without  anxiety 
but  with  firm  determination ;  and  immediately  after 
receiving  the  first  reports  on  the  subject,  he  had 
declared  beforehand  to  the  French  ambassador,  that 
there  was  no  choice  for  Prussia  in  Polish  matters,  and 
that  he  could  therefore  give  no  other  than  a  negative 
answer  to  any  intercession  in  favor  of  Poland.  But 
after  this  he  was  astonished  by  an  unexpected  an- 
nouncement from  the  opposite  quarter.  On  the  22d  of 
February,  the  Russian  ambassador,  Herr  von  Oubril, 
called  on  him,  and  informed  him  that  in  the  opinion  of 
his  Government  the  state  of  things  in  Europe  made  it 
desirable  that  the  clauses  of  the  convention  which  gave 
the  generals  on  both  sides  liberty  to  cross  the  frontier, 
should  go  out  of  effect.  That  meant  nearly  the  same 
as  a  suspension  of  the  entire  compact;  indeed,  the 
liberty  to  cross  the  frontier  was  the  only  provision  of 
that  compact  that  required  an  agreement  of  both  sides. 
The  Prussian  general  in  command,  however,  was  at 
once  given  orders  in  accordance  with  Oubril's  wish,  and 
Oul)i-il  was  informed  of  it. 

Two  days  later  tliere  came  another  surprise  in  the 
shape  of  a  telegram  from  Warsaw  stating  tliat  the 
Grand    Duke    Constantine    had    received    notice    that 


580  PRUSSIA  AND  RUSSIA. 

Prussia,  on  account  of  news  from  Paris,  desired,  in  spite 
of  Alvensleben's  arrangement,  to  have  no  passing  of  the 
frontier,  and  that  corresponding  instructions  should 
be  given  to  the  Russian  generals.  Bismarck  was  not  a 
little  astonislied  that  the  desire  for  the  suspension  or 
the  giving  up  of  the  convention  was  thus  attributed  to 
Prussia.  But,  at  any  rate,  by  such  action  the  conven- 
tion was  deprived  of  all  significance ;  and  Bismarck 
had,  therefore,  no  hesitation  in  announcing  to  the  Eng- 
lish ambassador  in  Oubril's  presence  that  the  compact 
would  from  that  time  remain  a  dead  letter. 

Immediately  after,  however,  it  appeared  that  this 
whole  affair  had  been  managed  by  Gortschakoff  behind 
the  Emperor's  back.  Alexander  first  learned  of  it 
through  Gortschakoff's  false  announcement  that 
Prussia  desired  that  the  convention  should  be  aban- 
doned ;  and  the  Emperor  was  much  disturbed.  On  the 
25th  of  February,  he  received  the  Prussian  military 
plenipotentiary,  Herr  von  Loen,  and  asked  him  excit- 
edly :  "  Do  you  know  what  has  happened  ?  When 
soldiers  deal  with  one  another,  everything  goes  well ; 
but  when  the  diplomats  begin  to  meddle,  everything  is 
done  foolishly  and  stupidly.  I  agreed  to  the  conven- 
tion with  great  satisfaction,  at  the  wish  of  the  King; 
now  I  hear  that  Prussia,  on  grounds  of  internal  and 
external  policy,  desires  that  the  agreement  should  come 
to  an  end ;  I  am  ready  to  assent  to  that  at  once,  though 
I  do  not  see  how  it  can  be  any  concern  of  France.  Or 
has  there  been  a  feeling  in  Berlin  that  Russia  desires  to 
withdraw  from  the  compact  ?     It  is  true  that  we   no 


GORTSCHAKOFF  THWARTED.  581 

longer  need  it  in  view  of  the  improved  state  of  things 
in  Poland,  but  I  never  thought  of  drawing  back ; 
though,  as  I  have  said,  I  am  perfectly  ready  to  do  so, 
if  I  can  save  Prussia  any  embarrassment.  If  Oubril 
has  said  anything  else  than  this  I  will  not  sustain 
him." 

Loen  sought  instructions  by  telegraph  from  his 
Government,  and  on  the  28th  received  word  that  the 
Prussian  Cabinet  saw  no  object  in  giving  up  the  com- 
pact ;  it  was  added,  that  so  far  as  outsiders  were  con- 
cerned, it  would  be  more  to  the  purpose  to  say  that  the 
convention  had  as  yet  remained  unfulfilled  through  the 
want  of  the  necessary  provisions  in  regard  to  its  being 
carried  out.  On  the  following  day  the  Emperor  again 
received  Loen  with  the  question :  "  Prussia,  then,  desires 
the  convention  to  be  given  up?"  He  was  agreeably 
surprised  when  Loen  read  him  Bismarck's  despatch; 
and  he  dwelt  at  length  on  his  satisfaction  at  the  clearing 
up  of  the  misunderstanding,  and  at  the  determination  to 
keep  up  harmonious  feeling. 

Gortschakoff's  intrigue  was  thus  thwarted  in  its 
main  object,  the  disturbing  of  the  intimate  relations 
between  two  sovereigns.  But  Bismarck  had  at  the 
same  time  other  difficulties  to  contend  with  at  liome,  in 
the  unfriendly  disposition  of  the  Lower  House,  which 
included  the  Polish  matter  also  within  the  limits  of 
its  deliberations.  Since  the  close  of  the  preceding 
session,  the  view  that  the  carrying  on  of  an  administra- 
tion witliout  a  budget  was  a  breach  of  the  Constitution 
had  spread  more  widely  in  the  country,  and  had  taken 


582  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

firmer  root  among  the  parties.  At  tlie  very  opening  of 
the  new  session,  this  view  found  energetic  expression 
in  an  address  to  the  King  containing  an  open  com- 
plaint against  the  Ministry.  As,  however,  the  King 
stood  firm  by  his  counsellors,  and  the  Constitution 
offered  no  means  of  legal  procedure  against  these,  the 
opinion  gained  ground  that  it  was  best  to  compel  a 
dismissal  of  the  hated  Ministers  by  rejecting  or  oppos- 
ing every  motion  made  and  every  step  taken  by  them, 
to  open  the  battle,  as  it  was  called,  along  the  whole 
line. 

When,  then,  the  convention  of  the  8th  of  February 
came  under  discussion,  in  regard  to  the  unpublished 
text  of  which  the  most  extravagant  rumors  were  cur- 
rent, it  was  only  a  few  deputies  that  were  moved  by 
enthusiasm  for  an  independent  Poland  to  desire  speedy 
action  in  regard  to  the  same :  the  majority  were  much 
more  affected  by  the  fear  of  a  great  European  war 
towards  which  the  country,  by  reason  of  the  foolhardy 
policy  of  Bismarck,  seemed  to  be  driving.  The  great 
body  of  the  people  and  of  the  House  felt,  with  regard 
to  him,  as  in  the  contest  about  the  budget,  the  convic- 
tion that  this  haughty  aristocrat  had  nothing  in  view 
but  a  reactionary  suppression  of  all  freedom,  and  that 
for  that  reason  he  was  assisting  to  suppress  the  Polish 
insurrection,  even  at  the  risk  of  Prussia's  being  over- 
whelmed by  an  attack  from  the  superior  force  of  the 
Western  Powers. 

After  a  passionate  debate  which  lasted  three  days, 
during  which  Bismarck  refused  to  make  any  communi- 


THE  LOWER   HOUSE  ATTACKS  BISMARCK.     583 

cation  concerning  the  contents  or  the  object  of  the 
convention,  the  House  voted  by  an  overwhelming 
majority  that  Prussia's  welfare  demanded  a  strict 
neutrality  while  the  struggles  were  going  on  in 
Poland.  In  the  midst  of  the  bitterness  of  the  quarrel 
about  the  Constitution,  there  was  no  thought  that  such 
a  vote  might  affect  the  prestige  of  the  Government  in 
Europe,  and  so  increase  the  possible  dangers  that  were 
threatening  Prussia.  Still  less  had  any  one  in  the 
House  or  in  the  country  any  suspicion  that  Bismarck 
had,  by  the  convention  and  the  assurance  of  Russian 
friendship  thereby  obtained,  laid  the  first  stone  for  the 
foundation  of  Prussia's  future  greatness. 

During  all  this,  the  Minister  did  not  allow  himself, 
either  by  these  attacks,  or  b}-  Gortschakoff's  machina- 
tions, or  by  Fi-ench  threats,  to  be  moved  a  hair's- 
breadth  from  the  line  of  action  he  had  adopted.  The 
English  invitation  to  participate  in  steps  to  be  taken  by 
the  Powers  who  had  been  present  at  the  Vienna  Con- 
gress, he  rejected  as  not  according  with  Prussia's  stand- 
point in  the  matter.  Moreover,  the  storm  about  the 
convention  of  February  gradually  abated,  when  the 
English  papers  published  Bismarck's  statement  that  it 
would  remain  a  dead  letter,  and  above  all  when  it  was 
clear  that  the  progress  of  the  struggle  in  Poland  no 
longer  gave  occasion  for  any  crossing  of  the  frontier. 

The  National  Committee  had  appointed  IMieroslawski 
dictator.  The  latter  had,  on  the  17th  of  February,  taken 
command  of  a  strong  body  of  troops  in  tlic  vicinity  of 
the  Prussian  frontier,  but  had  on  the  22d  been  attacked 


584  PRUSSIA  AND  RUSSIA. 

by  Russian  troops  not  far  from  Kalisch,  and  been  com- 
pletely beaten ;  his  men  had  been  scattered,  and  be 
himself  had  fled,  and  thus  disappeared  forever  from  the 
scene. 

This  aroused  a  new  spirit  of  independence  in  the 
White  party  of  the  great  landed-proprietors,  who  had 
up  to  this  time  remained  completely  in  subordination  to 
the  Reds.  Through  Ladislas  Czartoryski,  they  learned 
from  Paris  that  Napoleon  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  Mieroslawski,  as  one  of  the  stamp  of  Mazzini  and 
of  the  London  Revolutionary  Committee,  but  that  he  was 
ready  to  support  more  moderate  patriots.  The  party, 
therefore,  chose  as  their  leader  a  certain  Langiewicz 
from  Posen,  who  then  got  together  a  considerable  body 
of  men  in  the  southern  part  of  the  country,  took  the 
title  of  dictator  in  his  turn,  and  established  a  civil 
administration,  but  by  so  doing  excited  to  such  a 
degree  the  wrath  of  the  National  Committee  that  they 
sent  three  agents  to  his  camp  to  slay  the  mutineer  who 
had  taken  the  government  into  his  own  hands.  These 
men  were,  however,  discovered,  arrested,  and  con- 
demned to  death ;  they  were  just  on  the  point  of  being 
hanged,  when  the  Russians  attacked  the  camp  on  the 
19th  of  March,  scattered  the  insurgents  in  all  direc- 
tions, and -compelled  Langiewicz  to  fly  into  Galicia. 

A  few  days  later  the  same  thing  happened  to  two 
other  large  bands  ;  so  that  now  no  force  of  rebels  of 
any  consequence  anywhere  kept  the  field.  A  system- 
atic co-operation  of  the  different  bodies  of  Russian 
troops  would  soon  have  resulted  in  the  restoration  of 


WEAKNESS   OF  THE   GOVERNMENT.  585 

order,  especially  as  the  great  body  of  the  peasants  had 
remained  loyal  to  the  Emperor,  had  killed  some  who 
spoke  for  the  rebels  in  the  pulpit,  and  had  delivered 
over  disaffected  landholders  to  the  police;  so  that,  if  a 
vote  had  been  taken  on  a  basis  of  universal  suffrage, 
the  Polish  people  would  have  recognized  the  Czar  as 
their  ruler  by  a  large  majority.  But  the  imperial 
Government,  so  far  as  harmony  was  concerned,  was  not 
much  better  off  than  the  revolutionary  one.  The 
Grand  Duke,  and  even  more  decidedly  than  he,  the 
Grand  Duchess,  stood  by  Wielopolski,  who,  in  spite  of 
the  state  of  siege,  strove  to  keep  his  system  of  civil 
administration  on  foot,  and  to  soften  the  severity  of  the 
military  measures.  The  officers,  however,  were  indig- 
nant with  the  whole  system.  General  Ramsay  urgently 
prayed  to  be  allowed  to  resign,  and  proposed  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  prudent  and  energetic  general,  Count  Berg, 
as  Assistant  to  the  Grand  Duke  with  full  powers  in  both 
military  and  civil  affairs. 

In  St.  Petersburg  also,  a  strong  feeling  now  prevailed 
against  Wielopolski,  to  whom  the  delay  in  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  revolt  was  attributed  ;  yet  for  several  weeks 
more  tlie  Emperor  allowed  himself  to  be  restrained  by 
his  brother  and  the  Vice-Chancellor  from  taking  decided 
steps.  Ramsa}'  was  succeeded  by  a  man  whose  chief 
merit  was  his  intimate  connection  with  the  Grand 
Duke,  and  the  war  airaiiist  the;  rebels  drajjcfed  on  in  tlie 
slow  course  it  had  followed  hitherto.  The  soldiers 
conquered  every  band  tliat  tliey  encountered;  but  the 
intlifference  of  the  civil  authorities  was  such,  that  the 


586  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

troops  remained  masters  of  the  country  only  in  the  spot 
they  actually  occupied. 

Towards  the  end  of  March,  the  Emperor  finally 
decided  to  bring,  by  means  of  a  more  vigorous  hand, 
system  and  vigor  at  least  into  the  military  operations, 
without,  however,  completely  subordinating  the  civil 
administration  and  its  chief  to  a  military  dictatorship. 
On  the  30th  of  March,  Count  Berg  was  appointed  mili- 
tary Assistant  of  the  Grand  Duke,  that  is,  commander- 
in-chief  in  Poland.  The  whole  world  saw  in  this  a 
sign  of  the  approaching  downfall  of  the  system  of 
Wielopolski,  and  of  the  recall  of  the  Grand  Duke  and 
the  Minister  that  would  naturally  result.  Together 
with  this  appointment  another  step  was  taken,  not  so 
much  intended  to  affect  the  Polish  insurgents  as  the 
Foreign  Powers  who  were  connected  with  the  revolt  in 
Poland.  Up  to  this  time,  in  consideration  of  the 
insurrection,  Russia  had  mobilized  four  army-corps ; 
now  the  order  was  given  to  place  the  whole  army  on  a 
war-footing,  and  to  arm  the  coast  fortress  of  Cronstadt, 
which  protected  St.  Petersburg.  At  the  same  time 
considerable  reinforcements  were  despatched  to  Poland, 
and  the  positions  hitherto  held  by  these  were  now 
occupied  by  forces  quite  as  numerous  brought  forward 
from  the  interior  of  the  country.  Russia  was  prepar- 
ing herself  to  stand  on  the  defensive  against  any  show 
of  hostility  coming  from  the  West. 

The  Russian  Cabinet  had  sufficient  occasion  for 
taking  such  steps.  England  was,  indeed,  determined 
not  to  declare  war  herself  asrainst  Russia  on  account  of 


ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND.  587 

Poland,  but  she  rejoiced  at  everything  that  gave  in- 
creased embarrassment  to  her  Oriental  rival,  and  exerted 
all  her  energies  to  bring  the  other  Great  Powers  to 
accept  her  theory,  that  Russia  had  not  fulfilled  the 
conditions  on  which  Poland  had  been  allotted  to  her  by 
the  Vienna  Congress  in  1815,  but  that  the  constitution 
promised  and  brought  into  effect  at  that  time  had  been 
abolished  in  1831,  and  that  consequently  Russia  ought 
to  be  kept,  by  an  expression  of  European  opinion,  to 
the  fulfilment  of  her  duties,  or  else  to  be  ejected  from 
the  possessions  that  she  had  forfeited. 

From  a  legal  point  of  view  this  line  of  argument 
was  open  to  attack  in  two  directions,  both  in  regard  to 
the  substance  of  the  complaint  and  to  the  right  of  the 
complainant  to  make  it.  For  in  1815  Russia  and 
Austria  had  mutually  agreed  by  compact  on  the  3d  of 
May  to  grant  their  Polish  subjects  a  representation  and 
national  institutions,  framed  according  to  such  a  model 
of  political  existence  as  their  Governments  should 
deem  useful  and  expedient.  The  promise  of  represen- 
tation, therefore,  was  by  no  means  equivalent  to  an 
assent  to  a  parliamentary  constitution.  Only  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Congress  had  the  Emperor,  Alexander 
I.,  acting  on  liis  own  independent  judgment,  granted 
such  a  constitution  to  the  kingdom  of  Poland  ;  but  un- 
fortunately the  Poles  themselves,  by  their  revolt  in 
1830,  li;i(l  ovcitlirowii  this,  and  the  Emperor  Nicholas, 
after  the  su})pression  of  the  revolt,  had  not  restored  it. 

Moreover,  by  the  compact  of  Miinchengratz  in  1883, 
the    two    German    Powers    had    bound   themselves   in 


588  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

common  with  Russia  to  maintain  the  existing  state  of 
things,  and  had  by  this  action  admitted  that  they  inter- 
preted the  compacts  of  1815  in  the  same  sense  as  Russia. 
These  compacts,  indeed,  immediately  after  they  were 
concluded,  had  been  incorporated  into  the  Act  of  the 
Vienna  Congress ;  but,  as  we  have  before  seen,  this 
only  imposed  upon  the  other  Powers  that  took  part  in 
the  Congress  the  duty  of  respecting  on  their  side  the 
contents  of  the  compacts,  and  by  no  means  implied 
that  no  alteration  in  the  same  could  be  made  by  the 
original  contracting  parties  without  the  consent  of  all 
those  who  signed  the  Act  of  this  Congress.  From  this 
point  of  view,  England's  right  to  demand  a  restoration 
of  the  Polish  constitution  of  1815  on  the  ground  of  the 
compacts,  could  not  but  appear  decidedly  questionable. 

Considering  all  this,  it  is  easily  understood  how  im- 
portant it  was  to  England,  in  her  diplomatic  action,  to 
have  at  least  one  of  tlie  German  Powers  on  her  side ; 
and  Lord  John  Russell,  therefore,  used  every  means  to 
gain  Austria's  support  in  Polish  matters,  as  well  as  in 
the  eastern  complications.  In  this  he  was  most  warmly 
seconded  by  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  who  was  in  1863  just 
as  strongly  of  the  opinion  as  he  had  been  in  1854,  that 
a  Franco-Austrian  alliance  contained  the  remedy  for  all 
European  troubles,  and  who  therefore  did  everything 
in  his  power  to  keep  Napoleon  firm  in  the  course  he 
had  adopted,  which  was  favorable  to  Poland,  and  which 
was  now  to  be  distinctly  hostile  to  Russia. 

Napoleon  hesitated  for  a  time ;  then  the  political 
world  was    astonished  by   a  journey  of    the   Austrian 


FRANCE  NEGOTIATES   WITH  AUSTRIA.      589 

ambassador  in  Paris,  Prince  Metternich,  to  Vienna, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  14th  of  March,  and  remained 
for  a  week  in  anxious  deliberation  with  the  Emperor 
and  Count  Rechberg.  The  substance  of  these  delibera- 
tions is  not  yet  known  from  authentic  sources.  At  the 
time  many  rumors  were  afloat :  it  was  said  that  Napo- 
leon offered  Austria  an  alliance  with  himself  and  the 
acquisition  of  Silesia  and  Roumania  in  return  for  the 
abandonment  of  Venetia  ;  according  to  other  statements 
Napoleon  desired  that  Galicia  should  be  relinquished, 
and  in  return  agreed  to  the  acquisition  of  Roumania 
and  to  the  "•uaranteeingf  of  Venetia ;  while  the  Russian 
Emperor  received  information  that  Austria,  in  return 
for  acting  in  harmony  with  the  Western  Powers  against 
Russia,  was  promised  a  strengthened  joosition  in  Ger- 
many and  accessions  of  territory  in  the  East.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Prussian  ambassador,  Herr  von  Werther, 
reported  from  Vienna  tliat  he  had  received  the  express 
assurance  from  Count  Rechberg  that  Metternich  had 
been  called  to  Vienna  only  that  both  sides  might  be  in 
possession  of  accurate  information,  and  that  there  was 
no  mention  whatever  of  any  French  propositions  com- 
municated through  him.  Austria,  said  the  Count,  would 
not  falter  in  her  attitude  in  the  Polish  question,  and 
would  not  hear  of  a©  independent  Poland.^ 

In  fact,  Austria  had  sufficient  reason  for  thus  holding 
back.  Constituted  as  her  Emj^ire  was,  every  appeal  to 
the  principle  of  nationality  could  not  but  be  a  danger 
to  her ;  a  revolt   in    Poland   rendered   her   supremacy 

1  Weilher,  18lh  of  March. 


590  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

in  Galicia  uncertain  ;  a  combination  of  the  revolutionary- 
parties  in  Poland  and  Hungary  was  only  too  probable, 
and  it  was  impossible  to  say  what  Napoleon's  attitude 
would  be  in  such  a  case.  But  on  the  other  side,  con- 
stantly increasing  pressure  was  exerted  from  England ; 
it  was  urged  that  there  could  be  no  greater  danger  for 
both  England  and  Austria  than  the  realization  of  the 
Russo-French  alliance  that  had  been  threatened  since 
1857  ;  at  such  a  juncture  the  Polish  question  and  Napo- 
leon's attitude  in  regard  to  it  seemed  as  if  sent  from 
Heaven  ;  the  breach  between  him  and  Russia  would  be 
beyond  healing  if  he  should  decide  to  take  any  steps  in 
favor  of  Poland,  and  he  was  perfectly  ready  to  do  this, 
if  Austria  would  take  part  also. 

Then,  at  the  end  of  March,  the  official  invitation  was 
extended  from  Paris  to  London  and  Vienna  to  make  a 
common  effort  at  St.  Petersburg  in  favor  of  Poland. 

What  was  to  be  done  ?  In  his  relations  with  Prussia 
also,  Count  Rechberg,  saw  both  attractive  and  repellent 
points,  and  this  fact  naturally  did  not  render  the  decis- 
ion any  easier.  The  refusal  of  Austria  to  take  part  in 
the  common  note  which  Napoleon  had  prepared  to  be 
sent  to  Prussia  had  been  acknowledged  in  Berlin  with 
sincere  gratitude.  Bismarck  expressed  I'epeatedly  to 
Count  Karolyi  his  contentment  with  Austria's  firm  and 
befitting  attitude,  and  by  a  detailed  despatch  to  Werther 
conveyed  to  the  Court  of  Vienna  the  assurance  that 
the  same  feeling  was  entertained  by  the  King.  After 
Werther  had  read  the  despatch  to  the  Austrian  Minis- 
ter, the  former   reported  on  the  28th  of    March   that 


AUSTRIA'S  HESITATION.  591 

Rechberg  had  received  the  communication  with  keen 
satisfaction.  Everything  seemed  to  indicate  that  the 
community  of  interests  of  the  two  Courts  in  Polish 
matters  would  bring  about  a  more  intimate  relation  in 
every  direction. 

But  a  new  turn  of  affairs  in  the  sphere  of  commerce 
obliterated  again  at  one  stroke  all  these  favorable 
impressions.  Prussia,  in  the  name  of  the  Tariff-Union, 
had  concluded  a  commercial  treaty  with  Belgium  on 
the  same  liberal  basis  as  the  French.  This  was  a  new 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  tariff-union  desired  by 
Austria,  and  it  aroused  great  anger  in  Vienna.  In  vain 
did  Bismarck  declare  that  the  disasfreement  in  regard 
to  commercial  matters  need  be  no  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  political  friendship,  as  was  shown  by  Prussia's  rela- 
tions with  Itussia  and  with  Mecklenburg.  Rechberg 
insisted  that  it  was  impossible  to  separate  the  two ;  and 
when  Bismarck  again  observed  to  Karolyi  that  it  would 
be  for  the  interests  of  peace  to  pass  over  in  Confederate 
matters  all  motions  that  required  a  unanimous  vote, 
Rechberg  answered  decidedly  that  Confederate  reforms 
were  indispensable,  since,  if  they  were  not  brought 
about  by  the  Governments,  they  would  surely  be  by 
revolution.  "  In  the  Polish  matter,  also,"  he  declared, 
"a  closer  sympathy  with  Prussia  will  be  possible  for  us 
only  when  it  lias  been  preceded  b}'  an  understanding  in 
regard  to  the  tariff  and  to  Confederate  reform."'  ^ 

The  disagreement  with  Prussia  was  therefore  once 
more  present  in  full  force,  and  tliis  undoubtedly  made 

1  Wertber,  April  4tli,  May  10th. 


592  PRUSSIA  AND  RUSSIA. 

the  establishment  of  friendly  relations  with  France 
seem  very  desirable,  especially  as  England  daily  repeated 
her  urgent  requests  to  that  effect.  Besides  this,  there 
was  the  consideration  on  the  one  hand  that  the  liberal 
majority  of  the  existing  Reichstag  was  hostile  to  Russia, 
and  on  the  other  hand  that  the  Clerical  party  was  angry 
on  account  of  the  measures  taken  by  Russia  against  the 
rebellious  Polish  clergy.  Under  all  these  influences 
Rechberg  began  gradually  to  incline  to  the  French  side ; 
he  did  not  miscalculate  the  force  of  the  arguments 
against  this  ;  but  he  thought  that,  by  the  very  fact  of 
becoming  a  participant  in  the  action  taken  by  the 
Western  Powers,  he  could  accomplish  more  for  peace 
and  for  the  adoption  of  moderate  measures.  He 
announced,  therefore,  to  the  Western  Powers,  that  he 
chd,  indeed,  object  to  the  harsh  method  of  a  common 
note,  and  that  he  could  not  appeal  to  the  compacts  of 
1815,  which  had  not  been  infringed  by  Russia,  but  that 
he  was  ready  by  a  note  sent  at  the  same  time  with  those 
of  the  other  Powers  to  support  their  demands. 

This  was  agreed  to  in  Paris  and  London ;  and  on  the 
10th  and  12th  of  April,  therefore,  the  three  notes  were 
sent  to  St.  Petersburg.  Austria  in  hers  complained 
only  of  the  injurious  effect  of  the  state  of  anarchy  in 
Poland  on  Galicia,  and  begged  the  Emperor  on  that 
account  to  grant  to  his  Polish  provinces  the  conditions 
of  a  permanent  peace. 

England  took  a  sharper  tone,  and  declared  that 
Prussia's  obligations  to  the  Powers  that  took  part  in 
the  Congress  of  1815  had   not   been  abolished  by  the 


AUSTRIA   JOINS   THE    WESTERN  POWERS.     593 

revolution  of  1830,  and  that  consequently  Great  Britain 
had  a  right  to  desire  the  fulfilment  of  those  obligations, 
that  is  to  say,  the  restoration  of  the  Constitution  of  1815. 

France  spoke  of  the  constantly  recurring  convulsions 
in  Poland,  which  kept  all  Europe  in  a  state  of  turmoil ; 
she  requested  that  the  Russian  Government  would  at 
last  grant  to  Poland  the  conditions  of  a  permanent 
peace,  since  all  former  attempts  at  constitutions  had 
failed.  This  meant  the  same  as  pronouncing  both  the 
Constitution  of  1815  and  Wielopolski's  autonomous 
administration  to  be  insufficient,  and,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  designating  the  complete  independence  of  Poland 
as  the  only  satisfactory  solution  of  the  difficulty. 

Count  Rechberg  had  neither  said  nor  thought  any- 
thing like  this,  but  he  had  nevertheless  supported  it  by 
taking  part  in  the  representation :  however  much  he 
might  persist  in  his  assertion  that  he  was  only  acting  in 
the  interests  of  peace  and  would  co-operate  in  no  hostile 
action  against  Russia,  from  this  time  on  the  fact  could  not 
be  disputed  that  Austria  had  abandoned  her  neutrality 
and  become  a  sympathizer  with  the  Western  Powers. 

The  Western  Powers  hastened  to  inform  the  world 
of  the  step  they  had  taken.  All  the  Cabinets  of 
Europe,  among  the  rest  the  Courts  of  all  the  German 
States  also,  naturally  with  the  exception  of  Prussia, 
received  an  invitation  to  give  their  support  to  the  three 
notes;  and  even  the  Confederate  Diet  niiglit  almost 
have  been  the  scene  of  deliberations  favorable  to  the 
Poles,  if  Rechberg,  quite  as  decidedly  as  Bismarck,  had 
not  forbidden  such  an  exhibition. 


594  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

In  Paris  the  Government  was  in  doubt  as  to  what 
was  to  be  done,  if  Russia  remained  obstinate.  There 
was  talk  of  a  Swedish-French  landing  in  Courland,  but 
the  plan  was  abandoned  when  Bismarck  announced  in 
London  that  Prussia  would  make  an  armed  resistance 
to  such  an  undertaking.  It  was  also  proposed  to  land 
60,000  French  in  Triest,  whence  they  might  then  march 
to  Poland  in  conjunction  with  an  equal  number  of  Aus- 
trians.  But  Austria's  love  of  peace  made  it  necessary 
to  postpone  this  scheme  also  to  a  more  advanced  stage 
of  the  proceedings. 

Meanwhile  the  Polish  committees  in  Paris  and  Lon- 
don, in  Posen  and  Galicia,  worked  all  the  more  zeal- 
ously. In  spite  of  all  surveillance  on  the  frontiers, 
they  sent  over  volunteers,  arms,  and  munitions,  trans- 
mitted large  sums  of  money,  and  spread  abroad  in  all 
parts  of  the  land  the  news  of  the  action  taken  by 
Europe.  The  consequences  were  manifest  at  once  in  a 
revival  of  the  revolt,  which  had  been  dying  out,  in  an 
increase  in  the  number  and  strength  of  the  different 
bands,  and  in  a  rising  of  the  Polish  nobility  in  Lithuania 
and  Volhynia.  The  National  Government  at  Warsaw 
developed  its  authority  still  further,  and  gave  still 
harsher  orders  to  its  dreaded  agents,  which  punished 
all  disobedience  to  its  commands  with  steel,  fire,  and 
pillage. 

The  Russian  Ministry  beheld  these  proceedings  with 
wrath  and  anxiety.  In  Warsaw,  Count  Berg,  like  his 
predecessors,  had  quarrelled  with  Wielopolski,  and  now 
remained  passive,  since  the  Grand  Duke   refused  him 


RUSSIA'S  ANSWER.  695 

tis  support  against  the  Marquis.  The  great  military- 
preparations  advanced  but  slowly  ;  more  than  one  month 
might  pass  before  the  whole  force  was  in  condition  for 
active  service. 

Under  tiiese  circumstances  the  Government  decided 
to  restrain  for  the  time  its  anger  at  the  interference  of 
the  outside  world,  and  to  answer  the  three  notes  as 
mildly  as  possible.  In  the  reply  addressed  to  England 
on  the  26th  of  April,  Gortschakoff  observed  that  Russia 
recognized  all  compacts,  but  must  insist  upon  an  accu- 
rate interpretation  of  them :  in  no  document  of  1815 
had  a  parliamentary  constitution  been  promised  to  the 
Poles  ;  the  attempt  to  carry  out  such  a  constitution  had 
been  rendered  abortive  by  the  Poles  themselves ;  the 
Emperor  had  now  been  trying  for  years  to  introduce 
salutary  and  liberal  reforms  in  Poland,  and  in  return 
for  his  efforts  had  been  obliged  to  encounter  a  new 
insurrection.  He  was  ready,  the  reply  continued,  to 
enter  into  explanations  in  regard  to  the  principles  laid 
down  in  the  Act  of  the  Congress,  but  above  all  he 
wished  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Powers  to  the  true 
cause  of  the  disturbances,  the  stimulus  constantly 
applied  by  those  parties  that  were  fomenting  revolution 
everywhere.  This  last  point  was  especially  insisted 
upon  in  the  note  addressed  to  France,  and  somewhat 
more  briefly  in  the  one  intended  for  Austria  ;  but  botli 
these  Courts  were  referred  in  general  to  the  note  that 
had  been  sent  to  London. 

Though  perfectly  courteous  in  form,  the  reply  was 
substantially  a  decided  refusal  to  admit  the  unasked-for 


596  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

interference  of  the  Powers.  In  Paris  and  London,  it 
was  felt  that  this  could  not  be  allowed  to  pass  unan- 
swered :  indeed,  the  note  addressed  to  England  had 
contained  an  expression  of  willingness  to  enter  upon 
further  explanations.  The  only  question  was,  what 
positive  demands  were  now  to  be  made ;  and  on  this 
point  there  was  so  great  a  difference  of  opinion  that 
during  several  weeks  there  seemed  to  be  no  prospect 
that  an  understanding  would  be  arrived  at. 

At  the  same  time,  the  course  things  were  taking  in 
Poland  called  urgently  for  further  action,  unless  the 
three  Powers  were  willing  to  acknowledge  themselves 
beaten.  Their  notes  had  at  once  called  forth  a  great 
burst  of  national  indignation  among  the  Russian  people. 
Up  to  that  time,  as  has  been  said,  public  opinion  had 
been  divided,  one  party  desiring  the  punishment  of  the 
Polish  assassins,  the  other  the  severance  of  this  corrupt 
member  from  the  body  of  sacred  Russia.  Now,  how- 
ever, at  the  news  that  the  heretic  West  was  trying  to 
cry  halt  to  Russian  arms,  a  flood  of  patriotic  pride  filled 
all  hearts :  the  recruits  hastened  to  their  colors,  the 
nobles  and  the  cities  offered  voluntary  contributions, 
hundreds  and  hundreds  of  voices  urged  the  Emperor 
to  recall  the  Grand  Duke,  to  remove  Wielopolski,  and 
to  put  down  effectually  the  Polish  rebellion. 

The  Government  was  ready.  In  Warsaw,  Count 
Berg  received  increased  authority :  in  every  district, 
Russian  officers  undertook  the  most  important  positions 
in  the  administration,  and  organized  from  the  peasant 
population   strong   and   reliable    police    forces   for   the 


STATE   OF  THINGS  IN  POLAND.  597 

pursuit  of  the  fugitives  from  such  bands  as  might  be 
broken  up  and  to  prevent  the  formation  of  others.  The 
secret  National  Government  answered  this  by  estab- 
lishing in  every  district  of  Poland  and  Lithuania  revo- 
lutionary tribunals,  which  were  to  get  rid  of  the  enemies 
of  national  freedom  in  a  summary  manner  and  by  any 
means  whatsoever. 

Upon  this,  the  new  Governor  of  Lithuania,  General 
Muravieff,  an  able  man,  of  an  imperious  disposition,  and 
as  inflexible  as  iron,  determined  to  meet  terrorism  with 
terrorism  by  means  of  a  military  administration  carried 
into  the  most  minute  details  and  holding  the  power  of 
life  and  death.  Thus  beside  the  guerilla  war  in  the  open 
field,  there  was  carried  on  in  endless  reioetition  a  horrible 
struggle  between  sword  and  dagger,  between  military 
tribunal  and  secret  tribunal,  Ijetween  the  soldiers  and 
the  butcher-police,  as  the  people  termed  the  agents  of  the 
National  Committee.  The  result  could  not  be  doubtful ; 
in  the  public  opinion  of  Europe  there  was  a  mixture  of 
horror  and  astonishment ;  but  the  three  Powers  felt  it 
to  be  impossible  longer  to  watch  the  continuance  of 
such  a  frightful  state  of  things  and  remain  inactive. 

On  the  17th  and  ISth  of  June  they  sent  for  the 
second  time  notes  in  part  identical  with  one  another  to 
St.  Petersburg.  Austria  declined  to  have  anything 
to  do  with  the  more  extensive  demands  of  the  Western 
Powers,  and  declared  that  she  must  confine  herself  to 
the   following  six  requirements:  a  geneial  anniesly,^  a 

1  Oil  till' ].!tli  of  April  Alcxaiiilcr  li;ul  [MoclaiiiKMl  an  amnesty  to  bo 
pxtondcd  to  every  rebel  wlio  sboukl  submit  before  tlie  l^Uii  of  May. 
But  not  a  single  Pole  liad  taken  advanta<;e  of  tliis. 


598  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

national  representation  that  should  take  part  in  legisla- 
tion, an  autonomous  administration  carried  on  by  Polish 
officials,  the  removal  of  the  restrictions  that  burdened 
the  Catholic  Church,  the  exclusive  use  of  the  Polish 
language  in  the  administration  of  the  government,  and 
the  introduction  of  a  legal  system  of  recruiting. 

The  Western  Powers  accepted  these  six  points,  with 
the  understanding  that  they  were  to  serve  as  the  basis 
for  deliberations  at  a  conference  of  the  eight  Powers 
that  had  signed  in  1815 ;  and  to  this  Austria  agreed. 
In  this  connection  Napoleon  was  of  the  opinion  that 
the  conference  should  take  place  at  any  rate,  even  if 
Russia  refused  to  consent  to  it.  This  would  have  been 
substantially  the  same  as  a  declaration  of  war.  Aus- 
tria, therefore,  insisted  that  the  conference  should  only 
be  undertaken  with  Russia's  participation.  The  West- 
ern Powers  further  desired  that  while  the  negotiations 
were  going  on,  there  should  be  a  truce  to  hostilities 
in  Poland.  This  Austria  regarded  as  impossible,  and 
therefore  did  not  embody  such  a  demand  in  her  note. 

Drouyn  de  Lhuys  was  wholly  prepared  for  a  still 
more  decided  rejection  of  these  proposals  on  the  part  of 
the  Russian  Government.  His  desires  were  centred  in 
the  re-establishment  of  Poland,  which  would  make  any 
coalition  against  France  in  the  future  impossible  ;  it 
was  now  his  hope,  in  spite  of  the  love  of  peace  that 
was  felt  in  Vienna  and  London,  to  draw  both  Powers 
into  a  common  war  against  Russia.  Immediately  after 
the  sending  of  the  notes,  therefore,  although  even  his 
own  colleagues,  Fould  and  Morny,  expressed  themselves 


THE   THREE  POWERS  AGAIN  INTERFERE.      599 

decidedly  against  warlike  measures,  he  sent  to  Vienna 
and  London  proposals  for  the  establishment  of  a  closer 
understanding,  in  the  form  of  a  convention  or  a  pro- 
tocol, in  the  event  of  obstinacy  on  the  part  of  Russia, 
at  the  same  time  offering  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  every 
sort  of  guaranty  against  any  danger  that  might  threaten 
it  owing  to  its  geographical  position. 

In  Vienna,  as  in  Paris,  different  influences  were 
acting  in  opposition  to  one  another.  The  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph,  for  his  part,  had  always  been  against 
co-operating  in  the  action  of  the  Western  Powers :  he 
felt  the  solidarity  with  Prussia  and  Russia,  in  which 
his  possessions  in  Galicia  necessarily  involved  him,  and 
he  had  no  confidence  in  the  Emperor  Napoleon  in  any 
particular.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  said  that  the 
Minister  Schmerling  was  strongly  in  favor  of  a  policy 
friendly  to  the  Poles,  partly  for  the  sake  of  securing 
the  good-will  of  the  Liberal  majority  in  the  Reichstag, 
and  partly  for  the  sake  of  winning,  if  not  the  support, 
at  least  the  approval,  of  Napoleon  for  his  German 
projects.  Count  Rechberg  stood  undecided  between 
these  two  tendencies,  and  sought  to  comfort  himself 
with  the  formula :  "  Alliance  Avith  the  Western  Powers 
so  long  as  they  confine  themselves  to  peaceful  measures, 
separation  from  them  as  soon  as  they  take  any  warlike 
action."  He  had  no  thought  of  the  possibility  of  any 
third  course. 

The  first  effect  of  the  three  notes  in  St.  Petersburg 
was  the  removal  of  Wielopolski  under  the  form  of  an 
indefinite    leave    of    absence.      The    second    was    an 


600  RUSSIA   AND   PRUSSIA. 

increase  in  the  fierceness  of  the  battle  against  the 
insurrection  carried  on  by  Count  Berg,  who  now  became 
the  head  of  the  civil  administration  also,  and  began  to 
follow  the  example  of  Muravieff  in  Lithuania. 

So  far  as  the  answer  to  the  notes  was  concerned, 
Prince  Gortschakoff  had  long  since  announced  to  the 
envoys  of  the  Powers  that  in  his  note  of  April  he  had 
meant  by  the  explanations  there  proposed  nothing  else 
than  a  friendly  interchange  of  opinion  to  take  place  on 
the  spot  in  St.  Petersburg.  If  this  had  been  tried  it 
would  have  been  seen  that  the  Emperor  Alexander,  in 
accordance  with  his  natural  mildness  and  humanity, 
was  ready  to  agree  to  the  substance  of  the  six  demands, 
and  indeed  had  himself  already  offered  nearly  the  same 
thing  to  the  Poles.  But,  the  Prince  said,  it  was  con- 
trary to  the  dignity  and  independence  of  a  Great 
Power  to  allow  itself  to  be  dictated  to  by  a  conference 
of  outsiders  in  such  arrangements  as  in  part  touched 
upon  matters  that  belonged  most  peculiarly  to  the 
internal  administration  of  the  country.  In  any  case, 
such  a  conference  must  be  preceded  by  an  understand- 
ing between  the  three  Powers  that  had  taken  part  in 
the  partition,  since  these  three,  by  reason  of  the  similar 
conditions  prevailing  in  their  Polish  provinces,  were 
more  competent  to  judge  in  the  matter  than  any  others. 
And,  above  all,  such  concessions  and  negotiations  could 
be  considered  only  after  the  rebellion  had  been  thor- 
oughly put  down  and  order  restored.  That  in  the 
existing  condition  of  the  country  an  armistice  was 
simply  impossible,  every  one  who  understood  the  situa- 
tion would  bear  witness. 


RUSSIA   PERSISTS  IN  HER  ATTITUDE.      601 

To  this  effect,  then,  the  notes  were  drawn  up,  which, 
on  the  13th  of  July,  Prince  Gortscliakoff  despatched  as 
an  official  answer  to  the  three  Courts.  In  them,  how- 
ever, the  constantly  increasing  indignation  of  the  Court, 
of  the  people,  and  of  the  army,  necessitated  the  employ- 
ment of  curt  and  decisive  language  ;  but  this  was 
somewhat  moderated  in  the  note  intended  for  Vienna, 
since  Gortscliakoff  desired,  by  the  proposition  of  a 
conference  confined  to  the  three  Powers  that  took  part 
in  the  partition,  to  draw  his  Austrian  neighbor  away 
from  the  dangerous  society  of  Napoleon  and  back  into 
her  old  connections.  On  this  account  he  had  confi- 
dentially communicated  the  contents  of  his  note  to 
Count  Rechberg  a  few  days  in  advance ;  but  he  received 
a  telegram  from  Vienna  on  the  14th,  in  which  Rechberg 
categorically  declined  the  conference  of  three  as  con- 
trary to  the  dignity  of  Austria,  in  her  position  as 
the  ally  of  the  Western  Powers.  On  the  19th,  an 
Austrian  note  followed  to  the  same  effect,  but  in  a  still 
sharper  tone.  Just  at  that  time  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna 
was  occupied  in  getting  great  German  plans  under  way, 
and  was  anxious  to  give  the  Emperor  Napoleon  no 
occasion  for  anger.  Count  Rechberg  had,  it  would 
seem,  no  conception  of  any  danger  that  might  threaten 
Austria  from  any  other  quarter. 

The  Russian  army  ^as  now  -wholly  on  a  war-footing. 
Its  strength,  without  counting  tlie  troops  in  Orenburg, 
Caucasia,  and  Siberia,  was  400,000  men,  of  whom 
nearly  half  were  in  Lithuania,  Poland,  and  Volh3'nia ; 
and  a  new   levy  of  100,000    men    was   just  being  com- 


602  PRUSSIA   AND  RUSSIA. 

pleted.  It  was  felt  that,  without  doubt,  a  small  part  of 
this  force,  with  the  militia  composed  of  the  loyal  peas- 
ants, would  be  able,  under  a  determined  leader,  quickly 
to  put  down  what  was  left  of  the  Polish  insurrection  ; 
but  beside  this,  the  army  had  no  more  eager  desire  than 
to  punish,  sword  in  hand,  the  impertinent  interference 
of  the  Powers  in  Russia's  internal  affairs ;  and  the 
stream  of  national  enthusiasm  turned  so  decidedly  in 
this  direction,  that  the  Emperor,  in  an  autograph  letter, 
proposed  to  King  William  that  they  should  make  a 
common  declaration  of  war  against  France  and  Austria. 
The  proposal  had  its  attractive  side  for  Prussia.  In 
Austria,  there  was  no  sort  of  preparation  for  a  contest, 
and  the  quarrel  with  Hungary  was  going  en  as  hotly  as 
ever.  If  the  King,  therefore,  accepted  the  suggestion 
of  Russia,  Austria,  in  her  almost  defenceless  condition, 
would  be  overwhelmed  and  subdued,  before  a  single 
French  regiment  could  come  to  her  assistance.  Prussia 
would  then  have  her  hands  free  in  Germany,  and  at 
home  she  would  have  no  more  trouble  in  regard  to  the 
military  reforms.  But  undeniably  there  were  also 
serious  objections  to  this  proposal.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  that  France  would  throw  herself  with  her  whole 
power  into  the  struggle  And  in  all  probability  Prussia 
would  then  have  to  bear  alone  the  chief  burden  of  it, 
and  would  finally  be  forced  to  accept  such  a  peace  as 
should  be  arranged  between  France  and  Russia,  very 
likely  quite  in  accordance  with  the  old  ideas  of  Gort- 
schakoff.  "  In  such  a  case,"  said  Bismarck,  "  Russia 
would  he  sitting  on  the  longer  arm  of  the  levers 


RUSSIA   REFUSES   TO  MAKE    WAR.  603 

The  King,  whose  personal  feeling,  in  consideration  of 
old  friendship  and  connections,  was  always  opposed  to 
a  breach  with  Austria,  decided  at  once  in  favor  of  main- 
taining peace.  He  wrote  his  answer  to  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  following  a  draft  outlined  by  Bismarck  with 
his  own  hand,  which  explained  the  reasons  for  the 
decision  with  perfect  frankness.  King  William  said 
that  his  confidence  in  the  Emperor's  good  intentions 
was  unbounded,  but  asked  how  it  would  be,  if,  when 
such  an  agreement  had  once  been  made,  a  new  system 
under  the  pressure  of  other  influences  should  come  into 
control  of  things.  Several  other  letters  were  exchanged 
between  the  Sovereigns.  Finally  Alexander,  who  was 
naturally  much  more  fitted  to  reign  in  peace  than  to  be 
a  conqueror,  allowed  himself  to  be  convinced ;  and  his 
personal  feeling  toward  the  King  underwent  no  change 
whatever. 

On  the  Prussian  side  no  one  but  King  William  and 
Bismarck  knew  at  that  time  anything  of  the  matter. 
With  such  strict  observation  of  secrec3%  there  could 
naturally  be  no  claim  upon  Austria  to  feel  any  grati- 
tude for  the  part  Prussia  had  taken.  At  the  same 
time,  the  King  could  not  but  have  had  a  peculiar  feel- 
ing, when  just  at  tliis  juncture  there  arose  new  develop- 
ments emanating  from  Vienna,  of  a  nature  not  a  little 
surprising  and  by  no  means  friendly  to  Prussia  in  their 
tendencies. 


604      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE   ASSEIVIBLY   OF    PRINCES    AT   FRANKFOET. 

On  the  2d  of  August,  1863,  King  William  received 
at  Gastein,  where  he  was  making  his  usual  summer 
stay  for  the  sake  of  the  baths,  a  visit  from  the  Emperor 
of  Austria.  Francis  Joseph  then  communicated  to  him 
his  intention  to  invite,  on  the  16th  of  August,  all  the 
German  Princes  to  Frankfort,  that  they  might  delib- 
erate and  decide  in  person  in  regard  to  a  new  German 
constitution. 

So  far  as  I  know,  no  authentic  statement  of  the  facts 
concerning  the  genesis  of  this  imperial  idea  has  as  yet 
been  published.  The  proposal  that  not  the  ministers, 
but  the  Princes  themselves,  should  be  called  together  to 
undertake  the  cutting  of  the  Gordian  knot,  occurs  at 
the  conclusion  of  a  treatise  printed  as  manuscript  in 
1862  and  written  by  Count  Blome.  The  Count  was  a 
Holsteiner  in  the  Austrian  service,  son-in-law  of  the 
Minister  Buol,  and  one  of  those  "  converts  from 
abroad,"  like  Meysenbug  and  Max  Gagern,  of  whom 
the  Viennese  said  that  they  came  to  teach  the  Aus- 
trians  what  true  Austrian  patriotism  meant.  We  have 
already  seen  him  active  in  his  zeal  for  the  preparation 
of  the  notes  of  the  2d  of  February,  1862.  It  was  soon 
after  this  that  he  composed  the  brilliant  plan  for  Con- 


PROPOSAL   OF  AN  ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES.      605 

federate  reform,  which  gives  signs  of  literary  talent,  but 
in  which  one  feels  a  lack  of  comprehension  of  human 
nature.  He  concludes  with  the  question :  "  If  to-day 
the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  were  to  summon  an 
assembly  of  German  Princes,  and  were  to  invite  his 
sovereign  colleagues  to  appear  in  Ratisbon  or  Frankfort 
for  the  purpose  of  taking  counsel  with  His  Imperial 
and  Royal  Apostolic  Majesty  in  regard  to  the  present 
and  the  future  of  Germany,  who  would  hold  aloof? 
The  King  of  Prussia?     Perhaps;  but  for  how  long?" 

It  is  easy  to  understand  that  tliis  appeal  found  sym- 
pathetic hearers  in  Vienna.  It  is  stated,  moreover,  that 
a  proposition  of  the  same  sort  had  been  made  to  the 
Emperor  by  the  Duke  of  Coburg. 

As  to  the  outline  of  the  constitution  to  be  laid  before 
the  noble  assembly,  Ebeling,  in  his  biography  of  the 
Minister  Beust,^  —  a  book  containing  many  misrep- 
resentations in  regard  to  Prussian  affairs,  but  much 
useful  information  about  other  matters,  —  relates  that, 
after  the  miscarriage  of  the  project  of  an  assembly  of 
delegates  in  January,  1862,  the  ruling  and  media- 
tized Princes  of  South  Germany  had  caused  a  plan 
of  a  Confederate  constitution  to  be  worked  out,  and 
to  be  laid  before  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  by  tlie 
Postmaster-General  of  Thurn  and  Taxis,  Baron  von 
Dornberg.  Ebeling  says  also,  that  at  the  same  time 
the  Minister,  Von  Schmerling,  who  in  18(!1  with 
the  approval  of  tlie  German  Liberals  had  restored  the 
parliamentary  constitution   in   Austria,  in  view  of  the 

1  Vol.  II.,  |)HKo(;i.  IT. 


606      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

unpopularity  of  the  Prussian  Government,  of  its  strug- 
gle with  the  representatives  of  the  people,  and  of  its 
disputes  with  the  Lesser  States,  had  hit  upon  the  idea 
of  seizing  this  moment  of  supposed  weakness  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  for  the  carrying  out  of  German 
Confederate  reform  in  the  sense  approved  by  Austria, 
by  means  of  the  extraordinary  measure  of  holding  a 
congress  of  Princes.  Count  Rechberg,  our  author  adds, 
had  no  particular  confidence  in  the  plan,  and  hoped  at 
most  to  obtain  by  it  a  closer  connection  with  the  Lesser 
States.  The  Emperor,  however,  accepted  Schmerling's 
proposal  with  joy,  though  he  substituted  for  the  outline 
of  a  constitution  proposed  by  him  the  somewhat  less 
liberal  one  of  Herr  von  Dornberg.^ 

However  all  this  may  have  been,  in  the  interview  at 
Gastein  on  August  3d  the  Emperor  did  not  lay  before 
his  Prussian  associate  in  the  Confederation  any  detailed 
outline  of  a  constitution,  but  contented  himself  with 
sketching  out  by  word  of  mouth  the  main  features, 
mentioning  above  all  a  Confederate  directory  of  five 
members  and  a  Confederate  parliament  consisting  of 
delegates  from  the  German  Chambers,  who  should  only 
have  a  consulting,  not  a  deciding  voice.  He  then  gave 
the  King  a  memorial  that  was  to  explain  his  intentions 
more  in  detail. 

This  was,  indeed,  a  remarkable  document.  In  the 
first  part,  the  necessity  of  reform  was  confirmed  by  a 
portrayal  of  the  existing  state  of  things,  which  could 
not  have  been  written  more  effectively  by  Robert  Blum 

1  Ebeling,  Vol.  II.,  page  79. 


THE  AUSTRIAN  MEMORIAL.  607 

or  Mazzini.  "  The  compacts  of  confederation,"  so  the 
argument  ran,  "  have  long  been  shaken  to  their  founda- 
tions. ...  It  must  be  confessed  that  the  German 
Governments  are  now  no  longer  united  by  the  firm 
bonds  of  mutual  compact,  but  are  only  living  along 
side  by  side  from  day  to  day  with  the  presentiment  of 
an  approaching  catastrophe.  .  .  .  The  actual  condition 
of  things  is  simply  chaotic." 

A  second  paragraph  gave  the  main  lines  of  the 
Austrian  propositions  of  reform :  "  Both  a  single  head 
and  a  parliament  constituted  by  popular  election  are 
impossible,  because  they  would  be  in  contradiction  to 
the  principle  of  federation.  The  Emperor  holds 
firmly  to  the  ideas  contained  in  the  note  of  February 
2d,  1862,  and  to  the  statement  made  in  the  Confederate 
Diet  in  January,  1863.  He  will,  therefore,  propose  a 
Confederate  directory  and  an  assembly  of  delegates 
from  the  German  parliaments,  further,  a  Confederate 
court  of  appeal  and  periodical  congresses  of  the  Princes. 
As  to  the  means  to  be  employed  for  attaining  this 
object,  experience  has  shown  that  if  conferences  of 
ministers  and  diplomatic  negotiations  are  resorted  to, 
conflicting  interests  and  the  differences  of  opinion  that 
exist  will  render  any  agreement  impossible.  The  Ger- 
man Piinces,  however,  being  those  to  whom  the  rights 
in  (luestion  belong,  and  all  liaving  regard  for  the  inter- 
ests of  Germany,  will  understand  each  other  much 
better  by  meeting  personally  and  exchanging  opinions 
than  they  can  do  by  the  agency  of  third  parties." 

Finall}^  the  third  paragraph  declared  that  "Prussia  has 


608      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

the  power,  both  in  practice  and  in  theory,  to  hinder  the 
reform  of  the  German  Constitution.  If  she  interposes 
her  veto,  the  Confederation  as  a  whole  cannot  raise 
itself  from  the  wretched  condition  into  which  it  has 
fallen.  But  a  complete  stoppage  of  the  agitation  for 
reform  is  no  longer  possible  :  the  Governments  that 
recognize  this  fact  will  feel  themselves  compelled  to 
take  hold  of  it  as  a  work  of  necessity,  by  making  up 
their  minds  to  the  partial  carrying  out  of  the  proposed 
Confederate  reform  within  their  own  boundaries,  and 
by  giving,  for  this  purpose,  to  their  rights  as  independ- 
ent members  of  the  Confederation  the  widest  possible 
interpretation  that  shall  still  be  consistent  with  their 
relations  to  that  Confederation." 

In  conclusion,  an  urgent  request  was  addressed  to 
Prussia,  to  the  effect  that  she  should  abandon  the 
policy  hostile  to  the  strengthening  of  the  Confedera- 
tion, which  she  had  pursued  hitherto,  since  upon  her 
decision  now  depended  the  raising  of  the  Confederation 
to  that  fulness  of  power  which  was  so  infinitely  imjDor- 
tant  in  its  consequences  both  for  Germany  and  for 
Europe. 

It  will  be  admitted  that  this  memorial  was  not  of  a 
nature  that  would  be  likely  to  inspire  Prussia  with  a 
feeling  either  of  obligation  or  of  inclination  to  accept  its 
conclusions.  The  assertion  that  the  compacts  of  con- 
federation were  already,  properly  speaking,  dissolved,  a 
statement  which  Rechberg  soon  afterwards  explained 
in  a  positive  sense,  to  the  effect  that  Prussia  was  wholly 
to  blame   for  this    misfortune ;    then    the    undisguised 


KING   WILLIAM  AND  FRANCIS  JOSEPH.     CCO 

revival  of  the  constitutional  plans  so  often  rejected  by 
Prussia  ;  the  express  reference  to  the  fiercest  documents 
of  the  polemic  that  had  been  carried  on  against  her ; 
and  finally,  the  announcement  of  the  intention,  if 
Prussia  proved  obstinate,  to  form  a  more  restricted 
union  within  the  Confederation,  an  intention,  whicli, 
when  Prussia  had  entertained  it,  had  repeatedly  been 
received  with  the  most  violent  protests  in  the  name  of 
the  principles  of  the  Confederation,  —  all  this  was  by 
no  means  calculated  to  dispose  the  King  to  favor  the 
Austrian  plans. 

The  conversations  of  the  two  Sovereigns  in  regard 
to  the  great  question  took  place  without  witnesses ;. 
but,  as  is  shown  by  their  correspondence  afterwards 
and  by  the  memoranda  of  the  King,  the  tone  of 
them  was  thorouglily  friendly.  The  subject  of  Poland 
was  also  discussed  in  detail.  The  Emperor  distinctly 
repeated  the  assurance,  that  he  had  joined  the  Western 
Powers  in  their  diplomatic  action  only  with  the  object 
of  maintaining  peace,  and  that  he  would  abandon,  them 
so  soon  as  they  showed  an}^  intention  of  resorting  to 
arms.  "  I  am  only  afraid,"  said  the  King,  "  that  you 
will  find  it  very  difficult  to  separate  yourself  from  tlie 
Western  Powers." — "Not  the  least  in  the  world,"  was 
the  answer ;  "  the  Western  Powers  have  long  known 
my  determination,  neither  to  carry  on  war  nor  to  agree 
to  any  change  in  existing  territorial  arrangements,  and 
I  rejoice  that  England  also  is  determined  to  use  only 
diplomatic  means  and  not  force,  in  her  support  of 
Poland.     In  Galicia,  moreover,"  he  added,  "everything 


GIO      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

is  as  ready  for  revolution  as  in  Poland,  and  I  shall  be 
obliged  to  resort  to  serious  measures  there." 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  last  interview,  Francis 
Joseph  asked  the  King  to  send  to  him  at  Vienna  a 
resume  of  the  comments  made  by  word  of  mouth  about 
Confederate  reform.  The  King  wrote  such  a  resume 
immediately  after  the  Emperor's  departure  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  3d  of  August ;  from  it  we  learn  exactly 
what  his  views  in  the  matter  were. 

"  I  entirely  concur,"  he  says,  "  in  the  belief  of  the 
necessity  of  Confederate  reform  ;  but  I  consider  the 
convening  of  a  congress  of  Princes,  both  in  itself  and 
especially  at  so  early  a  date  as  the  16th  of  August,  to 
be  a  doubtful  experiment.  For  in  so  short  a  time,  the 
Princes  cannot  fully  prepare  for  so  important  a  decis- 
ion, and  even  with  a  longer  interval  for  preparation,  it 
seems  impossible  that,  the  working  capacity  of  an 
assembly  so  constituted  being  what  it  would  be,  due 
deliberation  could  be  given  to  so  weighty  a  question.. 
A  preliminary  discussion  of  the  outline  by  a  conference 
of  ministers  would  therefore  be  preferable,  the  results 
of  which  could  afterwards  be  sanctioned  by  an  assembly 
of  Princes.  Considering  the  constitution  of  many  of 
the  German  Chambers,  it  is  probable  that  delegations 
from  them  would  not  be  contented  with  a  consulting 
voice,  but  would  immediately  demand  further  powers, 
so  that  from  the  very  beginning  harmonious  action 
would  be  endangered.  If  a  conservative  electoral  law 
should  be  adopted,  good  results  might  be  looked  for 
from  direct  popular  elections.     As  to  the  Confederate 


PRUSSIA    STATES  HER   POSITION.  Gil 

directory,  the  appointment  of  the  three  members  in 
addition  to  Prussia  and  Austria  would  cause  great 
difficulties ;  the  composition  of  the  directory  would  be 
essentially  conditioned  by  the  extent  of  its  poAvers ; 
the  greater  its  authority,  the  harder  it  would  be  to 
obtain  for  it  the  approval  of  the  states  that  were  not 
to  be  represented."  In  conclusion  the  King  wrote : 
"  It  is  important  to  consider  what  an  impression  would 
necessarily  be  made,  if  the  congress  of  Princes  were  to 
adjourn  without  having  accomplished  anything.  A 
greater  service  to  revolutionary  tendencies  than  would 
be  rendered  by  such  a  result  cannot  be  imagined. 
It  is,  therefore,  all  the  more  necessary  to  take  pre- 
liminary measures  which  shall  insure  a  satisfactory 
outcome." 

As  is  seen,  the  King  avoided  a  direct  refusal. 
Indeed,  with  the  modifications  he  had  suggested,  the 
idea  of  a  solemn  convention  of  German  Princes  for 
the  sake  of  the  great  national  object  seemed  rather 
attractive  than  dangerous  to  liim. 

King  William  certainly  had  no  reason  to  expect  any- 
thing else  than  that  the  Emperor  would  await  the 
arrival  of  the  resume  before  taking  his  final  decision. 
He  was,  therefore,  not  a  little  surprised,  when,  on  the 
evening  of  the  3d  of  August,  an  imperial  adjutant 
delivered  to  him  the  official  invitation,  dated  July  31st, 
to  be  present  at  Frankfort  on  the  10th  of  August. 
Upon  this,  he  sent  the  rSsumS  to  the  Emperor  on  the 
4th,  together  with  a  private  letter  in  which  he  expressed 
regret  that  his  health  prevented  him  from  accepting  the 


612      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

invitation.  On  the  same  clay  the  invitation  was  also 
declined  officially.  Although  all  this  was  communi- 
cated that  same  morning  by  telegraph  to  Vienna,  yet 
afterwards  in  the  course  of  the  day  the  invitations  were 
nevertheless  sent  from  there  to  all  the  German  Courts. 
The  decision  of  the  Emperor  was  thus  irrevocably 
taken.  But  the  King  persisted  quite  as  firmly  in  his 
view,  which  was  not  altered  by  a  letter  from  Francis 
Joseph  on  the  7th  of  August.  On  the  contrary,  on  the 
13th  and  14th  two  ministerial  despatches  were  sent 
to  Herr  von  Werther  at  Vienna,  of  which  the  first 
expressed  astonishment  at  those  passages  of  the  Aus- 
trian memorial,  according  to  which  the  Confederate 
Constitution  had  already  ceased  to  exist.  In  the 
second,  it  was  declared  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  King 
to  take  part  in  an  assembly  the  object  of  which,  though 
infinitely  important,  had  not  been  previously  discussed 
with  him,  and  of  which  the  details  were  only  to  be 
communicated  to  him  in  the  assembly  itself.  "  A  final 
judgment,"  said  the  despatch,  "regarding  the  outline 
of  a  constitution  there  to  be  proposed  cannot  be  given 
on  such  meagre  information  as  has  been  communicated. 
So  far  as  can  be  seen  at  present,  a  Confederate  direc- 
tory, if  its  decisions  required  unanimity  among  five 
members,  would  leave  the  existing  state  of  things 
unchanged  ;  on  the  other  hand,  if  such  a  directory  were 
empowered  to  act  on  the  vote  of  a  majority,  Prussia 
would  never  agree  to  subordinate  her  independence  and 
her  legislative  competence  to  the  orders  of  three  voices 
out    of    five.      Delegations   with   a    consulting    voice 


BISMARCK'S   CRITICISM.  613 

amount  to  nothing  whatever.  Prussia  persists  in  her 
original  declaration,  that  she  can  approve  any  extension 
of  the  Confederate  authority  only  on  the  condition 
that  the  decrees  of  that  authority  are  made  dependent 
upon  the  consent  of  a  parliament  chosen  by  the 
people." 

In  communicating  this  despatch  to  the  Prussian 
deputy  in  the  Diet,  Von  Sydow,  who  had  succeeded 
Usedom  in  1862,  Bismarck  wrote  :  "  I  regard  the  Aus- 
trian project  of  reform  as  a  piece  of  display,  intended 
by  Schmerling  rather  as  a  manoeuvre  in  internal 
Austrian  policy  than  as  a  move  of  anti-Prussian  diplo- 
macy. He  is  arranging  for  the  Emperor  a  brilliant 
birthday  festival  with  Princes  in  white  uniforms,  and 
means  to  show  liim  the  great  results  of  the  constitu- 
tional era  in  Austria.  But  when  3'ou  get  rid  of  the 
smoke  of  fine  phrases,  the  substance  of  the  poodle  is 
so  wretchedly  meagre,  that  really  it  would  be  better 
not  to  give  the  people  practical  proof  beforehand  that 
such  a  scheme  can  yiever  be  made  to  work.  ...  It  does 
not  at  present  seem  desirable  to  attempt  to  exert  any 
influence  over  the  negotiations  ;  we  must  first  allow  the 
wisdom  of  the  reforms  to  manifest  itself  undisturbed." 

While  now,  at  this  very  same  time,  the  act  of  reform 
was  taking  its  final  shape  at  Vienna, — among  other 
things  the  third  place  in  the  directory  was  allotted  to 
the  King  of  Bavaria,  and  an  active  voice  in  all  Confed- 
erate legislation  was  conceded  to  the  delegations,  — 
Count  liechbcrg  was  once  more  busy  Avith  Polish 
matters.     Naj)oleon  was  strongly  inclined    not  to  rest 


614      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

satisfied  with  Russia's  answer,  and  laid  before  the  two 
other  Powers  the  outline  of  a  note  which  this  time  was 
to  be  sent  in  common,  and  which,  after  emphatically 
denying  all  Gortschakoff's  premises,  in  its  concluding 
words  took  almost  the  shape  of  an  ultimatum. 

But  neither  Lord  John  Russell  nor  Count  Rechberg 
would  listen  to  any  project  of  a  common  note.  The 
plan  of  simultaneous  protests  hitherto  employed  was 
persisted  in,  the  note  from  Vienna  having  a  much  more 
moderate  tone  than  that  from  Paris,  though  the  former 
cast,  as  before,  all  responsibility  for  evil  consequences 
upon  Russia.  The  proposal  of  an  alliance,  made  by 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  had  indeed  been  rejected  by  Austria, 
but  just  at  the  very  point  of  entering  ujjon  the  assembly 
of  Princes,  the  Vienna  Court  was  unwilling  to  break 
entirely  with  Paris.  After  the  two  Western  Powers, 
therefore,  had  sent  their  notes  on  the  3d  and  11th,  the 
Austrian  note  followed  on  August  12th. 

These  notes,  like  those  that  had  preceded  them  in 
June,  received  first  of  all  a  practical  answer.  On  the 
former  occasion,  Wielopolski  had  been  given  his  leave 
of  absence  ;  now,  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine,  in  spite 
of  his  great  reluctance,  was  recalled  to  St.  Petersburg. 
The  dictatorship  of  Count  Berg  was  thus  freed  from 
the  last  restraint.  Though  the  National  Government 
increased  the  horrors  of  its  reign  of  terror,  —  at  that 
time  the  assassinations  that  had  taken  place  at  its  com- 
mand since  the  beginning  of  the  revolt  were  calculated 
at  five  hundred,  ■ — ■  nevertheless  Lithuania  was  com- 
pletely  subdued,    and    in    Poland    the    iron    circle    of 


PREPARATIONS  AT  FRANKFORT.  615 

Russian  military  power  was  ever  drawing  closer  about 
the  nucleus  of  the  rebellion. 

In  the  mean  time  more  agreeable  things  were  taking 
place  in  South  Germany.  Above  all,  the  ancient  city 
of  the  imperial  elections  and  of  the  Confederate  Diet 
was  decking  itself  for  the  reception  of  the  youthful 
ruler,  who,  as  it  was  thought,  would,  in  the  midst  of  the 
German  Princes,  place  the  crown  of  the  new  Empire 
fu-mly  upon  his  head.  Frankfort  had  long  been  Aus- 
trian in  feeling,  owing  to  the  influence  of  the  Diet,  to 
the  activity  of  the  organs  of  the  Austrian  Press,  and 
to  the  friendliness  of  the  Austrian  officers,  perhaps  also 
to  the  great  number  of  Austrian  government-securities 
deposited  in  the  safes  of  the  good  citizens.  Expecta- 
tion was  raised  to  the  highest  pitch.  On  the  14th  and 
15th  of  August,  the  city  was  already  in  a  state  of  rest- 
less agitation :  Kings  and  Princes  were  arriving,  wel- 
comed with  salvos  of  artillery,  with  peals  of  bells,  and 
with  deputations  from  the  senate  of  the  town. 

All,  indeed,  were  present,  with  the  exception  of 
Lippe,  Anhalt-Bernburg,  and  Holstein  :  the  King  of 
Prussia,  it  was  generally  believed,  would  yield  in  the 
end.  Finally,  on  the  evening  of  the  16th,  appeared  in 
dignified  state,  the  chief  figure  of  the  festival,  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph.  All  the  streets  were  deco- 
rated ;  ■  an  immense  concourse  of  peoi)le  accompanied 
the  imperial  cort6<je  with  unceasing  shouts  of  joy  ;  the 
municipal  senate  in  a  body  offered  the  young  Sovereign 
an  address  of  wclcoim'.  'i'lio  Emperor  Frederick  Ikir- 
bai-ossa,    risiii-jf    fioin    the   caverns  of    the    1\\  ITluluser, 


616      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

could  not  have  been  received  with  more  boisterous 
enthusiasm. 

The  assembled  Princes,  also,  did  not  fail  to  be 
impressed  by  this  enthusiastic  expression  of  popular 
feeling.  Many  a  one  among  them  looked  with  an 
anxious  heart,  on  the  16tli  of  August,  at  the  outline  of 
a  constitution,  hitherto  unknown  to  him,  concerning 
which  he  was  to  enter  into  deliberations  on  the  morrow ; 
but  the  demeanor  of  the  Emperor,  as  calm  as  it  was 
firm,  made  an  impression  on  all  of  them,  since  it  gave 
them,  still  undetermined  as  they  were,  a  feeling  that 
there  was  conviction  and  deliberate  purpose  at  the 
bottom  of  the  whole  affair.  The  four  Kings  (the  King 
of  Wiirtemberg  was  represented  by  his  son)  sustained 
the  Emperor  entirely,  and  tliere  were  not  many  among 
the  petty  Princes  who  ventured  to  stand  against  such 
superior  power ;  while  the  assertion  of  Austria,  which 
she  had  once  made  in  Dresden,  that  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  leave  the  city  without  having  accomplished 
something^  daily  found  now,  as  formerly,  many  who  were 
moved  by  it  from  sheer  fear  of  revolution. 

On  the  17th  of  August  the  Emperor,  as  president, 
opened  the  first  sitting  with  a  well-calculated  speech, 
which  was  answered  and  substantially  seconded  by 
King  Max  of  Bavaria.  Upon  this,  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin  moved  that  the  Assembly  should 
send  a  written  invitation  to  the  King  of  Prussia  to  take 
part  in  their  proceedings.  King  John  of  Saxony  said 
that  he  would  not  discuss  the  fitness  of  such  a  step, 
nay,  that  he  would  give   his  voice  in  favor  of  it,  but 


FIRST  SITTING   OF   THE  ASSEMBLY.  617 

only  on  the  condition,  that  it  should  be  preceded  by 
two  resolutions,  first,  that  the  Assembly  recognized  in 
the  imperial  proposition  a  suitable  basis  for  their  future 
deliberations,  and  secondly,  that  the  Assembly  would 
not  allow  a  possible  negative  answer  on  the  King's  part 
to  prevent  them  from  continuing  their  deliberations  on 
that  basis.  The  Emperor  and  King  Max  supported  the 
motion  in  this  form,  which  was  then,  after  a  short  dis- 
cussion, approved. 

The  Emperor  expressed  his  satisfaction  at  having 
thus  received  evidence  that  the  august  personages  there 
assembled  were  all  agreed  that  in  any  case  their  delib- 
erations should  produce  a  definite  result.  King  John 
of  Saxony  then  undertook  the  task  of  drawing  up  the 
letter  to  King  William  and  of  conveying  it  in  person 
to  Baden.  In  S2)ite  of  advice  to  the  contrary  from  the 
Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  it  was  decided  that  the  fact  that 
the  Austrian  outline  had  already  been  adojoted  as  the 
basis  of  their  deliberations  should  be  expressly  men- 
tioned in  the  letter.  On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  King 
John  went  to  Baden,  and  the  Assembly  was  adjourned 
until  his  return. 

All  this  caused  King  William  much  discomfort.  His 
head  and  heart  were  at  war  in  regard  to  the  Assembly 
of  Princes.  It  would  have  been  a  real  satisfaction  to 
liini,  there,  in  the  midst  of  his  fellow  Princes,  to  have 
put  a  liand  to  the  great  work,  —  if  only  the  reasons  for 
a  contrary  course  had  not  been  too  strong.  Then  came 
the  doubt  whether,  after  all,  he  could  not  act  more 
effectively  for  Prussia's  interests  and   for   Germany's 


618      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

welfare  on  the  spot  than  at  a  distance.  Queen  Maria, 
in  Munich,  and  in  Wildbad  his  sister-in-law,  the  Dow- 
ager Queen  Elizabeth,  whom  he  so  highly  revered, 
urged  him  in  the  same  direction ;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  Bismarck  remained  firm  in  his  determination :  if 
the  King  commanded,  he  would  accompany  liim  to 
Frankfort,  but  would  never  again  return  as  Minister 
from  there  to  Berlin. 

The  stimulating  effect  of  the  baths  acting  together 
with  this  struggle  of  opposing  convictions  made  the 
King  nervous,  and  when  he  came  to  the  interviews  with 
King  John  he  grew  decidedly  ill.  He  expressed  to  the 
august  messenger  his  strong  desire  to  go  to  Frankfort, 
but  after  explaining  his  reasons,  said  that  he  preferred 
to  give  his  decision  in  writing,  in  his  answer  to  the 
Assembly. 

When  consulting  with  Bismarck  after  the  interview, 
he  cried :  "  Thirty  Princes  sending  an  invitation,  and 
the  courier  a  King  —  how  can  one  refuse  ?  "  Yet  in  the 
end,  as  always  with  him,  the  head  held  the  heart  in 
check.  After  much  hesitation  and  doubt,  the  letter 
of  refusal  was  written,  sealed,  and  then  delivered  by 
Bismarck  to  the  King  of  Saxony  at  his  departure. 
Bismarck's  wrath  was  boiling  inwardly  over  the  long 
suspense.  When  the  door  had  closed  behind  the  Saxon, 
he  smashed  a  plate  which  was  standing  on  the  table 
with  some  glasses  :  "  I  had  to  break  something ! "  he 
said  ;  "now  I  can  breathe  again." 

Meanwhile  in  Frankfort  the  Assembly  continued  to 
strike  while  the  iron  was  hot.     The   order  of  business 


DOINGS  OF  THE  ASSEMBLY.  619 

usually  followed  in  such  deliberations,  first  and  second 
reading,  discussion  of  the  matter  as  a  whole  and  in 
detail,  etc.,  naturally  did  not  come  in  question  here  ; 
what  was  important,  was  to  attain  the  object  as  quickly 
as  possible,  no  matter  under  what  form.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  21st  of  August  the  Princes  listened  to  an 
Austrian  memorial,  in  which  the  Emperor,  taking  as  a 
basis  the  acceptance  of  his  outline,  continued  with  the 
hope  that  only  such  amendments  to  that  outline  would 
be  proposed  as  should  not  alter  the  system  as  a  whole ; 
he  then  recommended  for  the  speedy  consideration  and 
decision  of  the  Princes  twelve  especially  important 
articles,  and  left  the  remainder  to  be  discussed  by  the 
Ministers  with  the  condition,  that,  whenever  no  under- 
standing could  be  arrived  at  in  regard  to  any  change, 
the  text  of  the  original  outline  should  be  left  un- 
touched. 

When  the  Emperor,  at  the  sitting  on  the  22d,  advo- 
cated this  method  of  proceeding,  he  was  at  once  sup- 
ported by  the  King  of  Saxony  and  by  some  of  the  other 
Princes.  In  vain  did  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden  point 
out  the  need  of  a  regular  order  of  business,  and  raise 
the  question  whether  resolutions  passed  by  the  majority 
of  tlic  Assembly  were  to  be  binding.  King  John  replied 
that  natui-ally  ea(;h  one  could  Ijind  only  himself  by  his 
own  vote,  ])ut  lliat  it  was  desirable  to  arrive  at  a  general 
understandijig,  and  that  for  that  purpose  it  was  neces- 
sary to  learn  the  opinion  of  all,  or  at  any  rate  of  the 
majority  ;  he  said  that  for  his  i)art  he  was  always  ready 
to   subordinate    his    (Opinion    to    that    of    the    niajoiily. 


620      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

The  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  thereupon 
declared  that  he  could  regard  the  votes  upon  the  special 
articles  for  the  present  as  only  preliminary ;  not  until  a 
general  vote  upon  the  whole  was  taken  would  the 
opinion  of  the  Assembly  be  finally  ascertained.  The 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  at  once  assented  to  this,  but 
expressed  the  hope  that  when  the  vote  upon  the  whole 
was  taken,  it  might  be  regarded  as  binding. 

After  the  question  of  the  form  of  proceeding  had 
been  thus  summarily  disposed  of,  the  Assembly  at  once 
proceeded  to  business ;  that  is,  to  the  consideration  of 
the  special  articles.  It  would  not  be  interesting  for  us 
to  follow  out  in  detail  these  discussions,  condemned 
from  the  beginning  to  result  in  nothing,  especially  as 
there  is  no  authentic  report  of  the  speeches  of  the 
august  participants,  and  as  in  the  records  of  the  ses- 
sions there  is  only  an  occasional  reference  to  particular 
propositions  that  were  made.  From  the  very  beginning 
a  decided  majority  declared  for  the  imperial  proposals  ; 
these  proposals  exactly  met  the  wishes  of  the  Lesser 
States,  and  only  a  small  number  of  the  others  had  the 
courage  to  maintain  an  opposite  view  under  the  eyes  of 
the  Emperor. 

During  the  whole  course  of  the  sessions  Francis 
Joseph  displayed  a  talent  for  presiding,  as  prudent  and 
energetic  as  if  he  had  been  occupied  his  whole  life 
with  parliamentary  business.  King  John  of  Saxony 
showed  himself  to  be  a  no  less  successful  leader  of 
the  Majority,  whether  it  was  a  question  of  making 
convincing  speeches  or  of  employing  strategic  skill  in 


DEBATES  ABOUT  THE   OUTLINES.  621 

the  harmonizing  of  conflicting  opinions.  In  opposition 
to  him,  it  was  above  all  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden  who 
fought  against  the  whole  system  without  flinching  and 
did  not  hesitate  to  give  expression  to  the  heretical 
view,  regarded  with  horror  by  the  other  side,  that  any 
fruitful  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Confederation  would 
be  impossible  so  long  as  two  Great  Powers  belonged 
to  it. 

For  his  propositions  of  amendment,  however,  he 
could  not  obtain  more  than  from  four  to  six  votes : 
Weimar,  Oldenburg,  and  occasionally  Coburg,  Waldeck, 
and  Reuss. 

In  its  contents  the  propositions  of  reform  followed 
exactly  the  lines  of  the  latest  deliberations  of  the  Con- 
federate Diet,  already  known  to  us  :  the  enlargement  of 
the  object  of  the  Confederation ;  the  authorizing  of  the 
Confederation  to  extend  its  legislative  and  administra- 
tive power  to  institutions  of  common  usefulness  of 
every  sort,  and  hence  the  decided  limiting  of  the 
requirement  of  unanimity  in  passing  votes ;  in  com- 
pensation for  this,  the  communicating  to  delegates  from 
the  Chambers  of  a  share  in  legislation,  and  the  creation 
of  an  executive  in  the  shape  of  a  directory,  in  which,  as 
well  as  in  the  Diet,  Austria  should  have  the  presidency 
and  could  count  upon  having,  in  connection  with  the 
Lesser  States,  a  permanent  majority.  Besides  this 
there  was  to  be  a  Confederate  court  of  appeal,  wliicli 
should  have  the  function  amoncr  others  of  making  a 
decision,  in  case  of  disputes  between  the  Government 
and  the  popular  representation  in   any  state  in  respect 


622      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

to  the  interpretation  of  the  constitution  of  that  state. 
In  order  to  recommend  the  Act  of  Reform  to  the  King 
of  Prussia,  it  was  pointed  out  to  him  that  by  this  means 
he  could  escape  entirely  from  every  contest  with  the 
Lower  House  in  regard  to  the  budget.  He  said  with  a 
smile  :  "  That  would  not  be  so  bad  ;  "  but  immediately 
added,  "  but  it  will  not  do." 

From  the  point  of  view  of  Austria's  wishes.  Article 
VHI.  of  the  Act  of  Reform,  that  concerning  peace  and 
war,  was  especially  characteristic.  "  Should  there  be 
danger  of  attack  upon  the  Confederation  or  upon  any 
part  of  the  Confederate  territory,  or  should  the  Euro- 
pean balance  of  power  appear  endangered  in  any  way 
likely  to  aifect  the  Confederation,  the  Directory  shall 
take  all  necessary  steps,  shall  arrange  the  mobilization 
of  the  Confederate  army,  and  shall  appoint  the  Confed- 
erate commander-in-chief.  The  formal  declaration  of 
war  shall  be  resolved  upon  by  the  Diet  (or,  as  it  was 
here  called,  the  Confederate  Council),  by  a  majority  of 
two-thirds.  Should  there  be  danger  of  a  war  between 
a  Confederate  State  that  at  the  same  time  has  posses- 
sions outside  of  the  Confederation  and  a  foreign  Power, 
then  at  the  motion  of  the  Directory  the  Confederate 
Diet  shall  decide  in  regard  to  participation  in  this  war 
(for  instance,  an  Austrian  war  about  Venetia)  by  a 
simple  majority-vote."  This  arrangement,  however,  — 
a  qualified  majority  for  the  defence  of  Confederate 
territory,  a  simple  majority  for  the  protection  of  non- 
Confederate  countries,  —  was  too  much  even  for  the 
faithful  Lesser  States.     On  the  motion  of  Saxony  and 


RESULT  OF   THE  DELIBERATIONS.  623 

Nassau,  the  majority  of  two-thirds  was  adopted  for  both 
cases.  Nevertheless,  the  article  still  remained  an 
advance  in  the  direction  desired  by  Austria;  since 
Article  XLVII.  of  the  Vienna  Final  Act  had  provided 
for  the  second  case,  that,  in  the  event  of  a  hostile 
attack  upon  non-Confederate  territory,  the  Confederate 
Diet  must  have  recognized  in  that  attack  a  danger  for 
the  Confederation,  before  deciding  to  resist  it. 

If  the  Act  of  Reform  thus  drawn  up  was  unacceptable 
to  Prussia,  it  was  quite  as  unsuccessful  in  winning  the 
favor  of  the  German  people.  Besides  the  Assembly  of 
Princes,  there  also  met  at  that  time  in  Frankfort  an 
Assembly  of  three  hundred  members  of  all  the  German 
Chambers  with  the  exception  of  Austria.  This  Assem- 
bly, on  the  22(1  of  August,  resolved  upon  the  demand 
of  a  Parliament  chosen  by  the  people,  of  the  equaliza- 
tion of  the  two  Great  Powers  in  the  Confederation,  and 
of  the  settlement  of  the  future  constitution  by  the 
Governments  and  the  Parliaments  in  common.  "  It  is 
impossible,"  said  the  resolution  in  polite  language,  "  to 
adopt  a  wholly  negative  attitude  in  regard  to  Austria's 
proposal."  But  it  was  evident  to  all  the  world  that 
the  statement  of  these  demands  implied  the  complete 
rejection  of  the  outline  brought  forward  by  the 
Emperor. 

At  the  last  sitting  of  the  Assembly  of  Princes,  on 
the  1st  of  September,  1863,  Hanover  and  Brunswick 
proposed  that  the  Articles  hitherto  reserved  for  the 
Conference  of  Ministers  should  be  accepted  at  one  vote, 
and  that  the  deliberations  of  the  Ministers  should  thus 


624      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRI.YCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

be  rendered  unnecessary.  The  proposal  was  well 
received,  and  after  a  short  debate  was  unanimously 
adopted,  Baden  only  making  a  reservation.  Thus  the 
discussion  in  detail  was  ended,  and  the  vote  in  regard 
to  the  whole  could  be  approached. 

In  regard  to  this,  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  put  two 
distinct  questions  :  1.  Does  the  Assembly  accept  the 
final  result  of  the  deliberations?  2.  Does  the  Assembly 
consider  itself  bound  by  these  resolutions  until  the 
members  of  the  Confederation  not  here  present  have 
either  definitively  refused  the  outline  or  have  commu- 
nicated to  us  their  counter-proposals  ?  Both  questions 
were  thereupon  answered  affirmatively  by  twenty-four 
voices  and  negatively  by  six :  Baden,  Schwerin,  Wei- 
mar, Luxemburg,  Waldeck,  and  Reuss  (younger 
branch). 

The  members  of  the  Majority  then  signed  a  declara- 
tion of  their  readiness  to  complete,  so  far  as  in  them 
lay,  the  future  constitution  of  Germany  according  to 
the  standard  of  the  resolutions  thus  adopted,  and  to  put 
it  into  execution,  and  with  this  object  to  strive  for  a 
general  understanding  on  the  basis  of  these  resolutions 
with  the  members  of  the  Confederation  not  represented 
in  the  Assembly,  especially  with  the  King  of  Prussia. 
It  is  noticeable  that  in  the  original  draft  of  the  decla- 
ration, instead  of  the  words  "  general  understanding," 
had  stood  the  words  "  an  understanding  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  the  Confederation ;  "  the  change 
was  preferred,  however,  in  order  to  exclude  any  doubt 
as  to  the  intention  being  really  to  secure  a  unanimity 


PRUSSIA'S   VIEW   OF  THE  RESOLUTIONS.      625 

of  all  the  members,  and  not  to  bring  about  a  more 
restricted  union  by  means  of  Article  XI.  of  the  old  Act 
of  Confederation. 

This  was  a  bad  sign  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  desii-es 
of  Austria,  which  ^vere  directed  toward  just  such  a 
union,  in  case  the  great  Confederate  reform  now  aimed 
at  should  prove  a  failure. 

Finally,  a  second  communication  from  the  Assembly 
to  the  King  of  Prussia  was  proposed  and  accepted ;  and 
then  the  German  Assembly  of  Princes  was  closed  by  a 
speech  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria.  To  speak  figura- 
tively, a  brilliant  display  of  pyrotechnics,  with  noisy 
rockets,  flashing  stars,  and  Bengal  lights,  had  been 
exhibited  before  the  astonished  public  ;  what  was  left 
of  it  after  the  last  gleam  had  faded  away  ? 

In  Berlin  the  outline  of  the  constitution  sent  from 
Frankfort  had  been  officially  placed  before  the  Council 
for  consideration,  and  the  report  was  presented  to  the 
King  on  the  15th  of  December.  This  contained  the 
advice  not  to  enter  into  a  criticism  of  the  special  arti- 
cles, but  rathei"  that  the  Government  should  declare 
itself  ready  to  carry  on  further  negotiations  in  regard 
to  Confederate  reform  by  means  of  conferences  of  min- 
ister, provided  a  preliminary  understanding  could  be 
arrived  at  concerning  three  decisive  and  essential  prin- 
ciples. Fi]-st,  Prussia  must  demand  for  heiself  as  well 
as  Austria  tlie  riglit  of  vetoing  a  declaration  of  war  on 
the  part  of  the  Confedei'ation,  since  Prussia,  as  a  Euro- 
pean Power,  could  not  make  her  foreign  policy  uncon- 
ditionally subservient  to  tliut  of  the  Confederation,  and 


626      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

since,  beside  this,  she  had  more  inhabitants  than  the 
Lesser  and  Petty  States  together,  who  by  joining  forces 
in  the  Confederate  Diet  could  at  any  time  prevent  for 
their  part  a  declaration  of  war.  Secondly,  Prussia 
required  that  her  position  in  the  Confederation  should 
be  equal  to  Austria's,  which  would  imply  an  alternation 
in  the  presidency  of  the  supreme  Confederate  authority; 
for  historical  developments  had  given  both  States  an 
equal  importance  in  Europe,  and  in  the  Confedera- 
tion Prussia  counted  more  inhabitants  than  Austria. 
Thirdly,  Prussia  could  not  agree  to  an  enlargement 
of  the  functions  of  the  Confederation,  which  would 
naturally  imply  a  limitation  of  her  own  independence, 
unless  a  guaranty  were  offered  to  her  that  this  sacrifice 
would  be  for  the  interests  of  the  German  Nation  as  a 
whole  and  not  for  those  of  particular  States :  such 
a  guaranty,  however,  Prussia  could  recognize  only  in  a 
German  Parliament  chosen  directly  by  the  people,  while 
the  proposed  assembly  of  delegates  would  be  the  exact 
opposite  of  this,  a  mere  representation  of  individualistic 
tendencies. 

King  William  at  once  expressed  his  acceptance  of 
this  report ;  and  on  the  22d  of  September  he  sent  the 
same,  together  with  letters  of  similar  purport,  to  all 
the  members  of  the  Frankfort  Majority.  By  this, 
every  hope  of  an  understanding  was  cut  off. 

A  characteristic  interlude  may  here  be  mentioned. 

Lord  John  Russell,  always  well-intentioned  and 
always  convinced  of  the  value  of  his  good  intentions, 
could  not  refuse  himself  the  pleasure  of  communicating 


PRUSSIA'S   VIEW  OF  THE  RESOLUTIONS.       627 

to  the  Prussian  Government,  on  this  occasion  also,  his 
opinion  of  their  attitude.  In  a  despatch  sent  to  Berlin 
on  the  30th  of  September  he  declared  that  the  first  two 
Prussian  demands,  concerning  the  veto  and  the  alter- 
nation in  the  presidency,  were  just  and  reasonable ;  but 
he  urgently  entreated  that  the  third,  the  demand  of  a 
German  parliament  chosen  directly  by  the  people, 
might  be  given  up ;  for,  he  said,  an  electoral  law  with 
a  high  qualification  would  arouse  the  opposition  of  all 
the  Liberals,  and  if  one  with  a  low  qualification,  or  with 
no  qualification  at  all,  were  adopted,  elections  would 
follow,  which,  as  in  1848,  would  throw  everything  open 
to  Revolution. 

Bismarck's  answer  to  this  is  worthy  of  notice,  be- 
cause it  shows  already  the  train  of  ideas  according  to 
which  he  three  years  later  gave  the  stamp  to  the  future 
imperial  constitution.  "  As  to  what  concerns  a  Ger- 
man parliament,"  he  said  in  a  despatch  of  the  8th  of 
October,  "'  our  standpoint  is  based,  not  upon  a  political 
theory,  but  upon  material  Prussian  interests  which  are 
identical  with  those  of  the  majority  of  the  German 
nation.  The  interests  of  the  German  Governments  are 
not  the  same  as  ours,  but  those  of  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  German  people  are  so.  Prussia  requires 
something  to  oppose  to  the  dynastic  policy  of  the 
Governments,  and  that  something  she  can  find  only  in 
a  national  representation.  .  .  .  Even  tlie  lowest  elec- 
toral qualitication  would  offer  us  better  guaranties 
against  revolutionary  extravagances  than  many  of  the 
electoral  laws  upon  which  the  representative  bodies  of 


628      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

the  individual  States  are  now  based,  better  guaranties, 
for  instance,  than  the  present  method  of  election  in 
Prussia." 

As  is  seen,  if  this  view  were  adopted,  general  uni- 
versal suffrao-e  would  not  be  at  a  OTeat  distance. 

o  o 

In  conclusion,  Bismarck  gave  the  assurance,  that, 
according  to  Prussia's  intentions,  the  proposition  of  a 
national  representation  would  not  serve  either  unify- 
ing or  revolutionary  purposes.  Such  a  representative 
assembly  would  have  great  authorit}^  in  matters  affect- 
ing the  Confederation,  but  would  be  much  less  author- 
ized to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  any  country 
than  would  a  Government  established  according-  to  the 
Austrian  proposal.  * 

With  this  for  the  present  Earl  Russell  was  content. 
The  reports  from  St.  Petersburg  and  Paris  at  that  time 
were  much  more  favorable  to  Prussia.  Prince  Gort- 
schakoff  expressed  to  the  Prussian  ambassador  the  con- 
viction that,  considering  the  dangers  which  threatened 
from  France  and  from  revolutionary  tendencies,  all 
friends  of  order  ought  to  take  care  that  any  diffi- 
culty between  Prussia  and  Austria  might  be  avoided. 
He  accordingly  expressed  sincere  regret  at  tlie  incon- 
siderate action  of  Austria  in  the  Frankfort  Assembly 
of  Princes,  which  had  tended  to  produce,  not  harmony, 
but  discord.  Russia,  he  said,  had  spared  no  pains  to 
dispel  in  Vienna  the  illusion  that  the  Act  of  Reform  met 
with  her  approval. 

In  Paris  an  entire  change  in  the  tone  of  feeling  that 
had  prevailed  since   February  was   now  taking  place. 


VIEWS   OF  THE  FOREIGN  POWERS.  629 

As  we  have  seen,  Napoleon  had  been  in  the  beginning 
but  little  inclined  to  a  diplomatic  campaign  against 
Russia.  By  the  persuasion  of  England  and  the  ap- 
proval of  Austria  he  had  gradually  allowed  himself 
to  be  led  into  such  measures,  and  then,  when  Russia's 
friendship  had  once  been  liazarded,  he  had  taken  hold 
of  the  matter  seriously,  had  made  imperative  demands, 
and  had  wished  to  support  them,  in  case  of  necessity, 
by  force  of  arms.  England,  however,  was  ready  to 
take  part  in  the  harshest  notes,  but  would  have  nothing 
to  do  with  war ;  and  Austria,  even  in  the  notes,  refused 
to  make  more  decided  demands  than  the  six  require- 
ments, and  rejected  every  suggestion  of  war  even  more 
energetically  than  England. 

In  the  midst  of  his  vexation  at  this,  the  Emperor 
received  news  of  the  Vienna  Act  of  Reform,  which  with 
its  directory  could  not  but  seem  to  him  the  first  step 
towards  the  "  empire  of  seventy  millions,"  and  with  its 
eighth  article  a  German  guaranty  of  Venetia.  He  was 
angry  from  the  bottom  of  his  heart.  If  Rechberg,  by 
taking  part  in  the  Polish  notes,  had  expected  to  gain 
Napoleon's  approval  for  the  Frankfort  Assembly  of 
Princes,  tlie  exact  contrary  of  this  had  happened. 
Napoleon  thought  that  he  had  first  been  maliciously 
drawn  into  a  (piarrel  with  Russia,  in  order  that  llien 
that  one  of  all  tlie  forms  of  a  German  constitution 
which  was  to  him  the  most  disagreeable  might  be  easily 
established. 

He  at  once  turned  again  to  Prnssia.  '"'J'liis  nnfortu- 
nate  Polisli  (picstion,"'  said  lie  to  Count  (ioltz,  "has  not 


630      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

indeed  made  a  quarrel  between  us,  —  it  has  never  come 
to  that,  —  but  has  made  our  rehitions  somewhat  less 
close.  It  is  our  only  point  of  difference.  I  would  give 
much  if  it  could  be  got  out  of  the  way  altogether. 
Prussia  is  in  a  position  to  accomplish  fruitful  results 
for  this  object."  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  seconded  his  mas- 
ter :  "  The  Emperor's  most  anxious  wish,"  he  said  to 
the  Ambassador,  "  is  to  do  something  in  concert  with 
Prussia."  Bismarck  answered  at  once  on  the  5th  of 
September,  expressing  satisfaction  at  the  renewal  of 
friendly  relations,  and  also  readiness  to  act  as  a  mediator 
at  St.  Petersburg. 

But  before  he  could  take  such  a  step,  there  appeared 
on  the  9th  of  September  Gortschakoff's  answer  to  the 
notes  of  the  3d  and  12th  of  August,  containing  the  not 
very  courteous  announcement  that  Russia  did  not  care 
to  continue  a  profitless  negotiation.  This  naturally 
caused  new  thoughts  of  war  in  Paris  ;  since  a  Power 
like  France  could  not  let  itself  be  put  off  in  such  a  way 
as  that. 

Further  negotiations  with  London  and  Vienna  fol- 
lowed. Lord  John  Russell  made  an  extremely  bold 
speech,  declaring  to  the  world  that  Russia,  after  the 
breach  of  the  agreement  of  1815,  had  forfeited  the  sup- 
port of  the  Act  of  the  Vienna  Congress  for  her  posses- 
sion of  her  Polish  provinces.  But  Lord  John  had  no 
intention  of  contributing  more  than  these  crushing 
words  to  the  Polish  cause.  Count  Rechberg  would  not 
even  indulge  in  threatening  language,  and  redoubled 
his    ©imposition   to    any  warlike    action.     This   made  it 


FRANCE  AGAIN  DRAWS  NEAR    TO  PRUSSIA.      631 

impossible  for  the  French  Emperor  to  punish  Russia 
for  the  note  of  the  9th  of  September.  He  expressed 
great  indignation  at  Austria's  poHcy,  and  showed 
increased  friendliness  toward  Prussia.  "  In  the  Polish 
matter,"  he  said  to  Count  Goltz,  "  you  were  among  my 
opponents  :  but  yowy  conduct  was  plain  and  open :  with 
you  one  always  knows  what  to  expect."  He  had 
already  considered  how  he  would  make  his  untrust- 
worthy ally  feel  the  weight  of  his  dissatisfaction. 

Meanwhile  Count  Rechberg  was  endeavoring  to 
gather  some  fruit,  whether  great  or  small,  from  the 
Frankfort  Assembly  of  Princes.  When  Herr  von 
Werther  communicated  to  him  the  Prussian  documents 
of  the  15th  and  22d  of  September,  the  Count  cried 
with  great  indignation :  "  Prussia  herself  can  hardly 
expect  that  such  demands  will  be  fulfilled.  She  claims 
for  Austria  and  for  herself  alike  the  right  of  objecting 
to  a  declaration  of  war  on  the  part  of  the  Confedera- 
tion ;  but  this  is  by  no  means  the  same  thing  for  the 
two  Courts :  Austria  may  very  easily  come  to  require 
the  help  of  the  Confederation  on  account  of  Venetia  or 
Hungary,  Prussia  is  not  likely  to  need  such  assistance. 
The  alternation  in  the  presidency  is  contrary  to  the  old 
compacts  ;  Austria  cannot  possibly  give  up  an  historical 
claim  of  her  Emperor  in  point  of  honor.  Finally,  a 
parliament  chosen  In'  the  people  means  notliing  more 
nor  less  than  revolution,  mediatization  of  tlie  I'riiiccs, 
and  suppression  of  the  individual  States.  What  it  all 
amounts  to  is,  that  Prussia,  as  usual,  is  oj)posing  every 
fruitful  develoi)ment  of  the  Confederation." 


632      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

In  his  excitement  and  anger  the  Count  did  not  even 
wait  for  the  orders  of  his  Sovereign,  who  was  then  at 
Ischl,  but  at  once,  on  the  26th  of  September,  proposed, 
by  a  circular  to  the  Princes  who  had  met  at  Frankfort, 
that  the  confutation — which  could  easily  be  drawn  up 
—  of  the  confused  and  involved  Prussian  statements 
should  be  sent  to  Berlin  in  the  form  of  a  common  note, 
in  which  also  a  fitting  place  might  be  found  for  the 
declaration  that  it  was  out  of  the  question  that  the 
Frankfort  resolutions  should  remain  without  practical 
results.  This  would  have  been  the  proclamation  of  a 
more  restricted  union  within  the  Confederation,  and 
hence  would  have  meant  the  abandonment  of  all  those 
principles,  relying  on  which  Prince  Schwarzenberg  had 
resisted  the  Prussian  Union,  and  the  senders  of  the 
common  note  of  1862  the  programme  of  Count  Bern- 
storff. 

But  Rechberg  found  little  soil  for  the  acceptance 
of  such  ideas  among  the  Lesser  States.  Even  at 
Frankfort  the  Bavarian  Minister,  Von  Schrenck,  had 
declared:  "We  will  have  no  confederation  without 
Austria,  but  likewise  none  without  Prussia."  This  was 
the  guiding  thought  in  the  entire  policy  of  the  Lesser 
States  at  that  time :  to  consider  the  presence  of  both 
the  Great  Powers  in  the  Confederation  as  the  best,  if 
not  the  only,  guaranty  of  their  own  independence  and 
power,  to  find  in  the  one  an  assurance  against  the  ambi- 
tion of  the  other,  and  finally  to  make  the  decision  in 
any  difference  between  the  two  depend  upon  their 
own  castinof  vote. 


AUSTRIA   AND   THE  LESSER   STATES.  633 

The  Lesser  States  were  now,  therefore,  quite  as  little 
disposed  to  listen  to  a  more  restricted  alliance  with 
Austria  as  they  had  been  formerly  to  a  union  with 
Prussia.  "  That  means  the  destruction  of  the  German 
Confederation,"  said  Schrenck.  And  Beust  expressed 
the  opinion,  that,  in  the  uncertain  state  of  European 
affairs,  it  was  of  the  greatest  importance  not  to  push 
the  quarrel  with  Prussia  to  extremities,  but  to  bring 
about  a  good  understanding  between  Vienna  and  Berlin. 
With  this  view,  these  States  would  not  agree  to  the 
harsh  method  of  a  common  note ;  so  that  some  weeks 
were  spent  in  considering  in  what  way  the  confutation 
of  the  Prussian  document  was  to  find  expression. 
Finally,  for  this  purpose  a  conference  of  ministers  was 
convened  at  Nuremberg  on  the  23d  of  October,  and  it 
was  decided  that  Austria  should  take  upon  herself  to 
answer  the  Prussian  document  in  the  name  of  all. 

But  when  Rechberg  called  upon  his  Frankfort  friends 
now  to  carry  out  in  their  own  States  the  Confederate 
Constitution  that  had  there  been  agreed  upon,  and  at 
once  to  proceed  to  the  establishment  of  a  directory,  he  was 
met  on  all  sides  with  a  categorical  refusal.  The  over- 
throw was  complete.  In  the  hope  of  confounding  their 
opponents,  the  Austrian  Government  had  played  a  bold 
game  ;  they  had  at  lengtli  found  opponents  even  in  their 
friends,  and  now  luid  to  regret  the  double  loss. 

Recliberg  returned  to  Vienna  with  the  feeling  that  if 
an  accord  with  Prussia  were  possible,  how  nmeh  more 
fruitful  it  would  be  than  dealing  witli  all  those  insigniti- 
cant  and  wilful  potentates  !     ij^it  only  were  possible  ! 


634      ASSEMBLY  OF  PRINCES  AT  FRANKFORT. 

The  trial  was  near  at  hand.  But  here  we  will  pause 
in  the  course  of  our  narrative.  We  have  arrived  at  the 
point  at  which  the  contest  in  regard  to  Schleswig- 
Holstein  began  to  be  decisive  for  the  future  of  Ger- 
many. For  the  understanding  of  the  questions  that 
arise  in  this  connection,  it  is  indispensable  to  take  a 
comprehensive  glance  at  the  origin  of  the  German- 
Danish  complication  and  at  the  course  it  had  taken  up 
to  this  time. 


^0hM^/h'l 


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